


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
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
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BOOK THE SEVENTH.

MACEDONIA AND GREECE.

FROM OL. CIV. 3 (B. C. 362) TO OL. CX. 4 (B. C. 337).

THE HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

THE KINGDOMS OF THE NORTH.

IN a higher degree than the other nations of ancient and of modern times, the Hellenes possess an independent history. Their civilization is based on their connexion with the East; but that which thence accrued to them they independently developed, and thoroughly converted into property of their own. Foreign nations at various times interfered in the relations between the Hellenic states; but these interventions actually brought about the reverse of that which they had been intended to accomplish. The Persian Wars only served to raise the Hellenes to a full consciousness of their national resources; and so far from the later proceedings on the part of Persia which affected Greece having had their origin in Persia itself, it was rather the Hellenic states which transferred to the Great King an influence such as he would never have been capable of acquiring by himself, and such as he was also unable to turn to account. For, notwithstanding the disruption of the Hellenic nation, it was beyond his power to recover the dominion over the sea, upon which the relations between Persia and Greece entirely hinged. Thus the development of the Hellenic states had hitherto been of a thoroughly independent character. Good and evil for-

The countries
in the North
of Greece.

tune had been the results of internal causes, and the history of Greece had never been controlled by foreign powers.

An entirely different phase necessarily began, when in the North of the Greek mainland forces of population came into motion, which had hitherto slumbered; when from the same mountains, whence a great part of the Hellenic nation had formerly issued, tribes came forth anew, to form states and to assert an influence upon their Southern neighbors. They were by birth infinitely better entitled to rank as the equals of the Hellenes, than were the Persians and Medes; and it was far easier for them to establish their claims as valid, inasmuch as no seas separated them from the Greek states. By sea, it was only a state already developed, and in command of a coast-line and of pecuniary resources, which could enter the lists with the Hellenes. By land, the greatest successes might be achieved even by ruder forces of population.

The first attempts to make the history of the Southern states dependent upon the North originated in Thessaly. No country indeed was by nature better adapted for the purpose. For Thessaly was the nearest in situation, and the wealthiest in resources; it formed the natural complement to the peninsular countries in the South. In Thessaly there dwelt the largest body of Hellenic population settled outside Hellas (in the more limited sense of the term); and according to ancient tradition Mount Olympus was the true boundary of a system of Hellenic states. The condition of political affairs was however too unfavorable for success to have attended the attempt to transfer the centre of gravity of Hellenic history to Thessaly. The endeavors in this direction proceeded from families, whose power was one founded by force, and was therefore insecure in its bases; these endeavors were identified with individual men, and were wrecked by the death of Iason (vol. iv. p. 472) and by the resistance of

Thebes, which frustrated for ever the schemes of a Thes-salian hegemony, without being able to carry out its own designs.

It was now the turn of the countries beyond Mount Olympus, which connect the southern peninsulas with the broad masses of territory forming the mainland of Eastern Europe,—of the alpine countries of Northern Greece, with their lofty ranges and large river-valleys, viz., Macedonia and Thrace. These regions had, with the exception of the tracts along the coasts, remained strange and unknown to the Hellenes; for centuries they had been regarded as a land of barbarians, destined only to be made use of by the Hellenes through the agency of the colonies settled on the coasts, and to be turned to account by them for the purposes of their trade. And indeed Mount Olympus, together with the Cambunian range, marks a very definite division. On the further side a new world commences; and this not only in the external formation of the land, but also in climate and in the whole life of nature. Thessaly itself already shows the transition towards the Northern regions, which in this part of Europe begins much sooner than in France or in Italy. On the further side of Mount Olympus the olive-tree and the flora of the South prosper only in specially favored localities, notably in the sunny plains by the sea-shore, stretching like a narrow rim round Macedonia and Thrace. In the interior a climate like that of Central Europe prevails, which was unfamiliar and full of mysterious discomfort to a Greek, and which with regard to dress and food, modes of dwelling and social intercourse, likewise prescribed to human life conditions quite different from those to which the Greeks were accustomed.

But though such differences beyond a doubt deeply affect national civilization, yet they are unable permanently to determine the progress of political relations. The very charms which a Southerner misses in a foreign

climate, tempt the Northerner to advance southwards, so soon as the weakness of the neighboring tribes opens to him a prospect of success; nor was Mount Olympus in any respect such a boundary as could have prevented the countries and populations beyond from claiming their share in Greek history. The peninsular countries of Greece are after all nothing but the offshoots of the Northern mountain-system; and the inhabitants of the countries on the hither and on the further side of Mount Olympus were, not less than those countries themselves, naturally connected together. An entirely new epoch therefore necessarily commenced, so soon as this connexion was asserted, so soon as the Hellenes ceased to lead in their states a life untouched from the direction of the North, and left entirely to itself. Accordingly, already those men who narrated the history of the Hellenes in the times of their absolute independence, Herodotus and Thucydides alike, directed glances of special attention to the North, and carefully watched the earliest beginnings of the formation of states observable there.

Let us now more closely survey the countries of the North, starting from the same point, which we previously designated as the starting-point of the formation of the Southern land (vol. i. p. 10).

The fortieth degree of latitude is the boundary-line of Hellas proper. Here the mountains are, out of the ramification dividing off the southern countries, drawn together in a firm knot, viz. Mount Lacmon. From this point the chain of mountains which severs Thessaly from Epirus continues in the same direction through two degrees of latitude. This is Mount Pindus, the lofty ridge of the regions between Macedonia and Illyria, extending from south to north as far as the point where it inserts itself in the Northern mountain-systems leading horizontally across from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. But

here, instead of any immediate junction taking place, a broad gap remains between the Dalmatian chain of Alps, running parallel to the Adriatic Gulf, and the Balkan. Into this gap the northern end of the extremity of the Pindus-chain, called at the present day the Tschardagh, inserts itself like a mighty promontory: it forms the final point of the mountains of the Greek peninsulas, the Scardus of the ancients.

After the Tschardagh there begin, in the forty-second degree of latitude, the heights stretching to the east, and separating the waters of the Danube from the rivers of the Archipelago. These form the rear-wall of the Thracian mainland, which are designated by the collective name of the Balkan or Hæmus. They are, however, no unbroken chain, but a series of knots of mountains (Rilostock and Perin), from which two main ranges issue separately,—a northern range, the Hæmus proper, and another, which runs down in a south-easterly direction, and gives to the coast-land of Thrace the character of a highland district, viz. Rhodope.

The two series of mountains which meet in a right angle at the Tschardagh, viz. Pindus and Hæmus, form the framework of the great river-territories which are distinctive of the North of the Greek world: two in the west, the valleys of the Haliacmon and the Axios, and two in the east, those of the Nestus and the Hebrus, with the valley of the Strymon in the centre.

These river-districts possess this feature in common: that they are by the lofty mountain-ranges cut off from the regions along the Adriatic, as well as from the low-lying districts of the Danube; while on the other hand the course of their rivers causes one and all of these countries to depend exclusively upon the Ægean, and summons them to participation in its affairs. At the same time, however, the surrounding mountain-ranges are broken through at certain points; whereby it becomes to

such a degree easier to pass to the districts beyond, (so especially from the sources of the Axios to the valley of the Morava, and again from the Hebrus to the Iscer or Osciis,) that it naturally suggested itself to the peoples dwelling in the valleys of those rivers also to advance further to the north. In other words, upon their states was imposed the mission of establishing a connexion between the lands of the Danube and the regions on the coasts of the Archipelago.

As to the internal configuration of the countries which we call Macedonia and Thrace, the two are by no means separated in any such way as that of a territory, coherent in itself and confined within natural boundaries, being formed in common by the basins of the two western, and another such by those of the two or three eastern, rivers. The valley of the Strymon in particular may be equally well reckoned as belonging to the eastern and as belonging to the western half. For this reason, too, no fixed frontier between the states ever existed here; but every imperial dominion developed in these regions endeavored to spread to the east or to the west, from the territory of one river to that of the next.

The most important part of the eastern country is the basin of the river Maritza, the ancient Hebrus. Its sources are at Mount Rilostock, called Scombrus by Aristotle; whence it flows first in a line parallel to that of the Balkan, and then after a sharp turn (at Adrianople) along the base of Rhodope, in a southerly direction, and into the sea.

The Thracian empire. When King Darius on his Scythian expedition passed through Thrace, he found settled in the valley of the Hebrus the Odrysæ, who at that time constituted only one of the many tribes dwelling as neighbors in the land. After the Persian Wars the chieftain of the Odrysæ, Teres, succeeded in increasing their power, and in placing his tribe at the head of the

whole population. He left to his son Sitalces a realm of considerable extent, which had its centre in the fertile lowland district of Adrianople, while in the north it reached as far as the Danube, and in the east as the Black Sea, and subjected to itself the populations of the mountain-ranges around. He passed, to the west, beyond the Strymon, and first opened paths through the jungle of the Cercine-chain, in order to incorporate in his kingdom the Pæoniâns in the valley of the Axios.

This was the first national kingdom in the North of the Archipelago,—a kingdom which comprehended an abundance of vigorous population. For the Thracian people was accounted the most numerous and the most powerful of all the nations in the regions of the Mediterranean; and its obstinate valor was most severely felt by the Athenians in the course of their settlements.

If the kingdom was to have a future, it was necessary for it to acquire influence on the shores of the Ægean. The first step towards this end was taken by the formation of family-connexions with the nearest Greek city of some importance, viz. Abdera (vol. ii. p. 147), whereby the introduction of the foreign princely dynasty into the system of relations subsisting between the Greek states was prepared. The brother-in-law of Sitalces, Nym-
phodorus (vol. iii. p. 64), acted as mediator Thrace and
Athens. with Athens, where it was early recognized what importance a Thracian empire possessed for the Attic maritime state, and what dangers, as well as what advantages, might arise from such an empire for the Athenians in the war then breaking out with Sparta. Nothing was therefore left undone, by way of honoring the royal house in the North; advantage was taken of the ancient popular legends about Tereus and Procne, in order to represent the family of Teres as of kin with the Athenians; the alliance with Sitalces was regarded as the most valuable of all the foreign connexions of Athens; and in his *Acharnians*

Aristophanes makes the envoys report, how Sitalces adored the city of the Athenians like a tender lover, and wrote her name upon every wall, while his son Sadocus, the honorary burgess of Athens, longed for naught else more deeply than to take part in the festive banquets of his new home.

But the alliance concluded in the year 431 was also to acquire a political significance. A great military expedition was jointly devised. From the north the Odrysæ, from the south the Athenians,—thus they intended in common to overthrow the guileful hostility of Perdiccas, who had injured both the one and the other, as well as the defiant obstinacy of the Potidæans and of the Chalcidians, which gave so much trouble to the Athenians; and who could have withstood such a power as this?

At the head of 150,000 men Sitalces advanced out of the valley of the Hebrus. It was a host of nations, such as had not been seen since the days of Xerxes. With fear and trembling the power of the North was for the first time recognized; all the neighboring peoples, all Thessaly, were full of apprehensions for their liberty; and the states which had taken the side against Athens already saw themselves crushed by a double overwhelming force (vol. iii. p. 103).

But grandly as the undertaking had begun, it ended as a failure after a campaign of thirty days. The Athenians never made their appearance, either from negligence, or because they were themselves visited by a fear of the superior strength of their ally and of the consequences of his intervention in Greek affairs. In Thrace a change likewise ensued. Sadocus must have died young. For when Sitalces fell in 424, fighting against the Triballi, his successor was his nephew Seuthes, who had already formerly played a part hostile to Athens. Seuthes allowed himself to be gained over by Perdiccas, who doubtless contrived to convince the young king, how the princes of

the North could not pursue a more absurd policy than that of supporting, from motives of a foolish Philhellenism, Athens, the most dangerous opponent of the extension of their own power.

Under Seuthes Thrace stood at the height ^{The kingdom of} of its prosperity. It formed a connected empire from Abdera to the Danube, from Byzantium to the Strymon. It was an inland country, strong in its natural seclusion, and yet with a coast-line skirting three seas; destined by its situation to control the passages leading across into Asia, as well as the communications between St. Pontus and the Archipelago. The central body of the forces of the empire was composed of the Thracians from the Hebrus, between Hæmus and Rhodope. To these were joined the Getæ, who dwelt beyond the Hæmus as far as the Danube, mounted archers like their neighbors the Scythians; and also the Thracians of Rhodope and of the mountains in the vicinity, armed with sabres. Finally, the fourth division of the army was formed by the Pæonians. The land abounded in resources, in corn and flocks and herds, in gold and silver. A yearly tribute of 400 talents of silver flowed into the treasury, besides an equal sum in the shape of gifts, consisting of stuffs for clothing, domestic implements, &c. Gifts of homage of this description were proffered not to the king alone, but also to his governors in the several provinces, and to the great officers of state.

No such state had as yet existed in the whole circuit of the Ægean. A commanding importance therefore seemed to be awaiting Thrace. Already even Greek towns were reckoned among her tributary subjects. Their numbers could not but increase; and to internal prosperity and flourishing manufactures would inevitably be added maritime trade and naval dominion. How would it, under such circumstances, be possible for the Athenians to maintain their hold over their colonies, already so vacillating? Accordingly the Spartans already in the days of Sitalces

attempted to provoke a hostile feeling on the part of the Thracian power against Athens (vol. iii. p. 75). The time seemed to have arrived, when the settlement of the Greek conflicts lay in the hands of the Thracian kings.

But their kingdom failed to endure. After Seuthes it broke up into several principalities; and this averted from Athens the danger menacing her. The land of the Thracians was not naturally adapted for a settled unity. The mountain-ranges traversing it acted as inducements to the tribes which had been united by so great exertions, to pursue once more their own separate courses; and indeed the cohesion between them had never been of any but a loose kind.*

The mountains and the rivers of Macedonia.

Different, and more favorable, conditions existed in Macedonia. Here too, indeed, the variety in the configuration of the ground was so great, as in a high degree to impede the union of the whole. For on the eastern side of the Pindus is to be found neither an extensive formation of table-land nor a simple incline; but from the central chain stretches forth a variety of branches, which subdivide the country by forming a series of basins of valleys. These valleys, surrounded in a circular form by heights, lie above and beside one another, and possess a great significance for the history of the country.

First comes the upper valley of the Vistritz (valley of the Haliaemon), between Pindus and a parallel line of mountains, running so near to the Cambrunian range, that it is only through a narrow gorge that the Haliaemon winds out of the circular valley. This valley was the ancient district of Elimeia; and further up, into the corner of the mountain-range, where out of a lake rises the rocky peninsula of Castorea, stretches the ancient Orestis. But,

* The people of the Thracians: Herod. vii. 110; their empire: Thuc. ii. 29 and 95, seq. (against the connexion, which in his day there was a fondness for asserting at Athens, between the Parnassian and the Odrysian Thracians, between Teres and Tereus).

secluded and remote as the valley of the Haliacmon seems, it is yet possessed of very important communications. For to the north-west of Castorea Mount Pindus is broken through by a deep rift in a horizontal direction; and through this a river (Devöl), of which the sources lie on the eastern side of the range, flows out to empty itself into the Adriatic. Here, then, is a natural mountain gate, opening a way to Albania, the solitary gap in the otherwise uninterrupted course of the central chain; while on the other side an easy transit offers itself by means of the Cambunian hills from the Haliacmon to the Thessalian valley of the Penëus.

Towards the east, another long valley lies between that of the Haliacmon and Mount Bermius, which forms the border-line towards the plain of the coast. This is the basin of Ostrovo, the district of the Eordæi, where from lakes and rivulets are gathered the waters which empty into the sea under the name of the river Lydias.

To the north of Eordæa and Orestis lies a third hollow valley, that of the sources of the river Erigon, which is traversed by the forty-first degree of latitude. This valley, the modern basin of Bitolia, leans upon the principal line of the northern Pindus-chain, across which an easy intercourse takes place with the Albanian districts. Here were in antiquity the seats of the Lyncestæ and, further to the north, those of the Pelagones. Finally, there is the Vardar-valley, the deep valley watered by the Axios (Paraxia), the northernmost of the entire system of mountains, bounded by lofty alpine chains, and fed by numerous streams having their sources here, of which the most distant lie near to the Morava, which empties itself into the Danube below Belgrade.

All these are basins of a circular shape, the rocky belts around which are broken only at a single point,—originally valleys of the sea, as is indicated by the still existing in-

land lakes; in other words, generally mere repetitions of the Thessalian plain, with which, for the traveller coming from the south, commences the series of the hollow valleys on the east side of the Pindus. But while Thessaly is by the river common to the whole country connected so as to form a natural unity, and opens at two places towards the sea, in Macedonia we have a highland region, remote from the sea, and only with difficulty accessible. And this highland region is again variously subdivided in itself; and the divisions between the several hollow valleys are in part more considerable than the external frontier-line of the entire land; for the parallel chains of the Pindus in part overtop the height of the principal chain, and it is easier to proceed from Macedonia to Thessaly, to Illyria, and to the Danube, than from one Macedonian valley into the other. Under these circumstances very serious obstacles lay in the path of a political union of the country; and the danger was greater in Macedonia than in Thrace, that the permanent consolidation of a single kingdom would never be effected.

Nature, however, provided in a very remarkable way for indicating most plainly to the inhabitants of the numerous divisions of the highland country the advantages of union amongst themselves and with the coast-land. This she effected by means of the course of the rivers. For out of the mountainous recesses of Orestis winds forth the Haliaemon, and out of Eordæa the Lydias; the Erigon forces his way into the valley of the Axios; and all these rivers, whatever the respective remoteness of their sources, after they have escaped from their mountain hollow, take their course towards the same sea-coast, where in one and the same bay they have what is equivalent to a common mouth. While, therefore, the Thracian rivers flow in a number of distant parallel valleys, the Macedonian become a single river, and serve to connect highlands and coast-plain, and at the same time to point out to the highland

tribes the direction, to which it behooves them to apply their attention and resources.

No greater natural difference can be imagined between two halves of a land, than that between the open plain along the coast and ^{The Macedonian coast-land.} the highlands, shut off like a citadel. Accordingly, the coast-land possessed a history of its own. The highlanders only were called Macedonians; while very different tribes dwelt below, on the shores of the beautiful bay, stretching between the wooded base of Mount Olympus and the opposite crags of the Chalcidian promontories deep into the land as far as the corner, where are the sources of the hot springs which gave its name to the town of Therma (afterwards Thessalonica). Therma was the ancient capital of Emathia, where the Bottiæans were settled in the delta formed by the Macedonian rivers. The Bottiæans were not aboriginal inhabitants. They derived their origin from Crete, whence they had brought their worship of Apollo; and they were conscious of ancient relations of kinship with remote coast-districts, in particular with Attica. Further to the south dwelt the Pierians, the servants of the Muses and of Dionysus, a tribe which by means of its early civilization exercised a very important influence in art and religious worship upon the whole nation of the Hellenes.

Among these coast-tribes, which had settled in pre-historic times on the Macedonian Gulf, afterwards came to dwell the colonist-citizens of Greek mercantile towns, notably the merchants from Eubœa (vol. i. p. 455, seq.). They attached themselves in a peaceable way to the earlier population; between the Pierians and the Bottiæans arose Methone, the colony of Eretria; and the entire coast was drawn into the commercial traffic opened by the Eubœans on the northern coast of the Archipelago (Ol. xii., B. C. 730, *circ.*)

While Emathia, naturally belonging to Hellas by the

The people
of the
Macedones.

proximity of the sea as well as by climate and vegetation, was also thoroughly pervaded by Hellenic culture, Upper Macedonia lay completely in the obscurity of autochthonous conditions of life; indeed, it became more and more estranged from the Hellenic nation. For originally it was not a foreign country. Distant reminiscences in the Hellenic nation mounted back to an age, when a close connexion had existed between it and the Macedonians. Of the Dorians Herodotus attests that they had once themselves been Macedonians,—and, indeed, it occasionally happens that individual tribes, belonging to a larger popular whole, issue forth from it and for a time again fall back among it. For this reason too the ancestor of the Macedonian people was reckoned among the sons of Pelagus; he was called a son of Lycaon, the forefather of the Pelasgian Arcadians; and if the language of the Macedonians was unintelligible to the Greeks, the same was likewise the case with regard to the populations on the Achelous, which assuredly no one will desire to exclude from the stock of the Greek nation (vol. iii. p. 146). The Hellenes of the classical period were extremely sensitive against anything strange in language or manners, and loved to draw a narrow circle marking themselves off from all outside it, so that they regarded even populations akin to themselves in race as foreigners and barbarians, if their feeling towards them was one of unfamiliarity. But inasmuch as this unfamiliarity is based on differences of culture, the consciousness of it cannot be considered decisive as to the original relationship of the peoples in question.

With reference to the meagre remnants of the Macedonian tongue, it is to be remarked that they reveal Greek roots, and that in them are found forms of the Æolic dialect, and also such words as belong to the ancient common property of Greeks and Italicans. In the manners of the Macedonians there are likewise several points cor-

responding to the most ancient usages of the Greeks ; so *e.g.* the custom of sitting at table. Finally, in their public life also much of an ancient Greek type was preserved, above all the kingship, which in the civic life of the Greeks had generally been extinguished at so early a date (vol. i. p. 264). As in the Heroic age, so with the Macedonians, the king was supreme judge, military commander-in-chief, and high-priest ; but he was no master over the people according to the Oriental fashion, no despot, before whom all other rights vanish. Rather, even as towards the king the people is conscious of its liberty and of its just claims ; the royal authority is limited by legal usage ; and among the Macedonians, as among the Greeks, a decided aversion prevails from unmeasured and absolute power placed in the hands of a single individual. By the side of the king stand noble families, the members of which form an association on terms of more intimate daily intercourse with him, accustomed to accompany him on expeditions of war, and to share with him the dangers of the conflict and the honors of the victory. Such a war-nobility, corresponding to that which the Homeric poems bring before our eyes in the kings' *comitatus*, maintained itself in the highlands of Macedonia, because here there existed no life in towns, which levels class-distinctions and creates a new class in the burghers. The nationality of the Macedonians, akin by descent as it was to the Greek race, yet remained not free from admixtures, which disturbed the original agreement between the two, and changed the character of the Macedonian people. This foreign element was above all formed by the Illyrians, the body of whose population <sup>Macedo-
nians and
Illyrians.</sup> branched out from the north-west far into the interior, and extended through the above-mentioned passes of Mount Pindus to the eastern slope,—a savage people, prone to a life of brigandage, who offered up children as sacrifices before battle, and among whom the

custom of tattooing the body obtained. In proportion as the nobler and more gifted branches of the nation, such as the Dorians, had separated themselves from the Macedonians, it became difficult for those who had remained behind in the mountains to withstand the inroads of the Western barbarians. Macedonian and Illyrian became at many points confounded; the fashion of dress and the way of clipping the hair, language and manners, were assimilated; so that gradually the population came in a certain sense to be of the same kind throughout the whole of the broad mainland from the Sound of Corcyra to Thrace, the original points of contrast between Macedonians and Illyrians losing themselves. In this way Macedonians and Greeks became estranged from one another; and the more fully that Greek civilization developed itself in the South, the more its inhabitants became accustomed to regard those who were originally members of the same race as themselves in the light of a fundamentally different race of men, and to despise them as such. They were looked upon as beings incapable of leading a political life, and as therefore destined by nature, like the other barbarians, to furnish slaves to the Hellenes. Nay, not even good slaves, so the Athenians thought, were obtainable from Macedonia.*

Thus highlands and coast-districts, Macedonia and Emathia, lay beside one another like two utterly different countries. From the narrow rim of land along the coast

* The system of the Macedonian hollow valleys is fully explained by Grisebach, *Reise in Rumetien*. Μακετα, highlands; Μακεδόνες, highlanders (or men of high growth? cf. G. Curtius, *Griech. Etymol.* i. 148).—Βοττιαῖοι, connected with Crete according to Aristotle, Plutarch. *Thes.* 15, and Strabo. Ancient worship of Apollo in Ἰχναί, &c.: *Rhein. Mus.* xvii. 742. The religious worships of Pieria: Hes. *Theogon.* 53; Müller, *Orch.* 381.—Τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν γένος . . . οἴκεε ἐν Πίνδῳ Μακεδνὸν καλεόμενον, Herod. i. 56. Δωρικόν τε καὶ Μακεδνὸν ἔθνος, viii. 43.—Macedonian kingly government, οὐ βίῃ ἀλλὰ νόμῳ, Callisth. ap. Arrian. iv. 11. Ἑταῖροι: Elian, *Ver. Hist.* xiii. 4; Theopomp. ap. Athen. 167.—Ἰαλύριοι κατάστικτοι, Strabo, 315; κακόβιοι, Theopomp. ap. Athen. 443. First in Herod. v. 61; ix. 43.—Ὀλεθρὸς Μακεδῶν, ὅθεν οὐδ' ἀνδράποδον σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον πρίασθαι, Dem. ix. 31.

it was impossible that a conquest and Hellenization of the highlands should proceed; a history common to the whole land was therefore not to be realized, unless among the Macedonian tribes were called forth a higher life, which should make the development of a state-growth possible. But this could not take place from within; there were needed external influences, through which the elements in the population akin to the Greeks could once more assert themselves. It was necessary that Hellenes should come to the North, in order there to give the impulse to political developments,

Such influences may have been exerted from various sides, although no information has ^{Greek im-} migration. been preserved on the subject. The earliest tradition points in the direction of the Western Sea.

The coasts of Illyria were already in the most ancient times visited by foreign mariners. Illyrius was the name given to a son of Cadmus; and just as the sea washing the shores of Illyria and Epirus from the earliest ages bore the name of the Ionian, so Old-Ionian settlements were also known to have existed on the coasts.* Next, the Corinthians took in hand the colonization of these regions (vol. i. p. 460; vol. iii. p. 5), and with unwearying industry also extended their mercantile connexions into the interior. This explains the circumstance, that we meet with the same Corinthian noble house, which represented Hellenic culture in the widest variety of Greek and Italian regions, also in the Macedono-Illyrian highlands (vol. i. p. 293). The Bacchiadæ had established the most intimate connexions with the Macedonian chieftains; and in particular the chieftains belonging to the tribe of the Lyncestæ gloried in their relationship to the Corinthian Heraclidæ. The Lyncestæ were settled on the banks of the Erigon, far away in the interior, at an equal distance from

* Ἰόνιος πόντος, Pind. *Nem.* iv. 54.

either sea; but it is precisely in this locality that the mountain-portal spoken of above is open to the west (p. 17); and the valley of the Apsus, which flows into the sea between the two Corinthian colonies of Epidamnus and Apollonia, here leads up into the country containing the sources of the Erigon and the habitations of the Lyncestæ.*

The
Temenidæ.

It would seem as if the same paths, which were opened by the Corinthians, had been likewise followed by the Heraclidæ of Argos; for Herodotus had heard that the ancestors of the Macedonian kings had been first settled in Illyria, whence they had crossed over into Macedonia.† The arrival of this family first gave to the country an impulse towards political union, which native elements would never have sufficed to accomplish. Macedonia is, therefore, essentially a dynastic state, and the history of the Macedonian kingdom is the history of its royal race.

The members of this royal house called themselves Temenidæ; *i. e.* they venerated as their original ancestor the same Temenus, who was accounted the founder of the Heraclide dynasty in Peloponnesian Argos (vol. i. p. 177). Now, we remember the disturbances at Argos during the regal period, the quarrel between the Heraclidæ and the Dorian soldiery, and the flight of a King Phidon to Tegea (vol. i. p. 272). It is therefore highly credible, that during these troubles individual members of the royal house emigrated, in order to seek a more favorable theatre for their activity, than was offered by the cribbed and confused affairs of their home; and tradition points precisely to the brother of this Phidon as the man who came to Macedonia from the shores of Peloponnesus. The name of *Caranus*, given to the immigrant, indicates the royal position which the Temenidæ contrived to obtain in their new home. Here the events of the Heroic age repeated them-

* Lyncestæ under Bacchiadæ: Strabo, 326.

† Temenidæ in Illyria: Herod. viii. 137.

selves. For as of old the city-founding families had come to Bœotia and Argos, so it was now Argive princes who came into the North, and whose intellectual superiority of mind enabled them to constitute themselves the centre of the highland populations.

That the Peloponnesians took the paths opened by Corinth, the chief commercial city of the peninsula, is in itself very probable, and is further confirmed by the circumstance, that the first Macedonian settlement of Temenidæ was Orestis, the district, already mentioned, situate around the sources of the Haliaemon, in the neighborhood of Illyria, and immediately to the south of the district of Lyncestæ. The chief place of Orestis was Argos, from which the Macedonian Temenidæ were named the Argeadæ.

Wherever Hellenes prevail, their tendency is to push on towards the sea. The Argeadæ, ^{Advance of the Argeadæ.} too, were unable long to remain content with the mountainous recess of Orestis; no sooner had they acquired power among the chieftains of the surrounding districts, than they advanced in the direction of the coast; and by these movements the two previously separated halves of the country were brought into connexion. The rivers Lydias and Haliaemon, the natural connecting veins, became the guides of the Temenidæ; and the first momentous act of their policy was the choice of a capital, belonging equally to the interior and the sea-coast. This was Edessa or Ægæ, a place of primitive antiquity, according to a Phrygian legend the ^{Foundation of Ægæ.} site of the gardens of Midas, at the northern extremity of Mount Bermius, where the Lydias comes forth from the mountains.

In all Macedonia there is no more excellent situation. As the traveller coming from Salonika ascends the gradually narrowing plain, his attention is already from afar enchained by the glittering silver streak, which reaches vertically down into the valley from the rim of the

mountain-side nearest to the front. It announces the waterfalls of Vódena, which lies on the site of ancient Ægæ, on a well-wooded declivity turned straight to the east, while in the background rises in solemn grandeur the lofty mountain range. The waterfalls, which at this day mark out the place and give to it a striking resemblance to Tibur, were not in existence in ancient times. Only gradually, by means of a progressive formation of tofa, the waters have contrived to stop up the passages in the rocks, through which they formerly found a subterraneous outlet. But at all times Ægæ must have been a spot of exceeding beauty and salubrity, the portal of the highlands and the dominant castle of the plain in the rear of which it lies, like Mycenæ or Ilium. The view from the castle extends over the gulf to the hills of the Chalcidice, and at its feet unite all the main rivers of the country.

Ægæ was the natural capital of the land. With its foundation the history of Macedonia had its beginning; Ægæ is the germ out of which the Macedonian empire grew; and for this reason mythology already ascribed its foundation to the Caranus, and spoke of him as having been conducted to the spot by a divine sign, as Cadmus was to Thebes.*

We have here a remarkable recurrence of processes belonging to the earliest history of Greece. Once more we see mountainous tribes of the North under the command

* Two forms of the regal myth, viz. the Caranus-myth in Theopompus, the Perdiccas-myth in Herodotus: Weissenborn, *Hellen.* lii. 4; Gutschmid, *Maced. Anagraphe* in *Symb. Philol.* (Bonn), 118. The ancestor of this royal house is a brother of Phidon, the seventh Temenide (*quære*, the one who fled to Argos? vol. i. p. 254). An attempt is made to establish a connexion between the Argæadæ and the history of Argos by C. F. Hermann in the *Verhandl. d. Altenburg. Philologenversamml.* p. 43. The existence of a connexion between the Ἀργεῖδαι (Strabo, 329; Steph. Byz. Ἀργέου) is denied by O. Müller and O. Abel, *Gesch. Makedon. vor Philipp*, 99, with whom also agree von Gutschmid and Born, *Zur Makedon. Gesch.* p. 8. Instead of Peloponnesian Argos, the Argos in Orestis is by them said to be the original home of the Macedonian dynasty,—a view, of the justice of which I have never been able to convince myself.

of Heraclidæ advancing towards the sea, in this instance moving in an eastward, as of old they moved in a southward, direction : once more they invade countries possessing a civilization of superior antiquity, like the Peloponnesian Heraclidæ occupy more ancient cities, and, starting from well-situated points, conquer the surrounding lands. Henceforth Emathia became Macedonia proper, the land of the three rivers, the most productive of territories, possessing a fertile soil, lakes and grassy lowlands, with a shore well adapted for maritime traffic. The Temenidæ were now changed from chieftains into kings, into princes engaged upon the formation of a state, who contrived gradually by conquest and treaty, to call into life a kingdom out of a number of mountain-cantons and city-territories.

The first of these kings was Perdiccas, who about the beginning of the seventh century B. C., starting from Ægæ, conquered the low-lying country between the Lydias and the Haliacmon. The Macedonians advanced with irresistible force, a hardened people of herdsmen and hunters, superior in vigor to the peaceful inhabitants of the plain, under the leadership of scions of noble families, who never laid aside their arms.

Perdiccas I.

700 B. C.
circ.

And yet the progress of the development of the Macedonian power was very slow and frequently interrupted. After Perdiccas a whole century passed, before the Temenidæ succeeded in giving a firm permanency to their kingdom, and in executing their seaward plans. For they had to meet a constant succession of attacks from the uplands, which prevented them from devoting themselves with full energy to their favorite task. Four kings, who ruled after Perdiccas, were incessantly occupied with their hereditary enemies, the Illyrians, whose predatory incursions endangered the realm. The fifth, Amyntas (vol. ii. p. 188), was the first who again found leisure to direct his attention to the

Amyntas.

B. C. 540-499.

coast. Pieria and Bottiæa were completely subjugated; part of their inhabitants were driven out into the Chalcidice, while in their place foreign settlers, from whom profit was expected, were brought into the land. Moreover, the sagacious prince sought to take advantage of the Greek party-feuds, and in particular offered Anthemus on the Thermæan Gulf as a habitation to the fugitive Pisistratidæ. But this desire to establish a connexion with Greece displays itself far more clearly in the case of Amyntas' son Alexander, as is attested by the cognomen of the latter, *Philhellen*.

Alexander
Philhellen.
B. C. 498-454.

Alexander viewed the conflict, commenced by the Achæmenidæ with the design of sub-
jecting Europe, from the standpoint of Greek love of freedom; and in his reign proof was first given of the aversion from the empires of the East, which was one of the popular tendencies wherein Macedonians and Greeks agreed. He caused the Persians to be massacred, who demanded submission from his father (vol. ii. p. 189); and when homage had after all to be done, he was even as a Persian vassal incessantly active in promoting the cause of the Hellenes. In him the ancient family character of the Temenidæ thoroughly revived; it was his highest ambition to be acknowledged as an equal in birth by the Greek nation, and he never rested, till he was allowed as a member of that nation to take part in the Olympian games. He perceived how in the Attic state Greek life found a full realization, and regarded it as the greatest distinction, when a relation of neutral hospitality was acknowledged by the Athenians between him and themselves.*

At the same time, however, he was also used by the Persians as an instrument of their policy (vol. ii. p. 304). For king Xerxes conceived of Macedonia as the nucleus

* Legitimization of Alexander at Olympia: Herod. v. 22. At this time the pedigree was definitely settled: Gutschmid. *u. s.*

of a vassal empire, which it was his design to found in Europe; and for this reason he extended the boundaries of the country from Mount Olympus as far as the Hæmus range. Alexander availed himself of the advantages of the situation, without on that account undertaking the part which the Persians intended him and his dynasty to play; he allowed Persia to make his kingdom great, in order thereafter to maintain it in this greatness by his own strength; and the increase of the power of his house enabled him to assume a doubly decisive and firm attitude as supreme lord towards the chieftains of the land. He subjected the Thracian tribes inhabiting the metalliferous mountains to the west of the Strymon, and adapted his royal coinage to the Asiatic standard of silver, which had been introduced from Abdera into the mining district in question, impressing upon the coins the armorial bearings of the Bisaltæ, who dwelt on the Strymonic Gulf. The mines produced him a talent of silver daily. Within his kingdom he advanced civilization, by introducing Hellenic settlers; thus he gave a welcome to the Mycenæan fugitives from Argos, the ancient home of the Temenidæ (vol. ii. p. 420). He attached great weight to his name being mentioned with honor among the Hellenes; for this purpose he availed himself of the victories at the national festivals, and of his connexion with eminent men in the nation, who celebrated his achievements, as was above all done by Pindar.

But although he so eagerly wooed the favor of the Hellenes, he could not resist the force of the actual state of affairs, which necessarily brought him into a different kind of contact with the same people. For it was indispensable to round off the territory of the Macedonian state; and this rounding-off could not be accomplished without conflicts with the Hellenes. Alexander had already removed his capital to Pydna, situate south of the Haliacmon, in the domain of Pieria. Between Pydna and

the mouth of the Lydias lay Methone, an independent Greek city. Such a territorial relation was not permanently tenable; and the same was the case with regard to the Thracian coast. Between the Thermæan Gulf and the Strymon lay a dense group of Hellenic towns, all of which after the Persian Wars attached themselves to Athens, and thus formed on the borders of the Macedonian country a coherent power, which, being directed from a single centre, controlled both sea and coast. So long as Athens maintained her position on these shores, the sovereign of the land was, so to speak, a prisoner on his own coasts. Regions closely connected with one another by nature were severed into two totally distinct territories serving two different masters;—as is very perceptible from the coinage of the land; for the royal coins follow the Thracian money, while the coast-towns in the immediate vicinity in their coinage adopt the Eubæo-Attic standard.*

Alexander had introduced Macedonia into the group of the Mediterranean states, and had thus prescribed to his successors their task. It was of a twofold kind: first, to give unity, system, and stability to the state at home, and by the introduction of higher culture to enable it to claim a natural equality with the Greek states; secondly, to enlarge its power abroad against its inconvenient neighbors. In either direction the successors of Alexander had to contend against the greatest difficulties; and it was extremely natural, that, in their foreign policy above all, they, instead of pursuing their ends by straight paths, sought to wind cautiously through the difficulties besetting them, and hoped to reach the goal rather by craftily taking advantage of the situation abroad, than by

* The most ancient silver coinage of *Ægæ*, with the he-goat as armorial bearing, follows the *Æginetic* standard; the first coins impressed with the royal name are (from 480) according to the *Bisaltic* standard. The *Chalcidian* towns used the *Eubæo-Attic* standard. Brandis, *Münzwesen von V. Athen*, 207, 209, 211.

using their own strength and engaging in open warfare. This system of policy, which was characteristic of the Temenidæ, shows itself at a stage of full development in the successor of Alexander, Perdikkas. In the course of his long reign Athens and Macedonia came to know one another as irreconcilable adversaries; both parties learnt clearly to understand the points at issue, the methods of attack, the dangers and the prizes of the struggle; and it was in this period that were laid the foundations of all subsequent complications and crises.

Perdikkas II.
B. C. 454-413.

Perdikkas was not the legitimate successor. He had first to oust the heir to the throne, Alcetas; hereupon, he divided the dominion with his second brother Philip, who held the land to the east of the Axios; nor was it till after contests lasting many years that he became sole sovereign.

In the settlement of these matters the Athenians bore a part. We remember, how since the victories of Cimon (vol. ii. p. 384) they incessantly kept in view the coasts of the Thracian sea, and how Pericles was most especially active in firmly establishing the Attic power in these regions. After the Thracian peninsula had been made secure (452 B. C.), the city of Brea had been founded to the north of the Chalcidice, and after it Amphipolis, the lordly city at the mouth of the Strymon, the foundation of which was a genuine triumph of the maritime policy of Athens. Amphipolis was to be the centre of the Northern colonial domain, the advance post against the peoples of the North, a bulwark against both Thrace and Macedonia. Pericles divined what dangers must arise for Athens, were a spirit of consolidation into states to arise in those peoples. It was therefore necessary to maintain a strict watch over all their movements, and to intervene in their internal quarrels in such a fashion, that the barbarian princes should

The Northern policy
of Athens.

feel themselves dependent upon Athens, as upon the city controlling the entire region of the *Ægean*.

About the time of the foundation of Amphipolis Perdiccas was still struggling with Philip; and as the territory of the latter lay next to the districts on the Strymon, the interests of the Athenians and those of Perdiccas at that time went hand in hand. It is therefore very probable, that the Athenians helped him to gain his victories, and that his assistance was only given on conditions, which made the king to a certain degree dependent upon Athens. For the first piece of absolutely certain information which reaches us out of the reign of Perdiccas states him to have belonged to the Attic confederacy; indeed, Macedonia is repeatedly stated to have been at that time a tributary state.*

These relations changed as soon as Perdiccas had reached the immediate goal of his ambition. He now at once lay in wait for a favorable opportunity to free himself from all burdensome obligations. The ways and means he easily found; for nowhere were the weak and assailable points of the Attic coast-empire more palpable, than in the vicinity of his kingdom; and doubtless no foreign prince arrived earlier than he at the conviction, that Athens would find it impossible long to bear such enormous exertions of strength, and to sustain the artificial edifice of her maritime dominion. The Thracian coast was the earliest field of contest between Attic and Peloponnesian policy; and in no colonial district were there so much ill-will against Athens, so much popular vigor and spirit of independence, as in the Chalcidian towns.

These facts prescribed to the king his next course of action. He established secret relations with the discontented cities; and, without openly quarrelling with the Athenians, he contrived to be the cause of the greatest perils for them, by animating the spirit of resistance

* Macedonia tributary: Arr. vii. 9, 1; Demosth. vii. 12.

among the Confederates, encouraging them by promises and giving them good advice, how by holding together they ought to raise their capabilities of withstanding Athens. Perdiccas would gladly have himself continued to remain in the background; but he was forced to come forth from his hiding-place. The Athenians found out their enemy; and the secret feud became an open war. The Potidæans, the Bottiæans and the Chalcidians renounced their relations with Athens; Perdiccas admitted part of the population into his territory; the rest he instigated to make Olynthus their capital and the centre of their resistance. He openly espoused the cause of the communities in revolt, and was together with them made war upon by Athens. The Athenians now supported those who opposed the king in his own country. Attacked at home and from the coast, and menaced in the east by the Thracian empire, the power of which was continuously on the increase, Perdiccas found himself in a situation of the utmost difficulty. Therma was captured, and Pydna besieged. Perdiccas saw himself incapable of meeting these dangers by force of arms.

But, never at a loss for a course to pursue, he applied to his neighbor Sitacles; by means of high promises he obtained the mediation of the influential prince; and, to outward appearance entirely changing his policy, and unhesitatingly abandoning the Chalcidians, he together with Sitacles entered the Athenian Confederation, and received back his port of Therma. The Athenians were hereupon able to restore their shaken power; they overcame the recalcitrant city of Potidæa, and sought by a sagacious system of policy to secure the fidelity of the towns on the Macedonian coast which had remained true to them. Thus, *e. g.*, the Methonæans were granted quite extraordinary privileges (Ol. lxxxvii. 4; B. C. 429). They were freed from all payment of tribute, with the exception of

The crisis
of Perdiccas'
reign.

Ol. lxxxvi. 4
(B. C. 432).

the temple-tithes, and accorded a distinctly privileged position among the Confederates.*

In this combination of severity and generosity we are doubtless justified in recognizing the sagacious spirit of the Periclean policy. Soon a change ensued. Perdikkas, who liked nothing better than carrying on war while seeming to keep peace, supported the Corinthians in Acarnania (vol. iii. p. 103), and at the same time freed himself from the obligations which he had undertaken towards Sitalecs. Hereby he embittered his two most powerful neighbors; and they agreed to inflict upon the faithless king a joint chastisement, a judgment which should once for all put an end to his intolerable intrigues. The non-appearance of the Athenians (vol. iii. p. 104) was the first momentous error of negligence in their Northern policy. By it they estranged from themselves the mightiest of their allies, and preserved the most dangerous of their foes from inevitable extinction. Indeed, he came forth incomparably stronger from this crisis. For it ridded him of Amyntas, the son of Philip, whom it had been intended to put in his place as king; and he now entered into the kindest relations with the Odrysæ as their very good friend and neighbor.

With Athens he for the time kept peace; but the fire which he had kindled in the Chalcidice, continued to burn without interruption; he understood how once more to gain the confidence of the cities, at the same time established relations in Thessaly securing him an influence in this country, so important because of its intermediate position between Macedonia and Hellas; and unceasingly lay in wait for opportunities of damaging Athens. The war, as it was conducted in Hellas, by no means corresponded

* Kirchhoff, *Chron. des Volksbeschl. für Methone*, in *Abhandl. d. Berlin. Akad. d. Wissensch.*, 1861, p. 555. In general, cf. W. Vischer, *Perdikkas II. König v. Maked.* in the *Schweizer Mus. für histor. Wissensch.*; and, with regard to the forty-one years of the king's reign, von Gutschmid, p. 106, seq.

to his hopes. The Spartans were unskilful and unfortunate; if matters continued thus, it was to be foreseen that Athens would soon have her hands free from asserting her power most decisively on the Thraco-Macedonian coast. This it was necessary to prevent. Perdicas therefore in conjunction with the Chalcidians sent the secret embassy to Sparta; occasioned the mission of Brasidas; opened the way through Thrace for him; and thus for the second time kindled a Thracian war, the most dangerous of all the contests which the Athenians had to wage during the Peloponnesian war, and of which they never afterwards completely recovered the consequences. At the same time, however, he wished to make use of the Spartan general as of a hired *condottiere* for the purposes of his dynastic policy, in order to break the obstinate resistance of the chieftains of Upper Macedonia, in particular of the Lyncestæ. Although these intentions were frustrated by the proud spirit of Brasidas; although bitter feelings of hostility between himself and the king were the result, such as they could hardly fail to be in consequence of the straight-forward character of the one, and the selfish faithlessness of the other; although this hostility against Brasidas even drove the king once more to an alliance with the Athenians;—yet Brasidas was of material service to Perdicas, by destroying the Attic power in Thrace; and the king took good care even as their ally to do nothing for the Athenians, which might have served once more to transform the affairs of the North in their favor. The utter incompleteness of the results attending upon the peace of 421, and its failure to restore the power of Athens on the Thracian coasts, were in complete accordance with his interests. He diligently observed the subsequent developments of Greek affairs; together with the Chalcidians in 418 joined the Argivo-Laconic alliance, again without openly renouncing that with the Athenians (vol. iii. p. 316); and was therefore by them punished by

a blockade of the harbors and landing-places. These undertakings, however, led to no further consequences ; and Perdicas, who had entered into an alliance with every power of political importance, with Sparta, Corinth and Athens, with the Odrysæ and the Chalcidians, and who had successively deceived them one and all, in the end alone derived a lasting advantage from all the struggles, although to him alone they had virtually cost no sacrifices. He secured all the gains of a thoroughly unscrupulous system of policy ; he knew of no distinction between friend and foe, between war and peace ; he was victorious by means of the conflicts excited by him between his neighbors ; and even though at the close of his reign he had not made any considerable acquisition of territory, yet to have crippled the Attic power on his shores amounted to a more important success than a series of conquests. In spite of all its home troubles Macedonia had proved itself to be a power difficult to attack and independent, and at the same time exercising a deeply-felt influence upon the affairs of the Greek states ; and this power and influence of Macedonia could not but grow in the same measure as that in which the Greek states mutually consumed their strength. No state, therefore, was more benefited by the Sicilian war than Macedonia, which was thereby freed from all anxiety on account of Athens ; nor is the mistaken course of Attic policy more manifest in any one point than in this : that, while the Athenians still had unlimited resources at their disposal, they failed to use every possible exertion in order to restore their dominion on the Thracian coasts. This omission they were never afterwards able to make good.

In the interior of his kingdom Perdicas was likewise a sagacious and active prince. He favored all combinations which brought his land into closer contact with the Greeks ; established relations of mutual hospitality with the noble families of Thessaly ; received into Macedonia the His-

tiæans who had been expelled from Eubœa, as well as some of the Chalcidian Greeks; and attached great value to having at his court famous Greeks, such as the dithyrambic poet Melanippides, and the great Hippocrates (vol. ii. p. 560).

In these peaceful endeavors he was far surpassed by his successor Archelaus, who was able all the more fully to devote himself to this task of Macedonian policy, inasmuch as he had no attacks to ward off from abroad, while for conquests no opportunity as yet offered itself. He made himself a path to the throne by criminal bloodshed; for as the son of a slave who had borne him to Perdiceas, he had to remove his legitimate kinsmen; but after this he showed himself a born ruler, who, with determined calm, pursued great aims. For he perceived how all external successes must remain useless to his kingdom, if it lacked a real coherence, and security and order, at home. It was still open to hostile incursions from the mountains as well as from the sea; and any resolute enemy might imperil not only the prosperity of the inhabitants, but the very existence of the state. It was therefore indispensable to build cities, the walls of which should offer a protection to the inhabitants. The cities were connected by roads, along which a regular traffic could unfold itself; standing forces guarded these roads, and put a check upon brigandage. The inhabitants became acquainted with the blessings of a generally observed peace; all property rose in value; and the higher civilization, which had hitherto only found a home at individual points, began to penetrate into the interior of the land, the several parts of which gradually blended into a single whole. As a founder of cities, constructor of roads, and organizer of the military system, Archelaus, according to the judgment of Thucydides, accomplished more than all the eight kings before him. His reign constituted a new era for the kingdom; and in order to establish this

Archelaus.

B. C. 415-399.

Founda-
tion of
Pella.

by outward evidence also, he founded, below Ægæ, in the low-lying district of Emathia, the new capital of Pella. Surrounded by the natural defences of lake and morasses, and connected with the sea by the river Lydias, Pella was better situated for a centre of the kingdom, and for the preservation of the royal treasures, than Pydna in Pieria, the city of Alexander. But Pieria was not, on this account, neglected by Archelaus. On the contrary, this district was pre-eminently used for the purpose of connecting with one another Hellas and Macedonia. At the northern base of Mount Olympus Dium was built, in the centre of the plain; for it was to be no fortified town, but, like Olympia in Elis, an openly and rurally situated place for festivals. It was dedicated to Zeus, the most ancient deity of the Hellenic race, and to the Muses, the first celebrations in whose honor had taken place on this spot. And this wor-

Pieria the
home of
the Muses.

ship of the Muses was further attested by Archelaus, in that he regarded it as a principal task of his government to make his court the meeting-place of the most eminent among his contemporaries. Invitations were therefore issued by him to the foremost men of Greece. Not all of these was he able to secure; neither Sophocles, who, as a genuine Hellene, held aloof from a royal court, nor Socrates, to whom every position in life was painful, where he could not give an equivalent for that which he received. But, with these exceptions, those who had been invited gladly responded to the summons, and gathered round the king, at whose hospitable court they enjoyed high appreciation and serene leisure, while their native cities were consuming their strength in sanguinary wars and party-struggles. Zeuxis of Heraclea adorned the royal palace with his pictures; Timotheus made its festivals glorious with the sounds of his art. Chœrilus and Agathon lived and composed poetry here; and, above all, Euripides, who in his *Archelaus* celebrated the glories of

the king, how like unto the ancient Heroes he redeemed the land from its savage condition, and who in his *Bacchæ* sang Pieria, the seat of the Muses, where fair festive joy freely unfolded itself, and lauded the fertile fields of the Lydias, the giver of blessings. But the death of Euripides also shows how a hostile party was opposed to the foreign guests; and we recognize in this event, as in so many other traits, the strange mixture of unfettered brutality and of ideal efforts, which met at the court of Pella. All the more are the actual achievements of Archelaus deserving of recognition. For it was no whim of taste or princely vanity which made him a munificent patron of arts and sciences; he clearly perceived, that he could in no way more effectively promote the most important objects of his state, than by constituting his capital a centre of Hellenic civilization. The state, which desired to rule on the shores of the Greek seas, was above all bound to acquire Greek culture.*

Archelaus had conducted the policy of Macedonia into the right course; and the young seed grew up hopefully under a royal dynasty, which so brilliantly proved its mission to rule, and which led the kingdom in the direction of a clearly-recognized goal. But immediately after the death of Archelaus a counter-current set in, a revolt on the part of the native nobility against the royal Philhellenism, a period of wild disorder, which, at the very time when the state was regularly organizing itself, cast it back into the vortex of internal party-struggles, and again absolutely called into question the rule of the Temenidæ.

Among their adversaries the Lyncestæ arose, an ambitious and unruly family, who had zealously encouraged

* Dium, so called from the temple of Zeus Olympius: DI d. xvii. 16: Steph. Byz. Concerning the court of Archelaus as a home of the Muses; Abel, *u. s.* p. 193. Euripides derided by Decamnichus: Ar. *Polit.* 220, 6. His death: Diogenian, vii. 52; Suidas.

the agitation in the people, and, although themselves of Greek descent, yet took advantage of every movement on the part of the faction of the autochthones, to escape from the enforced supremacy of the Temenidæ. They connected themselves with the other malcontent families of the country, in particular with the Elimiotæ; conciliated the support of the rural nobility, who were adverse to Hellenic culture; and brought the Illyrians into the country, in order to defy the royal army.

For ten years the throne was cast to and fro between the two parties. Neither was able to overthrow the other; they therefore sought to effect a compromise, by endeavoring to put an end to the prevalence of mutual hostility by means of a family alliance,—after the fashion in which in Attica, in the times of Pisistratus, the parties were temporarily re-united through marriage. Amyntas, a great-grandson of King Alexander, married a wife out of the family of the Lyncestæ, who was at the same time the daughter of an Elimiotæ, by name Eurydice. Amyntas proved his capacity for government, by remaining true to the policy of his house; among the Greeks of distinction who lived near him, we find, with others, the physician Nicomachus, the father of Aristotle. But Amyntas also had close to him insidious enemies; for which reason he sought to fortify himself against fresh dangers by establishing a connexion with the Chalcidian towns. The feelings of mutual opposition became again intensified; and in the seventh year the Lyncestæ set up a new counter-king; the Illyrians were again powerful in the land, and even the Thessalians, who possibly considered themselves as deceived with regard to the claims which they thought to possess, sided against Amyntas.*

* Into these ten years fall the following reigns: Orestes, 399-6 B. C., son of Archelaus; removed by his guardian, the Lyncestæ Æropus (= Archelaus II.), 396-2; Amyntas II., 392-90, according to von Gutschmid, p. 105, an illegitimate son of Archelaus; Pausanias, 390-89, son of Æropus. Next follows Amyntas III.; cf. von Gutschmid, p. 107. Nicomachus; Suidas, s. u

He now more and more threw himself into the arms of the Greeks; the coast-towns were his last anchor of hope. In his distress he promised them all possible commercial advantages, and gave up to them nearly the whole of Lower Macedonia, while the upper part of the country was in the hands of the Illyrian party. For two years he was a lackland king, till at last he after all succeeded, with the help of the Greeks, in recovering his throne (B. C. 382).

Hereupon fortune once more smiled upon ^{and B. C. 381-} the sorely-tried prince. He not only con- ^{369.}trived to maintain himself against the parties in the country itself, but he also beheld the superior power of those Greek states which were dangerous to him collapsing without any effort on his part. Against the Olynthians, who even had possession of Pella (vol. iv. p. 326), the Lacedæmonians intervened, rendering to the king the inestimable service of humbling the arrogant neighbor-city. But Sparta herself was unable to reap the advantages of her successes; inasmuch as, having been vanquished by Thebes, she was forced to renounce all territories under her dominion abroad. Hereupon a totally new power formed itself to the south of the Macedonian kingdom, viz. the Thessalian; and the Macedonians now inclined towards the Athenians, because they were always friends with that state, whose centre was furthest distant from their own domain. But in Thessaly, too, affairs took an unexpectedly favorable turn. For the danger which was undoubtedly imminent from that quarter, collapsed with the death of Iason (vol. iv. p. 472); and the troubles immediately ensuing upon this decisive event now even induced the Macedonians, whose policy had hitherto merely consisted in cunningly taking advantage of the condition of affairs presenting itself from abroad, to interfere for their part in the history of the neighboring countries. Alexander, the successor of Amyntas, crossed the moun-

Alexander tains, and occupied Larisa and Crannon.
 II. This was the first independent deed of Macedonian policy, the first step towards a hegemony over the North;—but the proceeding was too strongly characterized by violence; garrisons were kept in the cities against rules of right and express promises; and the Alcæadæ were suppressed, in whose aid the expedition had been undertaken. And thus the consequence was, that the Thebans made their appearance in Thessaly, and obliged the Macedonians to evacuate it. Indeed, instead of having reduced a country on their borders to dependence upon themselves, as had been their intention, they, by reason of their unsuccessful intervention, now themselves became dependent upon a foreign state, which was with mighty energy extending its influence to the north as well as to the south. Theban troops entered Macedonia, where new quarrels had broken out, and the Theban general became umpire between king and anti-king (vol. iv. p. 475).

Ptolemæus.

B. C. 368-365.

The anti-king's name was Ptolemæus. His wife was a daughter of Amyntas; but at the same time he lived in amorous intercourse with Eurydice, the widow of Amyntas, who favored him as against her own sons. Pelopidas thought best to serve the Theban interest, by endeavoring to satisfy both candidates for the throne. Alexander remained king, after having promised his alliance to the Thebans and given hostages; while his adversary received a principality in Bottiæa. But this compensatory arrangement only served to irritate the ambition of the pretender. Soon Alexander was made away with; and Ptolemæus, united to Eurydice, now reigned professedly in the name of the younger brothers, over all Macedonia.

His rule was, however, regarded in the land as a criminal usurpation, and provoked vehement resistance. The friends of the murdered king repaired to Thessaly, where Pelopidas was still present at the head of an army of mer-

cenaries; and at the same time Pausanias, a banished adherent and relative of the royal house, invaded Macedonia, took a number of towns, and became the head of a large party. The haughty Eurydice and her paramour were placed in a most critical position. Without any secure support in her own realm, she turned her eyes to the Attic vessels, which were at that time, under the command of Iphicrates, cruising in the waters of Amphipolis, in order to observe the progress of affairs. In the character of representative of the legitimate order of succession, and mother of the rightful heir to the throne, this woman, whose recent course had been one of arbitrary violence, addressed herself to the Athenian general, and humbly craved his succor against Pausanias. Attic and Theban influence now met face to face in Macedonia. Iphicrates stayed the progress of Pausanias, but was without the necessary resources for thoroughly effective measures. The influence of Thebes was the stronger of the two. On the other hand, however, Pelopidas was prevented by the untrustworthiness of his troops from asserting himself with decisive results. He was unable to settle the quarrel in the sense of those at whose summons he had come; he had to content himself with forcing the Macedonians once more to acknowledge the influence of Thebes as paramount, and to put an end to that of Athens. With the aid of Thebes Ptolemæus again firmly established his rule, but on condition that he should only reign as the guardian of the children of Amyntas; while he was forced, by way of security, to give hostages, who were taken to Thebes. Among these was his son Philoxenus, and probably also the younger son of Amyntas, Philip. If this was the occasion on which the latter came to Thebes, the object was to withdraw one of the legitimate heirs to the throne from the dangers threatening them in Macedonia itself, and thereby at the same time to have at command a source of authority as against the regent.

Ineffectual
settlement
by Pelopidas.

But this settlement, the result of a weak compromise sincere on neither side, likewise failed to endure. Perdiccas, the elder of the two surviving sons of Amyntas, was only awaiting the hour of vengeance. No sooner had he, on reaching maturity, become conscious of his powers and duties, than, careless of the arrangement made by Thebes, he came forward as the avenger of his brother against Ptolemæus, overthrew him, who had for three years occupied the throne gained by murder and adultery, and contrived rapidly to acquire authority as an independent sovereign. This he effected by energetically confronting all his enemies, making victorious war upon the Illyrians, and then establishing the independence of the kingdom against Thebes as well as against the Chalcidians. Fortune favored him; for very soon after the death of Pelopidas Thebes ceased to be a source of danger. Against the Chalcidians he availed himself of the Athenians, and supported the undertakings of Timotheus. This commander achieved precisely as much success, as corresponded to the intentions of Perdiccas. The power of Olynthus was broken, but the purposes of the Athenians were not accomplished; in particular they were unable to master Amphipolis, whose great importance the king fully appreciated. In order to strengthen his dynasty, he recalled his brother Philip, and gave to him a separate principality. Everything was proceeding according to the wishes of Perdiccas, when in the sixth year of his reign a fresh revolt broke out against the dynasty of the Temenidæ; Illyrians once more swarmed into the land; the young king fell in a bloody battle, together with a large number of loyal Macedonians; and once more the realm was in a condition of terrible and hopeless confusion.*

* Perdiccas and Timotheus: Dem. ii. 14; *Philol.* xix. 248, 578.

The heir to the throne was a child. Pretenders, old and young, made their appearance on all sides, and hoped now to be able successfully to assert their claims. First, a step-brother of Perdiccas, Archelaus by name; then, Pausanias, the leader of the Lyncestæ, accompanied by Thracian auxiliaries placed at his disposal by Cotys; again, Argæus, the former anti-king, supported by the Athenians, who desired to see on the throne of Macedonia a king owing his elevation to them. Finally, the Pæonians too rose, in order to turn to account for their own interests the difficulties of the house of the Temenidæ, and to shake off the yoke of strangers. Pæonian chieftains designed to take the place of the Temenidæ.

Competi-
tion for the
throne on
the death of
Perdiccas.

The most insignificant of all those who sought the Macedonian throne, the one competitor who had no foreign forces at his command was yet the best prepared. This was the third son of Amyntas, Philip, whose time had now arrived. He was animated by the same princely spirit and courage which had possessed his brothers, Alexander and Perdiccas; nor was he by their misfortunes frightened off from resolutely pursuing the same end. He had, quite unobserved, been admirably preparing himself for the events which had now actually taken place. Three years of adolescence spent at Thebes (B. C. 368-365) constituted a schooling, such as no prince of the North had before him undergone. Thebes was at that time a centre of contemporaneous history, a seat of all the arts of war and of peace, a city filled with generous self-consciousness, whose deeds had been great, though her resources had been small. In Thebes Philip had become a Greek. In accordance with his inborn sagacity he had abstained from all exclusiveness, such as might have been natural to one of his rank, in order that he might master whatever was to be learnt from the Greeks. He had been an inmate of the house of Pam-

Philip II.

B. C. 359-336.

menes, one of the foremost of the soldiers of Thebes (vol. iv. p. 442); and his intimate intercourse with his host had at the same time made him an admirer of Epaminondas, and initiated him into all the secrets of that great man's system as a general and a statesman. Nor had he remained a stranger to the higher intellectual culture which had found admission at Thebes; he is even, according to a statement which is, however, doubtful, said to have been acquainted with Plato, and by Plato's pupil, Euphræus, to have been recommended to Perdicas. On the other hand, it was of great advantage to the future ruler, that he first learnt in a smaller dominion to govern independently, and to recover his familiarity with Macedonian ways. Here he turned to account the lessons he had learnt at Thebes: how great things were to be achieved in a small sphere of action, and how quite unobservedly might be trained the nucleus of an excellent army, capable of deciding the course of events when the right moment should have arrived. At the head of a well-disciplined and devoted military force he suddenly came forth from his obscurity. The multitude of his enemies was rather an advantage to him than the reverse; for it caused the resistance to him to be split up. In proportion as the confusion increased, and as foreign influences asserted themselves from a greater number of quarters, the patriots hastened to gather round the one surviving son of Amyntas. Macedonia was in the camp of Philip.*

His accession.

B. C. 359.

Hereupon he displayed endowments, such as no man had expected in the youth. He was at this time twenty-three years of age, of a noble figure and princely bearing, master of all that skillfulness of conduct, versatility, and knowledge of the world,

* Philip's triennium at Thebes: Justin. vii. 5; Diod. xvi. 2. Through Pammenes he became a *ζηλωτής Ἐπαμεινώνδου*, Plutarch, *Pelop.* 26; Carystius Pergamenus from a letter of Speusippus, *ap. Athen.* 506; *Fr. Hist. Gr.* iv. 357, where Philip, as owing his sovereignty to Plato, is accused of ingratitude. As to Euphræus of Oreus, cf. Bernays, *Diæl. des Aristot.* 21, 143.

which were only to be acquired in Greek cities; he spoke and wrote Greek fluently and with taste. But he took care not to give offence by his foreign culture, for he wished not to appear a stranger among the Macedonians. He hunted and feasted with them like a true child of the land; he was the best swimmer and horseman, the most excellent of comrades in all national exercises and social pleasures to the young nobility, whom he contrived to sway, without allowing them to become aware of the real cause of his superiority. He assembled around him the chiefs of the several districts of the kingdom, knowing how to take hold of every one of them in his own way, and to turn to account his strength and his weakness alike; while in the people he managed to arouse confidence in his person by skilfully making known the sayings of oracles. The citizens of the royal town of *Ægæ*, whom *Argæus* sought to attract to his side, decisively declared for Philip; and soon it was no longer by uncertain expectations or by favorable divine signs, but by the most brilliant successes, that he was before all eyes proved to be the one man destined by fate to re-establish the kingdom out of its collapse.

He had in him many of the ways of a barbaric prince, in consonance with the usage of the Northern peoples; he could be savage and intemperate, and give himself up to sensual pleasures even to the extent of bestial indulgence. But he never lost sight of his higher aims. He was wrathful and merciful, valorous and cunning, obstinate and ready with concessions, just as circumstances demanded; there was in him a combination of royal dignity, natural vigor and Hellenic culture, such as was necessary, if Macedonia was at last to be made strong at home and powerful abroad.

With unfaltering sagacity he ridded himself of his adversaries. *Archelaus* had to pay for his claims to the throne with his life; *Argæus* was surprised during his retreat from *Ægæ* and destroyed, while the Athenians in

his army were allowed to go free without a ransom. The Pæonians were induced by gifts to retire; and the Thracian king was likewise by means of a peaceable settlement brought to abandon the cause of Pausanias.

Thus Philip became king of the land; and nowhere was thought taken in these times, when a thorough *man* was needed on the throne, of asserting the claims of his nephew, who was under age; especially inasmuch as there was anything but a definitely fixed order of succession in Macedonia.

His first
achievements.

Ol. cv. 2 (B. C.
358).

What was first required to be done, was to establish the kingdom in a position of security and freedom as against the neighbors of the realm. This was a twofold task, according as the coast or the neighbors towards the interior had to be dealt with. The latter had been the chief impediments to a continuous prosperity on the part of the Macedonian kingdom; for three generations the influences opposed to one another had alternated like ebb and tide. At one time the Illyrians had flooded the land, at another the Temenidæ had again made their appearance; Macedonia incessantly oscillated between Hellenism and barbarism, till in truth it was unknown who was really master in the land. If, therefore, there was to be any question of an assured progress, this conflict must be definitively suppressed, Macedonia must be emancipated from the barbarous countries around it, and secured against the intervention of foreign force; it must at last belong to its own people, and become free, and sure of itself and of its royal house.

Philip was at an early age master of the art of isolating his enemies, and of overcoming the dangers, to which he must have succumbed, had they all come upon him at one time, by the process of meeting them one after the other at the season suitable to himself. Thus after acquiring freedom of action in the interior, he first marched against

the Pæonians, with whom he had arrived at a temporary settlement. They were now once for all to acknowledge the superior strength of Macedonia, and to renounce all influence upon the affairs of the kingdom. He availed himself of the moment, when confusion had been created among the people by the death of the warlike king Agis, and when no preparations existed for a lasting resistance. After completely humbling the Pæonians, he attacked the Illyrians, who constituted a mighty military force under Bardylis, a man who had risen from the occupation of a charcoal-burner to the throne. They held a number of Macedonian towns, and were by no means minded to relinquish the authority acquired by them in the Macedonian kingdom in consequence of the endless disputes about the succession and party-conflicts there. A bloody, but decisive battle was fought, which forced the Illyrians to withdraw all their garrisons, and acknowledge the mountain ridges, which form the natural boundary between the eastern and western inclines, to be henceforth the frontier of their territory.

These successes Philip owed to the art of war, which he had learnt in Greece, where he had had opportunities of convincing himself of the political importance of useful reforms in military organization. He developed fully what his predecessors, Archelaus in particular, had commenced. The *right* of every free man to bear arms became the *duty* of bearing arms, the regular obligation to military service, for which the king furnished the arms and pay. The equipment of his soldiers was upon the whole that of the Greek hoplites, but it included certain details derived from ancient Macedonian usage. Among these were the large round shield studded with bronze, and above all the *sarissa*, a spear, the length of which is stated to have exceeded twenty feet. Shield joining shield, the men of Macedonia formed the closely-united phalanx, the firm

His reforms in the kingdom and in the military system.

central body of the national forces, which stood like an unassailable solid mass, with its motionless front and projecting forests of spears. Besides the phalanx, there existed as a separate division of the infantry the species of troops called *Hypaspistæ*, who were probably more lightly armed and more loosely organized. They were in a special sense a royal *corps*, of which part was always under arms and at the disposal of the king for every sudden emergency. The mountaineers were after their fashion employed to strengthen the military force, serving as light-armed troops and bowmen, as *e. g.* the Agrianes from the upper Strymon. Foreigners were used by Philip, where they seemed to promise to be of advantage, in particular Greeks of the widest variety of origin; he had captains from Tarentum, archers from Crete, while skilled workmen from Thessaly built engines of war for him. Special attention was devoted by him to the cavalry. At its head was the proper place of the king, whose person was surrounded by a picked body of horsemen. These formed the royal guard of honor, to which the sons of the nobility belonged, who entered the king's service as pages, were subject to his immediate training, and afterwards, if they had proved their efficiency, rose to the highest posts in the army. A corresponding band of companions or *ἐταῖροι* of the king, who formed the solid nucleus of the army, was likewise to be found in the infantry. In these guards, horse and foot, the *comitatus*, which in the most ancient times had surrounded the chieftains on their expeditions for the conquest of territory, continued to exist in a form adapted to the requirements of the times. While, therefore, the townsmen, peasants and herdsmen of the land were in the army blended into a Macedonian nation, felt their coherence as members of one great whole, and learnt to obey a single will, and in this union to recognize the guarantee of peace at home and of victory against foreign foes,—the grandees of the land were per-

sonally associated with the interests of the throne; an independent, or indeed recalcitrant, nobility of landed proprietors was changed into a nobility of courtiers and soldiers; the acquisition of authority and wealth depended upon the favor of the king; ambition attracted the young nobles near his person, and rendered them props of the monarchical power. This committee, always under arms, of the army of the realm, with the members of which the king lived on terms of a certain comradeship—this so-called *agema* was at the same time regarded as bearing in some respects a character resembling that of a popular representative body as towards the king. Thus Philip knew how to combine old things and new, foreign elements and native, Macedonian usages and Greek inventions, and by means of the organization of the army to give firmness and solidity to the whole country. And this was of all the more importance, inasmuch as hitherto Macedonia had been a loose group of mountain-cantons, devoid of any town-centre.

But the main point was this: that Philip not only gave laws and established institutions, but was himself the soul of all, controlling all relations by the superiority of his intellectual power, making high and low dependent upon himself, steeling and developing his soldiers, and thus creating an empire which possessed a living unity in the person of him, its sovereign military chief.

In this way Philip had raised his paternal kingdom from its low estate, and thus he had succeeded in drawing firm frontiers round the land wrested from his adversaries, and in so to speak damming it up against the inundations of the savage neighboring peoples. Now, and not before, thought could be taken of a Macedonian system of policy, and attention given to the world outside Macedonia. Here it was a directly opposite task which awaited him. Here the inland state stood opposed to the maritime powers, the barbarian to ^{His foreign} policy.

the Hellenes. Towards the interior, it behooved him to shut off the kingdom; but towards the sea, to open it; here the resources of the neighbors of Macedonia had, not to be warded off, but to be secured for the state itself.

From this point of view there were three powers, upon the relations of whom to Macedonia all ulterior successes depended. These were Athens at the head of her Maritime League, commanding the coast of the Thermæan Gulf; Amphipolis on the Strymon; and Olynthus on the Thracian peninsula, the mighty city enjoying the primacy among the Greek towns of the surrounding district. If these three acted in unison, nothing was to be accomplished; for then Macedonia must remain an inland and a petty state, in an oppressive condition of dependence upon foreign powers. The one thing absolutely indispensable, therefore, was that the Greeks should not penetrate the designs of Philip; they must be kept deceived and divided as long as possible; and by their mutual distrust one Greek city must be made to promote Philip's schemes against the other.

Amphipolis
and Athens. The first which was in question was Amphipolis, the fatal city, the source of so much grief to its parent, the maritime policy of Athens. How many brave bands of Attic youth had perished on these shores in conflict with the Thracians, before a lasting settlement had been brought to pass! At last success had crowned these endeavors, and in all the pride of hopefulness the city at the mouth of the Strymon had been built (vol. ii. p. 537). For twelve years the Athenians had rejoiced in the possession of the rapidly-progressing city; then it had fallen away from them; since which time the faithless daughter-city had been an incessant subject of vexation and most painful annoyance to the Athenians. All their labors, contests, and sacrifices were lost to them; and the costliest of constructions by land and by water

had been made for others, and those others the foes of Athens; for this very city, designed to become the coping-stone of Attic maritime supremacy and the dominant fortress of the Thracian sea, now became the most dangerous point of attack upon Athens, a basis of operations for the Lacedæmonian power, and in spite of the provisions of the Peace of Nicias had not been restored into the possession of the Athenians (vol. iii. p. 291). The citizens themselves would have nothing to say to the mother-city; Amphipolis was never an Attic town, as is attested by the dialect of its inscriptions; the non-Attic population, from the first far more numerous than the Attic, brought about a close connexion with the towns in the vicinity. In them and in the Thracian tribes Amphipolis, after having remained loyal to Sparta longer than any of the other coast-towns, found a security against Athens, while at the same time it contrived to maintain itself independent in all directions. Magnificent silver coins give evidence of the splendid prosperity of the city. Hereupon ensued the revival of the Attic naval power; and simultaneously there commenced the fresh attempts of the Athenians upon Amphipolis, by means of negotiations with the neighboring powers, as well as of campaigns by land and by sea. But nothing was done with the necessary energy; and when a success was obtained, it ended by changing into a failure. In B. C. 371 Amyntas solemnly acknowledged the claims of Athens; and Iphicrates, probably with the aid of a party among the Amphipolitans favorable to Athens, succeeded in bringing into his power a number of hostages from their city. Its capitulation seemed at hand, when of a sudden the general was recalled, and the hostages were returned to the citizens through the treachery of Charidemus. Hereupon commenced the efforts of Timotheus; but however greatly he prospered in other respects (B. C. 365), before Amphipolis he too was deserted by fortune; and his futile attack was

reckoned as the ninth in the series of the expeditions undertaken against Amphipolis. It was also the last of them. For now Philip intervened, to whom the city on account of its commanding situation on the main roads along the coast, on account of its harbor, and of its wealth of timber and metals, was the nearest and most important of all positions outside of Macedonia proper, and an indispensable basis for operations in the direction of Thrace. But Philip was far from interfering by open force. He seemingly resumed the policy of his father, by recognizing afresh the claims of the Athenians upon their colony, and, in order at a time inopportune to himself to avoid all possibility of conflict, withdrawing the garrison from Amphipolis, which had already on several occasions been in the hands of Macedonian troops. Amphipolis honored the generous prince as its liberator; while the Athenians rejoiced in the good-will displayed by him towards themselves, and entered into negotiations with him, in order even at the price of abandoning Pydna, which was still in their possession, to secure Amphipolis through the mediation of Macedonia.*

Negotiations concerning Amphipolis.

Meanwhile, Philip had secured freedom of action by his victories over the Illyrians and the Pæonians; and his designs upon the Thracian coast now became palpable. Amphipolis saw the troops approach, and rapidly took the resolution which was alone capable of saving it. Two Amphipolitans of consideration, Hierax and Stratocles, repaired to Athens; and the proud civic community now voluntarily did homage, opened its gates and harbors, its city and territory, and besought the protection of Athens against Philip.

* Amphipolis and Athens: Weissenborn, *Hellen.* 136 ff. Treason of Charidemus: Dem. xxiii. 149. Fresh defeats: Schol. *Æschin.* p. 754, ed. Reiske; p. 29, edd. Baier et Sauppe. J. de Witte, *Médailles d'Amphipolis* (in *Revue Numism.* 1864).—Macedonian troops in Amphipolis, at the request of Perdiccas, according to the probable conjecture of Grote, vol. x. p. 510, and vol. xi. p. 300.

But contemporaneously envoys from Philip himself made their appearance. They renewed the alliance which had been concluded already after the victory over Argæus, and at the same time made a confidential communication concerning Amphipolis, designed to remove all fears and misconceptions. The Athenians were reminded how they had already acknowledged the king to be their friend; how he had condoned their support of his adversary, and had sent their soldiers home with donations (p. 47). As to Amphipolis, that arrogant city was as much an enemy to him as to the Athenians. He would humble it; whereupon they should receive the city out of his hands as a pledge of his friendship.

Thus the city, for the possession of which the Athenians had carried on so many futile contests, was of a sudden voluntarily offered to them from two sides; and it seemed as if they had simply to choose, out of whose hands they would accept it. On calm reflection the citizens ought not to have remained in doubt as to choice. With regard to the Amphipolitans there was no reason for mistrust. They were in trouble, and since no alternative was left them, preferred losing their independence to Athens to losing it to Philip. But as to Philip on the other hand, what could induce him, whose comprehensive spirit of enterprise must have already been so secret, first to take the trouble of conquering the most important city in his immediate vicinity, and then to surrender it again, and surrender it to a state, which was more than any other capable of hindering the extension of his empire? In any case, it must assuredly have suggested itself to the Athenians, that the motive of this surrender would not be pure kindness of heart, but that it would be accompanied by conditions fully counterbalancing such a sacrifice.

The Athenians had quite recently accomplished a successful expedition to Eubœa; their navy was in full activity;—how then could the Amphipolitans anticipate,

that their offer would be refused? And yet this was the case. Instead of gladly seizing the opportunity, the Athenians were deluded enough to abandon themselves to the influence of a petty sensitiveness. They took pleasure in letting the obstinate city undergo a well-deserved chastisement, and thought themselves secure of obtaining possession of it without exertions, without sacrifices, and without giving offence to the magnanimous and benevolent king. They were vain enough to deem the friendship of Athens so great a blessing, that they thought it quite natural for even a powerful king to incur some expense in order to secure it.*

Conquest of
Amphipolis.
Ol. cv. 3
(B. c. 357).

This mistake on the part of the Athenians was worth more to Philip than a victory in battle, and was at the same time the most favorable of signs for all ulterior enterprises. Amphipolis was rapidly attacked and taken (B. c. 357); and hereupon there remained nothing for the king to fear but a combination between Olynthus and Athens. Olynthus which had calmly looked on at the fall of Amphipolis, could no longer remain neutral. Immediately after that event the Olynthians had accordingly represented to the Athenians the situation of affairs on the Thracian coast, and proposed to them an alliance against Philip. But at Athens belief was still rife in the magnanimous king; and the more that his good-will was now of importance, the less were they inclined to undertake anything against him. For although they had no longer any very sanguine expectation of an unconditional transfer of Amphipolis into their hands, yet they hoped to be able to recover the longed-for possession on the Strymon by means of an exchange of it for Pydna; and this project was treated with much self-importance as a secret of state by the Attic politicians.

* Hierax and Stratoeles; Theopomp. *ap.* Harpocr. *s. v.* Ἱέραξ. Decree of banishment against Philo and Stratoeles after the capture of the city: *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* No. 2008; Sauppe, *Inscr. Maced.* 20; Philistor, ii. 492.

But Philip needed no exchanges or voluntary offers; he took what he required. He unhesitatingly advanced into the territory of the Attic Confederacy; seized Pydna; and no sooner had he by this step openly brought about a rupture with Athens, than he concluded an alliance with the Olynthians, whom Athens had rejected: an alliance, which was of so much immediate importance to him, that he even consented to considerable concessions in order to bring it to pass. Since, then, a dispute had long prevailed between Macedonia and Olynthus as to Anthemus, the port-town on the Thermæan Gulf (p. 28), he now abandoned it to the Olynthians; indeed, he also promised them Potidæa, which closed against them the access to the island of Pal-lene, and which was at the present time the most important support of the Attic power in Thrace. Potidæa fell, before the Attic ships arrived; and the Athenians, taken by surprise, suddenly found themselves, without a war or a declaration of war, driven out of their most important positions, deprived of all their allies, and completely beaten out of the field. They hurled wrathful manifestoes against the faithless king, but were unable to change anything of what had been done; for they were shackled by the defection of their confederates, and amidst the confusion created by the events of the war were utterly incapable of accomplishing anything of consequence on behalf of their possessions in the North.

Alliance between Philip and Olynthus.

B. c. 357.

Philip had now full freedom of action, and contrived to take advantage of his gains for further acquisitions. For to him the city on the Strymon was only the key to that district beyond the river, which projects like a peninsula into the sea and forms on the one side the Strymonian Gulf, on the other the deep bay, separated by the island of Thasos from the open sea. In the centre of this projecting coast there rises at a height of 6,000 feet Mount Pilaf-Tepe, the ancient Pangæum, a

The mines of Thrace.

lofty range abounding in snow and difficult to cross, but on account of its subterranean treasures the most valuable piece of territory in the entire coast-region of the Archipelago. For although the Hebrus washed precious metals down from the Hæmus, although the Pæonians turned up gold with their ploughshares from their fields, and Thasos possessed mines of its own, yet Pangæum was by far the most productive source of gold and silver. Ever, therefore, since the Phœnicians had first brought these treasures to light, they became again and again the subject of bloody conflicts. For here the most warlike Thracian tribes dwelt in close proximity, in particular the Satræ and the Bessi, who adored on the summit of the mountains their national god, called Dionysus by the Greeks; next to them the Pierians, who had been pushed from the south to the base of Pangæum, the Edones and others. Certain of the tribes settled here, *e. g.* the Edones, the Letæans, the Orrhescians, as early as the sixth century B. C. coined their native silver; and, although they frequently quarrelled among themselves, yet they were united in defiantly defending the treasures of their land against any stranger. This was experienced by all who stretched forth their hands for the possession of these districts, among them by Aristagoras, who perished with his whole army, when endeavoring firmly to establish the dominion, which Histæus had founded in the land of the Strymon (vol. ii. p. 189). The Thasians contrived to maintain themselves longest on the gold-coast; they founded settlements on the shore, whence although only to a limited extent, they explored the mines; and their colony of Datum became proverbial for a locality overrichly endowed with all the good things of the earth. But even to them the gold brought no lasting good fortune. First they were humbled by the Persians, who themselves made the attempt of controlling the Ægean from Abdera (vol. ii. p. 226); and afterwards they had to contend

against Athens. Hereupon the Thracian gold acquired its significance in the history of the Greek states. It stimulated Sparta to ally herself with the Thasians; it tempted the Athenians to these shores; and one of the most terrible routs ever suffered by them made the names of Datum and Drabescus words of terror to every Attic ear (vol. ii. p. 403). But they refused to be awed away. They founded, opposite to Thasos, the town of Neapolis in the bay of Antisara, the ancient port belonging to Datum; and the new city became a flourishing colony. And yet they never thoroughly succeeded in securely possessing themselves of the district and turning to account its treasures. The Thracian tribes remained independent; nor was it until a very late date, in the year before the accession of Philip, that an attempt was made to penetrate from Thasos further into the interior. This took place at the instigation of Callistratus (vol. iv. p. 403), who even as an exile continued to pursue schemes of statesmanship. A body of settlers went up into the valley of the Angites, which flows into the Strymon to the north of Pangæum. There, in a well-watered region, was founded Crenides, a place most favorably situated for gold-washings. This was the first mining colony proper, which was called into life under Attic influence (B. C. 360). But this settlement only served the purposes of the enemy of Athens. For the little colony was so hard-pressed by the Thracians, that in its distress it applied for succor to Philip.

Nothing could have better suited the wishes of the king. He had long kept in view the gold-mines; they were indispensable to him for the execution of his schemes. Now, he could accomplish his purpose, not by forcing an entrance as a conqueror, but by appearing as the friend and ally of Hellenes in their struggle against barbarous tribes. Three or four years after the foundation of the above-mentioned colony he advanced across the Strymon; easily drove back the Thracians; annexed to Macedonia

all the land as far as the river Nestus; hereupon, in the place of Crenides in the fair valley of the Angites, which has a convenient outlet towards the gulf, built a fastness, which became the centre of the entire district of the mines. He succeeded in accomplishing by a single blow that in which the troops landing here after voyages from remote cities had invariably failed, since he entered from the land-side with a regularly organized army of horse and foot, and had all his resources close at hand. The ancient curse which lay upon the gold country, seemed expiated; land and people lost their savage nature; roads were levelled; marshes were dried up; the very climate was thereby altered; and at Philippi there began to flourish the first of those city-foundations, in which Greek citizens served the purposes of the Macedonian kingdom. Now at last the working of the mines prospered, so as to produce an annual revenue of one thousand talents in cash (£244,000 *circ.*).

Foundation
of Philippi.
Ol. cvi. 2
(B. C. 396).

The produce of the mines, as in Thasos and at Athens, constituted the fundamental capital of a naval power, which was needed in order to ward off every attack by sea, to extend the dominion along the coasts, and to protect Macedonian commerce. And for the foundation of a navy, as already Histiaëus had perceived, there existed no more favorable region. For in addition to the fine bays and passages through the sea, and to the inexhaustible wealth of timber, this coast possessed this great advantage over all others; that, by taking advantage of the north-wind prevalent throughout the summer, any point situate to the south could be rapidly and easily reached, while approach from that quarter was rendered correspondingly difficult. And the favorable opportunity for sudden and unexpected landing was of additional importance, because the Macedonians, before they possessed a real naval power, were forced to content themselves with such sudden

surprises and with freebooting, as Alexander of Pheræ had done before them. Hereby sensible damage might be inflicted even upon naval states of far superior power.*

The most important institutions in the newly-acquired territory were called into life, while Philip himself was occupied with fresh feuds with Thracians, Pæonians, and Illyrians, in the years 355 and 354. On his return to the coast, he attacked Methone, which hitherto, in order to calm the fears of the Athenians, he had allowed to continue as a free city and as a member of the Attic Naval Confederation. The Athenians attached a high value to this city (p. 34); notwithstanding which, at the critical moment they came too late. Methone fell, and was destroyed. Thus, with the exception of the Chalcidian towns, the whole coast-line from the Thessalian Olympus to the river Nestus was now subject to a single prince. The barbarian state of a remote inland country, which a few years ago had not felt well assured of its own existence, had become a power in the Archipelago, a state which was even by the Persians recognized as a Great Power, which had no need to fear any of its neighbors, but was a cause of fear to all.

With the acquisition of the mines and the successful rounding-off of the territory of the kingdom is connected the reform of the system of coinage, to which Philip attached great importance. Hitherto it was precisely in the countries now united that a difference of standards had prevailed, which exercised a very disturbing influence upon traffic. There was an entire absence of any centre, from which the institution of a regular system might have proceeded. Accord-

Philip's system of coinage.

* Concerning Pangæum, Philippi, Neapolis: Heuzey, *Miss. Arch. de Macédoine*; cf. *Göttingen Gel. Anzeigen*, 1864, p. 1228—Coins (but remarkably few gold) of the Letæans, &c., Brandis, 208.—*Δάρος* (*Δάρου*) *ἀγαθὼν*, Zenob. iv. 34. *Κρηνίδες*: Diod. xvi. 3. *Φίλιππο*, *ib.* 8. Harpocr. and Steph. s. v. *Datos*. Cf. Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. i. p. 15 [*E. Tr.*]; Schäfer, *Demosthenes*, i. 120; ii. 25.—Improvement in the climate: Theophr. *de caus. plant.* v. 14.

dingly, the Macedonian coinage had sought to attach itself to others in various directions. In the first instance, to the very ancient system of coinage in the Thracian towns and tribes (p. 58). Then, when in Thrace the Persian standard, as fixed by Darius, was adopted,—the standard which, at the very time when the political power of the Persians was in a condition of utter decadence, had widely spread even on the European side of the seas,—king Archelaus likewise accepted it. In the times of Philip's reign, on the other hand, the money of Asia Minor, as regulated by the Rhodians, had spread through the whole of the Archipelago. According to this standard, therefore, Philip, like Euagoras (vol. iv. p. 293), coined his royal silver. His coins show the growth of the prosperity of the kingdom, and the anxious care bestowed upon the interests of trade; for their workmanship is more careful than that of the coins of his predecessors. He treated the coinage of money as a royalty; and caused all coins belonging to separate cities in his dominions to be suppressed, with the exception of those belonging to his colony of Philippi, which he thereby wished to distinguish, as it were, as a free imperial city. At the same time he introduced a regular gold coinage, which had hitherto, even in the parts of his territory most abounding in gold, been singularly inconsiderable. His gold piece, the Philippic *stater*, was in value nothing else than the Persian *daricus*, which was current throughout all Greece, and which was likewise the prototype of the Attic gold. Hereby he established his position as a prince of equal rank as towards the Great King, and by the well-regulated double standard of the public coinage of his kingdom introduced Macedonia into the general traffic of the world.*

After Philip had firmly established his rule, and had

* As to Philip's system of coinage, see J. Brandis, p. 250.

hereupon given to his kingdom such a territory, that it could by virtue of its own resources assert itself as an independent Great Power, the third chapter of his activity commenced, which was concerned with the relation of Macedonia to the surrounding states of the mainland.

Philip and
Arybbas the
Molossian.

Towards the West he had already at an early period directed his attention, having entered into a combination with the most vigorous tribe of the Epirotes, the Molossi; as had been done before him, and with the same intentions, by Iason of Pheræ (vol. iv. p. 468). The Molossian princes had always undergone manifold pressure at the hands of the Illyrians; after, therefore, the latter had been with so much vigor overthrown by Philip, it very naturally suggested itself to seek in him a support against the common enemy. For this reason Arybbas, the successor of Alcetas, gladly consented to bestow the hand of his daughter Olympias upon Philip (before 357 B. C.), in whom he already recognized an ally mightier than himself; and by means of this connexion Philip found himself able to exercise upon the land of his western neighbors an influence, and reserved it to himself for an opportune moment, to turn this influence fully to account. For he was at present occupied with the incomparably more important and difficult task of bringing his relations with the states on his southern border into the condition necessary for the execution of his plans.

The relations of Philip towards the Greek states resembled those which had of old existed between Cræsus and the cities of Ionia. Neither of these princes was an enemy of Hellenism, or by any means desired its humiliation; on the contrary, it was the fullest recognition of Greek culture and of the power contained in it, which induced them to make every effort to render these forces serviceable to their empires, which in no other way could attain to their full development. But

Philip and
the Greeks.

Philip approached incomparably nearer to Greek culture than the Lydian king; and it was therefore much easier for Philip to attach himself to the traditions of Greek political life. While, therefore, the Asiatic prince saw no other way before him for the accomplishment of his objects, than that of conquest, Philip designed to have himself acknowledged by the Greek states as the leader and director of their common efforts. Already his ancestors had been recognized as Hellenes; he was himself a pupil of Greek training; he had also as victor at Olympia (Olymp. i. ; B. C. 356) in his own person acquired the Hellenic citizenship; now, his state, which had become strong through Greek culture, was to be introduced into the Greek system of states, and as the most powerful in this group of states to assume the leadership over them.

The position of affairs could not have been more promising. Thebes had sunk back into her former impotence; and after the death of Epaminondas Athens was the solitary state in which the idea of a national policy survived; but it was merely a dreamy reminiscence of the past, which her citizens would not bear to renounce, while at the same time they felt themselves possessed of no vital powers for making the idea a reality. During the bloody feuds, which led to no decisive result, a weariness of the present condition of things, and a desire for peace and union, had come to be more and more widely felt; and how were those ends to be reached otherwise than under the leadership of a state, which stood outside of the exhausted group of states, without being a stranger to them? When Philip took into consideration this condition of things; when with his keen glance he perceived, how the petty states had degenerated, how the still existing forces of population were uselessly consuming themselves in party discord, in war and in a lawless life of mercenary service, how among the best citizens many were longing for a vigorous leadership, without finding

the right men for the purpose in their own people; when Philip could convince himself, how in the same measure in which the faith in the vitality of the small republics had sunk, the reputation of regal power had risen in the eyes of many of the most intelligent Hellenes:—he naturally and necessarily arrived at the conviction, that the objects of his personal ambition were also that which was historically necessary and alone rational, and must thus in the end be also acknowledged by the Greeks, in spite of their obstinate local patriotism and of their contempt for the Macedonian people. The national history of the Greeks had lived its life to an end in the orbit of their native country, in a more limited sense of the term, and under the form of republican constitutions; if it was to have a future, the fresh vigor of the cognate peoples of the North must be added, and the direction of the national policy must pass into the hands of a prince, possessing a dynastic power which was independent, and superior to all the petty states together.

Philip, therefore, trod exactly in the steps of Iason of Pheræ, but stood in a signally ^{Philip the successor of Iason.} more advantageous position, than that of Iason had been. For while Iason was confronted by the Thebans, who disputed the hegemony with him, there existed at the present moment no Greek state capable of directing the affairs of Greece. Athens issued forth in pitiable and mortal exhaustion from the Social War; of Sparta nothing was left but her ancient obstinacy; Thebes was after the day of Mantinea incapable of holding her position, and of sustaining the system of policy which she had begun in Thessaly and in Peloponnesus. With the death of Epaminondas all the elements which that great statesman had united fell asunder again; and there remained nothing but an unhappy and pernicious excitement. The history of the Greek people demanded the leadership of a state holding the primacy; but the pri-

mary position stood empty; nor could it be presumed, that among the Greek states another would come forward, and display such a pre-eminence in power and moral force, as to be able to assert a claim to the hegemony.

Moreover, Iason was a prince who had ^{Philip's} ^{Greek policy.} founded his dominion by arbitrary force; he had no nation to fall back upon, and was not secure in his own house. Philip was a legitimate king, and master of incomparably greater resources; he was in league with Greek states, an ally of the Great King, and in possession of the most important coast-territory; he therefore enjoyed an authority in the eyes of the Greeks quite different from that of Iason, who compared with Philip was an audacious adventurer. Finally, Philip was in a quite different degree equipped with the intellectual powers, indispensable to a prince desirous of transferring the motive power of the Greek world to the North; he had gone through quite another schooling both abroad and at home. He was acquainted with all the resources of Greek statecraft, and knew how to employ them for his purposes. Like Themistocles, he contrived to apply the annual payments from the mines to the rapid construction of a navy; from Brasidas he had learnt to know the weakest point of the Attic power; with Lysander he shared an utter unscrupulousness in the choice of means, and the art of crippling the power of resistance in the several cities by taking advantage of the internal party-divisions existing in them; he was the scholar of Epaminondas in the science of war, in the policy of intervention, in the settlement of cities as bases of influence abroad; while lastly he was the successor of Iason in the method of bringing into his hands the hegemony over Hellas. That which had made the Athenians irresistible in the days of Cimon and Pericles, viz. rapidity and energy of action, was now the victorious force possessed by Philip; he now stood in the same relation towards the

Greeks, in which Athens had once stood towards the slowly-moving and irresolute Peloponnesians; for he was, as the Athenians had been, at all times ready to strike; he always advanced with rapidity upon his object, everywhere drove his adversaries into a position of mere defence, and confounded them by the unexpectedness of his attack. Free from nervous impatience, he knew how to wait for the right moment, calmly to pause when at the very height of success, and to localize war within definite limits. He therefore from the first took care not to wear the aspect of a conqueror after the fashion of the Persian kings, lest perchance he might stimulate the Greek states to unite for common resistance and for a struggle of despair against him; he rather sought to espy suitable opportunities for interference in the affairs of Greece; nor was he ever better satisfied, than when he found single parties or entire communities applying to him as the mighty neighboring prince, to undertake the office of a protector of those in trouble and of an umpire, so that he was thus able gradually to accustom the Greeks to recognize a supreme authority resting in his hands. But in order to give to such a position a semblance of justification, he, like Iason, could value nothing more highly, than admission into the Greek Amphictyony. The occasions needed for the purpose very soon presented themselves.

Thessaly was the country, through which lay the road to Hellas. In Thessaly it be-
Interven-
tion in Thes-
saly.
hooved Philip in the first instance to establish a footing, so that he might become the next-door neighbor of Interior Greece. With the state of affairs in Thessaly he had become sufficiently acquainted at Thebes. The Thebans had waged war against the Tyrannical dynasty of Pheræ, and had prevented the union by force of the country. It was Philip's task to take up the policy of Thebes, and for his part to accomplish the tasks which

she had left unfulfilled. Alexander of Pheræ (vol. iv. p. 472) had been assassinated in the year 359, at the instigation of his wife, by her brothers Tisiphonus, Lycophron, and Pitholaus. The last two resumed the struggle against the Thessalian nobility, who were at that time serving under the Thebans in the war against Phocis. The Aleuadae, abandoned by Thebes, applied for aid to Philip. He arrived at the head of an armed force, and was thereby simultaneously involved in the Sacred War, which had at that time broken out. He thus took up the policy of the Thebans, not only as an adversary of the Thessalian tyrants, but also as an adversary of Phocis.

Phocis.

For agitation had long prevailed in the highlands of Parnassus. This country, which had been only slightly affected by the earlier wars, was densely peopled; it possessed a large class of peasants and herdsmen, whose natural strength was still unused, and whose manners were of great simplicity. The free inhabitants themselves attended to their rural business; an ancient law in Phocis even prohibited, or narrowly restricted, the possession of slaves. This state of things changed in the fourth century. In the towns individual families arose, which acquired a large amount of landed property and abandoned the ancient usages of the country; the house of Mnaseas owned one thousand slaves. Henceforth, one family sought to outstrip the other; jealousy and hostility grew apace, *e. g.* between the houses of Mnaseas and Theotimus; and these relations of mutual ill-will led to important consequences, when the Phocians were drawn forth out of their former retirement, and introduced into the complications of the Greek world. They had little concern with the general national interests. The spirit animating them was one of defiant independence and hatred of their neighbors, of the Thessalians in particular, which already in the Wars of Liberation

had decided their political attitude (vol. ii. p. 274). In recent years they had against their will submitted to the Theban hegemony, and had, even while Epaminondas was still alive, refused to furnish a contingent for service beyond their own boundaries against their friends the Spartans (vol. iv. p. 503). For this conduct they were now, after the battle of Mantinea, to be punished. For, in spite of the warning uttered by their great general, the Thebans were by no means minded immediately to renounce their position as a Great Power, and even attempted to draw the reins of their hegemony over Central Greece tighter than before. This stimulated the Phocians to venture upon the most resolute resistance; their spirit of freedom, once aroused, grew after the first successes, and encouraged them to direct their efforts to ends yet greater than mere independence as towards Thebes. It was the exhaustion of the great states, which, as the example of Arcadia shows, at this time encouraged even the lesser popular communities to come forth from their obscurity, and to pursue a policy of their own. Thus in Phocis also there was awakened a new spirit of state-autonomy and of a high-flown craving for glory.

The Bœotians were not sufficiently superior in strength to their neighbors, to be able alone to subdue them. They therefore sought to take advantage of the ancient enmity of the Thessalians against Phocis, and again of the authority of Delphi. Here they found no difficulty in drawing the officers of the temple into their interest, and causing the Pythian god to intervene, in order through his support to secure their object, the chastisement of their rebellious vassals. A suitable occasion soon presented itself in the complicated frontier-relations of the sacred district. Phocian landed proprietors were accused of having encroached upon the domain of the temple. For this the Council of the

Amphictyonic decree
against Phocis.

Ol. cvi. 1
(B. C. 356.)

Amphietyons now inflicted a heavy pecuniary penalty; while in the event of this remaining unpaid, Phocis was placed under the ban, and declared to be land escheating to the god.

There existed from the first in Phocis a party, which recommended a compromise, when this storm gathered over the country. But vehement demagogues succeeded in making every voice of moderation die away. The mutual jealousy prevailing among the families contributed its effects. For at the head of the movement stood the houses of Theotimus and of Euthyrates,—the latter the same man, between whom and Mnaseas a violent quarrel concerning an heiress had broken out. The family-feud became a political struggle. Moreover, priestly guile had doubtless been concerned in the arrangement, according to which the house of Euthyrates, which was disliked at Delphi, had been hit especially hard in the sentence of the Amphietyons. Indignation at this sentence caused the son of Euthyrates, Onomarchus, to place himself at the head of the war-party, where a prospect opened to him of simultaneously satisfying his ambition and his family-hatred. Onomarchus was reputed the real author of the decisive decree. At his side stood Philomelus, the son of Theotimus. These were bold and highly-gifted men, potent in word and deed. Led by them, the popular assembly resolved upon energetic resistance against the demands of the Amphietyons. But this was not deemed enough. The entire political relations of the country were to be transformed; for every element of vexation and hatred, which had gathered from of old among the Phocians against Delphi, against Bœotia, or against Thessaly, now came to light; bitterest of all was the rage against Delphi, which was once more allowing itself to be used as the tool of the enemies of Phocis. This temple-state, it was declared, could no longer be tolerated; the natural guardian of the sanctuary was the Phocian state, which ought not to permit

such a focus of hostile intrigue to continue to exist in the heart of its own district.*

The Phocian people summoned up its energies for a new political career, and deemed itself called to great deeds. A general armament was decreed, and Philomelus was chosen commander, with Onomarchus as his colleague. Environed by bitter foes, the Phocians looked around for allies abroad, and placed their hopes above all in Sparta. For the Spartans, it was remembered, were lying under the same kind of sentence as the Phocians; they had been for the second time condemned by the Delphic authorities on account of their criminal seizure of the citadel of Cadmus, and like the Phocians had raised a protest against the sentence (vol. iv. p. 427). From Athens, too, support was hoped for. Both these states, it was thought, could not possibly remain tranquil supporters of the annihilation of an independent Phocis, and of the unconditional victory of the Thebano-Thessalian policy. Philomelus himself repaired to Sparta, where his plans met with approval, and where he received promises and pecuniary support, but no real aid from any quarter.

The Phocians were left to rely upon themselves; and from without they derived no advantage except through the tardiness of their adversaries, who shrank from decisive steps. Philomelus accordingly perceived, that everything de-

Outbreak
of the Sacred
War.

Ol. cvi. 1 (B. C.
365.)

* Our knowledge of the (ten years' : Duris, *ap.* Athen. 560) Phocian war is entirely based upon Diodorus, whose sources were Theopompus, Demophilus (the son and continuer of Ephorus), and Diyllus (the continuer of Callisthenes). Besides him we have Pausanias and Justin; and in occasional points Demosthenes and Æschines. Cf. Flathe, *der phokische Krieg*, 1854.—No slaves in Phocis: Athen. 264c.—Quarrel about the heiress: Aristot. *Polit.* 200, 28. (Aristotle had an immediate acquaintance with the mother as the friend of Mnason, the son of Mnaseas, according to Timæus *ap.* Athen. u. s.) The rape of Theano the occasion of the war: Duris *ap.* Athen. 560 b. Sentence of the Amphictyons in August, 356 B. C.—Onomarchus *πολλαῖς καὶ μεγάλας δίκας ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἦν καταδικασμένος ὁμοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις* (read *οὐχ ὁμοίως*), Diod. xvi. 32. Diod., c. 56 and 61, makes Onomarchus and Philomelus brothers.

pended upon rapid action ; by means of a bold advance he hoped to have the best chance of inducing his allies likewise to take part in the struggle. Nor indeed was it admissible for him to wait, until the members of the League were in arms, established themselves in the heart of the country under the pretext of protecting the temple, and controlled the connecting routes ; for the Phocian communities encircled Mount Parnassus, and could from Delphi be very easily hindered in their common action. He therefore urged on the armament, adding to it from his own resources, and, while outwardly peace still reigned, anticipated his adversaries by a bold sudden stroke. He occupied Delphi, where he demeaned himself with the utmost rigor as the guardian of the sanctuary. Bloody vengeance was wreaked upon the families at Delphi, which were particularly hostile in their sentiments and offered resistance ; their lands were confiscated ; the Locrians who were coming up were driven back ; the memorials of the recent decrees were destroyed ; and the Pythia herself was forced to espouse the side of the Phocians.

Philomelus
at Delphi.

Ol. cvi. 1 (B. C.
355).
Spring.

After this decisive advance, the necessity of a single leadership was felt even more keenly than before ; and on the part of the popular community all the powers of an absolute dictatorship were conferred upon Philomelus, who established his residence at Delphi, constructed a fort commanding the ways of access to it, and issued a manifesto to the Greek nation, wherein he justified his apparent breach of the peace, and solemnly declared his intention to maintain intact the common sanctuary of Hellas, and to render an account of the treasures of Delphi.*

The Thebans were manifestly extremely surprised by the resolute bearing and energetic action of the Phocian people. They had intended to use Delphi as the base of

* Fort erected by Philomelus: Ulrichs, *Reisen*, i. 117.

their further operations for the humiliation of the despised highlanders ; instead of which it had become a citadel of the foe, which they did not venture to approach. Philomelus, who was forced to undertake expeditions of pillage in order to support his mercenaries, even threatened the Bœotian frontiers ; and the Thebans began to fear for their country-towns, whose loyalty was never to be depended upon.

They accordingly summoned an Amphietyonic assembly to Thermopylæ, where the adversaries of the Phocians, the Thessalians in particular, were represented. This was a diet in every respect illegal ; it however, de-

clared itself to be the representative body of the Hellenic nation, and claimed the rights of such an assembly. Philomelus was placed under the ban ; and all the men capable of

Amphietyonic decree from Thermopylæ against Philomelus,

Ol. cvi. 2 (B. C. 355).

Autumn.

bearing arms were in the name of the Delphic god summoned to take part in a Sacred War. All the tribes armed, which stood towards Thebes in the relation of communities bound to furnish military contingents ; once more Thebes found herself at the head of the populations from Mount Olympus to the Corinthian Gulf, of the Locrians, Dorians, Thessalians, of the tribes of Mount Ceta and of the Pindus-range. They came in with great ardor for war, not in order to succor the Delphic god and his Pythia, but in order at last thoroughly to gratify their hatred against the Phocians (autumn of 355). Greece was divided into two camps, according as it adhered to the one or the other side. For Phocis there was much sympathy, but little aid ; the two Great Powers were crippled, and auxiliaries came only from Achaia. Philomelus therefore had the greatest difficulties to contend against ; and, although he was originally a party-politician, swayed by ambitious designs and dynastic schemes, he yet showed himself a born prince, and a man of mighty intellectual force.

Conduct of the war by Philomelus.

In his eyes everything depended upon awakening confidence in his cause, and upon proving that the Phocians were not a savage horde, but ripe for, and capable of, independence as a state, and worthy of taking their place among the other states. He maintained discipline and order, and by means of energetic counter-measures forced the enemy, who regarded his soldiers as sacrilegious despoilers of the temple, and was about to treat as such those who had fallen into his hands, to concede to his army equality of treatment according to the laws of war. But the worst evils he was unable to remove. They arose from the fact, that his power was based on mercenaries, whom he had rapidly collected by means of excessive payments of money. His whole power was therefore in reality a money power. Under these circumstances it would have been miraculous, had Philomelus succeeded in throughout observing the moderation which he had made his law, and which he had openly recognized as an obligation incumbent upon him. The temptation was too great. He and his friends were absolute masters of the best-filled treasury in Greece,—and were they from want of money to abandon the country to its most furious foes? In point of fact, no choice remained for the Phocians, after they had once gone so far. Accordingly, a treasury-office was instituted; and under its responsibility resort was had to the temple-treasure, in the first instance probably only in the form of a loan taken from the temple, afterwards, however, with increasing boldness and recklessness. The treasures, which had for centuries lain in a sacred place under the threshold of the temple, now found their way abroad; and the more gold was found, the more was sought. The long-restrained ill-will against the priestly, city gratified itself by taking full advantage of its treasures; not only was the gold cast into the mint, but the sacred relics too were laid hands upon, and precious ornaments dating from the Heroic age were seen glittering

upon the necks of the wives of the captains of the mercenaries. 10,000 talents (nearly £2,500,000) are said at that time to have come into circulation; nor were they merely expended as pay to the soldiery, but also applied abroad, in order to gain over influential personages, such as Dinicha, the consort of king Archidamus at Sparta, or on the other hand to excite favorable sentiments in the camp of the enemy.* And yet the Phocians could not secure a control over the fortune of war.

After a series of successful contests, Philomelus was attacked in the valley of Cephissus by a superior force, and involved in a battle, which ended in a defeat. He only escaped personal captivity by throwing himself, bleeding from many wounds, into the abyss from the rocky crags near Tithora.

Defeat and
death of
Philomelus.

Ol. cvii. 1
(B. C. 354).

Apparently, the Thebans regarded the cause of the Phocians as lost, inasmuch as about the same time they dispatched their best general, Pammenes, at the head of 5,000 men through Macedonia to Asia, where he was to support the satrap Artabazus against the Great King. But they were greatly mistaken, if they conceived the defiant spirit of the Phocians to have been broken. Even now the moderate party in the country was unable to prevail. Onomarchus, who had probably long borne with difficulty his subordination to Philomelus, now assumed the first place, and his brother Phayllus the second; the dynastic character of the movement becoming more and more palpable. The house of Euthyceates stood like a royal family at the head of the people; and, in order to gratify the ambition of that house, the bloody war was continued with fresh ardor. There were still more and more Delphic treasures to be turned into money; fresh bands of soldiery

Victories
of Onomarchus.

Ol. cvi. 4 (B.
C. 353).

* Dinicha and Archidamus are accused of corruption by Theopompus, *ap* Pausan. iii. 10, 3.

flowed in to serve the free-handed prince; under him Phocis was the first financial and military power in Hellas. Fortune likewise favored him. At Pheræ new tyrants arose. He connected himself with them, supported them with money, and thereby secured freedom from molestation in his rear. The Thebans had allowed their ardor to grow slack, while in a foolish dream of playing the part of a Great Power they had weakened their strength by undertakings at a distance. Of a sudden they found themselves no longer sure of their own land. For Onomarchus made himself master of all the advantages belonging to an energetically conducted war, occupied Thermopylæ, and devastated the territories of the confederates of Thebes, in order to render the tribes of Mount Cæta, the Dorians and Locrians, heartily sick of their obligation of furnishing military contingents to Thebes. Hereupon a revolt was provoked in Bœotia itself; while simultaneously an expedition was undertaken into Thessaly, in order there to secure the victory to the anti-Theban party.

It was in Thessaly, then, that the complications ensued, which caused the Macedonian king to intervene directly in the quarrels of the Greeks, precisely at the time when, after accomplishing his more immediate tasks, he was seeking for an opportunity to extend his influence upon the countries of Greece. No opportunity could have been more favorable than that which now offered itself to him. He had on his side not only the ancient dynastic families of the land, which claimed his aid against Lycophron and Pitholaus (p. 67) but also the Thessalian people. For the Tyrants of Pheræ were hated throughout the country on account of the arbitrary policy which they had at all times pursued; and this aversion had naturally in a high degree increased, since they had allied themselves with the hereditary enemies of Thessaly, the Phocians. Philip could therefore reckon upon vigorous support in Thessaly

itself; he appeared in the character of a protector against the savage mercenary bands which fed upon the spoils of the temple, and which had more and more become a plague to all Greece. And yet he found his next measures far from easy of execution. At first, indeed, he without much difficulty drove back Phayllus, who had been dispatched against him in support of the Tyrants. But hereupon Onomarchus perceived, that Thessalian affairs would not admit of being treated as matters of secondary importance. He advanced at the head of all his forces from Bœotia, and threw himself with wrathful energy upon the new foe, who was minded to ruin his schemes. In two great battles he defeated the Macedonian king, so that the latter only escaped pursuit with the broken remnants of his army. The power of the Aleuadæ had thus been broken; and inasmuch as simultaneously Bœotia, whose union had been an effort of so much difficulty, was likewise in a state of utter dissolution, Coronea, the ancient confederate city, falling into the hands of the Phocians, and Orchomenus again rising in opposition to Thebes, while the Tyrants of Pheræ were eagerly endeavoring to obtain for their energetic protector the supremacy over all Thessaly,—it was indeed possible for Onomarchus, who nowhere saw an enemy worthy of consideration confronting him in the field, to indulge in the hope, that he would succeed in founding a dominion for himself and his house, which should unite a great part of the Greek mainland as a single empire.

But king Philip had only marched home in order to return better armed to the scene of the conflict. After the lapse of a few months he was again in Thessaly, at the head of 20,000 foot and 3,000 horse. Here he contrived to turn to excellent account the hatred of Phocis, which had been provoked afresh by the late war; he fired the troops with the thought, that they were fighting for a sacred

His defeat
and death.

OL. cvi. 4 (B.
C. 352).

cause, and gained a bloody, but complete, victory. More than 6,000 of the enemy fell in the field, while 3,000 prisoners were cast into the sea as sacrilegious violators of the temple. Onomarchus himself fell, and his dead body was nailed to the cross (spring of 352 B. C.).*

The king pacified Thessaly, and, after expelling the Tyrants, immediately occupied the positions of the greatest moment to himself, which he had long resolved never to relinquish again; viz. Pagasæ, the most important harbor of all Thessaly, and the peninsula of Magnesia, which controlled the port, and the possession of which was of decisive significance for the mastery over all Thessaly. In order at the same time to be credited with some popular measure, he declared Pheræ, the city of the Tyrants, to be a free city, and was hereupon loudly celebrated as the saviour of Thessaly, as the benefactor of the Hellenes, and as the avenger of Apollo.

Meanwhile, the party opposed to him was anything but annihilated. Phayllus became leader of the Phocians; and it redounded to his advantage, that the victory of Philip had excited terror among the other Hellenes, and had roused them from their inaction. They beheld the Macedonian king—of whom they had been accustomed to think only as of a potentate on the distant frontiers of the Greek world, and who was known to them as a dangerous neighbor in the region of the colonies alone,—suddenly powerful in Thessaly, and standing with a victorious army on the boundary of Interior Greece. The Athenians without delay manned a fleet, and occupied Thermopylæ. Had Philip continued his advance, in order to fight out the Sacred War, he would have united Phocis, Athens, and Sparta, in an armed alliance, and have driven them to pursue an energetic national policy. Such was not his intention. There still

* Death of Onomarchus: Diod. xvi. 61.

remained more dedicatory gifts and temple-vessels to melt into money; succor arrived from Sparta and Achaia, and the Tyrants of Pheræ as fugitive partisans supported the war of pillage in the territory of Locris.

Phayllus died with his spirit unbroken, after he had appointed his nephew Phalæcus, the son of Onomarchus, his successor; the captainship in war had become a hereditary princely power.*

and Phalæcus at the head of affairs in Phocis.

But gradually the pecuniary resources failed. The war slackened; it degenerated into a border-feud, which dragged on year after year without arriving at any decision, and which, like an open sore, exhausted all the healthy forces of the population. More and more fields were left untilled; more and more homesteads were burnt down, and fruit trees felled; while the inhabitants were barbarized by the sufferings resulting from the war, which was carried on from year to year, without its being very clear with what object. Bœotia and Locris exhausted their strength, while the state of mercenaries was inevitably doomed to a thorough collapse. Neither side could obtain a result worthy of such enormous sacrifices. Everything remained undecided except that which king Philip had intended. He alone had secured any advantage.

His dominion now extended from the gold-mines of Thrace to Thermopylæ. Thessaly, the land so indispensable to him with its abundant resources, which had never before been united under the control of a single ruler, and had therefore never before been fairly turned to account, was at his feet, and the strongest natural boundary, Mount Olympus with its passes, no longer existed for him; the military contingents of the Thessalians, above all their cavalry, were at his disposal; in the Pagasæan Gulf he

Philip master of Thessaly.
(Il. cvi. 4 (B. C. 352).)

* Phalæcus, nephew (*quære* and adopted son? Wesseling *ad* Diod. xvi. 38) of Phayllus: Diod. Schol. Æschin. ii. 130; Pausan. x. 2, 6.

possessed a new naval station on the shores of the Greek sea, and in the port-dues levied there a new and rich source of income.* And all this he had achieved, not as a conqueror taking by force, but as a friend and benefactor of the country, fighting for a just and national cause, on behalf of order and sacred usage against Tyranny and military despotism, and had achieved it after such a fashion, that those whom he had aided would be also unable to spare him in the future. He retained the threads in his hands; he had thrown the bridge across into Interior Hellas, and calmly waited, till the hour should arrive for crossing it. In the meantime the Hellenes, in particular the immediate neighbors of Southern Thessaly, themselves did more than any foreign foe could have done thoroughly to consume the power of resistance remaining in Hellas; and, after securing Thessaly, Philip was all the more able calmly to turn his attention to the tasks demanding it in the North. An empire such as his claimed the presence of the king at the greatest variety of points; nowhere existed a fixed usage, everything was in a state of generation, and he was the soul of the whole. Accordingly, the rapidity of his marches, which excited the astonishment of all the world, was one of the most effectual means, whereby he made his empire firm and strong.

Philip in
Thrace.

Ol. cvii. 1
(B. C. 352).

In the autumn of 352 he stood in Thrace; forced the chiefs there to acknowledge his supremacy; advanced as far as the waters of the Pontus; and concluded treaties of amity with Cardia on the Hellespont, with Byzantium and Perinthus.† About the same time he extended his power in the direction of the Adriatic, erected forts in the Illyrian country, and accustomed the princes of Epirus to submit

* Port- and market-dues as a royalty of Philip: Dem. i. 22: τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγορὰς καρποῦσθαι.

† Philip in Thrace: Diod. xvi. 34, *et seq.*

to his ordinances. Finally he had also from Thessaly already opened communications with Eubœa, in order to secure friends in this important island, and was incessantly engaged in extending his combinations in all directions, and in acquiring influence on every coast.

These were introductory measures, which gently prepared future steps, while in localities nearer to his dominions he set about executing his previously prepared plans with full vigor. One of the principal among these was the complete subjection of the Chalcidian peninsulas.

It is true that since the fall of Amphipolis affairs nowhere wore a more peaceful aspect, ^{Philip and Olynthus.} than in the regions in question. While in Central Greece the war raged and everything was unhinged, prosperity and wealth prevailed among the Olynthians and the cities confederated with them. For they had nothing to fear either from Athens or from Sparta; and was not the single neighbor, who would have inflicted damage upon them, their best friend (p. 56)? He had proved himself such by his acts; to him they owed the extension and rounding-off of their territory, for he had abandoned to them Potidæa and Anthemus; he bestowed gifts upon their citizens; favored their city by manifold concessions; permitted their capitalists to take a lucrative share in the working of the mines, now flourishing with unprecedented vigor; extended their rights of pasture; and seemed to take pleasure in their prosperity. In this attitude of Philip the Olynthians recognized the old Macedonian policy, such as already king Perdiccas had pursued towards them; and they thought to have all the less reason for mistrust, inasmuch as they might consider that even the present monarchy, engaged as it was in efforts for a further advance, must necessarily attach some value to their friendship. But since the Macedonian kingdom spread with so bold a self-assurance in every direction, and developed a systematic policy of asserting itself as a

Great Power, the Olynthians after all began to be disquieted by their position next to a neighbor so vastly superior in strength, whose conquests surrounded their territory like an island. They felt as if they were sitting before the lair of a beast of prey, on whose humor alone it depended, when it would stretch forth its claws upon a victim which could not escape it. They lived in a constant condition of terror, which increased or diminished according as Philip and his army were more or less remote from them. This disquietude was further heightened by the fact, that the Olynthians were not a single city community, but a group of from twenty to thirty towns, each of which contained parties in mutual hostility against one another. For Philip had taken care to have in the communities of all the towns adherents, who advocated an unconditional alliance with Macedonia as the one true policy of the Chalcidians, and who kept him informed of every sign of movements in a contrary direction. And yet the feeling in favor of independence, which was so deeply rooted in all Greek communities, and the love of liberty once more gained the upper hand; the national parties in the confederate towns combined, and it was resolved to see, how far it was still permitted to them to pursue a policy of their own. For, although apparently enjoying equal rights of independence, they yet already stood in a relation of vassalage to Macedonia, since in the treaty of alliance they had undertaken to carry on war conjointly with her against Athens, or conjointly with her to conclude peace. This was the price exacted for Potidæa and Anthemus; for how could the king have given up such cities as these to a neighboring state, without having assured himself of its alliance? It was therefore from the Olynthians that the first offence against the treaties proceeded, when, without asking Philip, they entered into peace-negotiations with Athens, which was already in arms against the king, so as at least to claim for them-

selves the right of neutrality. The earliest of these transactions are probably contemporaneous with the Macedonian campaigns in Thessaly.*

Since this proceeding the relations between Philip and the confederation of cities had ^{Olynthus and Athens.} been the reverse of easy; but neither side was inclined to bring about an open rupture. The king came into contact with the territory of the cities on his expeditions to Thrace; he let them perceive his power, he warned and threatened, but did nothing on his side to break the peace. The Olynthians, on the other hand, under the guidance of the national party, went a step further, by requesting military aid from the Athenians for the protection of their frontiers. This already amounted to a decided demonstration against Philip, who could not possibly be expected to tolerate the appearance of hostile troops in the territory of his allies. There was now nothing needed but chance occasions, in order to bring the war to an outbreak. Such an occasion presented itself, when the king demanded that one of his step-brothers, who had taken refuge at Olynthus, should be given up. Hereupon the city ^{Embassy of the Olynthians to Athens. Ol. cvii. 4. (B. C. 349.)} took the decisive step, by sending envoys to Athens, with instructions to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance against Macedonia.

Everything now depended upon the result of this embassy. Olynthus and Athens were the two states alone remaining in possession of resources for resistance. A combination between them was therefore also what Philip had from the first endeavored to prevent. If Olynthus

* Conclusion of peace between Olynthus and Athens: summer of 352 B. C. according to Schäfer, *Demosth.*, ii. 114. The negotiations with Athens amounted to an "offence against the treaties," in so far as according to the sense of those treaties Olynthus had evidently renounced an independent foreign policy. This is quite reconcileable with the statement in Chap. iii, *infra*, that a real breach of the treaties could not be proved against the Olynthians.

was lost like Amphipolis, Pydna, and Methone, then Athens alone was left. What then was the condition of things at Athens? What had been her course of conduct during the period of the growth of the Macedonian power? Was she able and resolved, to enter upon a decisive struggle on her own behalf and on that of the Hellenes against Philip of Macedonia, whose intentions with regard to Greece could no longer be matter of doubt since his proceedings in the vicinity of Thermopylæ?

CHAPTER II.

THE POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF ATHENS UP TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PUBLIC CAREER OF DEMOSTHENES.

SINCE Athens had freed herself from the Thirty Tyrants, she involuntarily again and History of Attic policy. again returned to the courses of her ancient policy, endeavoring to extend her dominion, and to acquire influence over the general affairs of Greece. She was unable to forget her past, while at the same time the interests of her trade demanded that she should recover maritime power and confederates. But the great difference between the new and the old Athens lay in this: that it was now no longer the entire civic community, which of one accord desired progress, and that its efforts had no endurance. Athens betrayed her exhaustion; and when she had made a vigorous advance, she soon sank back into an attitude of fatigue, and craved for nothing but a tranquil enjoyment of life, and undisturbed comfort within the limited sphere of her civic life. The other difference lies in the circumstance, that the policy of old Athens had always developed itself out of itself by virtue of a certain necessity, while now impulses to a more vigorous course of action invariably came from without, so that the policy of the Athenians was determined by special opportunities, and depended upon outward accidents.

It was thus that Athens, her action being impelled by foreign states, had become involved in the Corinthian War; and after she had, exhausted and discouraged by

heavy losses, concluded peace, it was again the events in Bœotia which had determined the Athenian policy. Indeed, even the parties at home, to whose influence the resolutions of the citizens were subject, were distinguished from one another according to their relations towards the foreign states.

Now, the formation of these parties was not based upon any new principles of policy; but in them there merely reappeared in an altered shape the old tendencies. For while the one party disapproved of a one-sidedly democratic policy, and in spite of all the warnings of experience still continued to seek to bring about a good understanding with Sparta, the other clung to the principle, that the strength of the state lay in the sovereignty of the people, and that the state ought to be fortified against Sparta by means of an alliance with other states of the same kind of constitution. This could not at the present time be any longer effected by force, in the way in which Alcibiades had desired to bring it about, when he made Athens the centre of all the democratic parties in Greece; but it was necessary by means of the peaceable establishment of a connexion with states of cognate tendencies to support the city, and to endeavor to relieve it from the dangerous isolation in which it stood. And thus it wore the aspect of a piece of providential good fortune, when immediately after the deepest humiliation of Athens a mighty change took place in Bœotia, which burst asunder its ancient alliance with Sparta, and by virtue of an inner necessity placed the country on the side of the Athenians.

This turn in affairs was immediately recognized as a great advantage at Athens; and upon it was based the formation of the party, which during the ensuing decades united in its ranks the best elements of the community, and gave the most vigorous impulses to the life of the state. This

The Bœotian party;

party established as its principle the closest alliance with Thebes. This combination, which it had been in vain sought to bring about at the sword's point, was now by peaceable means to be made a reality redounding to the welfare of either state. Bœotia and Attica were naturally called upon to join hands as a land and a sea-power; neither state had cause to fear the other, or could derive aught but benefit from its neighbor. The friendship of Thebes made Attica secure as to her passes in the north, and equally so as to the Eubœan sea. United, they formed a power, which no other in Greece could defy.

Such was the programme of the Bœotian party,—a simple and clear plan of action, the healthy and fertile germ of a new-Attic policy, and the revival of the old popular party upon a basis in accordance with the demands of the times. This policy rested not merely on general principles and views, but also on personal relations of the most intimate character, on mutual services performed in days of great danger for the attainment of the highest purposes of state. These rapidly led to a warm feeling of elective affinity, to a political sympathy, which had a clear title to the removal of all earlier sentiments of ill-will. The “men of Phyle,” as the heroes were called, who had from the first taken part in the work of the Liberation, were also the leading statesmen of the Restoration (vol. iv. p. 68). Thrasybulus and Cephalus concluded the first offensive and defensive alliance with Thebes; the same tendency was shared by the eminent orator Leodamas of Acharnæ, by Aristophon the Hazeniæan (vol. iv. p. 71), and by Thrasybulus of Collytus.*

Although this party was so rich in efficient members, although its tendency was so genu-^{and its oppo-}inely patriotic, so thoroughly justified by the nents.

* Οἱ ἐπὶ Φυλῇ, Lys. xli. 52; οἱ συγκατελθόντες ἀπο Φυλῆς, xlii. 77.

existing state of things, and indeed so truly based upon historical necessity, yet it met with manifold contravention. It was the party of movement and of opposition to Sparta. Thrasybulus was the companion-in-arms of Alcibiades (vol. iii. p. 472); and Aristophon was the son of Demostratus, who had been the most zealous supporter of the Sicilian expedition (vol. iii. p. 346). For this reason all who were afraid of a new quarrel with Sparta and of new dangerous undertakings, all the enemies of democracy and of democratic agitation, were among the opponents of the Bœotian party. But at the same time it was opposed by the demagogues proper, such as Agyrrhius (vol. iv. p. 296), because they would not hear of any disturbance of a comfortable prosperity, and of the imposition of sacrifices upon the citizens. Hereupon, the influence of Thrasybulus and his associates was driven into the background by the appearance on the stage of Conon, who had been out of connexion with the period in which the new relations towards Thebes had formed themselves. Nor did the men, who attached themselves most closely to Conon, viz., Iphicrates and Timotheus, ever thoroughly enter into the points of view adopted by the Theban party; they were probably hampered in their judgment of the political situation by Attic pride. But the most decided adversary of the party was Callistratus of Aphidna, the foremost orator of his day at Athens. Although a nephew of Agyrrhius, he was on friendly terms with the Theban oligarchs; and, although as a good patriot he withstood every act of force on the part of Sparta, he was yet far more decisively prejudiced against Thebes. He was opposed to the establishment of a third capital in Greece, and of a Bœotia, united under the supremacy of Thebes, in the rear of Athens. In other words, he recurred to the principles of the policy of Cimon, in desiring to see the direction of national affairs retained by the two ancient primary states; and he thought he might hope to

find the right form in which to bring about this result, if the encroachments of Sparta were prevented by a firm course of action and a resolute bearing. But if Thebes put herself unduly forward, he held that the confusion which had existed of old would simply be increased. In no case was he willing to see Athens bound down to support Thebes; she was to reserve to herself the power of acting at any and every time according to circumstances. The policy which he advocated with great talent and in all sincerity, was therefore that of reserving perfect freedom of action. But this policy was in its whole tendency a faint-hearted one, which never glanced beyond the tasks of the hour, which lacked all great aims, and was therefore incapable of inspiring enthusiasm in the citizens and deciding them to vigorous resolves. This, however, was precisely the cause why it found a ready response; for it seemed to be the most cautious and prudent of policies.*

The Bœotian party was accordingly, in spite of all the sympathy which Thebes excited by her struggle for liberation, unable to carry its views, until again an outside event occurred, which put an end to this hesitation. The lawless attempt of Sphodrias (vol. iv. p. 379) made it clear even to the dumbest eye, that Sparta desired to have no allies, but only subjects, in Greece; to wage war against her was therefore ordained by the necessity of self-preservation. Hereupon, Cephalus carried the conclusion of the offensive and defensive alliance with Thebes; the civic community braced itself to fresh exertions, and all the parties in the state now co-operated with the Bœotian.†

There was no lack of the elements requisite for pursuing the new aims now adopted. The Athenians pos-

* Demagogic connexions of Callistratus: Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.* vol. i. p. 306 [*Eng. Tr.*]; Schäfer, *Demosth.* i. 12. As to his grandfather, cf. vol. ii. p. 500.

† Popular decree of Cephalus: Dinarch. i. 39; Xen. *Hellen.* v. 4, 34: οἱ βουλευτὰς οὖν ἐδίδασκον τὸν δῆμον, &c.

sessed generals of proved merit, who hailed with joy the opportunity for new deeds; they possessed experienced statesmen, who were able to provide that the agitation of the moment should result in a permanent strengthening of the state. Callistratus by no means evaded this task; for although he differed from the now dominant party with regard to the ultimate objects in view, he yet approved of whatever redounded to the advantage of the power of Athens, in particular by sea, where she could most independently assert herself as towards Sparta and as towards Thebes alike; and he was glad to be able to show, that his standpoint too was far from excluding a vigorous onward movement on the part of his native city. With him worked Aristoteles of Marathon and other men, who offered a splendid testimony to the fact, that the higher kind of statesmanship had not yet died out at Athens, and that there was no lack of organizing talent there.

Financial in-
novations. The thorough and methodical character of their proceedings is proved by the institutions dating from the year of Nausinicus (vol. iv. p. 385). The classes and the principle of the financial census, as established by Solon, were retained, in order that on the basis of this principle the actual property of the citizens as well as of the resident aliens might be officially ascertained; but the earlier usage was changed in important points, especially in this: that in all the classes there was entered as the capital subject to taxation not the entire property, but only part of it. This part in the lowest class corresponded roughly to the yearly income from its property; in the case of the wealthier classes, on the other hand, the amount of property liable to taxation proportionately increased; while, however, at the same time the citizens were reassured by the fact, that in none of the property-classes were the claims of the state allowed to extend to their capital itself, the interest of it being always alone in

question, of which eventually a certain percentage was to be contributed. The measure therefore amounted to nothing more than an income-tax graduated on a fair scale of proportion.

A second innovation consisted in the establishment of associations, in which the contributions for the requirements of the state were to be collected without the immediate participation of the government. The 1,200 richest citizens, elected out of the ten tribes, formed twenty unions or *Symmories*; and again the richest out of every symmory, fifteen from each, formed together a smaller college, that of the Three Hundred, whose duty it was to assess the payment of the war-tax imposed upon the community, and, if necessary, to cover deficiencies by advances.

A beginning was made with a not inconsiderable levy of taxation, which produced 300 talents (£73,000 *circ.*) With this sum a new armament was commenced; 100 ships of war were built, and 10,000 men placed under arms; the maritime supremacy of Athens being restored on essentially new principles (vol. iv. p. 387). For the first time a league of states was called into life, which was based on the foundation of impartial justice, an association which could not be taken advantage of for the purposes of any *one* state, but which served the well-understood interests of all those concerned in it. Athens was to possess no rights, except such as were necessary in order to give unity and strength to the League. No state could dispute with her the position of a directing primacy, or deny to her generals the conduct of the common undertakings. Athens necessarily became the seat of the permanent Federal Council, at which all the states were represented with equal rights of voting. Any possibility of encroachment was prevented by the prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of the states, of the de-

The new
Naval Con-
federation of
Athens.

Ol. c. 3 (B. C.
378.)

spatch of troops to garrison confederate towns, and of the arbitrary advance of any demand or arbitrary levy of any contribution. Nor was any Federal treasure formed, which again might have been transferred into the property of the Attic state; but the larger states furnished their own vessels, while the smaller paid their contributions according to the resolutions arrived at in common.

The ideas which lay at the basis of the new Federal policy had their origin at Athens. But before they were definitely fixed, an understanding was brought about with those states whose support it was pre-eminently necessary to secure, unless operations were to be commenced with nothing beyond an empty programme. Among those states were Chios, which had adhered to Athens even after the Peace of Antalcidas, as well as Mitylene and Byzantium; also Tenedos and Rhodes, where, after protracted party-feuds, the citizens had again deprived the families, partisans of Sparta, of the government; the Mitylenæans had drawn after them the Methymnæans, and the Byzantians Perinthus. An agreement had been secretly arrived at with these states, and afterwards with Thebes, where it was soon perceived what advantage could be drawn from the new Confederation. And, although Thebes itself was without immediate value for the power of the Naval Confederation, yet its accession was of importance, because it gave to the League the character of a wider, a Hellenic combination, and helped to remove the fears of a one-sided Attic policy.

After the execution of the proposed course of action had been thus assured, the instrument of the Confederation was, in accordance with the popular decree moved by Aristoteles, published, and after the names of the participating states had been added, erected as a lapidary inscription in the market-place; while at the same time a public summons was issued to all the maritime cities, to join this association, in

Attic policy
before the
battle of
Leuctra.

which they would find protection for their independence against the lawless encroachments of the superior strength of Sparta. But this summons could only exercise an effect, if, instead of being sent to its various addresses as a mere lifeless piece of writing, it reached the states through the personal mediation of men certain to awaken confidence. This was the task of the generals chosen in the first year of the new confederation, viz. Chabrias, Callistratus and Timotheus,—a combination of men, each of whom was after his fashion specially qualified for this difficult mission.

Callistratus enjoyed a widely-spread au- Callistratus.
 thority as a statesman; and the moderate
 policy, as the representative of which he was known, his
 comprehensive insight into affairs, his large experience
 and his diplomatic skill, were even more effective than
 his brilliant gifts as an orator. Chabrias was Chabrias.
 a commander of great fame both by land and
 by sea (vol. iv. p. 383), of inventive genius both in the
 improvement in the ships-of-war, and in the disposition
 and employment of his troops, and daring and prudent in
 all his undertakings. His good-fortune inspired confi-
 dence, and to be under his protection gave a sense of se-
 curity. Thus he succeeded in bringing about the adhe-
 rence of the Thracian island and coast-towns; while the
 important accession of Eubœa was due to Ti- Timotheus.
 motheus. The last-named, a man still in the
 vigor of youth, could not have been better recommended
 to his fellow-citizens or to the allies than by the fact of
 his being the son of Conon; and doubtless this recom-
 mendation was not left out of sight by the Athenians,
 when they set about resuming the work of his father,
 which the unfavorable aspect of the times had interrupted.
 But Timotheus was also personally eminently well
 adapted to represent the city abroad; for in him all the
 good elements which Athens contained were, so to speak,

incarnate. Accustomed from early youth to move in choice society, he possessed a refinement of manners, and a maturity and many-sidedness of culture, such as could be acquired nowhere else but at Athens. He was the son of a wealthy house, morally over-indulged and irritable, an aristocratic nature which, conscious of its own purity of intentions, was not devoid of acerbity against all efforts tinged with corruption, in particular against the doings of the popular orators, who sowed discord among the people; while at the same time he was always ready to acknowledge the deserts of others, perfectly free from arrogance and harsh party-feeling, courteous, open-handed and amiable. He belonged already to the younger Athens, whose best sons rose above mere party-distinctions, and were possessed of a culture free from all one-sidedness, and broadly Hellenic. Hereby he was singularly well qualified for intercourse with the cultivated men of all localities, and for acquiring everywhere friends for his native city. He viewed foreign policy from its ethical side; and the conquests which he made, whithersoever he came, were moral conquests,—in direct contrast to the clumsy method of the earlier democratic party, which asserted its influence by means of banishments, confiscations of property, and the overthrow of constitutions.

Isocrates. In his noble course of action Timotheus was assisted by the efforts of a chosen circle of friends, in particular by Isocrates, with whom he had entered into a close intimacy of habits of life since about the year 384. The writings of Isocrates were at this period extraordinarily popular in the whole of Greece, because they were the finished expression of an Attic culture, which with all its patriotism rested on the basis of the general national consciousness, and could be thoroughly appreciated and comprehended outside Athens. On this account his orations not only had an effect upon the taste of his contemporaries as models of style, but they

at the same time as political pamphlets exercised a momentous influence upon public opinion. For he contrived in so calm, impartial and winning a fashion to unfold the deserts of Athens, and her claims to the direction of national affairs, that he thereby advanced the interests of his native city. His writings were the open declaration of the new-Attic policy; he acted as pioneer to his youthful friend; and during his campaigns accompanied him and advised him, drew up his despatches, and became the eloquent herald of his deeds.*

A policy so well adapted to the times, and directed and supported by men of such capacity, could not remain without results. Transitory success of the Theban party. The ancient fears had vanished, and Athens was met with affectionate confidence. The cities, freed from the terror inspired by Sparta, paid the homage of wreaths of honor and monuments to their 'preserver and liberator, the people of Athens,' and united in an offensive and defensive alliance under its leadership. The Federal Council was established, and the regular levy of a Federal force of 200 vessels and 20,000 heavy-armed troops decreed. As of old, the citizens themselves mounted their triremes and, once more made the Archipelago an Attic sea (vol. iv. p. 390).

These brilliant successes lacked an enduring foundation. The Athenians were still capable of rising to an enthusiastic effort; but there existed no lasting readiness to come forward with personal sacrifices, and the successes themselves remained extremely incomplete. For while from the most distant seas tidings of victories arrived, the Athenians were unable to secure their own trading-vessels against the priva-

* As to the documents of the new Confederation, see note to vol. iv. p. 389. Aristoteles of Marathon (ὁ πολιτευσάμενος Ἀθήνησιν, οὗ καὶ δίκαια φέρονται λόγοι χαρίεντες, Diog. Laërt. v. 35). Instrument of the Confederation, i. 7; 76. To this law reference is probably made by Isocr. iv. 114; where he touches upon the removal of the former abuses in the treatment of the Confederates.—Invention of Chabrias: Polyæn. iv. 11, 13: cf. Boeckh, *Seeversen*, 161.—Timotheus and Isocrates: Rehdantz, 180.—Dem. xxii. 72: Εὐβοεῖς ἐλευθερωθέντες ἐστεφάνωσαν τὸν δῆμον.

teering operations of the Æginetans. This was a most unpleasant contrast, which could not but greatly mar the joyous interest in the glory of the naval heroes. The announcements of their triumphs were invariably accompanied by fresh demands for money; for in order to keep the newly-gained friends in uninterrupted good-humor, all harsh measures were carefully avoided, as well as any more rigorous application of the rights of the primary state for procuring the requisite moneys. This appeared, and not without reason, to the economical citizens at home to wear the aspect of an idealistic policy, in the pursuit of which nothing was to be gained but uncertain honor paid for at an excessive price. After all, it seemed as if the efforts of Athens only profited the Thebans, who took advantage of the naval war, in order undisturbed to complete the subjection of Bœotia.

And in point of fact the heroes of the new Naval Confederation had, without belonging to the Theban party, rendered the greatest services to it. The others were less sensitive to this fact, because they had altogether less distinctly adopted any particular standpoint, and were rather generals than statesmen; but Callistratus, the decided adversary of Thebes, who disapproved of any aimless war-policy, and who was moreover hurt in his self-conceit by the glory of the general, encouraged the pacific tendencies of the civic body. By means of the armaments of Athens and the new Naval Confederation he had obtained what he desired, viz. a more advantageous position as towards Sparta; and this position he now wished to use as a basis of peace, so as thereby to bring back into his hands the direction of affairs.

Fall of Timotheus. In order that this end should be reached, it was in the first instance necessary to remove that one among the generals who had most boldly passed beyond the measure of the intentions of Callistratus, and who had most decidedly cast him into the shade. In the case of Timotheus the disproportion

Ol. ci. 4
(B. C. 373).

between outward brilliancy and actual results stood forth in the most glaring light ; his enemies accordingly found no difficulty in depicting him to the citizens in the light of an arrogant and self-willed man, who in order to gratify his own vanity cruised about in the Ægean, and caused princes and cities to glorify him, while he was neglecting the tasks set him by the state,—an accusation all the more invidious, inasmuch as at the same time everything was done to deny the heroic patriot the means which he needed in order to achieve actual successes. Charges were twice preferred against Timotheus (vol. iv. p. 401). On the second occasion Callistratus combined with Iphicrates, who had quite recently returned in fresh vigor, and who was ambitious to have his share in the glory of the new great era of Athens. Amidst immense excitement the case was opened towards the close of the year 373. It was an indictment for high treason against the man who had achieved more than any of his contemporaries for the glory of his native city. His adherents exerted themselves to the utmost of their power. The Tyrant of Phæræ and the king of Epirus appeared in person, to offer testimony on behalf of their friend. Timotheus was able to prove, that he had staked his own property and pledged his lands, in order to prevent a dissolution of the naval force. And, indeed, he was himself acquitted by the jury, but his treasurer Antimachus, whose name was put forward by the adverse party, lest the guilt should rest upon the civic community and its advisers, was sentenced to death ; nor was the dismissal of Timotheus himself from his office of general, which had been decreed before the trial, reversed. He retired from public life, utterly ruined as to property, and took service with the Persians.*

* Trial of Timotheus: *Hellen.* vi. 2, 13; *Dem.* xlix. 9; Schäfer, *Demosth.* iii.² 138.

The policy
of Callistra-
tus.

Callistratus alone had a definite aim in view; and therefore the victories of Iphicrates (vol. iv. p. 402) were again simply subservient to the advancement of his policy. Callistratus perceived, that the Spartans had lost all heart for disputing the sea with the Athenians; while on the other hand he saw with very considerable satisfaction, that among the Athenians ill-will against Thebes was on the increase, because they could not renounce their ancient sympathies with Thespiae and Platææ, and had taken deep offence at the destruction of these cities. In spite of all the counter-representations of the Bœotian party, the citizens grew disgusted with the Theban alliance; and thus Callistratus found a most favorable basis for his policy. He was now able to put an end to the connexion which was so odious to him, and to bring about an alliance with Sparta, in which full consideration was allowed to the present power of his native city, and effective barriers were opposed to the ancient arrogance of Sparta as well as to the recent arrogance of Thebes. The peace of 371 wore the aspect of brilliant success on the part of the policy of Callistratus; Athens and Sparta had once more each assumed its proper position; the latter was by land, and the former by sea, the primary power of the Hellenes; and Thebes, which had endeavored to intrude itself as a third power, was utterly isolated (vol. iv. p. 403 seq.).

And yet this policy proved to be thoroughly shortsighted; and its calculations to be erroneous with regard to Thebes as well as Sparta. Thebes was not hindered in her progress by the alliance between the two states; while Sparta, because she had ceased to be a great power, lost her importance for Athens. The day of Leuctra overthrew the political system of Callistratus. That day found the Athenians wholly unprepared; and made their vacillation most clearly manifest. They oscillated between a petty annoy-

Attic poli-
cy after
Leuctra.

ance at the good fortune of Thebes, and the sympathetic feeling, still not extinct, towards the heroic victors. The Thebans too, it must be remembered, showed so warm a feeling for their former confederates, that before the battle they brought their wives and children to Athens, and sent thither the first messengers bringing the tidings of the victory. The leaders of the Bœotian party also now came forward once more, and demanded the immediate abandonment of the alliance with Sparta, which had become meaningless, now that there could no longer be any question as to dividing the hegemony with her. Now or never, they declared, was the time to join Thebes in rendering Sparta harmless for ever.

But there was yet a third way open to the Athenians, viz. that of siding neither for nor against Sparta, but taking advantage of her weakness for their own purposes, and going forward on their own account. There was some sense in this policy, if the Athenians were resolved to take the affairs of the nation into their own hands, if they were resolved to establish by the side of their naval force a land-army, which should render them able to assume the direction of the lesser states in the place of Sparta. The deputies of these states were summoned to Athens (vol. iv. p. 435); but the matter was not pursued with any real energy: it was thought preferable to rest contented with a lukewarm neutrality. Thus the Arcadians were forced to take the side of the Thebans (vol. iv. p. 446); and the Athenians had against their expectations and wishes to see a complete change take place in the entire situation of affairs. Instead of decisively intervening in its development, they stood before it as surprised spectators, and their tardy policy ever limped in the rear of events.

Hereupon the question confronted them, whether they would calmly look on at the annihilation of Sparta. This question they were called upon to answer at once, when in

the year 369 the Spartans entered into negotiations with Athens. Their envoys had on no previous occasion stood in so humble an attitude as this before the Attic civic assembly. They prayed the Athenians to save them; showing in a skilful argument how all the great military exploits of the Hellenes had owed their success to the combination of the two powers; asserting their belief, that what had been left undone after the battle of Plataeæ, viz. the destruction of Thebes, it was not now too late for them to accomplish with united strength; and thus contriving very successfully to intensify the existing feeling of ill-will against Thebes. Peloponnesian envoys likewise worked in favor of Sparta; and Cliteles of Corinth called for protection on behalf of his native city, which he declared to be innocently exposed to all the evils of the war; and when finally Procles of Phlius in an admirably calculated address reminded the Athenians, how well it would correspond with their ancient glory, now, when Sparta's destiny lay in their hands, magnanimously to forget the injuries formerly inflicted upon them, and how their own interest likewise demanded that they should not abandon Sparta, because otherwise Thebes would advance unrestrained and become the most dangerous of neighbors for an isolated Athens,—the success of the embassy was decided. The spokesmen of the Bœotian party found no listeners; and the policy professing to include in its aims the interests of the whole of Greece at once (*grossgriechische Politik*) was completely in the ascendant. The old phrase was revived as to the two eyes of Hellas, neither of which ought to be suffered to be put out, and so forth. Callistratus had therefore merely, in accordance with the prevailing state of feeling, to make his motion for the immediate despatch of succor; and 12,000 Athenians marched out, in order to hem in Epaminondas in the peninsula. Great events were expected. But both as a general and as a statesman, Iphicrates had good reasons

for avoiding to bring about a decisive battle (vol. iv. p. 456).

Although hereupon the Lacedæmonians were sufficiently irritated to find, that the Thebans had been allowed to escape unhurt through the passes of the Isthmus, yet they, without betraying their indignation, immediately entered into fresh negotiations, in order to bring about a closer alliance with Athens. They dropped all claims to precedence, and found the Council of Athens likewise ready to conclude a new treaty of alliance on the simple basis of a division of the supreme command. Hereupon a very lively discussion arose among the citizens as to this point, Cephisodotus coming forward against the proposition of the Council. It was not, he said, any real equality for Athens to have the command over Peloponnesian sailors, while the citizens of Athens stood under Spartan leaders. The supreme command ought therefore to alternate both by land and by sea; and he accordingly moved that it should so change every five days.

This strange proposal was solely designed to take the fullest possible advantage of the troublous situation of Sparta; her kings were thereby to be placed on a level with the citizens of Athens. Cephisodotus was one of those who, like Autocles (vol. iv. p. 405) and others, were vehement adversaries of Sparta, without on that account belonging to the Bœotian party. But of course that party voted with him; his motion was carried; and Sparta, who in her terror clung to Athens, actually submitted to this humiliation. The inevitable consequence was, that the kings withdrew from the command of the troops, and that the whole military action was crippled. Now, this precisely agreed with the wishes of the Athenians, who regarded the continuance of enmity between Sparta and Thebes as the source of their own strength, and were unwilling to change this state of things. They desired not to be involved in war with the Thebans; and the

latter were sagacious enough, in no way to force their neighbors to take up a more decisive attitude towards either side. On the part therefore both of Athens and of Thebes, direct hostilities were, in accordance with a tacit understanding, avoided.*

So feeble and false a policy as this, which was not courageous enough to own real friends and real foes, which was merely intent upon taking advantage of the troubles of other states, without having any ends or daring any deeds on its own account, specially delighted to indulge in combinations abroad, which inspired the pleasant sensation of Athens being a Great Power, whose friendship was sought. Thus a connexion was brought about through Sparta and Corinth with the Tyrant Dionysius, whose vanity stimulated him to desire to play a part in Greece, and again with Iason of Pheræ,—connexions not very honorable to the Athenians, and not productive of any lasting advantages.† But the most ambiguous relation of all was that with the Persian court.

In order here to counteract the superior influence of Thebes (vol. iv. p. 484), it was endeavored to intimidate the Great King by entering into combinations with rebellious satraps. Timotheus, on his return from Persia received orders to support Ariobarzanes (vol. iv. p. 480), who showed himself very ready to render services to the Athenians on the coasts of Thrace. After the fall of Ariobarzanes, Timotheus succeeded in occupying Sestus and Crithote on the Chersonnesus (Ol. ciii. 3 ; B. C. 365).‡ The endless confusion prevailing in the East offered a very favorable arena to the policy at this time pursued by Athens; in many places it was unknown who was really

* Spartan embassy: *Hellen.* vi. 5, 33; *Isocr.* vii. 69. Leptines (οὐκ ἐὰν περιδεῖν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐτερόφθαλμον γενομένην), *Aristot. Rhet.* 127, 25.—Cephisodotus. *Hellen.* vii. 1, 12.

† Athens and Dionysius (two embassies to Sicily in 369 and 368 B. C.): *Philol.* xii. 575.

‡ Concerning Sestus, see Schäfer in *Rhein. Mus.* xix. 610.

master in the land ; the Athenians therefore were friends with both parties, and, without declaring war against the Great King, fought against the royal troops.

The most reckless proceedings of all were those taken at Samos, where lay a Persian garrison. Timotheus, who was supremely anxious to perform some fresh brilliant exploit after his return, attacked the island. For ten months he besieged the city, and contrived so well to obtain supplies for his 3,000 light-armed soldiers in the island, that he needed no supplementary payments from home. In the end the Persians were forced to give way (Ol. ciii. 3 ; B. C. 365); and hereupon there was a great temptation to turn this success to the best possible account. Samos had not yet been a member of the new Naval Confederation ; and it seemed all the more admissible to proceed here according to martial law, inasmuch as the island had been taken by force of arms from the Persians. The entire Naval Confederation had lost much of its cohesion after the battle of Leuctra ; and Timotheus himself was not firm enough to remain true to the original Federal policy. In contravention of the solemn promise of the Athenians, to conduct themselves everywhere as liberators only, and in spite of the warnings of prudent statesmen, such as Cydias, the expulsion of the Persians was accompanied by that of many natives ; Attic citizens were taken across in several divisions, and settled in the island as landed proprietors. Thus Samos was placed in the same position as Imbros and Lemnos, which formed a separate group by the side of the members of the Confederation, and, so to speak, constituted the domestic power of Athens.*

Seizure of
Samos.

Ol. ciii. 3 (B.
C. 365).

* Conquest of Samos, which had through the oligarchical party been subjected to Persian control: Dem. xv. 9; Isocr. xv. 111; Nepos, *Timoth.* 1. Cydias *περὶ τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας*, Ar. *Rhet.* 70, 16. Expulsion of the hostile party, followed by the expulsion of all the Samians, owing to the repeated introduction of Attic citizens (*Ἀττικὸς πάροικος*, Zenob. ii. 23). The inscription in *Rhein. Mus.* xxii. 313, edited by W. Vischer, refers to their return (after an exile of forty-three years).

Herewith Timotheus once more became the popular favorite: he gained victories, without demanding sacrifices; he achieved the most important conquests, without carrying on war. He contrived to re-establish a firm footing in the Chersonnesus, and in common with Iphicrates in the following year once more subjected Methone, Pydna, Potidæa, to the control of Athens.

Loss of Oropus.

OL. ciii. 3
(B. C. 366.)

This good fortune was not, however, to endure. The first heavy blow was the loss of Oropus (vol. iv. p. 490). This event put an end to the neutrality of the Bœoto-Attic frontier, which had been so anxiously guarded. A war seemed inevitable; but no aid came from the allies, and the Athenians lacked courage to go forward alone.

Instead of the war against an outside enemy, which was in a craven spirit avoided, a passionate party-feud burst forth at home concerning Oropus. Those who sympathized with Bœotia seized the opportunity, to attack the party in power, in order to show that it was not they who sacrificed the interests of Athens to the Thebans. The leader was Leodamas of Acharnæ, and his charges were principally directed against Chabrias and Callistratus. He accused them of having caused the disaster by the insufficiency of their armaments and by their incapacity as commanders; and they were indicted before the people for neglect of duty, and even for treason. It seems that the accusers allowed their party-zeal to carry them too far, and thereby facilitated the defence of the accused. Certain it is, that Callistratus was splendidly successful, not only in rebutting the charges against him, but also in justifying his entire public administration so fully as to gain a thorough triumph over his opponents.

Callistratus
and Epami-
nondas.

But this failed to make the policy of Athens, which now remained in his hands, in any degree more successful or profitable. There was

no end to a feeble tacking from one side to the other. The alliance with Sparta and Corinth had fallen into utter discredit, since the Athenians had been left wholly in the lurch in the matter of Oropus; and when hereupon the Arcadians took advantage of this state of public feeling among the Athenians, and sent to them Lycomedes, a man of no ordinary intellectual power, to solicit help for effecting the liberation of Arcadia from Thebes, the Athenians very readily entered into the proposal. For in this way they thought they would in the first instance be able to revenge themselves upon Thebes; and, moreover, they secretly entertained secondary designs upon Corinth, which, it was thought, might in its isolated and dangerous position be forced to join Athens. In accordance with the system of policy now in vogue, it was believed that the alliance with Sparta might at the same time be preserved intact, since for Sparta too the withdrawal of Arcadia from the Theban connexion could be nothing else than a gain. The alliance was concluded; but it led to no results. For in the first place Lycomedes, who was the soul of the new combination, was assassinated on his way home from Athens; and, again, the Corinthians perceived what was in progress, and speedily came to terms with Thebes (vol. iv. p. 491). Athens, on the other hand, was heavily punished for her unworthy policy of merely looking out for opportunities. For, instead of acquiring fresh influence, she forfeited all that which she possessed in the peninsula; while at the same time new dangers of the most momentous character arose for her out of the naval armament of the Thebans. For Epaminondas very skilfully contrived to take advantage of the mistakes of the Athenians, and to discover their weak points. In a short time matters had come to such a pass, that Thebes was the rival of Athens in the Hellespont, the aid of Timotheus and that of Epaminondas being successively invoked by the council of the city of Heraclea in the Pontus, and Byzan-

tium engaging in negotiations with Thebes behind the backs of the Athenians.*

The Attic statesmen were now solely occupied with watching every movement on the part of Epaminondas, and counteracting every design of his for the extension of the power of Thebes. Thus above all Callistratus. He was incessantly countermining the great Theban; he set all his eloquence to work, in order to arouse distrust against him, to force the Corinthians out of their neutrality, to secure the co-operation of the Arcadians and the Messenians, and to bar the peninsula against the Thebans. He brought to pass a new league against Thebes; and the battle of Mantinea was, notwithstanding the defeat of the allies, to be regarded as an event most fortunate for Athens. For the mightiest of her rivals had been removed, and there was no longer any foe whom she needed to fear, neither Thebes nor Sparta.

And yet no fortunate turn ensued in the situation of affairs. On the contrary, the cessation of arms, which now ensued in consequence of the universal exhaustion, was more pernicious than the period of war. The attitude of opposition against Thebes had at all events produced a beneficial tension, and had directed the public mind to definite objects. This tension was now at an end; and the Athenians, who had long been accustomed to receive all powerful impulses from abroad, became all the more enervated, and allowed the evils of the times to overwhelm them, without offering any vigorous resistance. And those influences which had during the lifetime of Epaminondas been set in motion against Athens, exercised very perceptible after-effects even now, in particular the enmity of Alexander of Pheræ, who had been forced to join the Boeotian confederacy, and who now proved an intolerable burden to his former friends. He was an

* Heraclea and Byzantium: Justin. xvi. 4; Isocr. v. 53.

adept in petty naval warfare. With his pirate-fleet he levied forced requisitions upon the Cyclades, besieged Peparethus, surprised the squadron stationed there under Leosthenes by a sudden attack, and then, hastening in advance of the tidings of this defeat, sailed with such rapidity to the Piræus, that he was able thoroughly to pillage the warehouses of the port there, and to effect his departure with a rich cargo of booty, before the Athenians were ready for warding him off. Simultaneously, very bad news arrived from the coast of Thrace: Cotys was controlling the Chersonnesus; the prospects of recovering Amphipolis were worse than ever before; and thus everything combined most deeply to humiliate and to damage the Athenians, at the very time when they imagined that the death of Epaminondas had freed them from the most imminent danger.*

These humiliations as usual led to a reaction upon affairs at home. The leaders of the community were made responsible for the disasters, and the whole feeling of vexation at the unprofitable policy of recent years, at the useless war expenditure upon the Peloponnesian expedition, at the losses in Thrace, and at the disgrace suffered by sea, turned against Callistratus. The Bœotian party, which had for years contended against him, now found a better handle for attack than ever before. In the eyes of the Athenians, Callistratus was the born adversary of Epaminondas. So long as the latter existed to keep their fears alive, they thought it also impossible for them to be without the former; he was personally a pledge to them, that nothing was neglected which was demanded by their jealousy of Thebes. Now, he seemed no longer indispensable; now, all the weak points of his system of government were ruthlessly laid bare, and the hatred of his opponents,

Fall of Callistratus.

Ol. civ. 3 (B. C. 361).

* Piratical expeditions of Alexander: *Hellen.* vi. 4, 35; Dem. xxlii. 120. Peparethus: *ib.* li. 8; cf. Kirchhoff, *Red: vom trier. Kr.*

which had long been gathering, succeeded in making him to such a degree responsible for the most recent occurrences, that this time his eloquence failed of its effect, and that he as well as Leosthenes could only escape death by voluntarily going into banishment (361 B. C.).

Such a sentence had not been deserved by Callistratus. For there is no evidence to show that his counsels were given to the community from other than the most conscientious motives. He was an honest patriot, and highly gifted for the business of administration; but as a statesman he was devoid of creative ideas, narrow-minded and dependent upon prejudices. He followed the ancient traditions of conservative policy, and desired to revive dualism in Greece after a fashion in accordance with the times. But how could it be to the advantage of the Athenians, in times such as these, to tie the destiny of their city to Sparta, who only waived some of her ancient claims because she was conscious of her utter decline! It was for this reason that his whole system of policy was so sterile; and the apparent freedom of his activity as a statesman was at bottom nothing but weakness, inasmuch as he in a spirit of jealous irritation refused to recognize the most important development which had taken place in his times, viz. the power of Thebes. In his conduct towards Timotheus he likewise betrayed pettiness of mind. Notwithstanding the brilliant talents which he possessed, he lacked greatness of character: and, for the same reason, he disliked those men who had in them elements of a heroic nature, and who passed the ordinary measure of humanity.*

Victory of
the Boeotian
party.

The Boeotian party had during recent years never been wholly powerless. It had ever and again repeated its demand that, inasmuch as Athens was by herself incapable of leading Hellas, she should combine, not with weak states which had lost their

* Fall of Callistratus: Lycourg. in *Leocr.* 93; [Dem.] l. 48.

vitality, but with the one state possessed of vigor and energetic life, which was ready to conclude a sincere alliance, and alone adapted for such a purpose by virtue of the agreement between the principles of its constitution and those of the Athenian. But in proportion as the correctness of this policy was confirmed by the continuous progress of Thebes, the vexation of the Athenians increased; and in vain they were urged not to consume their strength in petty jealousy, and not to ruin their state by again and again concluding unfortunate alliances. At last the men belonging to this party came to the helm of affairs, but it was now too late. During the long and fruitless period of opposition their forces had been broken up and worn away, and their programme now no longer admitted of execution; for it was based on the hypothesis of a powerful Thebes. But at the present time Thebes was herself without a firm system of action, and incapable of being a vigorous ally; the day had therefore gone by for the existence of a real Bœotian party; and the consequence was, that even after the fall of Callistratus no onward movement ensued in Athenian affairs. In truth, what occurred was simply a change of persons in the leaders of the community; while in the main everything continued in the same track. The members of the party assumed the direction of affairs; but the party as such had outlived itself.

The most remarkable man among them was Aristophon. Aristophon (p. 87), the most active member of his party, and an orator of high talent. During more than forty years he had contended on behalf of his views; he had always been found at his post, when it was requisite to fan into flames the popular passion against Sparta, and to promote the cause of the Theban alliance. Vehement as he was in temperament, he had become involved in numerous quarrels, and had more frequently than any other citizen been called to account for illegal

proposals. For this reason he had drawn upon himself the enmity of many men, with whom an amicable understanding would have been both possible and in the interests of the city extremely desirable,—of such men as Chabrias, Timotheus, and Iphicrates. He lacked moral earnestness and sobriety; and the fact of his having long remained in opposition, as well as his numerous lawsuits, had probably contributed to intensify his natural vehemence. True dignity and self-control were therefore found to be wanting in him, when by the overthrow of Callistratus he became the foremost man in Athens. For in proportion to its own want of energy, the civic community gave itself up to the control of individuals, and conceded to them such a degree of influence, that they were able to exercise an arbitrary sway, and to fill the most important offices with persons of their own color.*

His conduct of affairs, from 361 B. C.

But the worst evil lay in the circumstance, that the best men of the Bœotian party were no longer present in the city, and that Aristophon found himself unable to attract new personages of eminence into the public service. The most highly-considered among his friends was Chares, of the deme of Æxone, a born soldier, nurtured in the life of a mercenary, full of courage and spirit of enterprise, daring and versatile, but devoid of character, untrustworthy, and without political training or natural tact. Of the generals of proved merit several were still in full vigor, but they were not to be reckoned upon; for their relations to their native city defied calculation. While Athens was being pillaged by pirates in her own harbor, and endangered in her most important possessions, Chabrias was serving in Egypt, and Iphicrates was helping his father-in-law Cotys finally to establish his dominion against Athens no less than against other adversaries. It was under such circumstances as these that the public admin-

* Aristophon: Schäfer, *u. s. i.* 122 seq.

istration of Aristophon commenced. It would therefore be unjust, if he, who entered upon the inheritance of a long period of misgovernment, were to be made responsible for all the disasters of the next-ensuing years. In his toilsome life he proved himself a man of uncommon intellectual force; but he came to the supreme conduct of affairs, when his day had really passed by; and he was incapable of sustaining the city against the heavy disadvantages of the situation.

One calamity followed upon the heels of the other. In the first place, Chares repaired to Coreyra, in order to settle disputes which had arisen there. But with great want of wisdom he intervened in favor of an oligarchical faction; and the consequence was, that Coreyra was lost to the Attic Naval Confederation.* The disastrous events in Thrace, which had occasioned the fall of Callistratus, were to be made good by vigorous armaments; but Autocles (p. 101), the first general who obtained the command through the influence of Aristophon, was unable to accomplish anything effectual against Cotys. In vain the generals were changed, without any consideration being paid to party-color. Things continued to become worse and worse. Amphipolis remained lost, although Timotheus too attempted a new attack upon it; Timomachus, the brother-in-law of Callistratus, had to abandon the whole of Chersonnesus, and finally (360 B. C.) Sestus, the chief station of the Attic fleet in the Hellespont, likewise fell into the power of Cotys.

Under these circumstances it could not but be regarded as a piece of great good fortune, when the tidings unexpectedly arrived, that the despot in Thrace had been assassinated (359 B. C.). The assassins were extolled as heroes of liberty and as benefactors of the state; but before advantage could be taken of this favorable turn, the son of Cotys,

Events in
Thrace.

Ol. cv. 1 (B. C.
360 seq.).

* Chares in Coreyra: Diod. xv 95.

Cersobleptes, contrived to reunite in his hands the dominion of his father. And in this he succeeded through the aid of a man who had served with distinction under Iphicrates and Timotheus, and who had in consequence acquired the Attic citizenship; but who after the manner of these *condottieri* was of far too roving a disposition to devote his services permanently to any one state. This was Charidemus of Oreus, one of the boldest captains of mercenaries of his age. He enabled the son of Cotys to secure his dominion, just as Iphicrates had helped the father, and like Iphicrates married into the Thracian royal house. Cephisodotus, the Attic admiral, was defeated by Charidemus, and forced to acknowledge Cersobleptes as ruler over his dominions; and although fresh disputes as to the tenure of the throne involved the Thracian prince in difficulties, and made him incline to a variety of concessions, yet there was no fleet at hand to enforce their being carried out, and the situation was immediately reversed again. The Athenians for their part could do nothing but call to account their unfortunate commanders, one after the other, and declare the treaties which had been concluded invalid.*

Successes
in Eubœa and
Thrace.

Ol. cv. 3 (B. C.
357).

While Athens was so impotent with regard to Thracian affairs, a danger nearer home after a long interval once again aroused her to superior energy. For this time the most important of all the districts outside Attica was in question, viz. Eubœa. Here sanguinary disturbances had broken out; and Eretria, allied with Chalcis and Carystus, was attacked by hostile neighbors, who had established a connexion with Bœotia. Manifestly the intention was nothing short of resuming the policy which had be-

* Death of Cotys, Ol. cv. 1; beginning of 359 B. C.; cf. F. Schultz, *Schol. des Aisch.* in *Neue Jahrb. für Philol.*, 1865, p. 399. Charidemus: Dem. xxiii. 162. Harpocr. s. v. Κερσοβλέπτης. Cephisodotus fined five talents: Dem. xxiii. 163 seq. He was sent out before the death of Cotys; his recall took place Ol. cv. 2; cf. Schultz, *u. s.*

gun with the occupation of Oropus (vol. iv. p. 490), and of extending the power of Thebes to the land, as well as the waters, of Eubœa. The present case admitted of no hesitation; and the men of the Bœotian party, unless they were to offer a most excellent opportunity of attack to their opponents, who were still not wholly without power, were bound least of all to neglect a danger coming from the side of Thebes; it behooved them on this occasion to prove themselves more energetic than their predecessors had been in the affair of Oropus. In this matter the different parties went hand in hand. Timotheus above the rest urged the furnishing of vigorous aid. Voluntary trierarchs were summoned; in a few days the armament was complete; and a campaign of thirty days sufficed to force the Thebans to take their departure from the island. Eubœa had been recovered to the Naval Confederation (357 B. C.).*

But this was not deemed enough: it was thought well to take advantage of the favorable moment of patriotic enthusiasm. Aristophon once more entertained the highest hopes of Chares; and persuaded the citizens to send him into the Northern seas with extensive powers. Success was thought to be all the more ensured to the expedition, inasmuch as it was confined to the execution of a single task; when therefore the troops of king Philip about the same time advanced upon the coasts, and when in consequence Amphipolis applied to Athens (p. 54), it was held to be a very prudent proceeding, to trust to Philip's friendly assurances and to reject the application for aid, in order that the whole power of the state might be directed upon the Chersonnesus, the possession of which was the condition, not only of the maritime dominion, but also of the civil prosperity, of Athens.

This policy seemed in truth to prove itself right. The

* Eubœa: Diod. xvi. 7; Æschin. iii. 85; Dem. viii. 74; xviii. 99, and in frequent other passages.

victory over Thebes was followed by the restoration of the Athenian power on the shores of the Hellespont. Cersobleptes was compelled to conclude a treaty, in which he ceded the Thracian peninsula with the exception of Cardia, and recognized the proteges of Athens, Amadocus and Berisades, as independent princes. Philip might be regarded as a new ally against Cersobleptes; and it was firmly reckoned upon, that Amphipolis would likewise soon be bestowed upon the Athenians by his hands.*

But how soon the whole aspect of affairs changed! How rapidly a bitter disappointment followed upon this hopeful phase of public feeling! It was perceived how nothing certain had been gained in Peloponnesus, while with regard to Amphipolis the most favorable opportunity had been sacrificed. The seeming friend revealed himself as a fresh foe; and the task of Athens in the North continued to increase in difficulty. But the Athenians did not give way to despair. They were resolved to exert themselves to the utmost, in order to punish the perfidious king; and Chares received orders to attack Amphipolis. But for achieving this he needed greater resources than Athens was able alone to collect. Chares turned to Chios. But at the very moment, when the confederates were needed more urgently than ever, they not only refused to furnish any aid, but, in accordance with an agreement arrived at in common, rose against Athens, so that the unhappy city was suddenly surrounded by a multitude of new foes.

Outbreak of
the Social
War.

Ol. cv. 4
(B. C. 357).

This rising had both nearer and more remote causes. The first blow experienced by the newly-established Naval Confederation was the secession of Thebes; for upon this there immediately ensued a prevalence of ill-will, and the establishment of secret connexions between Epaminondas

* Treaty with Cersobleptes: Dem. xxiii. 173 (dated four years too late in Diod. xvi. 34).

and the more powerful maritime cities. He labored with excellent success to dissolve the Confederation; for he was strong enough to afford protection, while at the same time more confidence was placed in him than in Athens with regard to the freedom of the islands. It was, therefore, only by his death that the fear of a transfer of their alliance on the part of the confederates from Athens to Thebes came to an end. But the agitation which had once existed remained and increased, and received a continuous accession of materials through the constant jealousy, which even a more just and less selfish state than Athens would have been unable to allay. For without unpleasant disagreement of various kinds a league composed of members so different, and yet all entitled to an equality of rights, who were all to act in common, was in the nature of the case not to be maintained. Either it must lose all significance, or the influence on the primary state must assert itself. Moreover, in consequence of the insufficiency of her own resources, Athens was dependent upon those of her confederates; without them, it was impossible for her to sustain her position; and accordingly it was not admissible for her in every individual case to rely upon the good-will of the confederates. Thus, there occurred transgressions of the confederate code, fresh attempts to bring about a relation of mistress and subjects, forced levies of contributions and measures of violence, such as were inevitable in the existing condition of the military power of Athens. For it was out of the question, to control the bands of mercenaries from Athens; and the leaders of these bands were by the force of circumstances driven to arbitrary measures, to irritating proceedings of all kinds, and to requisitions made by violent means. But a specially dangerous effect had attached to the proceedings in Samos, as Cydias had predicted (p. 103). For although no similar allotments of land ensued in the territories proper of the confederates, yet it was feared,

that the Athenians would recover their taste for sending out *cleruchies*, and would once more establish themselves as landed proprietors in the islands.

The dynasts of Caria. All these feelings of discontent and anxiety were devoid of danger, so long as there existed no centre, where the prevailing dissatisfaction could gather, and so long as no foreign state availed itself of it. But this now actually took place from a quarter whence the Athenians had for a long time not had to experience any hostile proceedings, viz. from the Carian coast. In this region there had arisen out of the same princely house to which Artemisia, of old the most dangerous adversary of the Athenians, had belonged (vol. ii. p. 318), a younger generation, which about the time of the Peace of Antalcidas ruled over the Carian country as a hereditary satrapy. Hecatomnus invested this principality with splendor and importance; he already endeavored to connect himself most intimately with the traffic of the Greek coasts, as is proved by his silver coins, which follow the Attic standard, while impressed with the Milesian crest. Maussollus, the son of Hecatomnus, carried this system of policy further (from the year 377 B. C.); he transferred the princely residence from Mylasa to Halicarnassus, which by uniting the communities of the vicinity he rendered one of the most splendid cities of the Greek world; he firmly established his dominion by land and by sea, and took arms against the Great King on the outbreak of the rebellion of Ariobarzanes (vol. iv. p. 479), as well as on other occasions. Subsequently he changed his attitude towards the court, and found it more advantageous to pursue the ends of his ambition in harmony with the Great King. After, therefore, already several satraps before him had taken advantage of the weakness of the Greeks, in order once more to advance into the Greek Sea, as is shown by the existence of Persian garrisons in Sestos and Samos (p. 102), Maussollus was now intent upon rendering his new capital what

formerly according to the plan of Aristagoras Miletus was to have become, viz. the centre of an island-and coast-empire, which ensured to him an independent and brilliant position, although the Persian suzerainty was acknowledged by him. Towards this end he chose the right way, when, following the precedent of Epaminondas, he instigated the confederates of Athens to revolt, excited fears of Attic ambition, supported the parties hostile to Athens, and quite unobserved brought about an understanding with the most considerable island-states, with Cos, Chios, and notably with Rhodes. The Rhodians had already long been in a disturbed condition. By the foundation of the city of Rhodes they had united into one state (408 B. C.), and had thereby gained very largely in vigor and in self-consciousness; they had afterwards concluded treaties of currency and commerce with Cnidus, Samos, and Ephesus; and their standard of coinage, introduced in Cyprus as well as in Macedonia (p. 61), attests the magnificent growth of their traffic. Maussollus promised aid for the war, furnished troops and ships, and gained over the cities, by designating liberty as the one object of the struggle and as the one task of his policy. Byzantium had likewise joined this combination. All were prepared for revolt, and merely awaited the decisive impulse. This was given at Chios. It is probable that Chares repaired thither, in order to provide himself with materials of war for his attack upon Amphipolis; and perhaps he on this occasion put forth claims which it was possible to regard as encroachments upon the compact of the Confederacy.

Revolt of
Cos, Chios,
Rhodes.
Ol. cv. 4
(B. C. 357).

Like a festering sore, towards the formation of which the noxious humors have long been gathering, the war suddenly broke out, without having been preceded by any negotiations, without any renunciation of the treaties, without any formal secession on the part of the individual states. It is clear how unhealthy the relations were, and

how rudely it was thought possible to tear asunder the bonds, which attached the states against their will to Athens.*

At Athens the determination was taken, to regard the rising of the confederates as a *casus belli*. It was necessary at the same time not to mistake the fact, that, when once the war had broken out, a restoration of the previous relations was out of the question; the Athenians therefore felt confident of being strong enough to force rebels into a subject position, and once more to make Athens in the full sense mistress of the Archipelago. Such was manifestly the view prevailing in the circles which at that time led public opinion, the view of Aristophon, Chares, and their associates. It was not without justification, in so far as the relations hitherto existing in the Confederation had become untenable; so that the only point at issue was, whether Athens was willing to renounce her maritime dominion, or to restore it by the exertion of any and every measure of force. But it seems neither explicable nor excusable, that no preparations should have been made, in order vigorously to carry out so bold a policy. Nothing was in readiness. There was a want of ships, of ships' furniture, and of citizens prepared to undertake the trierarchy. Hitherto resort had been had to joint trierarchies, so that two persons together bore the burdens of a single

* Milesian coins with EKA: J. Brandis, 323. The Halicarnassian coinage followed the Rhodian standard, *ib.* 338. The official form of name, Μαύσωλος, is attested by the coins. Maus. and Rhodes: Dem. xv. 3; Diod. xvi. 7.—Synœcism of Rhodes: Strab. 654; Diod. xiii. 75.—Coinage-union between Rhodes, Samos, Ephesus, and Cnidus: Waddington, *Rev. Num.*, 1863, p. 223. Legend ΣΥΝΑΧΙΑ, Leake, *Num. Hell. Inscr.* 38; Brandis, 262, 375,—as to the occasion of the Social War: Oncken, *Isokrates und Athen.* p. 136 seq.; cf. Kayser in *Neue Jahrb. für Philol.* 1864, p. 560.—A welcome accession to the extremely meagre materials for the history of the war is afforded by the Inscription of Ol. cvi. 2 (B.C. 355-4), edited by Kumanudes and Sauppe (*Göttinger Nachr.*, 1867, p. 151). Philiscus of Sestus is honored on account of the service rendered by him during the war to the civic community by means of an important piece of news, *μηνύσας τὸν τῶν Βυζαντιῶν στόλ[ου]*, as Sauppe very felicitously supplements the *lacuna*.

trierarchy. But even the burdens thus divided proved too heavy. It was necessary to establish a further subdivision, and to impose proportionate exertions even upon the less wealthy. Accordingly, on the motion of Perikander, the principle of association, which had already been applied to the property-tax (vol. iv. p. 385), was now likewise made use of for the naval armament. The 1,200 wealthiest members of the civic community were divided into twenty companies or *symmories*, whose duty it was, under the direction of a committee of 300, of whom fifteen were taken from each symmory, to furnish the requisites for the fleet demanded by the state. With the utmost rigor everything was called in, which had belonged to the public inventory of the navy and had remained in the hands of individuals; the goods and chattels of all public debtors were distrained; and even what had become private property, but might be of service for the equipment of the fleet, was forcibly called in. Aristophon and his friends took advantage of this season of public trouble to raise their power to the highest pitch. All views opposed to theirs, all expression of pacific sentiments, all attempts to create dissension in the enemies' camp by means of negotiation, were repressed by them.

By a spasmodic effort a naval force was brought together; and the best generals were set to work. But they received separate commands according to the parties to which they belonged; and this could not have a favorable effect upon the result. Sixty vessels were commanded by Chares, upon whose courage Aristophon pre-eminently counted in this desperate course of policy; a second fleet of equal strength was entrusted to Iphicrates, his son Menestheus, and Timotheus. Chares advanced at once upon Chios with his fleet; and drove it in wedgewise into the harbor, which had been barred by the islanders. Chabrias, who served

Battle in
the harbor
of Chios.

Ol. cv. 4 (B. C.
357).

as a trierarch under Chares, was in the van ; boldly pushing forward before the rest, he had penetrated deep into the dense mass of the enemy, and fell, fighting, on the deck of his trireme, since he was too proud to abandon the vessel committed to his charge. The whole attack ended in failure, and the insurgents were able to assume the offensive. They devastated the islands in the possession of Athens, in particular Lemnos and Imbros, and then appeared with a hundred vessels off Samos. But this island was relieved by the combined squadrons of the Athenians, who determined to sail from here to Byzantium, which they hoped to find in the most advanced state of preparation. But on a stormy day they unexpectedly in the channel off Chios came across the enemy's fleet. Chares demanded a short attack ; the leaders of the second squadron unanimously opposed it on account of the weather, but Chares refused to give way. He thought by boldly advancing to force the others to follow, but he was left alone, and was obliged, after suffering losses, to relinquish the contest.

He sent a report of what had occurred to Athens, and cast all the blame upon his colleagues. Aristophon supported his cause ; his fellow-generals were immediately recalled ; and Chares was now at the head of the entire fleet.

Victory of
Chares under
Artabazus.

Ol. cvi. 1 (B.
c. 356).

He was now above all anxious to perform some brilliant exploit, wherever the opportunity might offer. And as he was probably also urged on by want of money, he rapidly resolved to enter with his whole fleet into the pay of Artabazus, who was engaged in a revolt against the Great King and was hard pressed by the royal troops. The position of Maussollus might to some extent justify this step, since every defeat inflicted upon the King might also be regarded as a defeat inflicted upon Maussollus and his allies. In any case, Chares completely achieved his im-

mediate object. By a brilliant victory he secured, in addition to the high pay for his forces, ample spoils, occupied Lampsacus and Sigeum, and caused great rejoicing among the citizens.

But hereupon an embassy from the Great King arrived at Athens, which bitterly complained of Chares, and gave utterance to the most serious menaces. It was already thought to be certain that a great Persian fleet had combined with the islanders for a joint expedition against Athens; and there ensued a revulsion in public opinion, and a lively movement arose against Aristophon and his party. Attention was directed to the empty treasury, the intolerable burdens of the war, and the impossibility of bringing the confederates to obedience by force. Aristophon had by his system of terrorism estranged from himself even many friends; and it was an adherent of his own party, Eubulus, who in the civic assembly brought forward this motion: that a cessation of arms must immediately be effected, unless the city was to be utterly ruined. As hastily as the war had been begun the peace was concluded, in order at any cost to put an end to the hardships of the war, without even the attempt being made to save as much as could be saved of influence and power. The confederates now in revolt were freed from all obligations; and thus, then, after absolutely fruitless efforts of the most arduous kind, the Naval Confederation founded twenty years before with the happiest prospects by Callistratus and Timotheus, had, from fear of Persian menaces, been shamefully and disgracefully abandoned. In the place of the Attic influence, which kept the island-sea in order and cohesion for national purposes, Asiatic influence, partly that of the Great King, partly that of the Carian Tyrants, now asserted itself. Athens had openly confessed her impotence, and had pusillanimously renounced her truest and most proper mission. Henceforth all attempts

Close of the
Social War.

Ol. cvi. 1 (B. c.
355).

at maintaining in the *Ægean* a state of things established by treaties, were renounced ; and anarchy pure and simple was the recognized condition of those waters. As in the Corinthian war the land-powers of secondary rank, so now in the maritime regions there came forward a group of secondary states, which emancipated itself from all control. No Great Power any longer guaranteed the peace of the sea ; the boundaries between the maritime dominions of the barbarians and of the Hellenes had been destroyed ; and Athens herself could in future feel sure neither of her own routes of trade nor of the smaller islands remaining to her.

Nor was this all. The struggle between the parties was continued in the law-courts, and demanded yet further victims. Aristophon exerted all the remnants of his influence, in order in conjunction with Chares to ruin the other generals, and to deprive Athens, in her deep humiliation, even of those men who were alone capable of bringing about a better future. On the occasion of the rendering of their account by the generals, Iphicrates, Menestheus and Timotheus were accused of having been bribed by Chian and Rhodian money to ruin their native city. The charge excited great indignation ; and Iphicrates was soon surrounded by a band of companions-in-arms, who were resolved to protect and defend him against extremities, if necessary by the use of force. The aged hero, covered with scars, confronted, in the full pride of a warrior, the forensic tricks of Aristophon. He acknowledged his inability to meet him with the same weapons. "This man," he said, "is a better actor ; but mine is the better play." He appealed to his deeds, and inquired whether he was thought capable of an act of knavery, of which even an Aristophon would be ashamed ?

Condemnation of the generals.
Ol. cvi. 1
(B. C. 355).

The chivalrous pride of Iphicrates did not miss its effect. Both he and his son were acquitted. Less favorable was the issue in the case of Timotheus. He was not indeed

found guilty of the crime imputed to him; but he damaged his cause, by irritating the judges through his aristocratic bearing; and thus it came to pass, that he was sentenced to the enormous fine of one hundred talents (£25,000 *circ.*). He took his departure to Chalcis, where he died the same year, after having seen the work of his life so miserably ruined. Iphicrates remained at Athens, in retirement from public life. Chabrias had fallen in battle. Thus at the close of this disastrous war Athens had not only forfeited her dominion and exhausted her resources, but she had also been deprived of her best heroes.*

Such were the course of Attic politics up to the close of the Social War, and the series of outward events necessarily resulting from the relations which we find prevailing in the interior of the state.

Social condition of Athens, up to the first appearance of Demosthenes in public life.

The attempts which had been made in order to cure the evils besetting the life of the Attic community had long been abandoned again; the old tracks had once more been re-entered, and the traditional forms of life belonging to the democratic system thoughtlessly resumed. And inasmuch as the commonwealth, sick and devoid of vigor as it was, could not elevate or ennoble the individual citizens, the bonds uniting men among themselves and with the state were more and more relaxed, civic duties and the demands imposed by them fell into neglect, life lost part of its seriousness and significance, and men became accustomed to a low standard in judging themselves and others.

Outwardly, the difference from earlier times was above all perceptible in the circumstance, that, while hitherto

* Diod. xvi. 22; Dionys.; Din. p. 668; Nepos, *Timoth.* 3; Isocr. xv. 129. Plutarch, *Præc. ger. reip.* 801 F: Ἰφικράτης, ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ Ἀριστοφῶντα καταρρήτο-
ρεύόμενος· βελτίων μὲν ὁ τῶν ἀντιδίκων ὑποκριτής, δῶμα δὲ τοῦμὸν ἄμεινον.

more considerable edifices had been erected only for the purposes of public worship and of the state, the public ends were now neglected, while building was carried on in the service of the comfort and love of pomp of individual citizens. The richer citizens indulged their vanity by the display of their wealth; mansions resembling palaces were built in Athens and in its neighborhood. Men delighted in exhibiting their establishments of numerous servants, splendid equipages, and costly robes and furniture; and although this arrogance on the part of the rich was so directly opposed to the spirit of the constitution, yet it was not punished and condemned by public opinion, but imposed upon the multitude, and brought with it influence and authority.

In proportion as the public resources dwindled, the difference of property asserted itself among the citizens, and the new institutions designed for satisfying the wants of the state helped to raise the power of money; for the distribution of the public burdens in the symmories (p. 119) was in the hands of the most highly taxed; and they employed their influence so as to spare themselves. Though on occasion they performed this or that public service with pompous munificence, in order to dazzle the multitude, yet in general they contrived to arrange matters after such a fashion, that disproportionate efforts were exacted from the less wealthy, and a disproportionate pressure was placed upon them. Thus, in addition to the distinction between the classes with and without property, an opposition arose between the rich and the middle classes; the committees of the symmories became a privileged order in the state, and the system of factions became less and less endurable.

In the same degree in which the idea of the state lost its power, the virtues rooting in this idea died out, in particular the joyous promptitude for personal sacrifices. The citizens concealed their property; and if the richest

among them evaded their duties to such a degree as to farm out for execution the trierarchies falling to their lot to the lowest bidders, how much less were they willing to venture their lives on behalf of the state! Military service was regarded as an intolerable interference with personal comfort and with commercial profits. Pretexts of all kinds were sought; and it was necessary to pass severe laws of war, in order to secure what formerly had been a matter of course. But even these laws proved of no avail. The aversion of the citizens from bearing arms spread like a contagious disease; and the trierarchs found it so interminable a task to man their vessels, that they preferred to offer hand-money, and to entrust the most precious possession of the city, her ships, to strangers who had no interest in her.

The desire was to maintain only those elements in the democracy which gratified sensual indulgence, and which offered a pleasant pastime. Accordingly, the festivals became the principal object in public life, and were as its most important side treated with the utmost seriousness. But at the same time the higher considerations lying at the basis of Attic festive life, viz. the grateful celebration of the gods, the patriotic elevation of men's minds, and the emulous cultivation of liberal arts, fell quite into the background. In their stead the processions and banquets formed the gist of the matter; and in order not to miss any of these, the citizens evaded service abroad, while for the same reason the troops were disbanded, so as to be able to rush home. To disturb the festive rejoicing was accounted the worst of crimes, and an act of treason against the city. In all things only the rights of the citizens, and not their duties, were taken into account, all attempts to enforce obligations were kept at a distance, and there was an absence of salutary discipline in the public market-place as well as in the private homes; for even the slaves it was not contrived to keep under. A system of

mutual concession had been tacitly agreed upon at Athens; it would have amounted to an offence against the fashion of society for any man publicly to stigmatize the frivolous self-indulgence of any of his fellow-citizens; and Æschines, when inveighing against the vices of the trierarchs, expressly wishes it to be understood that the object of his charge is only the brutal audacity which mocks all public decency, and the conversion of immorality into a trade.

Such was the condition of society; and thus
The popular assembly. neither could the civic assemblies maintain any dignity in their bearing. A really earnest spirit was wanting, even when the most momentous matters were the subject of debate; the common interest was no longer generally interesting; and here, too, pastime and diversion were sought, and these objects determined the conduct of the orators. Outwardly negligent, even with their shoulders bare, they appeared before the people, relying upon a sonorous voice and a dazzling flow of words, to which they added the attraction of histrionic tricks. Their speeches were poor in considerations on the subjects under discussion, but, on the other hand, abounded in personalities, scandal and vulgar jests. Since the multitude was too indolent to enter into a consultation and to form an opinion for itself, few took part in the debate; and those speakers were the most popular who gave the least trouble to their hearers. This demand of course only men devoid of conscience were ready to supply, persons of talent and practical skill, but without superior culture or a liberal training. They struck the note, and had their agents at hand, who according to given hints shouted applause to the one, drowned the words of the other in clamor, and thus confused the multitude in order to be able all the more easily to direct it. A group of men entertaining the same views unites; they form a close party; and the multitude so thoroughly accustoms itself to be controlled by them, that they demean themselves as the lords and masters of the

city. Such was notably the case with Aristophon and his associates, who established a genuine reign of terror over Athens. "They claim," we read in a speech of the day, "absolute liberty of speaking to you and of acting according as they choose; they bring everything into their hands, and, as it were like public criers, offer the state to the highest bidder. They cause whom they wish to be crowned or not crowned, and have secured to themselves more authority than belongs to the decrees of the civic assembly." The orators flatter the people and foster phases of agitation, in order to maintain their influence; they take pay both for speaking and for holding their peace; and change from beggars into rich men, while the state is becoming more and more impoverished. The citizens curse them, when affairs take a bad turn, but relapse again and again into their unworthy relation of dependence.*

In legislation, the principles of ancient Legislation. times had been recurred to; but they had not been faithfully observed. There prevailed anew an over-busy tendency to make new laws, and in consequence an incurable state of disquiet. Every month—and frequently too in violation of the customary regulations, viz. without any motion on the part of the Senate, without any preliminary examination and public exhibition such as prescription demanded, without the fixed terms being awaited or the contradictions thence resulting taken into account—new laws were passed, which in contravention of the principles of the republic were devised to suit special cases; laws of debt, which were to help particular persons out of their difficulties, and others to which a retrospective force was given, in order to accomplish certain party-objects. Herewith is connected the influence gained in Athens by the scribes. These were persons of a low class, slaves and freedmen, whose business was the reading,

* Dominion of faction: *πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ συμμορίας*, Dem. ii. 29. Description of the terrorism exercised by the party of Aristophon: Dem. li. 22.

composition, and preservation of written documents, and who thereby acquired a versatility in business, which made them indispensable to every office, great or small. They were a venal set, useful for any and every purpose, ready for any kind of service, and familiar with all the species of tricks. When such men acquired authority, there spread together with them through all branches of the administration a spirit of impunity and dishonesty, above all, of course, where the management of trust-moneys was in question. A universal mistrust poisoned

public life. The most usual weapon with
 Litigious-
 ness. which one party attacked the other, or one citizen fought out a personal contest against another, was an indictment for peculation; and the lamentable love of litigation, which characterized the Athenians, thereby received superabundant nourishment. Aristophon himself was charged with having kept back in his hands moneys intended to provide for the manufacture of golden wreaths; and, in order to avoid a worse alternative, he was obliged at once to make good the deficiency. Indeed, it became customary to appoint extraordinary commissions to inquire who was illegally in possession of sacred or public moneys. During the progress of the suits, opportunities were found for tricks of all kinds, in order to delude the judges, or to prevent the execution of the sentences actually pronounced. In public and in private matters all means seemed allowable; personal abuse was indulged in, and there were always at command venal witnesses and advocates, who were ready to compose a speech to be made in court in any cause, either for plaintiff or for defendant. No dishonor any longer attached to the payment of counsel; the advocates or writers of speeches (*Logographi*) made their living out of the suits, and did their best to goad men into quarreling with one another. They had as it were set up their domestic establishments in the law-courts, and lay in wait for any dispute among the citizens

This petty warfare between citizens and civic parties claimed attention more than anything else; upon it time and strength were expended, while the commonweal remained neglected. As the confusion in legislation increased, indictments for illegal motions became more frequent, and the popular orators of the genuine stamp sought a kind of chivalry in boldly confronting these attacks. Aristophon boasted of having fought to an issue seventy-five such quarrels.

Those were most of all exposed to suspicion and active enmity who were invested with public powers, viz. the envoys and, most notably, the generals. If they were successful, they were without consideration of persons immoderately honored and extolled; for the observance of a just standard in public acknowledgments had long been lost, and, instead of the wise economy which had distinguished the Athens of earlier days, it had become the practice prodigally to squander the highest gifts of honor, and to indulge in a senseless extravagance. But far worse was the opposite of this: viz. that, whenever a calamity had befallen the city, the commanders of the troops were made to suffer for the vexation felt by the citizens. Nothing was more damaging to the state than the perpetual strife between the orators and the generals. Person who sat safely at home and understood nothing of the military matters, brought charges of life and death against the men returning from arduous campaigns, when it became their duty to give an account of their conduct in office, and made them sick of doing their best, though upon their will to do it everything depended. After Callistratus had set so bad an example by his attack upon Timotheus, this evil system steadily grew worse; and there was no general who was not several times indicted for high treason.

And what in truth was the position of the generals in those days? They no longer, it should be remembered,

The orators and the generals.

commanded Attic citizens, held together by a sense of honor and by a feeling of patriotism. The wealthy Athenians as a matter of duty served as cavalry, the state furnishing the customary supplementary payment for the purpose; their handsome squadrons formed the processions, which were part of the pomp of the city festivals; but service abroad they evaded. In the place of the wealthier, poorer citizens entered as substitutes, in order to improve their financial circumstances by pay and pillage; in this matter again money became so emphatically the main object, that the warriors would not even march outside the gates for a review without having received pay. From other states, too, enough men came in who were ready to sell their persons and their lives; and these were homeless adventurers, folk to whom nothing was sacred, who took service to-day with the Persians and the Egyptians, and to-morrow with the Athenians. Such troops were only to be kept together by money. War was therefore diverted into those regions where there was the best prospect of gain; money meant power and victory, and in order to obtain money, hands were laid even upon the property of the temples.

The condition of the finances.

If such a system of mercenaries was not to bring about the ruin of the state, there was needed a public treasury with well-assured sources of income, and a fixed war-budget. But the entire financial system upon which the greatness of Athens rested (vol. ii. p. 523) had long ago fallen to pieces; the regular sources of income, in particular the tributes, had dried up, with the exception of a small remnant, and there was no fund in existence. No sooner, therefore, was an army to be assembled, than it became requisite to levy property-taxes, and to obtain immediately out of the pockets of the citizens the moneys needed for the expenses of each particular war. The dislike of giving was intensified by the frequent demands, as well as by the absence

of corresponding success : and this dislike was all the greater, inasmuch as the money of the citizens mostly went into the hands of strangers. To these causes of unwillingness were addéd the distrust of the administrators of the sums collected with so much trouble and the informations perpetually laid as to unconscientious squandering of the moneys. Special officials (*Exetastæ*) were therefore sent out to see whether the professed number of mercenaries was actually in existence ; but these controlling authorities it was likewise possible to bribe, if the general thought it worth his while. But even if no part of the moneys granted was made away with, yet there was an utter disproportion between them and the requirements of the war ; as a rule they only sufficed to bring together the mercenaries, and the idea became more and more customary, that army and fleet ought to maintain themselves abroad.

Timotheus set the first example of wars which cost nothing. In his patriotic zeal he exerted himself to the utmost to remove every obstacle in the way of glorious enterprises, and took pleasure in contrasting the trifling expense of his victories with the enormous pecuniary sacrifices exacted by the expeditions of Pericles. He procured money from friend and from foe, and, when a deficiency occurred, contrived to pay his way by a sham-money of copper, to which he was able to give currency by virtue of his personal credit. Timotheus seduced the Athenians into the serious error of believing it possible to carry on successful wars without a fund and without a regular system of financial administration. This delusion was too agreeable for them to take warning from experience, although already in the case of Timotheus himself it might have been perceived, what where the real conditions of such a method of conducting war. The general never had any control over his own movements ; he was incapable of carrying out plans of an extensive

The position
of the
generals.

kind; he was forced to evade all more important tasks, and to dissipate his strength in petty warfare; from the first he was altogether unable to undertake to receive and execute definite instructions. The necessary consequence was, that the generals became more and more independent, self-willed and arbitrary as towards the city. In proportion as they had to pay more consideration to their troops, they took less account of those by whom they were commissioned. If they procured pay and soldiers themselves, they desired likewise to reserve for themselves the glory of the successes which were achieved. Accordingly, instead of the victories of Athens, the victories of the generals were now alone spoken of; and it was not the name of the city, but his own, which the victorious commander was wont to inscribe upon the spoils brought home by him.

Furthermore, it lay in the nature of the existing state of things, that the generals, while finding less and less support and vigorous assistance in their native city, were all the more eager to seek for combinations abroad. For this
 Their connexion with foreign princes. numerous opportunities offered themselves; and thus we find Timotheus in alliance with Iason of Pheræ, with Alcetas the Molossian, with Amyntas of Macedonia, and even with Persian satraps. The most important advantages were obtained as the gifts of personal friendship. Similar relations are met with between Iphicrates and the Thracian princes, between Chares and Artabazus. These ties of amity were secured by matrimonial alliances with the princely families, which naturally were greatly interested in attaching Hellenes to their interests. Thus Seuthes had offered the hand of his daughter to Xenophon (vol. iv. p. 196); Cotys became the brother-in-law of Iphicrates, and Cersobleptes of Charidemus. Hereby the Attic generals were placed in the most ambiguous of positions, and involved in inextricable conflicts between opposite obligations (p.

109). They, as it were, included themselves among foreign dynasts, and were more at home in foreign lands than at Athens. Just as Alcibiades after his banishment founded fastnesses for himself in the Chersonnesus, so we find in this period generals of the city, while they were still its officers, in possession of towns, bestowed upon them by foreign princes, or conquered by them on their own account. Thus Timotheus is said to have received the towns of Sestus and Crithote as a gift at the hands of Ariobarzanes. Iphicrates was allowed to regard the Thracian city of Drys as his personal property, and to surround it with walls. Chares had his residence at Sigeum; and Chabrias was to all intents and purposes at home in Egypt, where he pursued a perfectly independent policy.

Thus the generals became estranged from the city, and obtained a personal power, gla-
Their estrangement from the city.
 rily contravening the spirit of the republic.

And in proportion as military life grew distinct from civil, the commanders, being in constant intercourse with the mercenaries, who required a downright kind of discipline, assumed a rough and imperious bearing; they felt themselves, as towards the citizens, in the character of soldiers, and refused to suffer the tongue-valiant gentry, who monopolized the attention of the assembly at Athens, to interfere in their doings, or to pass judgment upon their campaigns. But on the other side there remained to the civic community, guided by its orators, the duty of assigning to each general his sphere of military operations, and of receiving from each on his return the account of his proceedings demanded by the constitution. There accordingly arose on this head an unsatisfactory state of relations, which more than anything else inflicted serious damage upon the commonwealth.*

* Routine by the regular business of scribes (*ὑπογραμματοεῖα*). *Vit. X. Oral.* 840. Προσκυνεῖν τὴν θέλον, *Dem.* xix. 314. Meier, *Comment. de Vita Lyceurgi*, pag. c. Aristophon seventy-five times indicted *παράνομων*: *Æschin. in Ctes.* 194.

Such was the change which had taken place in the relations of the generals to the state; and how rapidly these relations became yet worse! How great in these times was the difference between the older and the younger generation! Chabrias, Iphicrates, and notably Timotheus, still admirably contrived to control the existing evils, and to maintain the cohesion between city and army. With truly Attic genius they knew how to make the new military system as serviceable as possible to the state, and to raise its defensive strength by combining the service of mercenaries with that of citizens; they understood how to assert the superiority of Attic culture over the savage mass of the troops, although already in the case of Iphicrates the defiant ways of the soldier are perceptible,—as was shown on the occasion of the indictment of Aristophon, when the general drew his sword in the face of the orators.

At a later date, however, the disastrous evils of these relations became far more openly manifest. The generals were barbarized simultaneously with the bands commanded by them; and as they blended with these, they separated themselves from the citizens, and lost all habits of discipline and legality. They made no distinction between friend and foe, squandered the money in Tyrannical arrogance, levied forced requisitions upon the confederates, and on occasion passed with all their troops into foreign service, so that the Athenians were altogether ignorant of the whereabouts of the fleet, and had to search for it on the wide seas. Indeed, it had become unknown who was the master of the fleet. It is in this condition that we find affairs under Chares and Charidemus, who exhibit the wild ways of a Greek *condottiere* in their full

Chares. development. Chares was already in his personal exterior a complete contrast to the ele-

—Ἐξετασται τῶν ξένων, Æschin. *Tim.* 113.—Timotheus and Pericles: Isocr. xv. 111.—Sham-money: Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.* vol. i. p. 392 [Eng. Tr.].—Conflicts between civic duty and foreign connexions: Dem. xxiii. 129.

gantly-built Timotheus, who, like his father, was of slight bodily stature. Chares made a point of letting it be seen on every occasion that he was above all a soldier; and sought to impose by means of his martial figure and rodomontading talk. Accordingly, Timotheus reproved his countrymen for appointing a man general by reason of his broad shoulders. Such a man, he said, might indeed be adapted for carrying the general's baggage; but the office of general required a man, who, free from all low desires, possessed a clear judgment concerning the mission of the city; so that if Chares boasted of the holes in his shield and the wounds on his body, foolhardiness was no praise befitting a general. At the same time Chares was a man of profligate habits, who took delight in the harsh alternation of bloody frays with effeminate debauchery, whose admiral's vessel was filled with wenches and female flute-players, and who shrank from no means of securing the favor of the orators and of the civic assembly. As a man of the vulgar type, his natural downrightness pleased the people far better than the fine culture of Timotheus. And indeed Chares, by virtue of his indefatigable ambition, his versatility and his unwearying officiousness, during fifty years of active life as a general, obtained many an advantage in the field for the Athenians; but he missed more opportunities than he took advantage of, and did more harm than good; and, although he is not to be regarded as the sole cause of the Social War and of its disastrous issue, which the friends of Timotheus laid to his charge, yet he, above all others, contributed to bring his native city into evil repute, and to destroy the patriotic work of Timotheus.*

The above-mentioned generals were born Athenians. But under the then existing circumstances foreigners too were unhesitatingly taken into

Charidemus of Orens.

* Timotheus on Chares: Plut. *Apophthegm.* 187. Chares and Cleon: Polyb. ix. 23.

the service of the state, provided only that they distinguished themselves in the art, which in those times was accounted the highest task of the general, viz. that of collecting volunteer recruits, and drilling them, and attaching them to the general's person. In this way Charidemus attained to high honors: a man who was not even in his own native place, Oreus in Eubœa, reckoned among the citizens of the full-blood, who rose from the meanest condition by his exertions as a soldier, then at the head of a band of his own made himself a name as a freebooter by land and by sea, and was on this account, together with his men, taken into pay by Iphicrates, when that general wished to increase his forces against Amphipolis. Iphicrates displayed a thoughtless confidence in Charidemus; he entrusted to his care the hostages from Amphipolis, with instructions to take them to Athens. Instead of this, Charidemus took them home to their native city, and fought on the side of the Thracians against Athens. But in lieu of receiving the just recompense of his treachery, the cunning adventurer contrived anew to secure confidence. Notwithstanding his perfidy, which had inflicted irremediable damage upon the Athenians, they regarded him as a man whose services ought not to be rejected. Timotheus took him into pay again; and the Athenians even conferred their civic franchise upon him, in order to attach him permanently to the interest of their city. So low had the standard fallen, according to which men were judged; so little was even a general of the city required to possess what in truth was the fundamental condition of any salutary service to the state,—conscientiousness, fidelity, and patriotism.*

Such was the condition of the military system of the Athenians in times when the possession of forces which could be relied upon was more indispensable than ever before; for the number of points

Foreign
relations.

* Charidemus: Schäfer, *Demosth.* i. 379.

requiring to be defended was continually on the increase. The utmost vigilance, sagacity, and energy were therefore needed, if Athens desired to maintain her position in the *Ægean*. But since the condition of things at home was what it was, the foreign relations could not fail to become rapidly worse, the most important places to be lost, and the confederates to revolt. The Athenians allowed themselves to be carried on by the course of events, while there was no mind gifted with foresight to guide the helm of the state and to keep definite aims in view. They took pleasure in the vagueness of existing relations, entertaining no really serious intentions either of war or of peace, and concluding treaties without any fixed resolutions of observing them. Thus even their foreign policy shows how thoroughly the love of law and of moral order in public life had become dulled.

Of all the existing foreign relations, those with the princes on the Cimmerian Bosphorus The Cimmerian Bosphorus. were in truth the most favorable and the best warranted. Here since the year 438 the family of the Spartocidæ had held sway, who displayed a friendship towards the Athenians, which had alone survived all the changes of fortune and the heaviest blows suffered by Athens. Satyrus and his son Leucon (393–353 B. C.) were specially zealous in giving proofs of this kindly feeling. Leucon relieved the Attic vessels of the exit-dues, conceded to them important privileges in the purchase of corn, so that all vessels had to wait, until the Athenians had fully laden their ships; he even occasionally in times of dearth allowed them to buy considerable stores at a moderate price. In general he attached the highest value to the maintenance of fixed and well-ordered relations with the chief market for the corn of the Pontus, which were based upon a salutary reciprocity of hospitable relations of traffic.

With Egypt and Cyprus the most advantageous con-

nexions had been entered into by Athens; but in either country she had left her allies in the lurch (vol. iv. p. 294). As towards Persia, the relations of the Athenians were in the highest degree uncertain; they oscillated between a respectful attitude, conceding to the Great King the authority of a suzerain, and a contempt, regarding the empire as in a condition of dissolution, and treating it as a state in the case of which it was of no moment whatever, whether the obligations assumed towards it were observed or not. The highest value was attached to the conclusion of treaties of peace with the Great King, while on the other hand the satraps in revolt against him were supported, as if no knowledge of what was taking place in the Archipelago ever reached the remote court of Susa. The entire civic community loudly applauded the defeat of the royal army by Chares, as if it had been another victory of Marathon; and when hereupon Artaxerxes III., Ochus, complained, this sufficed to scare the Athenians to such a degree, that they withdrew their fleet and abandoned all the advantages gained, in order at any risk to avoid being involved in a serious quarrel with the Great King (p. 121).

But the most important of all foreign relations were those with the powers on the Thracian Sea and on the Hellespont, the high-road of the Athenian corn-supplies. Nowhere were their affairs involved in greater difficulty and exposed to more frequent changes; here was the open wound, which kept the city in a perpetual state of feverish excitement, and consumed its best vital power. Here everything had entered into an unfortunate phase; and the dominion which had been gained at the cost of such infinite sacrifices, it was, since the fatal expedition of Brasidas, found impossible in any way to restore. Amphipolis, solemnly declared the property of the Athenians by Sparta, Persia and Macedonia, defied all the attacks even of Iphicrates and Timotheus;

and though seemingly the Athenians had it once more in their hands, it was again further from them than ever before. Similarly, Olynthus and the Chalcidian cities were able, without receiving chastisement, to refuse to join the Attic Naval confederation. The ancient friendship of the Odrysæ (p. 15) had long since changed into bitter enmity; and bloody feuds were carried on in order to decide, whether for a time the influence of Athens, or that of a native dynast, was to preponderate. Neither party was decidedly the stronger; for the superiority of the Attic arms was far outweighed by the fact of the extreme remoteness of the scene of the struggle, as well as by the difficulties caused by wind and weather; and the Thracian princes contrived to overcome the Athenians with their own weapons, and to make the talent of Attic generals serve the purposes of dynastic policy; for Cotys, it will be remembered, owed his position of power to Iphicrates, and Cersobleptes his (since the year 359) to Charidemus. But such successes as were actually obtained, the Athenians owed solely to the feuds which broke out between the Thracian chiefs; and it was again only in this way that in the year 357 the treaty was brought about, by which Chares once more recovered the Chersonnesus for Athens. Yet even now the tenure of it remained a very insecure one; for Cardia, the most considerable place in the peninsula of which its citadel was the key, situate on the isthmus connecting the peninsula with the mainland, a town founded by Greeks and inhabited by a population of Attic descent, remained in the hands of the Thracian prince. And concerning all treaties with him this alone was known: that he kept them only just so long as he lacked the power to free himself from them. There was absolutely no guarantee for these possessions, which Athens was wholly unable to renounce without seeing the bases of her prosperity called in question, unless the princes there were completely overcome and deprived of the pos-

sibility of outstepping the limits placed upon them by treaty. But for such a method of conducting war the Athenians were wholly deficient in both courage and resources; the utmost they accomplished were naval armaments, which temporarily restored the authority of Athens and enforced momentary concessions. But if it was impossible to overcome the chieftains of the Thracian coast, how was the new enemy to be defied, who was advancing from the interior, and who combined the faithless policy of the petty barbarian princes with a steadily extending imperial power, the nucleus of which was quite beyond the reach of attacks on the part of the Athenians?

The results
of the policy
of Aristophan.

At first they had indulged in the flattering delusion, that the interests of the Macedonian king were identical with those of Athens, and that he would be of good service against Amphipolis, against the Chalcidian cities, and against the Odrysæ. But by his occupation of Amphipolis (p. 55) Philip had thrown off the mask; and herewith a new foe had been added to the list of those who endangered the possession of the colonies; and this new foe, as the Athenians were soon obliged to confess to themselves, was the most dangerous of all.

With regard to the relations with the Greek states, the Naval Confederation had notwithstanding its many infirmities yet ensured this advantage: that it maintained a connexion between Athens and the Archipelago, and prevented the downfall of the ancient traditions. Athens might, and could not but, conceive herself a Great Power, when the deputies came to the city from Rhodes and from Cos, from Byzantium and from Chios. After all, there was a possibility of this connexion being firmly established by the gradual force of habit, and invested with a new importance by the common danger which beset it. But now it began to collapse at the very moment when the worst danger was imminent, when Philip was revealing

his designs of maritime dominion. Corcyra had already been lost at an earlier date (p. 111); Athens therefore only retained the least powerful islands; a shadowy remnant of the old Federal Council continued to hold its meetings in the city, and about forty-five talents (£11,000 *circ.*) of federal contributions were paid in. The cowardly character of the treaty of peace materially helped thoroughly to undermine the authority of Athens. For hitherto she had always at least remained a power in the Ægean; and for this reason an Attic party had maintained itself in the islands, and had directed their constitutional life in harmony with Athens. But now the opposite influences came to prevail, and in the most important cities revolutionary movements broke out, which ended either in the government falling into the hands of the oligarchs, or in the establishment of Tyrannical rule. The Persians encouraged these revolutions; and Maussollus took advantage of them, in order to subject to his authority and to the suzerainty of the Great King the islands in his more immediate vicinity, in particular Cos and Rhodes. In Chios the civic community and the oligarchical party contended with alternating success. In the towns of Lesbos oligarchical or Tyrannical governments were likewise established. Thus hostile parties and hostile powers gained preponderance in the islands, and estranged them from the Athenians, so that even the non-political relations suffered, while the commercial traffic was disturbed and the prosperity of the citizens damaged.

This was the result brought about for the Athenians by the policy of Aristophon; although the conclusion of peace was moved in opposition to him, and carried by a party which was adverse to his, and which asserted a novel view of public affairs. For up to this time the Attic statesmen, although they pursued no independent or consistent policy, had invariably deemed it their duty to uphold the power of their native city, so far as in them lay.

Callistratus had indefatigably struggled against the hegemony of Thebes; and Aristophon had sought to advance Athens at the cost of Sparta, and had shrunk from no contest for the maintenance of the honor of the city. Both retained something of the moral elevation which had accompanied the new birth of Athens; they never left out of sight the thought of the Hellenic mission of the city, and incited their fellow-citizens to patriotic exertions.*

The policy
of Eubulus.

But now men came forward, who acquired influence by providing for nothing but the personal comfort of the Athenians, and by setting up as the programme of their party the renunciation of all aims of a loftier character and such as could be reached only by means of sacrifices. All the troubles through which the city had passed since the Sicilian expedition they averred to be the result of visionary projects surpassing the strength of the commonwealth, and the fruits of the craving of the Athenians to be a great power. It was therefore, they said, necessary for the city to confine itself to its most immediate tasks, and above all to endeavor, while maintaining a well-ordered economy at home and peaceable relations towards its neighbors, to foster trade and civic prosperity. This public policy resembled the views of life taken by a man, who withdraws from extensive concerns involving heavy risks, in order to enjoy the evening of his life in comfortable tranquillity. The great majority of the citizens were well satisfied with this system; they by no means intended on that account to cease to be conscious that they were Athenians; and nothing was more welcome to them, than when the orators narrated to them the deeds of their great ancestors, while they were themselves reposing on the laurels of their forefathers, and not disturbed in their comfortable life by any levies of troops or taxes.

* As to the dominion on the Bosphorus: Boeckh, *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* ii. p. 88.—Revenues derived by Athens from the Confederates: Dem. xviii. 234.

The spokesman of this peace-policy was Eubulus, of the Attic deme of Anaphlystus, who was born about the time when Athens was liberating herself from the Spartan yoke. He had introduced himself to the citizens as an orator, and they took pleasure in his guileless ways, which were of a kind naturally to awaken confidence. He displayed skill in business, and in particular a clear-sightedness in matters of finance, which enabled him to lay bare a variety of abuses and transgressions committed under the administration of Aristophon and his associates. When hereupon the interference of Persia threatened endlessly to extend the Social War,—while the resources of Athens had already been exhausted at its commencement, while the generals were quarrelling with one another, and there was an utter absence of belief in a successful issue,—Eubulus perceived that the moment had arrived for him to come forth from his more restricted sphere, which had merely been that of exercising a control over the finances, and to take into his hands the great question of the day. It is true that the career of an Attic statesman could not have begun more shamefully, than by his insisting upon the conclusion, under existing circumstances, of peace at any price, upon the sacrifice of the great efforts which had been made, and upon an absolute renunciation of the old maritime dominion of Athens. But the unblushing openness with which he subordinated all considerations of honor and power to the longing for peace, gained him the hearts of the citizens, who now enjoyed the pleasant sensation of hearing their most secret feelings and innermost wishes defended by eloquent lips as thoroughly justifiable. They therefore gave themselves up with indefinite kindness to their Eubulus, who contrived to tranquillize them as to the losses of the moment, and to console them with the prospect of better times. It was, he declared, the imprudent and irritating policy of Aristophon and Chares which had caused the recent disasters: let the Athenians

only endeavor to put their own house in good order ; for upon a modest domestic life were based the true welfare and prosperity of a democratic commonwealth.

But Eubulus had no intention of bidding his fellow-citizens remained satisfied with mere phrases. He earnestly set about turning the benefits of the peace to good account for his city, so soon as an opportunity presented itself for the purpose ; and this opportunity he found, when immediately after the retirement of Aristophon he was appointed to the office of Treasurer of the state (vol. ii. p. 504). His entire system of policy, it should be remembered, had its origin in the management of the finances : in this department he was at home ; with reference to it he had led the opposition, and was acquainted with all the defects of the previous administration ; he could therefore energetically address himself to reforming it, and achieve rapid results. At the close of the first term of his administration he enjoyed the triumph of being able to show a not inconsiderable augmentation of the public revenues.

Hereupon it could not fail to become clear, ^{The festival-money.} whether the object of Eubulus really was the welfare of the city. In that case, however much he loved peace, it behooved him to provide for unseen cases and to collect a fund, while without such a fund the city must always remain impotent, and incapable even of preserving a peace worthy of trust. But to this he gave no thought. He desired to maintain himself, to make himself indispensable, and to attach the people to him. He accordingly proposed the distribution of the surplus of the first year of peace. The Dionysia (probably in the spring of 353 B. C.) were celebrated with a merriment long denied to the people ; even the poorest indulged to his heart's content in unlimited festive enjoyment. Henceforth Eubulus was omnipotent. He introduced dependants of his own as his successors in the supreme financial office, at the same time,

however, diminishing the importance of this post; for he was powerful enough essentially to transform the whole system of the Attic financial offices in accordance with his principles.

Formerly it had been the ordinary practice for the surplus sums of the public revenues to be sunk in the war-fund, while in good years part of the surplus was distributed, in order to make up to the poorer citizens their entrance-money on the days of theatrical performances. This was the *Theoricon*, or theatre-money, an institution connecting itself with the noblest tendencies of the Periclean state (vol. ii. p. 493), but more than any other exposed to the danger of degenerating. The theatre-money became banqueting-money; it was doubled, and trebled. The Athenians themselves recognized in it a serious evil besetting the commonweal, and abolished it accordingly; but Agyrrhius (vol. iv. p. 297) re-introduced it as a recognized integral element in the democracy, and therefore in the system of the Attic state. But it had at least never been anything more than a practice occasionally resorted to, and the citizens had not been allowed an established claim upon it, however disagreeable the non-payment of it might affect them.

Now of a sudden entirely new principles were asserted. The festival-moneys, it was now said, are the most important item in the entire budget: the fund devoted to them ought to be an entirely independent one, with a well-assured income. The officers of this fund ought therefore not only to have instructions to distribute the moneys handed over to them, but, in order that the payments to their fund may never fall short of its due, they ought to be enabled to control the whole system of public receipts and expenditure. For this purpose are needed men enjoying public confidence, commissioned by the civic community, —if it chooses, year by year. Of course Eubulus now had a fixed seat at his board; the distributions were made

more copiously than ever before, and he was regarded as the author of this blissful state of things.

The admin-
istration of
Eubulus.

OL. cvi. 3—cx.
2. (B. C. 354±
338).

Herein the standpoint of his system of administration announces itself; and there is equally little obscurity as to its inevitable consequences. A merry life for the people is the most important of all considerations; and to procure the means requisite for this is the first and most serious task of a conscientious statesman. It is as if in a monarchy the principle were asserted, that the income of the state is in the first instance designed to defray the court-festivals, and court hunting-parties, and other amusements of the sovereign, while what is left over must suffice for the requirements of the commonwealth. Only, of course, a principle so utterly repugnant to the essential idea of a state is but rarely put forward and carried out with so charmingly simple an openness as it was by Eubulus. Granted that the festival moneys, constitute the revenues of the civic community, any curtailment of these moneys amounts to a crime of *lèse-majesté*, and any motion tending in this direction is, so to speak, equivalent to an attempted act of violence against the person of the *Demos*. Now, since according to earlier usage the surplus of the year's income passed into the war-fund, it became necessary to counteract this danger by anticipation; and a special law was therefore passed, attaching the penalty of death to any venturesome attempt to propose the employment of festival-moneys for purposes of war. Thus the wise application of the public resources was made penal as an abuse of popular rights, and prudent economy as an offence against them; while on the other hand luxury was recognized as the one thing needful. In attempting completely to realize the principle of democracy, the Athenians destroyed its fundamental law, viz. freedom of speech; for the citizens and their spokesmen were now left with their hands bound, when the most important affairs of the com-

monwealth came under discussion. Every expenditure for war-purposes had henceforth to be defrayed by the special imposition of a property-tax; and hereby the whole question, even if it happened to involve the preservation or ruin of the state, was from the very outset made unpalatable to the citizens.

Of such institutions it was possible to carry the establishment; whereas formerly every orator who made any novel proposal, was eagerly watched with a view to the indictment for unconstitutional motions. But Eubulus knew how to strike chords which found a ready response on all sides; he based his policy upon the low and vulgar inclinations of humanity, and by satisfying these estranged his fellow-citizens from all more serious endeavors. The grandeur and loftiness of Attic democracy had vanished, while all the germs of the pernicious contained in it were fully developed. The state cherished and fostered selfishness instead of overcoming it. A life of comfort and a craving for amusement were encouraged in every way, and the interests of the citizens were withdrawn from serious affairs. Conversation became more and more superficial and frivolous. Famous *hetæreæ* formed the chief topic of the town-talk; the new inventions of Thearion, the leading pastry-cook in Athens, were hailed with loud applause; and the witty sayings which had been uttered at jovial banquets were with great ardor repeated about town. The manufacture of jokes became a recognized proficiency, above all in the circle of the so-called "Sixty," who held their meetings in the Heracleum near the Cynosarges. King Philip is said to have offered a talent for a report of the meetings of this society.

Thus life went on in the joviality characteristic of a petty town, and the people became more and more enfeebled. No counter-movement took place. The great mass of men without means was satisfied by the festival-

moneys, and the well-to-do were contented by a peace-policy which kept at a distance the terror of the property-tax. The democrats saw in Eubulus one of their own set at the head of affairs, while the aristocratic circles were likewise in his favor, because they had never given their support to the maintenance of a maritime dominion, or to the pursuit of the policy of a Great Power, on the part of Athens. And thus it came to pass, that such a man as this was for sixteen years able to direct the state of Pericles.*

In the earlier times it was possible to become acquainted with all the intellectual tendencies of Athens, by realizing to oneself its public life in its various relations. For everything was more or less closely connected with the state, served its ends, and found its basis and nourishment in it. Such was the case with plastic, pictorial, and architectural art, with poetry in all its branches, with the studies of the philosopher, the historian, the astronomer, and with all the departments of science, the manifold variety of intellectual life forming a single whole, as we endeavored to show it did in the Periclean age. Now things had changed; and it would be in the highest degree unjust, were a judgment as to the intellectual life of Athens to be formed on the basis of her political condition in the times of Callistratus, Aristophon and Eubulus; for its best forces had been estranged from the state, and the noblest tendencies of the period were unconnected with it. It is therefore of all the more importance to devote a separate survey to the intellectual life of Athens in Science and Art.

* Eubulus, Treasurer for the financial term beginning with Ol. cvi. 3 (Aphobetas from Ol. cvii. 3); his financial law dating from the time before the Olynthian War: Schäfer, *u. s. i.* 177, 185. Eubulus changed the Athenians into Tarentines: Theop. *ap.* Harpocr. *s. v.* Εὐβουλος, and Athen. 166.—Among the *hetærai* Naïs was notorious from 403 *circ.* (Harp.; Athen.).—Thearion: Plat. *Gorgias.* 518 b; Athen. 112. His shop "the habitation of twists," in Aristoph. *Gerytades* (*Fr. Com.* ii. 1009).—The "Sixty;" Athen. 614; Götting, *Ges. Abhandl.* i. 257.

Philosophy might most readily be expected to have acquired a salutary influence upon the whole life of the Athenians. For philosophy was the youngest and the mightiest movement which had seized upon the minds of men. An inclination to philosophical contemplation had been an Attic characteristic; and the tendency of the times made even poets moral philosophers, as is shown in the case of Euripides. Moreover, the Socratic philosophy designed to be not idle speculation, but practical wisdom for the conduct of life; and Socrates demanded from his disciples anything but seclusion from society; rather, he called upon them to take a part in public affairs. Finally, we also remember, how the death of Socrates by no means put an end to his influence over the Athenians; on the contrary, there ensued a thorough reaction (vol. iv. p. 161); and when the Sophist Polycrates put forth a pamphlet in which he endeavored to vindicate the condemnation of Socrates, the attempt met with general opposition among the public, and was refuted by several hands.*

Scientific
life at Athens.

Philosophy.

This reaction was a remorseful consciousness of a wrong committed, creditable to the kind-heartedness of the Athenians; but it amounted to no return on their part from the course of conduct which they had hitherto pursued. They now recognized the noble martyr as one of the best of their fellow-citizens, they paid him honors and set up his image; yet this recognition was not deep or serious enough to impel them to possess themselves of the elements of good offered to them by Socrates. Accordingly, the germs of a higher life, which he with unwearying zeal fostered among his fellow-citizens, attained to de-

* Polycrates the Sophist: Diog. Laërt. ii. 38. Suidas, Defender of Basiris and accuser of Socrates: Isocr. xi. 4.—It was against him that Lysias wrote (Hölscher, *V. Lys.* 200), and that Xenophon too composed his *Memorabilia*, according to Cobet, *Mnem.* vii. 752, who appeals to Hermippus *ap.* Diog. Laërt. This is assented to by Th. Bergk, *Gr. Litt.* 292.

velopment only in a more limited association of men ; and this community forms within the popular multitude as it were a separate race, a new generation of men, owing their spiritual existence to Socrates, and finding in him their common centre.

The influ-
ence of Soc-
rates.

This Socratic group was not, however, an exclusive sect, like that of the Pythagoreans ; for Socrates was at no time the head of a school pledged to the sayings of its master. His teaching was not a seed which, wheresoever it finds a ground upon which to fall, produces, though in different degrees of excellence, the same kind of plant ; but it was of its nature nothing more or less than the impulse to a human life having its being within, and independent of external influences, to a search after enduring truth, to the development of a free and self-conscious individuality. For this reason, too, the influence of Socrates was not restricted to his fellow-citizens. In his time the points of contrast between the several states and cities had in general lost much of their former distinctness ; the Sophists took a pride in finding themselves at home everywhere, and the culture spread by them effaced the impress of the different characters of the several tribes. This is also manifest from the flexible natures of a Theramenes and an Alcibiades, who was able, as circumstances demanded, to be an Athenian, Spartan, Boeotian, Ionian, Thracian, or Persian. But Socrates desired not an effacement of peculiarities due to birth, but a purification of them ; he wished that men should rise above the usages and views of the narrower circles of their homes, to that which was Hellenic and universally human. An effort in this direction in these times pervaded the entire people ; and in proportion to the moral and mental superiority of any individual Greek, he felt himself unsatisfied by the life of any particular state, and by the social relations in which he was placed ; and was vividly conscious of a craving for a higher stand-

point, for absolute and universally valid truth. This craving Socrates met, and his influence therefore extended far beyond the walls of Athens. But on the other hand, its benefits were pre-eminently reaped by his native city, inasmuch as it was through him that Athens first became in full measure the seat of Hellenic philosophy, to which end it had been consecrated by Pericles, and that it attained in the domain of intellectual life to a primacy, which far outlasted its political pre-eminence.

From all sides Hellenes eager for knowledge arrived, in order to imbibe Socratic wisdom at its source. From Thebes came Simmias and Cebes (vol. iv. p. 355); from Megara Euclides, round whom the orphaned band gathered after the death of its master. Having already before been occupied with philosophic studies, he was able in a very high degree to acknowledge the services which Socrates had rendered to the development of a logically consequent method of thought. Keen dialectics were his element; and he was indefatigable in his endeavors to attack all conceptions, views, and conclusions based upon sensual perceptions. Accordingly, the ethical side of the Socratic teaching was comparatively disregarded by him, and still more so by his successors, who neglected the profounder problems of philosophical consciousness, and sought to place their whole strength in the *eristic* art, *i. e.* in that of dialectic contest. The formal side preponderated in this school; and this was why it met with all the more ready a response on the part of those who had no wish to be philosophers proper, but who only desired, with a view to general culture and practical purposes, to exercise their thinking powers, and to learn the art of convincing argumentation. In this direction Eubulides distinguished himself, a Milesian by birth, who lived and taught at Athens. His was a manly character; in the philosopher, not less than

Foreign
followers of
Socrates.

Euclides.

Eubulides.

in other men, he demanded patriotism and a love of liberty; and himself adhered to the democratic party at Athens.*

Phædo.

Elis was the birthplace of Phædo, a youth of a noble house, who had become a prisoner during the war (vol. iv. p. 204). Socrates became acquainted with him, and brought about his liberation on the payment of a ransom. He found in Phædo a receptive mind, which gave itself up to him with absolute devotion. To Socrates Phædo owed his salvation from external and internal unfreedom; and with faithful zeal he cherished in his breast the germs of his preserver's teaching. To the dialectical side of it he likewise addressed himself with predilection; yet he seems to have more deeply entered into its ethical significance than Eubulides.

Aristippus.

A third was Aristippus, whom the fame of Socrates had attracted to Athens from remote Cyrene. He was vividly moved by the teachings of the master, but never fully gave himself up to them. He could not emancipate himself from the habits of the wealthy commercial city; he retained a certain want of fixity in his conduct and bearing, and had about him something of the ways of the Sophists. In his philosophical tendency the man of the world likewise displays himself; inasmuch as he was prejudiced against theoretical knowledge, had no appreciation for dialectics, and regarded philosophy entirely as the art of the conduct of life, as the institution of man in the way of attaining to happiness. In reality, he said, we know nothing except that which has reference to ourselves, that which we perceive as occurring in ourselves. In this alone we possess a fixed standard for the desirable and the good; for all men term that which excites a feeling of enjoyment good, and the reverse bad. But certain distinctions ought to be drawn: there are perceptions of enjoyment of several

* Eubulides: Diog. Laërt. ii. 108.

kinds, sensual and mental, selfish and unselfish, pure undisturbed sensations, and again such as must be paid for with a greater degree of discomfort. Intelligence is therefore necessary, and a many-sided mental culture, in order to distinguish those enjoyments which are salutary from those which are hurtful, in order in the midst of enjoyment to preserve independence of mind, in order to become free from perverse excitements, which disquiet the soul, from envy and passion, from prejudices and changing phases of feeling, in order finally to be able to bear even wants and pain with equanimity. Although, therefore, Aristippus still preserved a connexion between his views and the teachings of Socrates, inasmuch as he asserted knowledge to be indispensable as means for attaining to a happy life, yet this connexion was of a very loose kind. For with him the domain of knowledge narrowed itself into the perception of the individual, and in his eyes virtue was essentially nothing more or less than moderation in enjoyment. It was difficult to sustain a teaching of this kind at a moral elevation; it coquetted with the lower impulses of human nature, and thus, after already Aristippus had contrived to reconcile his philosophy with luxurious worldly enjoyment, his successors in the Cyrenaic school went further and further on the dangerous path, and more and more completely renounced the Socratic impulse towards inquiry and towards a serious conduct of life.

A different course was pursued by Antis-
thenes, who was a native of Athens, but the Antisthenes.
son of a Thracian mother. In his case it was precisely the grandeur of the character of Socrates which withdrew him from the Sophistical tendency and from the admiration of Gorgias, and which impelled him to constitute the Socratic idea of virtue the centre of all his efforts. He therefore agreed with Aristippus in this, that like him he regarded knowledge as nothing more than means to an

end; in his view, too, philosophy was essentially the wise conduct of life and the systematic teaching of bliss; but on the other hand, he decisively rejected all happiness of life rooted in external possessions and in effeminate sensations; and, in direct contrast with the refined love of enjoyment urged by Aristippus, Antisthenes found happiness to lie in the absolute freedom of man from all outward possessions, in virtue, which suffices for itself. Virtue is the sole and perfect happiness of man, and there is no unhappiness except in evil. Virtue is the fruit of correct intelligence; but, after all, with Antisthenes intelligence is essentially the direction of the will; no sooner has this been gained than inquiry loses its significance; so that for him the idea of virtue had little definiteness and little meaning. His practical maxims, on the other hand, he expressed with extreme decision and distinctness; declaring self-indulgence to be a thing, not merely of indifference and without value, but pernicious and hateful, so that he could not otherwise conceive of true virtue, than in the form of voluntary poverty, absolute self-denial and resignation. The enjoyment of social intercourse and of all the charms with which Attic *esprit* had contrived so abundantly and charmingly to endow the life of the city, in his eyes resembled idol-worship; and so emphatically was the development of an absolutely free individuality the object of main importance to him, that even the community of state-life seemed to him a preventive restriction of it. He stood in no other relations with the world, except in that of struggling against it and endeavoring to save individual men out of it. For this purpose he worked with extraordinary zeal, by word of mouth and by writings, up to an advanced period of age; and, as Aristippus was surpassed by his pupils in the art of enjoyment, so was Antisthenes by his in the art of resignation. Diogenes, the son of Hicesius, of the "dog," Sinope, was the perfected cynic—for such was the name given to the followers of Antisthenes, a name

derived from his place of teaching, the gymnasium Cynosarges, and at the same time intended to point at their offensive manner of life, as unworthy of a human being. Hitherto the Athenians had been accustomed to see philosophic culture united to prosperous circumstances and refined manners; it was accounted a possession of the higher classes, and Socrates himself was, notwithstanding his contempt for all externals, seen holding intercourse with aristocratic circles. The philosophy of the cynics declared war against all culture of superior refinement; and Diogenes lay in his earthen tub in front of the Metróum at Athens, or in the Cronéum, the luxurious suburb of Corinth, castigating the perversities of the world after the fashion of a dirty mendicant friar, and entertaining the jeering crowd by his originality.

The above named Socratic philosophers were foreigners, or, at all events, though born at Athens, like Antisthenes, were in their tendency strangers to the state; and all of them have this characteristic in common: that it was only particular sides in Socrates which were followed by them. The schools of Euclides and Phædo attached themselves above all to his method, while the Cyrenaics and Cynics paid no attention to the theoretical side in him, broke up the union between knowledge and will, the establishment of which was one of the main merits of Socrates, and virtually converted philosophizing into action. Every one of these four schools was accordingly based upon a one-sided view of the great master; and it was after all the genuine Athenians who were best adapted for understanding Socrates in his totality.

The Athenian followers of Socrates.

The influence of Socrates upon his immediate fellow-countrymen operated in various ways. In the case of some men it never went beyond impulses which failed to have a permanent result, as with Critias and Alcibiades. In the case of others there arose an enduring relation of an

intimate community of life, which to Socrates was the real joy of his existence, and a source of blessings to his friends, such as the faithful Crito, and again Apollodorus and Chærephon, who were possessed by a deep love of truth. Lastly, neither could there be at Athens a lack of men of whom Socrates took so complete a hold, that they could not remain satisfied with keeping to themselves the benefits received by them, but were also desirous of placing the image of their benefactor before the eyes of those further removed from him and of posterity, of spreading his teaching in wider circles, and of continuing his work after his death. Such attempts were made in various ways. Thus the shoemaker Simon, in whose shop the old sage had been a frequent visitor, wrote down from remembrance the conversations which had specially impressed themselves upon his memory; while Æschines, the son of Lysanias, published Socratic dialogues in a more independent form and with a deeper sense of their meaning, although his conduct of life by no means redounded to the honor of his master. These and other writings of the same kind are lost; on the other hand, we can with perfect clearness realize to ourselves the features of Xenophon, the son of Gryllus, as a Socratic writer,—the only genuine follower of Socrates who is also closely connected with the great public events of the times.*

Xenophon;
born Ol. lxxxvii.
(B. C. 432)
circ. (?) Honorably trained in a family of consideration, distinguished in person and of noble manners, an Attic knight of aristocratic tendencies, but free from arrogance, simple-hearted and pious, and full of a zealous endeavor to attain

* Simon (διδάλογοι σκυτικοί, Diog. Laërt. ii. 100), Hermann, *Plato*, 419; 585—Æschines the Sphettian (according to some, next to Plato the most important of the followers of Socrates), Athen. 611; cf. Brandis, *Gesch. d. att. Philos.* ii. 70; Zeller, ii. 1, 170. As to the life of Xenophon, Cobet, *N. L.* 535, has demonstrated the impossibility of his having been present at the battle of Delium; and many indications (notably *Anab.* iii. 1, 25: οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἡλικίαν) justify us in unhesitatingly dating his birth, with Bergk, in 431 B. C. Cf. *Philol.* xviii. 247.

to general culture,—it was as such that the young man came into contact with Socrates. It was in a deep and living spirit that he recognized the value of the man as compared with the Sophists to whom he had hitherto given ear; and he became his faithful disciple and indefatigable companion in his walks and conversations. And yet Xenophon could not permanently find satisfaction in life at Athens; for with all his craving for instruction he was not yet created by nature for finding in scientific labors the calling of his life; and thus it seemed to him a hint from Providence, when in the year 401 he received from his friend, the Theban Proxenus, a letter from Sardis, which depicted the court at that place (vol. iv. p. 184) in brilliant colors, and promised him an introduction to Cyrus. The resolution which he was called upon to form was not easy for an Athenian; for it will be remembered how no man done had more harm to the city than Cyrus, to whom a good patriot could wish nothing but evil. Instead of this, Xenophon was to devote his services to him! Socrates made no secret to him of the doubtfulness of his scheme, but had no reason for absolutely dissuading him from it; he knew Xenophon to be a man requiring great tasks, if his talents were to be turned to account; and for such no opportunity was furnished at Athens. He advised him to apply to Delphi, because a determination of decisive importance for his whole future life was in question, on which it behooved him to take serious counsel with the deity and with his own conscience. But Xenophon anticipated the decision of the deity, by merely inquiring to which gods he ought to offer sacrifice before departing. His chivalrous spirit had decided for itself. He had no heart for the Attic democracy; his patriotism was a Hellenic patriotism; and as at that time the hegemony of his native city seemed to have come to an end forever, he thought it admissible for him to give himself up all the more trustfully to his predilection for

Sparta, which, it will be remembered, had now been acknowledged by Athens itself as the primary state of the Hellenes (vol. iv. p. 20), and for the friends of Sparta.

Thus Xenophon, when probably not more than thirty years of age, entered the service of Cyrus, and was unexpectedly called upon to perform duties of high importance (vol. iv. p. 191), in which he exhibited so much efficiency, that his fame even radiated back upon Athens. And yet by what he did he incurred the loss of his native city; for, probably about the time when proceedings against all anti-constitutional tendencies were resumed at Athens (vol. iv. p. 153), and when Socrates was sentenced, Xenophon was by a popular decree deprived of his civic rights as a partisan of Cyrus; possibly a diplomatic consideration for the wishes of the Persian King contributed to bring about this decision. Hereupon Xenophon lived as a captain of mercenaries with Thibron (vol. iv. p. 188), and then with Agesilaus, returned with the latter to his native land, and fought at Coronca against the Athenians. Sparta felt itself bound to offer so faithful an adherent an acknowledgment of gratitude, and, in order to provide him with a new home, presented him with a landed property at Scillus, a pretty spot, hidden between wood-clad heights in the neighborhood of Olympia, in a side valley of the Asopus, and watered by the rivulet, abounding in fish, of the Selinus. Here he devoted the proceeds of his campaigns to the erection of the sanctuaries vowed by him to Artemis, and divided his life between the chase and science, while his sons grew up in Spartan discipline. The war between Arcadia and Elis, (vol. iv. p. 492) once more deprived him of a home; he emigrated to Elis, but about the same time also again entered into more intimate relations with his native city, since the latter had under the guidance of Callistratus taken the side of Sparta against Thebes. His banishment was revoked on the motion of Eubulus; his

son Gryllus died the death of a brave cavalier while serving in the Attic army at Mantinea; and Xenophon personally in the last year of his life (up to Ol. cv. 3; B. C. 357, *circ.*) exerted himself on behalf of his native city, restored to him after so many experiences, although he continued to have his residence at Corinth.

Xenophon's life is not like that of a philosopher; and the unquiet impulse of ambition which moved him seems to have little in common with the frugal spirit of Socrates. And yet he is one of the most faithful followers of the master; and after campaigns full of glory we find him in the period of leisure recurring with undiminished veneration to the figure of his beloved teacher, in order to note it in his *Memorabilia*, and to purify it from all falsification. It was, however, not the inquiring philosopher, whose courses of thought he was anxious to unfold and to carry on, but the simple man of the people and teacher of the people, who was in his eyes a model at the same time of the highest honesty, wisdom in the conduct of life, and piety. For, notwithstanding all his productivity and versatility, there was yet upon the whole a very one-sided tendency in Xenophon. Knowledge itself and the methods of attaining to it were subjects of indifference to him; he merely sought results useful for the improvement of man. The teaching of virtue is in his view the main point; and again, he essentially regards virtue on its practical side, as the condition of a happy life, because without it nothing of real value is to be found on earth. This doctrine he then seeks to apply to all conditions of life. In his *Œconomicus* he treats the whole management of a household, gives precepts for the state of marriage, demands intellectual culture for women, a fair treatment for slaves, and the right use of property, which only becomes a thing of value when it is turned to a prudent account. He discusses husbandry in its connexion with the breed

Xenophon
as a philoso-
pher.

ing of cattle and with the chase. Even this last he requires to be pursued with competent knowledge, in order that it may harden the young citizen; in the same way horsemanship is to be regarded as an art; and for the cavalry of the city he requires a commander of pre-eminent culture, in order that his squadrons may be a credit to the commonwealth. Finally, in the life of the state the utmost disorder and confusion will according to his opinion infallibly prevail, if those occupied with public affairs lack intellectual preparation and training in virtue.

In short, all the relations of life, which already the Sophists had treated theoretically, are illustrated by Xenophon according to Socratic principles; his writings present an applied system of ethics devoid of loftier points of view, a moral philosophy of a homely sort, which within its limit exhibits a sound judgment and delicate observation. His mind was always intent upon details. Thus in practical life too he showed himself in the presence of the most arduous tasks brave, determined, and an excellent leader of the helpless multitude; but in matters of general interest he displayed uncertainty and want of independence, so that he sought in characters superior to his own the anchorage which he was unable to find in himself. At the same time, notwithstanding his great receptivity for everything good, he was so much in want of a fixed standard, that, after having been first enchained by the grandeur of the character of Socrates, he could afterwards give himself up to Cyrus, and in the end attach himself with blind veneration to Agesilaus. Xenophon had a soldier's nature, which demanded discipline and order; but on the other hand, itself felt in need of a commanding authority. The unstable condition of things at Athens confirmed him in his conviction, that there must exist *one* will, and a personage of royal pre-eminence, where a commonwealth is to prosper. It was therefore one of the last labors of his

life to sketch in his *Cyropædia*, in connexion with the figure of the Elder Cyrus, the idealizing picture of a genuine king and founder of an empire.

Of all the Attic followers of Socrates, Xenophon and Plato might be supposed to have stood in the nearest connexion with, and dependence upon, one another. They were nearly of the same age; their position in society was the same; they partook of the same aversion from the Sophists, as from the men who had ruined the Hellenic people; they were at one in their love for their master and in their zeal for laboring at the continuation of the work of his life; they were both for the same reasons dissatisfied with the state of things in their native city, and in their conception of the tasks of Hellenic culture had both no hesitation in attaching themselves to eminent personages in foreign lands. And yet it is impossible, in the numerous writings which are preserved from the hands of precisely these two followers of Socrates, to demonstrate the existence of any trace of a more intimate intercourse between them; and already in ancient times it was sought to account for this by the supposition of unfriendly relations between them. There is however no reason for assuming any other motive than that of the great difference which, notwithstanding all the points of agreement in them, prevails between the two disciples of Socrates.

Plato, the son of Ariston, was born at Athens about the time of the death of Pericles; nor can any man be said to have more thoroughly appreciated than he the moral position given to his native city by that great statesman. For Plato possessed in the highest degree the Attic spirit of an eagerness for knowledge and a love of art; and he grew up in excellent bodily and mental training as the son of a noble house, connected by descent with Codrus and Solon. But he was in his whole individuality of a delicately framed and fragile nature; and

Xenophon
and Plato.

Plato the
son of Ariston.

Ol. lxxxviii.
1; cviii. 1 (B.
c. 427-348.)

as in Xenophon it was the military sense of order, so in Plato it was the idealistic sense of measure and harmony, which found itself repelled by the ways of the Attic democracy. The bitter calamities suffered by his native city confirmed him in his political views, without his being able, like his relatives Critias, Charmides and others, to expect her recovery to result from a complete change of the constitution. He therefore all the more completely gave himself up to a life of contemplation, to which he was attracted by his whole nature, and, after for some time hesitating between philosophy and poetry, he formed and kept the happy resolution of devoting himself to that tendency, which in those days possessed the most vigor and had the greatest future before it. This decision he

owed to Socrates. Through Socrates, Plato
 His
 training. was emancipated from the narrow-hearted party-life which poisoned the existence of the community and of its individual members; through Socrates, he clearly realized the aim of his endeavors; for the sake of Socrates, degenerate and deeply-humbled Athens was yet dear to him above all other things; and he prized as the highest blessing of his life the nine years which he was allowed to spend in the society of the master.

Now, though after the death of Socrates Plato quitted Athens, this was not the result of indifference or hatred; on the contrary, he loved his fellow-citizens, and entertained a high opinion of their capability of culture; for let an Athenian, he said, only be an honest man, and he will generally be such in an eminent degree. Moreover, Plato was far removed from that cosmopolitan spirit which shows itself *e. g.* in Antisthenes and Aristippus; he adhered to the belief in the contrast between Hellenes and barbarians. But he was the first Athenian who felt himself in full measure animated by the impulse towards uniting in his consciousness all human science, and towards obtaining, by means of a personal acquaintance with

the most important of his contemporaries and of the tendencies of his times, the freest standpoint possible for contemplation of the world. He could not, therefore, like Socrates, restrict himself to the streets and public places of Athens. For this reason he went to Cyrene, in order to cultivate his mind by intercourse with the mathematician Theodorus; for the same reason he sought the instruction of the Egyptian priests in astronomical science; addressed himself in Italy to the schools of the Pythagoreans, and entered into an intimacy with Archytas. It was at this time that he also acquired a knowledge of Sicilian affairs; and thus, about twelve years after the death of Socrates, he returned to his native city, in order here in the gardens of the Academy to begin the life of a teacher, which he continued during forty years, up to the close of his life.

Plato is the single follower of Socrates who remained absolutely true to the master, and ^{His teaching.} who at the same time deepened and developed his teaching in every direction, and broadened it into a collective view of the entire moral world.

But what Plato established was not a scholastic system of doctrine; for philosophy was not to be a special branch of knowledge;—it was rather a matter of universal human interest. We all, so he thought, live amidst the greatest variety of conceptions; and the question is whether they are just or erroneous, and whether the virtue, which we are eager to practise, is merely one taught to us by force of habit, or one which is self-conscious, free, and based upon intelligence. This is a question of vital importance, which forces itself with an inner necessity upon every consciousness. The human soul finds no repose in the contemplation of outward things; it must therefore possess the innate power of divining an invisible world; before its earthly life began, impressions and views must have fallen to the lot of the soul, of which the remem-

brance survives in it and impels it to seek after a higher life. This endeavor manifests itself in the irresistible attraction exercised upon the soul by the Beautiful, in the longing for the Perfect, in the love for the Divine. Herein lies the productive germ of a new life. But while remaining unregulated and left to itself, this impulse fails to reach its goal. It must be subjected to discipline; and this discipline is the art of the just combination of ideas—the Dialectic art. Out of its union with the enthusiastic impulse of the human soul arises the true philosophy, the elevation, progressing step by step, from the sensual to the spiritual, from conception to knowledge, the full possession of which is the privilege of the deity.

Whatsoever is sensual, underlies a continual change; it accordingly has no full reality, it is a combination of being and not being, while that which really *is*, only the possible object of knowledge, is something suprasensual. The visible *is* only in so far as it has part in the invisible Essences; these are that which alone endures, the everlasting first forms and first causes of everything which *is*, the ‘ideas’ whose life lies in a sphere above the world. There are accordingly as many ideas as there are definable species; and the first and prevailing one among them is the idea of the Good, the final cause of all knowledge and being, the intelligence which forms the world—in a word, God.

By the side of God exists the corporeal, without any independent being of its own. Through God, as through Him who formed the world, it has received measure and law, the soul of the world having entered into the bodily form. By means of this soul the world has become an animated being, as man has become such through the human soul, which is likewise implanted in the body, without having an essential connexion with it, and which only by its return into incorporeal life returns to its natural condition.

Since the corporeal clings to our soul like a hurt and a disfigurement, our moral aim can be no other than aversion and purification from the sensual, participation in ideas, and realization of them in virtue and perfect knowledge. Virtue is that condition of the soul which is in accordance with nature ; virtue is freedom and happiness ; it is based upon a clear perception of that which is absolutely good, and this perception produces the will ; virtue appears, as corresponding to the several forces of the soul, as wisdom, as valor, as prudence ; but the one and universal virtue is justice, the harmonious accord of all the forces of the soul. The true training towards such a virtue is only possible in the life of a community, *i. e.* in the state, which ought to be an image of a harmoniously ordered individual life ; like the individual life, therefore, the state must be trained by philosophy ; and, inasmuch as the great mass of the members of a state cannot be philosophical, the consciousness of the true state-community of life must be upheld by those whose calling philosophy is ; and only where they hold sway, can the true state be realized.

No other of the great men of Greece is brought so near to us as a living man as Plato ; and in his mind we at the same time see reflected the entire intellectual life of his nation. He is the glorified type of a Hellene, the perfect Athenian. In his indefatigable impulse towards knowledge he never satisfied himself, and up to a late age of life never ceased from learning ; for this reason, even as an old man he had no hesitation in altering his views, and *e. g.* in recalling his doctrine as to the central position of the world in the system of the universe. Notwithstanding the many-sidedness of his knowledge, he remained true to the national consciousness of the Hellenic people, in asserting man to be akin to the gods, in regarding all nature as pervaded by divine beings, and in recognising even in the constellations divine life and divine personages. He venerated the

popular belief, and loved to take favorite figures of the popular mythology as starting-points of his teaching, as *e. g.* when he made use of Glaucus, rendered unsightly by shells and sea-weed, to give a clear picture of the condition of the human soul disfigured by earthly dross. He was zealous on behalf of the traditional forms of divine worship, full of veneration for the Delphic god and for the mysterious rites of Eleusis. He takes his stand on the basis of popular consciousness, when he celebrates the god Eros as the author of the higher endeavors of the human mind,—when he acknowledges symmetry and beauty, together with truth, to be the three sides of the good. Nay, however much in his dialectics Plato seeks to soar to the pure idea, to the formless and colorless essence of the true, he yet remains the genuine child of his nation, which is averse from formless abstractions and from pure conceptions of thought; and accordingly he regards the supreme truths and forces as *ideas*—*i. e.* as forms, as lofty models, which human things seek to follow. In consonance with the popular sentiment Plato judges concerning the desirability of attaining to an equal balance between physical and mental training, concerning marriage, in which he assigns everything of importance to the man, and fails to do justice to the family as such in its moral significance, and finally also concerning the state. Only as a member of the state man becomes fully man. For this reason ethics necessarily lose themselves in politics; and again the political maxims of the philosopher are no newly-invented maxims, but connect themselves with traditions of Old-Hellenic public law, such as had maintained themselves in Cretan and Spartan institutions (vol. i. p. 196). Among these are the superintendence by the state of children from the day of their birth, the leaving of agriculture and of trades and handicrafts to subordinate classes, the limitation of the number of the citizens, the equality of landed property, and the placing of obstacles

in the way of intercourse with other communities. At the same time Plato also contrives to turn to account in his political writings a variety of Attic and democratic institutions. The nation of the Hellenes, by its natural mental gifts destined above all other peoples of the earth to the attainment of wisdom and virtue, is in his eyes a great, closely-connected community; the earlier and the later generations of the nation likewise form a single whole, to which its knowledge belongs as a common possession; and Plato is the first who united in himself the thinking consciousness of the nation, Plato and his predecessors. which had gradually grown into maturity, from the Ionic philosophers with their system of nature down to his own Socratic contemporaries. From all of these he took into himself the productive germs, supplementing the one by the other. From Heraclitus he took the recognition of the eternal change in human things, but he saved from the consequences of this view the doctrine of true *being*, according as it was most justly established by the Eleatics. This *being*, however, he could not consent to regard as solidly fixed and devoid of movement, because this would have left inexplicable the element of reason in the order of the universe. Therefore he had resort to the 'Spirit' of Anaxagoras, to Him who orders the universe; but the mere ordering of it was not sufficient for him, and, in looking around for other forms, in which it might be possible for the relations between the world of *being* and the world of phenomena to realize themselves, he followed the Pythagoreans, by assuming mathematical laws, according to which these operations of the one upon the other were to be accomplished. From the Pythagoreans he likewise borrowed a variety of suggestions for his doctrines of immortality and of the state. Everywhere he was able to perceive those elements which were productive, to put aside what was imperfect, and to blend what was of permanent validity into a general view of the

system of the universe, amounting to a perfect expression of the matured consciousness of the nation, such as lived only in his mind. Finally, the diction of Plato is another manifest testimony showing how popular the great thinker remained, and how lovingly he cherished and developed every possession belonging to his nation.

Prose-writ-
ing before
Plato.

Attic prose had unfolded its growth at a late date (vol. ii. p. 565), and it was for a strikingly long time that at Athens rhythmic speech was subjected to artistic treatment, while prose was only regarded as an instrument for ordinary intercourse and for the settlement of business matters. Prose composition only began, when the life of the state had fully developed itself, so that it was unable to keep pace with the rapid unfolding of the popular mind, and quite incapable of responding to the abundance of the materials of thought. It is quite perceptible in Thucydides, how he is wrestling with a still unwieldy language, in order to obtain from it expressions exactly rendering his meaning. We are irresistibly attracted by the unwearying force of muscular tension, whence his diction derives the same character of manliness and seriousness which is born by the whole age of Pericles; but that diction at the same time lacks the just proportion between form and meaning, and is therefore frequently awkward, unpleasing, and obscure.

Soon a change took place. About the time when the active energy of the Athenians began to grow faint, the love of an intellectual exchange of ideas and of communication by word of mouth and by writing on all subjects of thought became intensified in them; the influence of the Sophists contributed its share, and that which the Athenians of the old school lamented as a decay, indubitably amounted to a progress for general culture. The language became more flexible and facile of movement; the intentional brevity of expression in writing was no longer

adhered to ; and convenient intelligibility was established as the primary condition of a pleasing diction. Thus, especially in the higher circles of society, where the abuses of language common in the market-place and on the orators' tribunes were avoided, a refined Atticism developed itself, of which the writings of Xenophon bear the clear impress. It would not be easy to name two other authors who, while belonging to the same city, to the same department of literature, and all but to the same age, wrote so differently from one another as Xenophon and Thucydides ! The latter could never be fully appreciated except by a comparatively small number of readers ; Xenophon, on the other hand, by the light flow of his diction, and by the transparency and perspicuity of his mode of expression, attained to the fame of a model writer, and the Athenians honored him, although he was an aristocrat and a Laconizer, as the genuine representative of their style of composition. It was well adapted for general acceptance and imitation ; and since Attic as a dialect too occupied a kind of mediating position, which made it possible for Greeks of the most varying origin easily to accommodate themselves to it, there developed itself in Attic prose a form of literary diction which attained to universal currency.*

But in addition a peculiar and genuinely Attic form of prose composition developed itself in the *dialogue*. With a people quick of thought even reflection and the forming of resolutions in the mind are prone to assume the form of a conversation conducted by the soul with itself ; and of this we find many

The popular art of the Platonic Dialogues.

* As to the Attic dialect, cf. vol. ii. p. 566, *Note*. It is the least consistent of Greek dialects and the most varied in its sounds ; and was therefore pre-eminently fitted for harmonizing the dialects on the hither and on the farther side of the sea. It presents many analogous elements, particularly in its popular form, to the speech of the mainland ; e.g. it shares with the Doric the long α , with the Doric and the Æolic the τ for σ ($\tau\eta\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, $\tau\acute{\eta}\mu\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu$), with the Æolic the $\tau\tau$.

instances in the Greek poets. So immediate with the Greeks was the connexion between speech and thought; and it was therefore in perfect accordance with the national character, that philosophical inquiry should likewise clothe itself in a dialogue form, in which the one interlocutor aids the other in disentangling the conflicting ideas and leading them to definite issues. Socrates regarded this office as a duty incumbent upon a citizen; he was unable to remain apathetic and inactive, when he found his Athenians in an unworthy condition of ignorance and uncleanness with regard to the most important questions of life; he could not but do what in him lay to remedy this condition. And this he did as a genuine Athenian, not by expounding the results of his research in a finished systematic form, but by constituting all more important problems subjects of conversation, and discussing them by lively question and answer in the streets and public places. Thus he conferred an entirely new significance upon the Attic love of talk, and at the same time thereby rendered the greatest service to the language and literature of his people. For in their writings, which were to carry on the personal influence of the master, his pupils could not abandon the form which was so peculiarly characteristic of his teaching. Accordingly, the Dialogues of Plato are actually pictures drawn from nature. Socrates constitutes their centre, their moral unity. Every Platonic discussion is a joint search after truth under the guidance of Socrates, who with considerate gentleness enters into every opinion, with delicate irony participates in the errors, and alone retains in his hand the thread which seems often to be lost, and which yet at the end makes its appearance again, and leads to the desired goal. The Dialogues of Plato are not, however, mere copies. It was by the force of his own intellect that he developed the method of teaching which had grown out of Attic life, and shaped it into an artistic form, so intimately intertwined with his philo-

sophy, that it is quite impossible to separate it from the latter. By means of his poetic endowment he created dramatic works of art, which naturally divide themselves into several acts; a charming introduction, in which the scenery of the particular dialogue is sketched, usually preceding the successive entrances of the several interlocutors, a fresh turn in the conversation always beginning with the appearance of each of them. The speakers are historic personages, well known men of the times, in whom the various tendencies of intellectual life are reflected; Athenians of every rank and degree of culture, in the life-like depiction of whom Plato rivals the comic poets.

One is easily inclined to consider this form of philosophical instruction, this thorough shaking- and breaking-up of an exposition into a mere series of questions and answers, not only inconvenient and burdensome, but also radically unsuited to the end in view. But those who enter more deeply into the spirit of these Dialogues will, after all, find themselves obliged to allow that in them not only was a method handed down by the master retained from motives of piety and skilfully developed, but that it connects itself most closely with the essential nature of the Platonic philosophy,—a philosophy which demands not only to be listened to and approved of, but also to be participated in as an actual experience of life; which, in short, lays claim to the entire man. It needs a form of communication, comprehending in it the enforcement of independent reflection, and securing the ultimate result by bringing about an express common agreement on all the several points in the path leading to that end. It was doubly necessary to have this security in the case of inquiries commencing with the Socratic standpoint of *not-knowing*, and in view of the condition of vagueness, which beset the consciousness of most of the Athenians, and notably of those trained by Sophistry. They were everywhere absolutely without fixed, without acknowledged

positions; everywhere, therefore, it was necessary to begin at the bottom, in order to gain a secure basis. This explains the inexhaustible abundance and variety of Platonic questionings, which never for a moment allow the hearer to go astray with his thoughts, or to allow his co-operating participation in the inquiry to grow slack.

Hereby, then, a species of literature was founded, which more than any other deserves to be called national. For inasmuch as the Hellenes were naturally to a certain degree averse from the use of writing, in which living speech seemed to them to grow stiff and cold, it was a genuine triumph of the Greek mind, that a successful attempt should have been made to overcome this contrast, to cause the disturbing means employed to be forgotten, and to diffuse over the dead written letter the full charm, freshness, and vital warmth of a personal conversation. Every inquiry is an ideal dialogue, which repeats itself to every attentive reader; it flexibly accommodates itself with perfect directness to all turns of thought and to all phases of the mind; written speech springs forth like the speech of the tongue from the inmost recesses of the soul; and the masterly skill with which Plato succeeded in developing this species of Attic prose out of the popular manner in which Socrates carried on his conversations, and in elevating it into an artistic form, perfect in itself, attests most clearly how firmly he took his stand on the basis of popular life, as a genuine Hellene and Athenian.

At the same time, the standpoint of Plato was in all directions a loftier one than that of his people and of his contemporaries. For he not only, like Xenophon, applied the demands of Socratic ethics to the various relations of life in which the Greeks moved, but he from the first, in his thoughts and demands passed beyond the data of existing relations, nay, beyond the whole visible world. For by his origin and destiny man belongs to an order of things which is

Plato's
standpoint
above his
people.

above and beyond the earth; and from this standpoint Plato necessarily finds himself in manifold opposition to the ordinary views of his people. He is obliged to demand a renunciation of the sensual, which renunciation was utterly repugnant to the conceptions of the Greeks; and in much which to them seemed permitted and natural, he cannot but find aberration, and tendencies leading away from the Divine. He extols Eros, but it is only a refined and pure love of which he approves; he sees in beauty an image of the Divine, but he reduces the idea of the Beautiful to that of the Good, and attaches to the latter in all spheres of life a totally different conception and significance. If the Deity is pure goodness, it follows that the views as to the envy entertained by the Deity must be unconditionally rejected; and equally unallowable is it for man to fancy that he can obtain Its favors by sacrifices, dedicatory gifts, and other works. Furthermore, if man desires to be really good, he must renounce all impure inclinations, he must not wish to return evil for evil, or to hate his enemy.

In these points, therefore, Plato passes far beyond that which was comprehended in the moral consciousness of his nation; herein he stands like a prophet above his times and his people; and what he demands is not merely an amendment of the existing world in this or that direction, but an essentially new world. And in proportion as Plato in his ideal demands rose above the data of the circumstances and principles around him, it became impossible to expect that he would exercise a transforming influence upon the great body of the people. He was by his whole nature far more aristocratic than Socrates, the simple man of the people; and his teachings and aims could only become the possession of a circle of elect, capable of comprehending in their general connexion the doctrines put forth by their master in the grove of Academus, and of developing them

The
followers of
Plato.

further. It is true that Plato's personal qualities gave to him such a pre-eminence, that he could not fail to make a deep impression upon all who possessed receptivity for intellectual greatness; and thus we find, even outside the philosophers of the Academy, a number of noteworthy men of the times, such as Chabrias, Phocion, and Timotheus, who were, for a longer period or temporarily, subject to the influence of Plato; though we are unfortunately unable to demonstrate more closely the nature and the significance of this influence.

Isocrates.

Ol. lxxxvi. 1;
cx. 3 (B. C. 436
-338).

The best-known among all the Athenians who were personally connected with Plato, and who may be included among the followers of Socrates in the less restricted sense of the term, is Isocrates, a man who during the course of nearly an entire century (436-338 B. C.) was a sympathetic witness of the experiences of his native city from the most splendid height of its power to the downfall of its independence. As a youth of much promise, he was introduced into the circle of Socrates, and aroused the attention of the great student of men. He was gifted by nature with a tendency to the ideal, and with a receptivity for the truly good; for this reason, too, he felt himself attracted by Socrates, without, however, any productive relation of personal intercourse growing up between them. Isocrates was not deeply enough seized by the impulse towards truth to be inwardly transformed by it; he remained a child of his age, and sought to labor and to shine by his gifts after a fashion corresponding to its tastes. His talents lay chiefly in the direction of form; and for this reason not quiet inquiry, but the art of oratory, was the domain where he could satisfy himself. But since for the profession of a popular orator he lacked the necessary confidence, as well as sufficient physical strength and presence of mind, he found it necessary in his public career to fall back upon written speech; and after having for a time occupied him-

self with forensic orations, he recognized his real calling in expounding to the educated public in addresses and writings his views concerning the affairs of his native city and country. This he did as a warm and honest patriot, in whose eyes Athens was the intellectual centre of Hellas. But he lamented the existing condition of the city; his thoughts lived in the past; he was full of enthusiasm for the Athens of the Persian wars and for the constitution of Clisthenes; and perceived no other safety for Athens except a return to the ancient institutions. His patriotism is not, however, confined to his native city; he regards as the greatest of evils the civil wars, by which he has seen Athens ruined; above all, he desires to see the Hellenes re-united as a people of brothers; and inasmuch as he is aware of no other means towards such an end besides a common national war against Persia, which he believes now to have a better prospect of brilliant success than at any previous time, his political efforts are essentially directed towards bringing about such a war; in which endeavor his Hellenic patriotism to such a degree outweighs that of the mere Athenian, that he welcomes any leadership, under which the wished-for war may be realized. He rests his hopes upon Archidamus, the heroic son of Agesilaus (vol. iv. p. 481), upon Dionysius, upon the Thessalian Tyrants, and finally upon king Philip. Isocrates was not the kind of man to subject questions of the policy of the day to a keen and effective discussion in his political orations; there was nothing fresh or productive in his ideas, which invariably moved about in the same tracks. With weakly sentimentality he longs for the return of what has irrecoverably passed away; with shortsighted simplicity he expects outward events to bring about a brilliant future, but he never summons his fellow-citizens to energetic self-help, or excites their sense of honor. He rather desires the renunciation of all efforts irreconcilable with his ideal of a universal peace, and

with a moderation dominating over all public relations; his views accordingly thoroughly agree with those of Eu-
bulus; for which reason in his oration *concerning the Peace* (B. C. 355), he demanded that all confederates who objected to continuing in the League should be allowed to leave it; in fact, Athens was to exhibit a modest self-restraint, and to renounce her cravings after the position of a great power. It is true that the same Isocrates was also the associate of Timotheus (p. 94), and the panegyrist of Conon, and of his victory achieved in conjunction with Persia over Hellenes; but such contradictions are by no means astonishing in a policy of mere sentiment, not clearly understanding its own objects, and lost in the vagueness of its own course.

Nor indeed could it have been possible, except in a period of exhaustion and fatigued relaxation of energy in Attic public life, that such a man as Isocrates should have gained so important an influence upon his contemporaries. He owed it in the first instance to his personal character, the moral dignity and gentle earnestness of which must have exercised a kindly effect upon those around him, such as the youthful Timotheus, who, being originally inclined to luxury, is said to have been led by the example of Isocrates to a well-ordered and serious course of life. Again, he undoubtedly possessed eminent gifts as a teacher, which enabled him, first at Chios, and afterwards at Athens, to gather around him a brilliant circle of young men. He was their fatherly friend and adviser; he impelled them to turn their natural gifts to a useful account, partly as statesmen, as in the case of Timotheus, Eunomus (vol. iv. p. 298) and others, partly as men of learning, and authors. And yet, notwithstanding all his merits and his fame, which was spread through the whole Hellenic world, he was not a man equal to the highest demands of his age. He desired to mediate between public life and philosophy; but this mediation was of an unfor-

fortunate kind in either direction. For statesmanship he lacked a free eye and a courageous heart, while true science was denied by him when he made it the handmaid of practical wants. He had opened his school with a programme directed against the Sophists, and yet it was to their standpoint he too recurred, when he set up an artistically skilful versatility in speech and thought as the highest end of instruction. The applause of the multitude, which liked that species of philosophy best which it most readily understood, made him vain and self-conceited like the Sophists, so that he eagerly denounced all inquiry of a more searching sort as unnecessary refining, and at the utmost conceded to it the value of serving as a preliminary training for the art taught by himself. Thus Isocrates, in life as in science, was opposed to the endeavors of the best among his contemporaries; he estranged the young generation from true philosophy, by giving currency under its name to a superficial and hollow rhetorical training; from being an adherent of Socratic science he became an opponent of it, and made it shallow in the same degree in which Plato deepened it.

The real services of Isocrates lie in the domain of the art of oratory. This was the art, which more than any other was intertwined in its growth with the natural genius of the Athenians and with their constitution; and accordingly every progress of Attic culture was at the same time a new step in the development of oratory.

Originally oratory was no artistic acquirement, but a power of natural growth, without ^{Attic oratory.} which it was impossible to conceive of a man of intellectual mark in the community. In proportion as the affairs of public life became more complicated, the demands rose: a special preparation seemed necessary for political and forensic speeches, and schools were formed, which provided theoretical instruction for the purpose. This

took place under the influence of Sophistry, whose efforts were in no department more in accordance with the times and more successful than in that of rhetoric. In this department the Sophists labored with more thoroughness than elsewhere; and notably Protagoras entered as a serious inquirer into the subject of the nature of language, in order to establish a correct method for its employment. Sicilian oratory, which attained to its highest perfection through Gorgias (vol. iii. pp. 264, 265), likewise attached itself most closely to Sophistry; for it too regarded oratory as essentially nothing else than the mastery over the employment of all means which can serve to produce a decided conviction in the listener.

This new art met with the readiest response at Athens, where Antiphon (vol. ii. p. 569) had been the founder of scientific rhetoric. Thus, *e. g.* Agathon (vol. iv. p. 92) was entirely under the influence of Gorgias; the same master was followed by Polus of Agrigentum, Thrasy-machus of Chalcedon, and Alcidas of Elæa, who sought each after his own fashion to develop the art of Gorgias.

Thrasyma-
chus. Thrasy-machus in particular endeavored to moderate the poetical bombast in the peculiar manner of the Sicilian orator, and to approximate it to the language of ordinary conversation. But at the same time he attended in his prose diction to the fall of the syllables, rounded off each sentence into an artificially-constructed period, and went so far in intentional artificiality, that certain combinations of feet, especially the third Pæon ($\upsilon\upsilon-\upsilon$), play a great part in his build of sentences.*

The art of
Isocrates. This tendency, then, Isocrates likewise followed; while at the same time there can be no doubt but that he aimed at a higher goal than the

* Thrasy-machus the predecessor of Isocrates in the rhythmical construction of periods: Aristot. *Rhet.* 183; Cic. *Orator.* c. 52; cf. Hermann, *de Thrasy-macho*, 10.

rhetoꝛs of the Sicilian school. As might be expected from an opponent of Sophistry, he desired not to prove the power of persuasion by applying it to any and every kind of material, but only to concern himself with select subjects, and only to bring forward such ideas as were worthy of being taken to heart; he refused recognition to any art, which was not sustained by moral earnestness and productive of noble resolves. These indeed were echoes of his Socratic tendency; but he gradually more and more lost the habit of giving a deeper moral significance to his labors; and while Plato was establishing a philosophical foundation for the essential nature of true eloquence, and deducing it from love, which is unable to retain for itself the treasure of knowledge secured by it, and is bound to enable others also to enjoy it in the most appropriate form,—Isocrates on the other hand fell back more and more upon a formal system of technicalities, and devoted all his efforts to the perfection of style. And in this direction, with the support of a quite peculiar natural endowment, he in truth achieved results of very great importance, and novel of their kind; for although he had been preceded by Thrasymachus in the perfection of the construction of sentences, it was he who first contrived with full masterly skill to exhibit the *period*, which comprehends a thought in all its ramifications with clearness and immediate perspicuity in a well-ordered frame. He builds up his sentences with the art of an architect, who calculates with precision upon pressure and counter-pressure, so that no joint is missing, while each is fitted into its proper place, and no word can be changed, without the effect of the whole being impaired. By means of an agreeable distribution of accents, together with a pleasing copiousness and rhythmical symmetry, his orations create the impression of music, which exercised a great charm upon the receptive ear of the Greeks; whatever disturbed the evenness of flow, even the mere occurrence of a col-

lision of vowels in two words following upon one another, was most carefully avoided in his compositions. They afforded an artistic enjoyment, while at the same time they exercised an edifying effect by the noble character of their contents, and by means of their admirable arrangement and logical consistency in a high degree satisfied the educated listener. In this branch of artistic oratory Isocrates was the acknowledged master; but at the same time his orations betrayed their artificiality: they were not works which had freshly sprung from the mind, but anxiously elaborated model specimens, which had been again and again subjected to the file, and which, in consequence of the prolix amplitude in the development of their ideas, became in the end fatiguing; the breath of the living word was no longer perceptible. It was against this point that the rhetor Alcidas (p. 178) in particular directed his attacks, which contrasted as true oratory with the literary eloquence of Isocrates the genuinely original vigor of a Gorgias, who, as Alcidas said, could almost extemporaneously find the right word. Isocrates was in point of fact an artist in diction, a stylist, and only in outward form an orator.

Practical
oratory.

The real oratory of the Athenians connected itself closely with the tasks of actual life, as they offered themselves in the law-courts and in the popular assembly. Here it could take for its model neither the pomp of the style of Gorgias, nor the artistically-constructed periods of Isocrates; for the ample and self-satisfied manner of the artistic orators was not in its proper place, when the point at issue was to treat a given case according to the facts at issue, and in the short time allowed concisely to combine that which was adapted for determining the decision of the civic assembly or of the jury. Such was the oratorical art of Andocides (vol. iv. p. 275); in the same kind the highly-gifted Critias distinguished himself by his abundance of ideas. But this

Attic oratory reached its fullest development, and the most abundant evidence of it remains, in the works of Lysias (vol. ii. p. 537 ; vol. iii. p. 152), who is likewise by the experiences of his life so intimately associated with the internal and external history of Athens. He was the son of Cephalus, the friend of Pericles (vol. ii. p. 546), and was of the same age as Isocrates. After the death of his father he lived at Thurii, where he enjoyed the instruction of Tisias (vol. ii. p. 537) ; about the year 411 B. C. he returned to Athens, where he resided with his brother Polemarchus as a well-to-do alien under the protection of the state, and as a loyal adherent of the constitution. On this account they were persecuted by the Thirty ; Polemarchus was put to death ; Lysias fled to Megara, supported from his own resources the liberation of Athens (vol. iv. p. 53), and as the avenger of his brother's death publicly indicted Eratosthenes (vol. iv. p. 152). At a subsequent period he again took part in public affairs (vol. iv. p. 303), and with inflexible consistency remained a warm patriot, although, for all that he had done and suffered as such, he was not even rewarded by the civic franchise. But he now applied himself entirely to forensic oratory, which at Athens came more and more into the foreground, and which was also the principal subject treated in the books of instruction. Under the salutary discipline of a practical profession Lysias put aside whatever had formerly clung to him of artificiality and Sophistic mannerism ; he emancipated himself from all useless ornament, and wrote his speeches in so straightforward and simple a style, that they became perfect models of the natural grace of Attic prose. He moreover possessed a peculiar gift, which very probably was due to his Sicilian blood (vol. iii. p. 248), viz. the power of seizing with admirable force the characteristic points, according to age and social class, in the particular personages whose suits he conducted, and of thus making his speeches dramatic sketches of actual life.

The two species of practical oratory separated themselves more and more sharply from one another. As popular orators the party-leaders Leodamas and Aristophon (p. 88), and above all Callistratus, obtained distinction; in the department of forensic oratory it was achieved by

Isæus. Isæus of Chalcis, who was possibly induced to

emigrate to Athens by the revolt of Eubœa in the year 411 (vol. iii. p. 483). At Athens he devoted his time to philosophical studies, and connected himself with Plato; but, following the same impulse which diverted so many Hellenes of this period from philosophy to oratory, he too became a writer of speeches, like Lysias, and in the same spirit as he, although failing to compass the graceful charm in which Lysias causes us to forget all the art underlying it. On the other hand he surpasses Lysias in vigor of thought and incisiveness of argumentation.*

The history of oratory leads directly into the adjoining domain of the sciences. For all the remarkable orators were at the same time men of theory, and composed scientific manuals for the disciples of their art, as was done by Isocrates, Isæus, Thrasymachus and others. In general this was the great service rendered by Sophistry, from which the rhetorical art had likewise, as will be remembered, derived its origin; that it gave an impulse to scientific reflection in all departments. And in proportion as this tendency averted

* Plato's doctrine concerning oratory in Part II. of the *Phædrus*: von Stein, *Platonismus*, i. 106. Polemical efforts of Alcidas against written and epidaictic speeches and praise of *ἀντροσχεδιάζειν*: Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alkidamas*, 1864, p. 21. The genuineness of Alc. *περὶ τῶν τοῦς γρ. λ. γραφόντων* is defended by Sprengel and Vahlen. In any case the oration is composed in the spirit of Alcidas. Lysias failed to receive the Athenian citizenship, as Thrasybulus had proposed: Archinus *κατὰ Θρασ. παρανόμων*, *Orat. Att.* ed. Did. ii. 249; cf. Ferd. Schultz, *Demosth.*, 1866, p. 13.—Isæus, *Ἀθηναῖος τὸ γένος*, was a native of Chalcis; hence according to Schömann (and Meier) one of the *cleruchi* in Chalcis. *Contra* Liebmann *de vita Isæi*, p. 3. The hypothesis of Schömann seems, however, to be the simplest and the most acceptable.

itself from speculative philosophy it turned its attention to political and historical subjects, and in these produced a literary activity of a very mobile and varied character.

Literary intercourse had already during the Peloponnesian War (vol. iv. p. 96) come to flourish very vigorously. There existed a distinct class of writers and booksellers, who supplied the Attic book-market with cheap wares; the works of Anaxagoras, *e. g.*, were to be bought at Athens for a drachm. Moreover, a lively trade in books was carried on beyond the seas into the colonies; and Hermodorus, the son of Plato, circulated the Dialogues of his master, while the latter was yet living. The rapidity and facility in the spread of writings are best seen from the fact, that this method was employed for working upon the public in the interest of a party. Such party-publications appeared already during the great war; they were either outpourings of vehement passion, such as the so-called 'Invectives' of Antiphon, or programmes in brief of particular parties, which were published in order to create an effect, and to seek sympathizers even in wider and more distant circles. A pamphlet of this description was the address of Andocides '*to his political friends*,' which dates from the crisis of Attic party-life after 420 B. C. Of a cognate kind are the memoranda preserved under the name of Xenophon, the essay *on the Athenian Polity* (vol. iv. p. 21) and that *on the Revenues*. The last-named belongs to the times of Eubulus; it recommends an administration of the state which carefully turns to account all the resources of the country, and under the protection of a happy peace fosters commerce, handicrafts, and art. These are the same views as those upon which is based the oration of Isocrates *concerning the Peace*. The influence exercised by Isocrates himself rests upon the significance which the exchange of ideas in writing had gained in his age; his orations and letters were pamphlets on the events of the times. In the same way Thrasy-machus put forth

his oration for the *Larisæans*, as it would appear, in an anti-Macedonian sense. Alcidas, again, treated political questions of the day, notably in his *Messenian Oration*, in which he supported with his authority the recognition of Messenia, the work of Thebes, whose statesmen he was able thoroughly to appreciate. In this instance we therefore have a written oration and counter-oration, in other words a literary controversy. For at the same time Isocrates published his *Archidamus*, in which he calls upon the Spartans steadfastly to refuse the recognition of Messenia.*

To such a degree the literature of the political pamphlet at that time flourished. But the writers did not confine themselves to the events and questions of the day which admitted of being treated in flying sheets; after rhetoric had once applied itself to historical subjects, the attempt could not but be made, to prove the art of composition also in greater efforts of the same kind.

The combination of rhetoric and history was no new idea. For inasmuch as by the labors of the rhetoricians Attic speech had been first prepared and trained for all higher demands, how could those who set themselves the arduous task of depicting human life in the State and in society, remain strangers to this progress on the part of the exercise of language and thought? Thus already Thucydides learnt something from Antiphon and the Sophists. Thus Xenophon again is as a historian under the influence of rhetoric; to the greatest extent, it is true, in the work in which he is least of a historic writer, viz. in the *Cyropædia*. It is the

* Λόγοισιν Ἑρμοδωρος ἐμπορεύεται. Cic. *ad Att.* xiii. 20.—Antiphon's *Λοιδορίαι*: Sauppe, *ad Fragm. Or. Att.* 144.—Androcides, ἐν τῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους: Kirchhoff, *Hermes*, i. 5.—'Xenophon,' περὶ προσόδων, composed after Ol. cvi. 2 (Bergk, *Griech. Litt.* 393; Oncken, *Isocr. und Alc.* 96, where the agreement with Isocr. *Symm.* is demonstrated). Thrasym. ὑπὲρ Λαρισαίων ('*Ἀρχελάφ δουλεύομεν Ἕλληνες ὄντες βαρβάρῃ*;) *Fragm. Or.* ii. 245. Alc. λόγος Μεσσηνιακός, p. 316; cf. Schäfer, i. 100, 4; Vahlen, 5.

most fully elaborated of his writings, but its weakness is the inner untruth, that under the image of Cyrus and of the Persian monarchy certain ideal conceptions of state-government and of phases of national life are put forward. Xenophon deserves most respect, where he with simple fidelity relates his actual experiences, whether out of his own military life or out of the life of Socrates. But in undertaking to continue Thucydides, he assumed a task far beyond his powers. At the beginning of the work the influence of his predecessor is still observable, as sustaining him; but this only makes it the more apparent, in the course of his *Hellenic History*, how he lacks independence of judgment, freedom of view, and intellectual force.

Through Isocrates an entirely new combination was established between rhetoric and history. It is true that in this department also he had little interest for serious research; but he at the same time recognized the necessity of not merely fatiguing his pupils with stylistic exercises, but also directing their attention to subjects which might interest them by their facts. For his art, we remember, was to be the centre and flower of all superior culture, and it in any cases stood incomparably nearer to the task of the historian than did the forensic rhetoric of Antiphon and the Sophists. Nor could the frequent recurrence to history fail to lead to an endeavor to apply a connected treatment to history itself, in particular to that of the student's own city, out of whose past so many edifying examples were held up to contemporary eyes; and it was a triumph for the rhetorical art, to succeed in discovering a pleasing side even in the least flexible and driest subjects, and in rendering large masses of materials perspicuous by means of methodical arrangement. Thus there arose out of the history and archæology of Athens a special department of learned literature, in which a pupil of Isocrates, Androtion, distinguished himself. At an advanced age he

Attic archæology and ancient history.

Androtion.

withdrew from the busy life of an orator and statesman, and at Megara wrote his *Atthis*, in which he pursued the history of Athens from its first beginnings down to his own times, paying special attention to the constitution. Contemporaneously Pharodemus composed an *Atthis*; and even before these two, such a work was written by Clidemus, who had lived early enough to be a witness of the Sicilian Expedition, and who was accounted the founder proper of the literature of *Atthides*. But the historical studies which had their origin in the rhetorical school extended far beyond the range of Athens; and Isocrates as a teacher rendered no service greater than that of inciting two of his most gifted pupils, Theopompus and Ephorus, to labor in the field of universal history.*

Theopompus. Theopompus of Chios was a man of a fiery and ambitious mind. He accordingly devoted himself with full ardor to oratory, in which he attained to such mastery, that at the celebration of the obsequies of Mausollus (Ol. cvii. 1; B. c. 355) he gained the prize in panegyric eloquence. It is consequently all the more deserving of acknowledgment, that by the advice of his teacher, who probably considered a serious and connected system of work specially desirable for the unquiet spirit of Theopompus, the latter devoted himself entirely to science, and spent his means upon travelling through the wildest variety of countries, becoming acquainted with the most remarkable persons, and acquiring a clear judgment concerning both the past and the present. He wrote Greek history down to the battle of Cnidus, at which point he broke off and commenced a new and historical work, because he had meanwhile reached a new standpoint. This new work he called *Philippics*, because he was arriv-

* Androtion: Suidas; Zosimus, *Life of Isocrates*, 257, Westermann; Plut. *de exilio*, 605; Schäfer, i. 351. Κλειδημος, according to Pausanias the earliest writer of an *Atthis*, survived to the times of Demosthenes. Cf. Boeckh, *Seewesen*, 182."

ing at the conviction, that the age of petty states had passed away, and that the king of Macedonia would henceforth be the centre of Hellenic history itself. After the manner of Herodotus, to whom he felt akin as an Ionian and to whom he had dedicated his earliest writings, he arranged his work like a great picture of the world, with numerous retrospects of earlier affairs and with constant attention to political and social institutions. Thus he placed side by side the various democracies, compared with one another the civic communities of Tarentum and of Athens, to the disadvantage of the latter, and in a special section gave a review of the Attic popular orators, among whom he blamed Callistratus for his luxuriousness, but judged Eubulus yet far more severely as leader of the state. The wide range of his view, which was that of a historian of civilization, further shows itself in the fact, that he did not neglect the territorial products and works of art of remoter lands, and was the first to direct the attention of the Hellenes across the seas as far as the Roman world. Everywhere he displayed a serious love of truth, as well as an absolute independence of judgment; and by means of the impartial rigor with which he castigated the faults of kings and of demagogues alike, and judged all the corruptions of the times, gave to his narrative an ethical character in the spirit of Isocrates. In his style too he shared the clearness and dignity of his teacher, whom he followed in trivial points, such as the avoidance of the *Hiatus*; but in those parts of his works which were fuller of movement he exhibited a superiority in vigor and pathos.*

Ephorus of Cyme was not so brilliantly endowed by nature; he had a good share of Ephorus.
Æolic phlegm; but his power of endurance and his quali-

* As contributions to a just appreciation of Theopompus, cf. Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. i. p. 390 [E. Tr.]; Mure, *Crit. Hist.* v. 520. Erroneous judgment of Polybius, viii. 13.

fications for learned research were proportionately greater. He diligently followed up the most ancient popular traditions and the documents, and with unwearying application completed a work, such as few men before him had designed, a universal history of the Greek nation, which he continued through a period of more than seven centuries. He was an adept at methodically commanding his materials, contrived, at all events in their main bodies, to separate legend and history, and was the first to establish as the commencement of the latter the Dorian migration; he knew how to develop with a delicate perception the geographical configuration of the different countries, and inquired with special zeal into the foundation of cities beyond the seas. At the same time he was elevated above the party-divisions which broke up the Greek nation; he was able to do full justice to the greatness of Thebes, and his civic patriotism was extremely harmless, inasmuch as it only seduced him, when in the course of all too many pages there had been no opportunity for speaking of his native city, into allowing himself the gratification of at all events inserting the words: 'About this time the Cymæans remained quiet.'*

Ctesias.
(Persian
History.) While Theopompus and Ephorus were enlarging the knowledge of national history and deepening it, Ctesias of Cnidus, who sojourned from 415 to 398 B. C. as royal body-physician at the Persian court and also took part in affairs of state (vol. iv. p. 220), founded a science of oriental history. He was the first Greek to whom the archives of the Persian empire were opened; but the gains derived from them by him failed to correspond to the demands of serious science. He lacked a sincere love of truth; his vanity made him desire to produce at once a work of grandeur and completeness, but in the attempt he permitted himself the

* Ephorus: Mure, *u. s.* 539; Niebuhr, *Lectures on Anc. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 240 [E. Tr.].

most arbitrary proceedings; even in the points having reference to Perso-Greek history, which there was no reason for his not knowing accurately, he proved himself utterly untrustworthy; and in those departments of his work, where no watch could be kept over him, notably in Assyrian and Indian archæology, he constructed a thoroughly mendacious system of figures and facts, whereby he criminally deluded his contemporaries and subsequent generations down to the most recent times. This was the wrong path, to which the Sophistic culture of the age conducted, which had no respect for facts and sought in a frivolous fashion to satisfy the craving for knowledge which had been excited in every direction.*

The great desire which in these times prevailed for an encyclopædic knowledge is likewise evident from the attempts made to found a learned philology. It no longer sufficed to be simply acquainted with the classics, and to be able to recite their works in the manner of an educated man. The Sophists took well-known passages from the poets as the starting-points of their conversations, examined them in form and meaning, and this moreover frequently only in order to assert their own superior standpoint, and to demonstrate a false use of words or want of correct judgment in the ancient masters. But more serious studies were also pursued; and in particular a special class of scholars arose, who made the exegesis of Homer their regular calling. Thasos and Lampsacus were the localities where these studies flourished. Thasos was the birthplace of Hippias, who endeavoured to set forth a thoroughly emendated text of the poet, and of Stesimbrotus, who lived chiefly at Athens (vol. ii. p. 557), and who, together with the Lamp-sacene Metrodorus, was in the times of Plato accounted the ablest commentator on the epos. But exegesis already

History
and
Philology.

* Ctesias makes use of the *διφθέραι βασιλικαί*. Diod. ii. 32.

at an early date went astray, allegorical interpretations being applied and a physical meaning put into the epic myths. In this department too Ephorus exhibited greater sobriety, who compiled the local traditions concerning Homer, and became the real authority for the view, that the poet was born at Smyrna of Cymæan parents.*

Among the physical sciences, medicine in particular entered into the most intimate relations with general culture. For after medicine had formerly been cultivated in the priestly schools of the Asclepiadæ, and had remained a technical craft based upon hereditary experience, a connexion was at a later date established between it and the gymnastic art. It was sought to fix the rules of a scientific promotion of health; inquiry was made into the influence of the various nutriments and ways of life; and thus a new art was created, which had reference, not to the treatment of particular diseases, but rather to the invigoration and preservation of the human organism as a whole. The real founder of the school was Herodicus of Selymbria, whose reforms belong to the period before Plato. According to his system researches were carried on at Athens by Acumenus and his son Eryximachus, who belonged to the most intimate circle of the associates of Socrates, and were very well known to the Athenians by their precepts as to appropriate exercise in the open air and similar subjects. This side of medicine, which had been set in motion by the Sophists, was connected with the earlier mode of practice by Hippocrates, the Asclepiade of Cos (vol. iii. p. 69). He was possessed of the ancient family tradition, and diligently collected what information was to be gained from the inscriptions on the votive tablets placed in the sanctuaries of Asclepius by those who had recovered from illness concerning the pro-

* Homeric philology: Sengebusch, *Homer. Diss.* i. 205. Metrodorus: Plat. *Ion*, 530 c.; Diog. Laërt. ii. 11.

cess of their cures ; but he emancipated the medical art from the sphere of the institutions of the temples ; and by means of travels acquired a new and wide range of observations and experiences. He became a pupil of Herodicus, of Gorgias, of Democritus of Abdera ; and it was he who hereupon first founded a science of medicine, which stood fully on the level of the scientific life of the nation, and indeed in some respects passed beyond it. For he succeeded, more than any other man, in uniting the salutary impulses which proceeded from Sophistry, in order to introduce methodical reflection into every department of life, to the most conscientious inquiry into facts and to the purest love of truth. In his writings concerning diseases and remedies, as well as in his researches concerning the human organism and the influence of climate, atmosphere, winds, &c., he proved himself a true philosopher, a predecessor of Aristotle ; for instead of adhering to a dry empiricism, he sought for laws. He combined the progress of the new age with the good elements of the old, inasmuch as he understood how thoroughly to view his calling on its moral side, and established the virtues of reverence for the gods, unselfishness, discretion and love of his neighbor, as the first requisites in the Hellenic physician. Finally he also knew how to preserve to his calling the character of a liberal art ; for while among the Egyptians there existed medical systems legally authorized, to which every practising physician had unconditionally to submit, the art of Hippocrates was one which was independent of the letter, and in the practice of which no man was to be responsible to any authority but his own conscience.

Thus many men of real intellectual ability among the younger generation of physicians likewise followed in the footsteps of Hippocrates, giving diligent attention to philosophy and satisfying their desire for knowledge in distant travel.

Endoxus
of Chidus.
Ol. xciii. 1 ;
cvi. 2 (B. C.
408-355).

Among these Eudoxus journeyed in the company of the Cnidian physician Chrysippus, who was at the same time his pupil in philosophy, to Egypt, and in that of the physician Theomedon to Athens. Eudoxus himself is among all the contemporaries of Plato the personage, in whom the many-sidedness of the culture of the age mirrors itself most distinctly; he was a mathematician, an astronomer and a physician, a philosopher, a politician and a geographer; in him were combined the sciences of the East and of the West, and the Hellenic culture, as it had matured itself in Asia, at Athens, and in Italy. Born and trained at Cnidus, he journeyed in the twenty-fourth year of his age to Athens, then among the Egyptians, of whose astronomical science he availed himself to give a superior perfection to the *octaëteris* of Cleostratus (vol. ii. p. 562), and finally in Magna Græcia, where he studied geometry under Archytas and medicine under the Locrian Philistion. After these years of travel, in themselves rich in scientific results, he founded at Cyzicus a school, which stood at its full height about the year 368. Hereupon he came with many of his pupils to Athens, and there formed a union of friendship with Plato, so that he also followed the latter to Syracuse, when he repaired to the court of Dionysius the younger, where for a short time the Platonic circle was assembled. This was about the time of the battle of Mantinea. Two years after this we find Eudoxus in his native city of Cnidus, where, as the man in whom his fellow-citizens reposed their confidence, he regulated their constitution; he also visited the court of Maussollus; and finally at the age of fifty-three closed a life full of interest and usefulness, leaving traces of his labors behind him in the most various fields of science, and notably in geometry and astronomy. For whereas his predecessors had only directed their observations to the rising and setting of stars important for the practical wants of the mariner and the husbandman, or had like the Ionic and Pythagorean philo-

sophers set up vague theories concerning the heavenly bodies, Eudoxus, agreeing on this head with Plato, founded the first astronomy worthy of the name upon the basis of mathematical researches,—an astronomy which even with the meagre means at its disposal addressed itself to comprehending the movements of the planets. And to the Athenians he rendered a special service, by regulating their civil year, and materially improving the Attic calendar through the introduction of the rising of Sirius as its chief epoch, without at the same time destroying its traditional and popular system.*

When so wide-spread an activity prevailed in all the departments of philosophy, of rhetoric, of history and of natural science, language could of course not fail to receive a many-sided development. With the exception of Hippocrates, all the authors wrote in the Attic dialect; it became the organ of Greek science, the general means of communication among all educated men. That very language, which to Thucydides was still so brittle a material, which he could only with much labor force to lend itself to his ideas, had now become so flexible, as to admit of being poured like a liquid metal into any mould. In it moves the style of Gorgias with all its pomp; it bends to the smooth periods constructed by Isocrates; under the

The Attic dialect the organ of Greek culture and science.

* Herodicus of Selymbria, in the period before the Peloponnesian war, discoverer of a methodical system of dialectics: cf. Sprengel, *Gesch. der Arzneikunde*, by Rosenbaum, i. 307. Acumenus and Eryximachus (περίπατοι κατὰ τοὺς ὁδοὺς): Plat. *Phædr.* 268; *Sympos.* 176; *Protag.* 315.—Hippocrates in connexion with Herodicus, Gorgias, Democritus: Sprengel, 330. The liberal art of Hippocrates as contrasted with the *ιατρικὴν κατὰ γράμματα*, Aristot. *Polit.* 87, 8. Medicine and philosophy: Boeckh, *Sonnenkreise*, 142, 149. Travels of Eudoxus: *ib.* 140, seq.—Cleostratus, according to Censorinus (p. 37, Hultsch) the inventor, certainly one of the first elaborators, of the *Octaeteris*; cf. E. Müller s. v. 'Annus' in Pauly, *Realencyclopädie*, i. 2, 1005, seq.—Eudoxus gave to the octaeteris the form of a period of 160 years. Morning-rising of Sirius, July 23d. Inasmuch as Eudoxus retained the old *νομηνίαι*, his epoch-year is probably one in which the new moon after the longest day occurred somewhere near that date, i. e. the year 381 or 373 B. C.

artist-hand of Plato it reflects the perfect charm of cultivated conversation ; it becomes the expression of historical exposition, both in the simple manner of Xenophon and in the more highly colored rhetorical style of Theopompus ; finally, in the orations of Lysias and Isæus it combines the utmost skilfulness both of narrative and of contending argumentation with simplicity of expression and terse brevity. It is thus that in these very decades, when the ancient State of the Athenians was perishing and when their poetic art was slowly fading away, Attic prose developed itself with youthful vigor, and reached that perfection in which it served Demosthenes for communicating to the state itself a new elevation.

Poetry at
Athens. For art the age was not favorable. Poetry, as it had flourished at Athens, presumes a healthy condition of public life, a happy and secure position as belonging to the State. It could not prosper, if men felt unsatisfied with that which had been handed down to them, and were morally and mentally in an unsettled condition. The dominant tendency towards the cultivation of the reasoning powers and towards the extension of knowledge drove into the background the enjoyment of poetry, and in it the deepest requirements of all more generous natures found no satisfaction. It was not agreeable entertainment nor the idle play of fancy which they desired ; the mythology in which the poets lived was repugnant to them ; they sought after a truth which the popular religion was unable to offer to them, after pledges of an inner happiness, capable of outlasting the decay of the states, after eternal possessions, the acquisition of which might improve and heal the individual as well as society. For this reason the greatest poetic genius of the age devoted himself entirely to philosophy ; and again Isocrates has esteem to spare for the poets, only in so far as useful and edifying maxims of morality are to be

found in their works. The rest was considered dangerous. How great was the revulsion in the relations of men of culture to poetry, and what contradictions pervaded the consciousness of the people, when even sayings of Æschylus were deemed so immoral, that it was thought necessary to keep them away from the ear of youth! Such *e. g.* was Plato's judgment concerning the maxim of the poet: 'The occasion is provided by the Deity itself, when It designed utterly to ruin a race.'

And yet there was not wanting in the people
 a lively sympathy for the treasures of ancient Epos.
 poetry. The rhapsodes were to be seen, in the solemn vesture of their long robes, reciting in the midst of devout circles of hearers in the public places the Homeric poems. The art of recitation flourished greatly; and with this art were also combined performances based upon the power of memory. It was a much-admired accomplishment for a man to know by heart the entire Iliad and Odyssey, and to be ready to fall in at any point of the declamation. Youths of noble houses too, such as Niceratus, the son of Nicias, we find skilled in these arts, and constantly in the company of the rhapsodes. But in general the esteem in which these persons were held was on the decrease, and although individuals among them appeared in public much to their own satisfaction as late as the time of Plato, as *e. g.* Ion of Ephesus, yet men grew tired of their hollow pathos, and looked down with contempt upon the wandering mountebanks. Of new creations in the department of the epos the *Perseïs* of Chœrilus (vol. iv. p. 166) alone, already on account of its subject, met with recognition at Athens.*

Drama.

In the drama there was great liveliness of

* Plato *v. Republ.* 380; cf. Stark, *Niobe*, 38, 92. Power of memory (cf. G. Curtius on the ἀγών υποβολῆς in *Berichte der Sächs. Ges. der Wissensch.* 1866, p. 153) in the instance of Niceratus: Xen. *Symp.* 4; cf. Cobet, *Prosop. Xen.* 70. Concerning the rhapsodes, cf. Plato's *Ion*.

movement. In this department, as is so often the case in periods of an aftergrowth, it became fashionable for the young men, who could not accommodate their tastes to more serious studies, to try their powers as poets. Plato himself is said, after having burnt his juvenile epics, to have had a dramatic tetralogy read for acting, when he found himself awakened to higher efforts by Socrates, and hereupon devoted this product of his poetic dilettantism with equal pitilessness to destruction. Other men of the time exhibited less severity against themselves, and in particular in the Attic poet families (vol. iv. p. 89), there was no lack of writers of talent, who supplied the stage with new plays. But it was impossible for them to furnish creations of their own of original value and of really important contents; the esteem in which the tragic poets were held decreased, while in some measure the actors were more highly valued, and pre-eminently secured to themselves the interest of the public. Their art freed itself from its dependence upon the poets; they formed a distinct class, which possessed its own institutions and held its own meetings. They associated themselves with one another in special groups, which were wont to appear on the stage in the same plays, with the protagonist at their head, and the performers of the second and third parts subordinated to him. Those among them who had secured public favor held a very brilliant position; they received high pay out of the public treasury, obtained large fees on their travels, said to have arisen as high as a talent (243*l.* 15*s.*) for single performances, and were moreover distinguished by prizes of victory. Actors of proved merit took the place of the poets in the conducting of performances, and were left free by the authorities as to the choice of pieces and the distribution of parts. With the texts of the poets too they dealt as they liked, and permitted themselves alterations, which might serve to display their own talents in a more brilliant light. At the same time the comic and

the tragic artists separated from one another as two distinct classes ; and the latter acquired a quite special importance, by intervening in the study of oratory and being much sought after as tutors to the young rhetors. They were accounted the true models for the cultivation of the voice and of recitation ; their art was itself an oratory proceeding by bodily exposition ; and as the art of oratory had its proper home at Athens, so the actors' art in its new development was likewise essentially Attic. In Athens Satyrus, Neoptolemus and Andronicus worked and shone, who stood at the height of their fame in the times of Demosthenes.*

Comedy suffered less from the effects of the ^{Later} circumstances of the times unfavorable to comedy. poetry, than tragedy. For comedy was naturally more flexible ; it was not bound down to a fixed range of subjects, and was better able to accommodate itself to the changes of taste. It gave up what could no longer be retained, above all, the chorus (vol. iv. p. 125) ; this was the element in comedy by which it had most fully proved itself to be an art rooted in public life. Herewith it gradually changed its entire character. The poets no longer stood in the midst of the conflict of the parties ; they no longer seized upon subjects of the same grandeur and boldness ; their joyous freshness was dried up, their diction came to approach the language of ordinary conversation, their fervor of imagination grew feebler, as became an age in which reason predominated, and in which the general public could no longer be expected to elevate itself into ideal regions. The poets accordingly descended into the petty everyday life of the population, and here sought for the motives of pleasing productions, which

* Prominence of the actors (Aristot. *Rhet.* iii. I., p. 111, 11: *μείζον δύνανται γὺν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὑποκριταί*) and *χοροδιδάσκαλοι*: Helbig, *Zeitschr. für Gymn.* 1862. p. 104 seq.; Boeckh, *Trag. Gr. Princ.* 108. Korn, *de publ. Æsch. Soph. Eur. fab. exemplari* (cf. *Rhein. Mus.* xix. 130), actors of the age of Demosthenes in the inscription *ὑπερ τῶν περὶ τὸν Διόνυσον τεχνιτῶν*, *Philol.* xxiv. 538.

rounded themselves off into cheerful pictures of society, in scenes loosely connected with one another and seasoned by love-adventures. At the same time it was in accordance with the philosophic impulse belonging to the age, that not individual personages, but general types of character were represented, which repeated themselves in men of the same species; thus there were brought on the stage the usurer, the gamester, the parasite, and again the dandy virtuoso, the cunning slave, the clumsy peasant, the heavy guardian, the braggart soldier, the fiery lover, the philosophers, physicians, cooks, &c. They appeared under fictitious names, which thereby acquired a universal significance; or again historical names were taken, and vacillation was depicted in Theramenes, misanthropy in Timon, and superstition in Lampon. At the same time, however, living personages were brought forward, poets whose queer phrases were mocked, statesmen whose exciting speeches were derided, philosophers, who were put on the stage with their eccentricities, now as cynics and Pythagoreans, who perversely refused the gifts of the gods and in voluntary self-abasement creep about poor, dirty, and discontented, pitiable fools, now as the fine gentlemen of the Academy, who make a point of appearing with trim hair and in choice apparel. Special attention was bestowed upon Plato himself and the reforms proposed by him, and his doctrines as to the community of property, as to the emancipation of women, &c., furnished the most desirable materials for amusement. But in fact fun was made of all the philosophers in a body, and they were laughed at as time-killers and brain-sick pedants with their eternal questionings as to the real essence of all things, were it only of a cucumber. This was done with merry whimsicality and with delicate irony, but in a harmless fashion and without much keenness of attack; for the art, feebler than of old, covered all its productions with the varnish of a smooth politeness, which avoided all conflicts

of a more serious kind. There was no intention of changing men or of improving them; even their follies were taken to task without any real earnestness; the public was entertained with those matters of which in the times of Eubulus it best liked to hear. Exquisite banquets were described most perspicuously with the utmost display of culinary learning, and again splendid wedding-feasts, such as that of Iphicrates, when he was courting the northern princess (p. 111), and when in the market-place of the royal city, "which was covered with purple tapestry as far on high as the Great Bear, many thousands of unkempt, butter-swallowing Thracians were assembled at the banquet, at which the flesh-pots were larger than cisterns, and the soup was served in a tureen of pure gold by father-in-law Cotys with His Majesty's own royal hands,"—and similar diverting anecdotes of the day. The higher enjoyments of Attic social life were likewise turned to account by comedy; the charm of fine conversation, in which wit and humor displayed themselves, and notably the riddles in verse, which were a favorite amusement in social meetings at Athens, also played a great part on the stage. Finally it was likewise a favorite theme of the latter species of comedy to review the stories of mythology in the spirit of the age; which was done either in a very cold-blooded way, by attempting to explain them according to the standard of healthy common-sense, *e. g.* to interpret the turning of Niobe into stone as an expression for speechless stupefaction, or by making merry over the old myths and entertaining the public with burlesque representations of Cronus, dining on his children, of marvellous divine births, of the Seven against Thebes and other Heroes, who were seen seated on the form at school, reading books and going through all the ordinary experiences of common life. These travesties developed into a distinct species of public amusement at Athens, in which even competitive contests were instituted,

Travesty.

like those in tragedy and comedy, in the dithyrambus and in rhapsodic recitations. A beginning had already been made in this direction during the Peloponnesian War, and Hegemon of Thasos is mentioned as the first who produced at Athens parodies of the Homeric myths concerning the gods. It is stated, that the public was amusing itself with his *Gigantomachia* on the day when the tidings of the Sicilian disaster reached the city.

Such was the character of the later comedy as it flourished at full height, with its subsidiary species, parody, from the close of the Peloponnesian War down to the time of Alexander. Antiphanes, Alexis, Eubulus, Anaxandrides distinguished themselves in it; about sixty authors are mentioned, with more than eight hundred plays. Among these authors were genuine Athenians, such as the descendants of Aristophanes, and foreigners from Rhodes, Thurii, Sinope, &c. But the foreigners too were thoroughly transformed into Athenians; the varied life of the city, where men of all kinds of origin, even Egyptians and Babylonians, were to be found, mirrored itself in the productions of the stage; and therefore Antiphanes could excuse himself before the Macedonian king, who was unable duly to appreciate one of his comedies, by saying that it was indeed necessary to be thoroughly at home in Athenian society, to have taken part in Attic picnics, and to have received and given blows in quarrels about amours, if one wished to find Attic comedy thoroughly to his taste.*

The fine
arts. With regard, lastly, to Fine Art, the flourishing condition which it enjoyed in the city of Pericles (vol. ii. p. 596 *seq.*) was unable to survive the decay of that city itself. A public art, such as the Attic,

* Comedy and Plato: Alex. *ap.* Athen. 226; cf. Becker, *Charicles*, p. 405 [E. Tr.]. Iphicrates: Meineke, iii. 182; Rehdantz, 30. Riddles: Meineke, *Hist. Crit.* 277; Paul, *de Symposiis enigmatis*, 2; O. Ribbeck, *Mittlere u. Neuere Comödie*, 1857, p. 19.—Parodies: Schrader in *Rhein. Mus.* xx. 186.—Antiphanes and King Alexander: Athen. 555.

presumes a prosperous commonwealth, peace, and an abundant flow of public resources. The civic community must be internally united and animated by a free spirit, if it is to love what is beautiful and to esteem the condign cultivation of art a point of honor on the part of the State. Finally, there must be in existence men enjoying the confidence of the public, to whom full powers are accorded even for longer periods of time. All these presumptions were wanting in the case of Athens. The civic community was disintegrated by party-divisions; the ideal tendencies were neglected; passing agitations controlled the phases of public feeling; the foreign policy of the State was capricious, vacillating and unsuccessful,—how then could the arts have found a favorable soil? The age of great and corrected creations had passed away, without hope of return, with the death of Pericles.

But art itself did not perish. In general, where the Fine Arts have ever found a vigorous and popular development, they possess a certain independence as towards the life of a community; they have a more fixed tradition than music and poetry. Indeed, they are even capable of receiving new impulses from such a crisis as that which occurred in Attic society after Pericles, and of appropriating through its agency fresh germs of life, which fruitfully develop themselves. For the lofty calm which characterized the works of Phidias, and which could easily pass into sameness, was substituted a greater degree of variety; the artists were more daring, they designed with greater boldness, they placed their figures in clearer relief in comparison with the repose of the balance formerly maintained, and sought to preserve the most transitory movement. As to bodily movement, it is true that already the Æginetans and Myron (vol. ^{Sculpture. and architecture.} ii. p. 602) had achieved what was possible; but intellectual life had in their time not yet vindicated to itself its rights; the countenances appeared cold and indif-

ferent ; the noble simplicity in the works of statuary on the Parthenon no longer satisfied the younger generation, which was full of inner agitation and eager for excitement, and which demanded novel attractions, if it was to take interest in the creations of art. The transition to this later style is already very perceptible in the frieze of the temple of Apollo, which Ictinus, the architect of the Parthenon, erected for the Phigaleans at Bassæ. Here it is already impossible to mistake in the groups of the contests of Amazons and Centaurs a greater degree of unquiet, a heightened vehemence of movement, showing itself in the flutter of the drapery, and an accumulation of motives of effect displaying an intention of creating it. These examples of relieved work already have a relation towards the frieze of the Parthenon, similar to that between the diction of Euripides and the grand style of Sophocles. The influence of the stage hereupon operated in causing plastic art likewise to attempt to give expression to emotional life ; the more ancient circle of the figures of the gods was therefore passed, and a predilection was shown towards those spheres of ideas, where opportunity was offered for effectively representing the various movements of the life of the soul. In Aphrodite was shown the power of love, in Dionysus the bliss of intoxication ; entirely new tasks presented themselves, when it was endeavored with psychologically delicate distinctions to express the whole serial succession of human sensations, pain, longing, tenderness, ecstacy, madness. Man now for the first time became in full measure the subject of artistic treatment, *i. e.* man as he existed in those times, in which the ancient discipline had vanished, the bonds of family had been loosened, and the power of passion had been set free. Sophistry sharpened the insight into the characters and temperaments of men ; for even famous situations invented by individual Sophists, such as the " Judgment of Heracles " (vol. iv. p. 140), were imitated by plastic art.

Rhetoric likewise led in the direction of the treatment of emotions, as did the later style of music and the dithyramb ; everywhere we see prevailing a tendency towards the impassioned, which put an end to the reservation of the earlier times, and called forth greater freedom of movement.

In architecture, too, the age of rhetoric manifested itself. Simplicity no longer sufficed ; a greater wealth of ornament, novel and more telling motives of effect, were demanded. This direction was particularly followed by a contemporary of Ictinus, Callimachus, a man possessing all the many-sidedness and ardor of a genuine Athenian, but not the calm and the self-confidence which characterized the great temple-architects of Pericles. Under the full influence of the spirit of the age, he strove after novelty, and desire to outvie all his predecessors ; but he found no satisfaction in the endeavor ; for he lacked the true creative power, and therefore also the joyous self-confidence of an artist of true genius. But in inventive skilfulness as an architect, sculptor, and mechanician he surpassed all. The much-admired palm-tree of bronze was his work, which was erected over the eternal lamp in the temple of Athene Polias, and which served to conduct the smoke of the flame out of the sanctuary ; he, again, invented the stone drill, in order by means of it to add to the treatment of marble a delicacy of execution previously unknown ; lastly, it was he who made the discovery, which led to many important results, of giving an entirely new formation to the capital of the pillar of the temple, by placing on the shaft of the column a basket-shaped calix of acanthus-leaves, thus transmuting with a surprising effect the severe, serious forms of the earlier style of architecture. This invention met with extraordinary applause, because it perfectly corresponded to the craving for change and fulness. It soon became an acquisition of Hellenic art ; and the first temple, where the

three orders of columns were demonstrably applied, was that of Athene at Tegea, erected after the burning-down of its predecessor (Ol. xcvi. 2 ; B. C. 395),—the most glorious work accomplished in Greece after the Parthenon. On the outside it was Ionic, like the Old-Attic temple of Athene, inside it was Doric, and in the upper story Corinthian—for this name was given to the new style of Callimachus, who was said to have borrowed his idea from a Corinthian sepulchral pillar. As the Phigaleans had sent for Ictinus, and the Elceans for Phidias, so the Tegeatæ had summoned Scopas from Athens. It was his good fortune to be able to construct, still in the manner of the earlier period, a great sacred edifice of national significance; for the sacred authority of Athene Alea was recognized beyond the boundaries of Tegea and Arcadia. Scopas adorned the pediments of this temple with large groups of statues, the subject of which was taken from the popular legends of the Calydonian chase, and of the contests of the Arcadian Hero Telephus. Praxiteles himself contributed works for architectural purposes; he enriched the pediments of the Heracleum at Thebes with compositions representing the labors of Heracles (vol. iv. p. 521). But in general the intimate connexion between sculpture and architecture was relaxed, just as music and poetry, and the drama and the histrionic art, had separated from one another. All the arts strove after independence, in order that each might develop its own special proficiency with all the more splendor; and in particular plastic art, with its tendency towards expressing the life of the soul, could not fail to deem any subordination to architectural purposes oppressive.*

Among the masters of sculpture it was Alcamenes (vol.

* The judgment of Heracles: Welcker, *A. Denkm.* iii. 310; Overbeck in *Berichte d. k. Sachs. Ges. d. Wissensch.* 1865, 46. Callimachus: Brunn, *Geschichte d. Griech. Künstler*, i. 251; Lohde, *Architektonik der Hellenen*, 40. Temple at Tegea: Curtius, *Peloponnesos*, i. 255.

iv. p. 521 ; vol. iii. p. 45) who kept alive the school of Phidias. To the same school belonged Cephisodotus, upon whom was imposed the noble task of celebrating the victory of Conon by a bronze statue of Athene and a magnificent altar to Zeus the Preserver in the Piræus.* After this there was a lack of occasions and of inclination for the execution of public sculptures ; and the Attic artists, in particular those who had immigrated from abroad, readily obeyed any summons holding out to them the prospect of the work they desired in other parts of Greece. Thus already Aristander, who was a member of the Parian colony of artists at Athens (vol. ii. p. 638), labored for the glorification of the victories of Sparta, and wrought for one of the Amyclæan tripods (vol. iv. p. 170) the figure of the female lyre-player, which represented the city of Sparta. We have a yet more palpable in-
Works of
Scopas.
B. C. 392-348,
circ.
 stance of the migratory life of the artists of that age in Scopas, who was probably a son of Aristander. He returned from Tegea to Athens, where he lived and worked during the period, when the power of the city took a new rise in the second Naval Confederation ; then, about the time of the Social War, he went to Asia, where he was employed in adorning sanctuaries of high consideration at Ephesus, Cnidus, &c., and notably at Halicarnassus created works in honor of the dynasty there.

Scopas, the man of the greatest genius among the representatives of the New-Attic school, combined in himself all the attainments of the older masters ; in his representation of Asclepius, as a type of youthful beauty and health, he followed the artistic tendency of Polyclethus ; he chiselled Hermæ according to Attic taste in ideal perfection, and was able to animate the marble as Phidias had animated it. But he went far beyond all previous endeavors. He wrought a Bacchante, such as Euripides had

* Cephisodotus : Brunn, *u. s. i.* 269.

represented upon the stage, in a state of utter ecstasy, with her head thrown back and her curls fluttering in the air; all the pulses of living excitement seemed to be beating in the marble. On the other hand, he represented, in his Apollo playing on the cithar, the mild power of the enthusiasm inspired by the Music art; a movement of lofty ardor pervaded the grand figure from the sole of the foot to the flowing hair; the body was nothing less than the glorified organ of a blissful enthusiasm. Most remarkable of all was the transformation of Aphrodite. Already the more ancient style of art had conceived of her as the goddess of beauty, and had therefore represented the upper part of the body without drapery. Thus she appears in the statue of Milo, which still displays a serious, Pallas-like character, and the lofty dignity of a work from the school of Phidias. The mythological connexion between the goddess and the element of water led the artists a step further. Was not this the time when the famous Phryne of Thespiae ventured at a festival in Eleusis to rise from the sea as Aphrodite Anadyomene? Thus the sculptors now likewise undertook to let all drapery fall, and to represent the goddess of love in the fully revealed perfection of form. At the same time artists such as Scopas and Praxiteles still faithfully adhered to the principles of true art; their purpose was not to seduce and stimulate, nor was the goddess in their hands converted into a bold *hetæra*; they represented her as modest and chaste, as frightened and timid even in the solitude of the bath; but the goddess became a woman, the deity which inspired love became a being which felt and needed it, just as in Apollo the Music enthusiasm, and in Dionysus the Bacchic, were represented.

The extent to which, even in this period,
and of
 Praxiteles. Greek art developed itself according to defi-
 nite laws, is very clearly manifest from the
B. C. 368-336, circ.
 fact that the two contemporaries, Scopas and

Praxiteles, notwithstanding all the difference in their respective tendencies, yet so fully agreed, that the works of the one were frequently mistaken for those of the other, and that it is consequently also impossible to consider the two artists separately. Praxiteles, probably the son of Cephisodotus (p. 204), was an Athenian by birth; he was of more settled habits than Scopas, less comprehensive in his artistic labors, but in his own way even more highly esteemed. The material used by him was likewise chiefly marble, and his art was most masterly in the execution of the heads, in which he knew how to give reality to the mysterious action and reaction upon one another of body and soul. He was therefore thoroughly in his own sphere when he wrought a figure of Eros, whom he represented as a boy growing towards maturity, standing with his head dreamily bent down, as lost in the thoughts which, as yet not understood by himself, pass through his soul. In general, the art of this age displayed a great predilection for the soft and tender forms of early youth, contrasting herein with earlier times, when the gymnastic art flourished, and when the artists had before their eyes the human figures developed in the *palæstræ* and swelling with vigor. Apollo, too, was represented in a boyish form, and the ancient god Dionysus was converted into a youth of effeminate presence, in whose eye languishing desire and the state of bliss produced by wine found expression. But, lest the dignity of the god should be lost, he was surrounded with a following of Satyrs and Mænads, in whom the power of Dionysus revealed itself. The Satyrs, too, were treated as youthful and ideal figures; they served to express in an extremely pleasing way, a simple devotion to natural life, an easy dreamy existence in wood and field, while in the female companions of the god all the phases and degrees of Bacchic ecstasy were called into life. Thus a whole world of figures arose, in which a freshness of life displayed itself in a perfect natural simplicity, wholly un-

dreamt of by the more solemn and serious art of the earlier age. A joyous rout of this kind, such as had formed itself around Dionysus, Scopas also transplanted to the sea, combining the Nereids and Tritons with dolphins, sea-horses, and other fabulous animals into a grand procession, by which, as it would seem, the re-union of Thetis with Achilles was celebrated, and the homage of the deep was offered to her beautiful son. Here the loftiest poetry had been breathed into stone, and an opportunity had been offered to the artist of attesting at once the richest wealth of imagination and the most accurate knowledge of the forms of nature. Already the ancients considered the group of Niobe and her children as the highest effort of this school, without knowing to which of the two artists it was to be ascribed. In this work a mighty doom from on high is represented, but in such a manner that we see, not how it is sent, but only how it is met,—met by the mother, who is alone guilty, and by her blooming progeny: a doom, instigated by the greatness of soul and active love of the sufferers; a tragedy in marble, which, in spite of all the confusion of woe, yet forms a whole in itself, and derives a certain calm from the circumstance that the composition is arranged in rhythmical order, like the group of a pediment.

Leochares. By the side of Scopas and Praxiteles wrought Leochares. He produced a series of public monuments in the manner of the earlier masters, a Zeus on the Acropolis, a group of Zeus and the Demos of Athens in the Piræus, and a statue of Apollo in the Attic market place. But he also worked completely in the spirit of the later school, as is notably shown in the instance of his most famous creation, his *Ganymede*, a production in which the inert mass of the stone seemed to have been absolutely conquered; for thus was the boy seen passing aloft, carefully and firmly borne by the eagle, not as a captive prey, but as one longingly striving heav-

enwards ; while another celebrated group of Leochares, a slave-dealer by the side of a cunning slave, thoroughly corresponds to the character of the later comedy.*

It is likewise characteristic of the practice of the art of this age, that frequently a work of the later epoch was set up by the side of one of the earlier, in order, as it were, to repeat the same idea in a style according with the times. Thus the Apollo of Leochares, and the Artemis Brauronia of Praxiteles, were placed by the side of earlier statues of the same divinities. Thus, again in the sanctuary of the "Venerable Goddesses" (*i. e.* of the Erinyes) at Athens, the sculpture of Calamis stood between two by Scopas. The age was altogether one of a new and highly ingenious composition of groups, not merely such personages being, in accordance with earlier practice, combined as participated in a common action, in the capacity of witnesses or co-operating agents, but the essential character of a divine individuality being illustrated by surrounding the central figure with subsidiary figures, as, *e. g.*, that of Zeus the Preserver was associated with those of Asclepius and Hygeia ; and what a degree of delicacy of conception is it not permissible to assume when we hear that Scopas in the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Megara gave visible expression to the essential nature of this deity by means of three statues of *Eros* (Love), *Pothos* (Desire), and *Himeros* (Longing) ! The group resembled a triad developing itself out of a key-note. Finally, it was a task of the art of this age, with its tendency to psychological delicacy, to represent personages of note in faithful accordance with their characters. This task was twofold. Either the object was to represent famous Hellenes in the grand monumental style, *e. g.* the masters of tragedy in the theatre ; or to

Groups
and por-
traits in
statuary.

* Ulrichs, *Skopas' Leben und Werke*, 1863. Venus of Milo: Ulrichs, 122. "Leochares manganem et puerum subdolæ et fucatæ vernilitatis," the reading in Plin. *Hist. Nat.* xxxiv. 17, which I follow Ulrichs in preferring.

produce the likeness of contemporaries after a fashion more corresponding to ordinary life, so as to preserve their memory in the circle of their friends. Thus the statue of Isocrates by Leochares was a monument of the pious reverence of Timotheus; thus Silanion formed his figure of Plato, seated in an attitude of bending forward, engaged at his ease in deep converse with his friends, a work taken from life, and a valued remembrance for all Plato's grateful pupils. In these compositions, too, is to be recognized the tendency of the age towards the general and the typical, as we found it in comedy. There was a fondness for representing such persons as might typify a species of men. Thus the portrait which Silanion made of Apollodorus (probably the odd disciple of Socrates) (vol. iv. p. 131) was such that it might at the same time be regarded as a type of indignation, and of self-tormenting discontent.

The creations of the Attic artists were sought even in remote regions. Euclides, a sculptor belonging to the circle of Plato's acquaintances, wrought temple-compositions for Bura, which was rebuilt after it had been swallowed up in the earth (vol. iv. p. 435), and for Ægira in Achaia. The works of Leochares found their way to Syracuse, and the same artist afterwards likewise journeyed with Scopas, Bryaxis, and Timotheus to Halicarnassus, where Mausollos had entered upon an Attic course of policy, had founded an Attic maritime dominion and a flourishing Attic art-life, and where a monument was erected in his honor, in the production of which the Attic artists emulated one another under the guidance of Scopas.*

Painting.

The art of painting is even less dependent than that of sculpture upon the condition of

* Groups of more ancient and more recent statues of divinities: O. Jahn, *Zeus Polieus in Nuove Memorie*, p. 22. Figure of Plato: O. Jahn, *Darstell. Griech. Dichter*, 1861, 719. Apollodorus ("non homo, sed iracundia"), Plin. *Hist. Nat.* xxxiv. 21; M. Hertz, *de Apollodoro statuario et phil.* (Breslau), 1867.—Mausoleum: *Philol.* xxi. 453.

public affairs ; and, although it had attained to a certain perfection through Polygnotus, which in its way has never been surpassed (vol. ii. p. 597), yet it was precisely to this art that totally new courses were still open. It had hitherto remained essentially an art of design, in which plastic forms prevailed. Nor had it in truth yet attained to a consciousness of its special artistic resources, in particular of the magic effect of light and color, of the superior degree of freedom which it owes to its more uncorporeal means of representation, and of its capability of more directly seizing upon, and making visible, the spiritual element in man. These sides painting had hitherto left undeveloped ; it was not till now that the time for effecting this had arrived ; and the whole tendency of the age was in a high degree favorable to such a progressive development of the ancient pictorial art. Apollodorus of Athens, who established his fame towards the close of the Great War, was the first who contrived to give a new charm to his pictures by means of light and shade, and whose use of color created a remarkable effect. He entered upon this new course with timidity, and was immediately far surpassed by Zeuxis of Heraclea, the acknowledged master of illusive effect and color. But that this art was not allowed to lose itself in sensual effects, is proved by the examples of Parrhasius of Ephesus, an artist of genius who contrived to represent the *Demos* of Athens in such a way that all the whimsical qualities of the original were thought to be recognizable in the portrait ; and of Timanthes of Cythnus, who in his picture of the sacrifice of Iphigenia was able admirably to indicate the various kinds and degrees of sympathy in the several personages depicted as present.

The witty mockery of events of the day, which at this time flourished more than ever among the Athenians (p. 147), likewise found expression in painting, as is proved by a famous picture of Timotheus. For inasmuch as the

victorious general was modest enough to ascribe all his successes to Fortune, he was taken by his word, and depicted as slumbering in his general's tent, while the goddess *Tyche* hovered over his head, and in a long trailing net dragged after her, like a haul of sea-fish, the confederate cities which Timotheus had secured.*

The painters Athens was even less able to retain within her walls than the sculptors. Distinct schools were formed at Thebes (vol. iv. p. 520), and at Sicyon. The Sicyonian school perfected the technical part of the art; it ventured upon grand historical subjects, as *e. g.* in Euphranor's picture of the battle of Mantinea, or speaking more precisely, of the cavalry skirmish, so honorable to Athens, which preceded the battle—(vol. iv. p. 507)—a picture which was accordingly set up in the Attic Ceramicus.† Finally, this school also sought to establish a productive connexion between the art of painting and scientific, in particular mathematical, studies. After these endeavors had combined themselves with the perfection of color, of which Asia Minor was the home, there finally arose in the times of Alexander that development of painting, which it was possible to regard as the highest effort of national art, viz. the works of Apelles.

The degree to which the Athenians took part in these several developments of art is only recognizable from their pottery. For the painting on pottery was not merely a preliminary school for higher art, and one of great importance (for on clay the Hellenes learnt to paint with rapidity and certainty, while such materials of art as afford more facility for effacing and correcting are apt to accustom artists to a timid and irresolute manner of composition), but it also accompanied the pictorial art through all its stages, inasmuch as even on so humble a material and on surfaces so inconvenient,

* Painting of Timotheus: *Ælian. Ver. Hist.* xiii. 43; cf. Rehdantz, 188.

† Euphranor: Schäfer, *Demosthenes*, iii. 2 11.

the Greeks with indefatigable diligence sought to produce representations full of life and significance.

It is true that vase-painting was more capable of reproducing the grand simplicity of the style of Polygnotus than of following the advances of the subsequent age, which were based upon the effects of color. Yet it is very clearly to be perceived how the severe and hard outlines gradually became fluid, how a greater freedom of grouping makes its appearance, how the countenances become more expressive, and the motions less forced. In connexion with the entire artistic development of the age we recognize a tendency towards sensual beauty, an inclination towards the delicate and the effeminate. Dionysus with his companions, Aphrodite and Eros, Apollo with the Muses, and cognate circles, in which Scopas and Praxiteles preferred to move, come into the foreground. Social life is, after the manner of the later comedy, represented with its enjoyments in charming pictures. Allegorical figures appear, either accompanying divinities, whose individualities they supplement and illustrate, *e. g.* *Peitho*, *Himeros* and *Pothos* by the side of Aphrodite, or again as independent beings, who owe their origin to an age of reflection and abstraction, *e. g.* *Plutos* or Wealth, *Chrysos* or Gold, *Paidia* or Merriment, *Eudaimonia* or Comfortable Prosperity, *Pandaisia* or the Pleasure of the Table, &c. Seriousness of meaning is less taken thought of; and less care is bestowed upon the drawing; we perceive a striving after pretty and unusual shapes in the vases, for a mixed variety in the figures, for fanciful costumes and more brilliant ornamentation. The ancient black and red no longer suffices; the painting is done on a ground of white chalk, various colors are employed, and gold is laid on, in order to give a novel attraction to the vases. Thus it is possible even in these trivial remains of antiquity to recognize the change of taste, the transition from simplicity to artificiality, from that which im-

plies its own meaning to that which is outwardly brilliant, from ancient faith to the Sophistic treatment of ethical conceptions. But this period of transition was a period of many-sided impulse for art, and imposed upon it tasks which strengthened it for ulterior developments.*

Thus Athens in fact still remained the focus of a many-sided and luxuriantly flourishing intellectual life. In spite of the competition, which on the one side was attempted by Syracuse under Dionysius, on the other by Halicarnassus under the Carian dynasts, Athens was still the intellectual capital of the Hellenes, the solitary spot where there existed from of old an uninterrupted development, a constant progress, and an abundance of the most generous forces. No new accession of culture became the common property of the nation until it had asserted itself at Athens; and from Athens were summoned the men by whose admission other cities were to participate in the fame which attached to the cultivation of science and art. Nor can it be denied that the decay of the ancient religiosity and code of manners gave a mighty impulse towards obtaining, by means of independent inquiry, a new certainty of life and thought; and again that the relaxation of ancient usages, the freer movement of ideas, and the more passionate excitement of the minds of men likewise redounded to the advantage of the arts, and qualified them for achievements, which in the times of greater simplicity, tranquillity, and moderation would never have been brought to pass. But intellectual life at Athens was no longer the life of the community; and the unity of a healthy organism, where all forces served one final object, had been lost. From a scientific point of view Sophistry had been overcome; but the process of analysis and decomposition,

* Gold-ornamentation (sparingly used already in vases of a more ancient date: Heydemann, *Illupersis*, 10); O. Jahn, *Bemalte Vasen mit Goldschmuck*, 26.

which it had commenced, continued without abatement; and Socrates himself had only contributed to widen the rift which ran through human society. His stand-point, although it in many ways attached itself to the primitive wisdom of the temples, after all contrasted with everything which had preceded it; he owed everything to his own meditations, and throughout insisted upon the inner tasks of life, upon the conscience of the individual, and upon his relation to the divinity. Morality separated itself from civic virtue, and the human individual separated himself from the state. There now existed two kinds of men: thinkers and non-thinkers. The latter swim with the stream, and sink deeper and deeper, since whatever could have offered them an anchorage has lost its strength; the former constitute an intellectual aristocracy, they regard themselves in the light of a higher organism as compared with all other mortals. The communal feeling, so powerful in the Hellenes, has not been extinguished; but there now arise in the schools of philosophers new communities, in which principles prevail wholly contradictory to the existing condition of things. An opposition of this kind notably developed itself among the followers of Socrates. This master, the most influential man of his age, was of no account in the community of the state; nay, the very man whom they deemed the purest of human beings and the greatest benefactor of his fellow-citizens, had been ejected by the state as one hurtful to the commonweal. For this reason there lay a deep gulf, and there prevailed an invincible repugnance, between the followers of Socrates and the state of the Athenians. It is true that according to the Greek way of thinking the individual and the state continued to be conceived of as inseparable; but the spiritual life of the individual henceforth became the standard whereby to judge of the commonwealth. Whatsoever acts as an obstacle to the citizen in the performance of his duty as a man, has

no validity for him ; virtue, and the happiness of the individual which is based thereon, are the final object of the whole. Hereby an utter revulsion is brought about in the consciousness of the Hellenes ; civic legality loses its value, and the centre of gravity of spiritual life is laid entirely in the attainment of perfect knowledge ; and thus a movement without aims is occasioned. For definite results are reached only by a few and isolated elect, who penetrate to the perfect tranquillity of soul belonging to the Wise ; and the followers of Socrates themselves diverge so widely from one another, that some of them, viz. the Cynics, spurn the whole culture of the people, while others contrive to find means of reconciling themselves to the enjoyments of the world. And in wider circles the entire movement simply has the effect of weakening all usage, and of causing a tendency to negation to spread further and further.

Cosmo-
politicism. This tendency shows itself in the growth of agitation in outward life ; the associations of home lose their significance ; educated men cease to care for their native city, and there gradually develops itself a citizenship of the world, in which all distinctions between states and peoples vanish, even the contrast between Hellenes and barbarians, upon which the national consciousness was essentially based. It was among the Dorians that a clear consciousness of this contrast was first gained ; it was among the Athenians that it was developed so as to become thoroughly justifiable ; but it was at Athens that it also lost its sharpness and was in the end overcome altogether. For the Socratic idea of virtue could not allow those distinctions to remain valid, which traditional prejudices had established among men.

As towards the demands of morality all men were equals ; and the same reasons, which induced the philosophers to protest eagerly against the neglectful treatment of the female sex, and to advocate the rights of the slave

(p. 159), likewise made it necessary to abandon the national distinction of Hellenes as against Non-Hellenes, and to acknowledge, that whosoever was wise and just, to whatever nation and to whatever class he belonged, must be acceptable to the Divinity, and must therefore also have a right to claim full recognition from men. It is true that Isocrates even in these latter days preached war against the Persians as a sacred and national duty; but the ancient enmity between Asia and Europe had become nothing more than a fine phrase, which was warmed up for the sake of special purposes. And Isocrates himself, it will be remembered, is already the representative of a new Hellenism, lying not in the blood, but in the sentiments of the mind, which sentiments again can be acquired by all uncorrupted natures. An ideal Hellenism of this kind, such as the most eminent men of this age, Epaminondas (vol. iv. p. 522), Timotheus (p. 94), and others sought to represent in their own persons, developed itself more especially at Athens, because Athens was a city belonging to the world at large, where members of the wildest variety of nations met,—Greeks from all the colonies, half-Greeks and barbarians, Thracians, Babylonians and Egyptians,—and where all these nations were represented by their best men. Had not ever since the time of Solon those foreigners repaired to Athens, who were desirous of tasting Hellenic culture? It was here that this culture first lost its local coloring, that men learnt to regard it as a world-culture; here Mithridates, the son of Rhodobates, a Persian prince, was seen as an enthusiastic admirer of Plato erecting the likeness of his teacher in the Academy, and consecrating it to the Muses. Here it was therefore impossible to remain involved in the conceptions of a narrow patriotism; and here the point was soonest reached, of acknowledging without restraint the defects of native, and the advantage of foreign institutions, instead of frequently admiring most what was different

from the ways of Athens. In defiance of all experience Sparta was still lauded as the seat of moral discipline and fidelity to the law; and enthusiastic praises were bestowed upon the simple manners of the Northern peoples. And in particular the monarchical constitution of foreign countries received the tribute of sincere veneration, and not only when based upon the legitimate foundation of popular statutes or usages, but also when established by force. In the dialogue *Hiero*, attributed to Xenophon, the Tyrant converses with the poet Simonides; for it is no less a personage than he whom the author has chosen as a representative of the traditional view of the enviable good fortune of a ruler's office. The Tyrant eloquently demonstrates its dark sides from his own experience; he describes the weary feeling of want amidst the abundance of all good things, as well as the constant fear and the absence of freedom which accompany the tenure of absolute power. But Simonides is by no means converted into a republican; on the contrary, he adheres to his view that these evils are not necessary concomitants of the calling of a ruler, and that an absolute sovereign is after all able to be a benefactor of his people, and a prince enjoying love and confidence.*

The court of Perdiccas and Archelaus (p. 40), the magic charm exercised by the personality of the younger

* Socrates mundanus: Hermann, *Plato*, 70. Gentle views with regard to slaves in Euripides (Schenkl, *Politische Ansichten des Eurip.* 15) and Xenophon (Zeller, ii. 1, 170). Plato is obscure with regard to women (*ib.* 570), and as to slaves less generous than Xenophon, who has a deeper conception of the idea of the family. Cf. Strümpel, *Praktische Philosophie der Griechen*, 505.—According to Isocr. iv. 50, it was the desert of Athens, that the name of Helenes was *μηκέτι τοῦ γένους ἀλλὰ τῆς διανοίας*. Rauchenstein *ad* Isocr. 12.—Mithridates, ὁ Ῥοδοβάτου (Ῥοροντοβάτου), Diog. Laërt. iii. 25. Unfortunately no details are known concerning the author of the dedicatory gift; but it after all remains probable that Mithridates was a contemporary of Plato and of Silanion (Whom Pliny dates Ol. cxiii. but who must have been at work before that time; cf. Brunn, i. 394), and that personal relations existed between him and Plato. Vaillant, *Ach. imp.* 14. introduces him as Mithridates IV. and identifies him with the friend of Cyrus (*Anab.* ii. 5, 35; iii. 3 2) and with the satrap of Lycæonia (*ib.* vii. 8, 25).

Cyrus, and the fame of Euagoras prove, what an attraction monarchy possessed for the Greeks of this age. In speaking of Euagoras, Isocrates declares monarchical sway to be the highest of all possessions among gods and men, and all the art of rhetors and of poets to be inadequate to a worthy celebration of the true ruler. The same Isocrates in his political orations and epistles addresses himself mainly to princely personages, to Archidamus, to Dionysius, to Philip, to Timotheus the son and successor of the Tyrant Clearchus, and others. All this shows how strong a tendency existed in these times, to expect salvation for states not from popular assemblies and proposals of laws, but from a thorough vigor of action on the part of individual men.

This tendency of the age, which presents itself to us with great distinctness in the ^{Platonic} politics, rhetors, as well as in the historical writers Theopompus and Xenophon, in the case of the philosophers appears as a dogma developed with perfect clearness. It is true that the philosophers of the Academy likewise occupy themselves with the regulation of republican constitutions, and several pupils of Plato are mentioned, who were active as legislators, *e. g.* Menedemus at Pyrrha, Phormion in Elis, Aristonymus in Arcadia, and Eudoxus in Cnidus; but these legislations, which have their origin in philosophical reflection, after all only prove how utterly their authors and the age had lost confidence in the independent vitality of the civic communities; nor was Plato himself ever able to recognize the freely active spirit of a community of citizens as the foundation on which the true State might be built up. For of the idea of the state, which his mind pictured to itself, none but philosophically trained men could attain to a full consciousness; according to his view, it could not be realized otherwise than through a man of eminence, who by the absolute force of his will controlled the whole, repressed the impulses of selfishness,

and as with the hand of an artist moulded a harmonious commonwealth.

But, notwithstanding the clearness and inner consistency of these views as to the essential nature of the State, their application to existing circumstances was infinitely difficult; and yet the Platonic school was unwilling to renounce it; they wished to be practical politicians as well as philosophers, and in this endeavor involved themselves in the most contradictory results. For from their moral stand-point they were, in full accordance with the popular feeling, obliged to disapprove of whatever was accomplished in the State by means of force; while on the other hand the actual realization of their political system demanded a form of government which could not be established without the perpetration of the most serious wrongs. Plato describes Tyrannical government as the most abominable of all constitutions, and yet he is able to enter into the closest relations with the Tyrant Dionysius; indeed, there existed Tyrants, who could boast themselves the pupils of Plato, such as especially the Clearchus mentioned above, who for twelve years (B. C. 363—352) held sway at Heraclea on the Pontus, as a model of Tyrannical guile and falseness, but at the same time also as a friend and patron of science. On the other hand, however, the two assassins of Clearchus, Chion and Leonides, are likewise pupils of the Academy, as are the brothers Python and Heraclides, the murderers of Cotys (p. 110); they believed themselves to be acting in the spirit of their master, when they risked their life for the removal of foes of freedom. Now, although it would be extremely unjust to hold Plato and his philosophy accountable for the actions of individual members of the Platonic school, yet so much is evident: that it was impossible to derive from the teachings of the Academy a fixed position in the political questions of the age, or a safe standard for the estimation of persons and affairs. Is not this most clearly to be seen

in the instance of Plato himself? When the younger Dionysius, a prince endowed with abilities of great promise, had begun his rule at Syracuse and summoned Plato to his court (p. 192), Plato had expected from him the accomplishment of the lofty task of philosophically moulding a state, but after for a brief time indulging in hopes, had seen himself most completely deceived. And yet the idea of establishing a philosopher's state at Syracuse was not abandoned. But the same prince, on whom the Platonic school had counted, was now their worst foe. The undertaking of Dion, of which the object was the overthrow of Dionysius (B. C. 357), was a joint act of the Academy, whose association we see on this occasion appearing as a political power. All these efforts, however, remained without result; the ideal politics of Plato were indeed capable of inspiring enthusiasm in the minds of men, but unfit to furnish them with a fixed stand-point in the struggles of the present, and still less able to cure its evils.*

The more that the philosophers themselves became convinced of this fact, the more they retired in deep vexation of spirit from public life; they had lost all sympathy with the State as it existed. They renounced all endeavors at influencing the multitude, and a broad gulf formed itself between them and the people. This division was a misfortune for the State. For while formerly the best forces had at the same time also been those which were the most effective in the civic community, and while even those who were thoroughly dissatisfied with the ruling party, yet with patriotic self-denial contributed their share of service to the commonwealth,—as *e. g.* Nicias did,—we now find the most gifted men averting themselves from it; the State is

Philosophy
and the
State.

* Platonic legislators: Hermann, *Plato*, 74.—Clearchus and his assassins: Egger, *Etudes d'histoire et de morale sur le meurtre politique*, 1866, p. 19.—Euphræus and Platonic politics in Sicily: Bernays, *Dial. des Aristoteles*, 21.

to them a matter of indifference, of ridicule, and of offence. In proportion as their spirit is lofty and their judgment clear, they regard the existing condition of things with hopelessness. They despise the petty statehood of Greece, in which the interests of the meanest selfishness are the determining element, and deride a commonwealth, in which the chance of the beans determines who is to govern. Nor, again, is any interest left for the past of Athens. Plato condemns all, even the most glorious, statesmen of his native city; he regards its acquisition of the supremacy on the sea as its great misfortune, and in merely pronouncing the word 'democracy,' he assumes that all reasonable men will agree in condemning it. Now, inasmuch as from their point of view the Sophists likewise labored to undermine the authority of the institutions of the State, by setting up the individual as judge over them, and regarding all laws as arbitrary ordinances which owe their origin to compromise or force, —the two tendencies of the age which differed most from one another, Socratic philosophy and Sophistry, coincided in this point: that both undermined the feeling of devotion to the existing constitution and shook at its base the firm strength of the ancient civic State, resting as it did on the agreement between its laws and the sentiments of all its members.

Severance
of the spheres
of life.

In this age we find only a few men in Athens, who, like Timotheus, *e. g.*, sought to combine the performance of public duties with philosophical culture. In general the different circles came to exist apart, and the vital resources which still survived in the commonwealth separated from one another. The wise man avoids contact with civil business, as if it were a pollution, and intellectual interests have been removed into quite another field. Accordingly it seems a matter of course, that the conduct of public business should be left in the hands of men of a subordinate kind, selfish

persons who lead the people by encouraging its foibles and flattering its thoughtless indolence. Meanwhile, the great mass of the Athenians believe it possible to preserve liberty and prosperity without exertions; while apparently standing still, they fail to observe that they are retrogressing, although the feeling for civic honor and civic duty is growing duller and duller. They had shamefully abandoned the last remnant of maritime dominion; they had not even bestowed serious thoughts upon the security of their own city itself, and refused to see the dangers, for the aversion of which sacrifices were required. On the one side a wealthy intellectual life, floating in ideal elevation, from the stand-point of which the Attic civic State was regarded as a thing without value; on the other an indolent existence, swayed by selfishness, lazily sunk in obedience to daily habit, and unwilling to allow its comfortable ease to be disturbed by any exertion. It was thus that the Athens of Eubulus drifted on, like a ship without a helmsman, with the current of the age.

And now a foe had appeared, more dangerous than any with whom Athens had had to deal when at the height of her power, a great State of growing strength and of inexhaustible resources, a State which, securely directed by the foresight of a sagacious mind, took advantage of every opportunity, by sea as well as by land, for mastering one after the other of the petty States of Greece, and which was lying in wait for the Athenians above all the rest. If, then, the city was not to drift into his grasp as a defenceless prey, and to perish dishonorably, there was need of an Athenian who refused to despair of his native city, although he thoroughly perceived its weak points, who united in himself to high intellectual force and an idealizing spirit, a devoted patriotism, and who ventured to undertake the task of once more gathering all the forces of good which remained, of arousing the sense of honor which had been

The resurrection of Athens.

extinguished, and of bringing to pass a regeneration of the Attic commonwealth, so that it should once more take the field at the head of the Hellenes on behalf of the noblest possessions of the nation. Such a man was Demosthenes; and with him there begins once more a history of Athens.

CHAPTER III.

ATHENS AND KING PHILIP TO THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES.*

In the period when Pericles was extending the Attic dominion in the Pontus (vol. ii. p. 534), one of the remotest points reached by it was Nymphæum, a port of the

* Concerning the age of Demosthenes we possess a greater abundance of materials than for any other section of Greek history; but no history of it has been handed down to us. Even in antiquity Demosthenes found no narrator of his public activity worthy of him; and out of the works concerning the period of Philip (Theopompus, Philochorus, lib. vi., Duris) there are left to us only meagre fragments, or tradition reaching us at second or third hand (Diodorus, Justin). Plutarch is of importance when he mentions his sources; in the same way Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose principal work on Demosthenes is unfortunately lost: of all those who have judged Demosthenes, he displays the greatest insight. The biographers are uncritical. We are therefore without a connected history; instead of this, the age stands before us like a drama, in which we see historical personages acting with all the clearness of living individualities. We find ourselves personally placed between the two parties. Herein lies the extraordinary charm of the Demosthenic age; hereon, too, is based the difference in the conceptions formed of it; for it depends on the personal attitude which we assume towards Demosthenes, upon the moral impression made upon us by his speeches, upon the truthfulness with which we credit him. All the attempts which have been made to whitewash Æschines (cf. Francke on Stechow *de vita Æsch.* in *Neue Jahrb. für Philol.*, xii.) or to prove the representation of his character in Demosthenes to be a caricature due to political hatred (Spengel, *Demosth. Vertheidigung des Ktesiphon*, Munich, 1863), as it appears to me, by their want of success merely furnish a testimony in favor of Demosthenes. Equally unsatisfactory are the attempts to tack in a midway-course between Demosthenes and Æschines (cf. Frohberger on O. Haupt *Leben des Demosth.* in *Neue Jahrb. für Philol.* 1862, p. 614). Without denying the character of a democratic party-orator to belong to Demosthenes, we shall yet be justified in regarding his speeches as genuine sources of history, if we believe in the truthfulness and honesty of his mind. In this respect I have from full conviction followed the view which was asserted by Niebuhr. Since his time science has labored unwearyingly to bring order into the history of this age. I merely mention the labors of F. Ranke, Boeckh, Winiewski, Droysen, Böhneke, Vömel, Funkhanel, the critical and exegetical labors on the Orators of Sauppe, Westermann, Franke, Rehdantz and others, and the narratives of Thirl-

Taurian peninsula, situate to the south of Panticapæum, on the Cimmerian Bosphorus, which leads from the Pontus into the Palus Mæotis. These distant members of the Confederation were placed in a difficult position after the Sicilian calamity, inasmuch as what had hitherto been their protecting power was no longer able to take care of them. There accordingly remained no course open to them but that of arriving at an understanding with their neighbors on their own account, and of attaching themselves to these after such a fashion as to leave their commercial relations with Athens unhurt and secured. Panticapæum was the centre of the Bosporan empire, which was at that time at the height of prosperity under the Spartocidæ (p. 137); it was upon friendly intercourse with them that the community of Nymphæum had to depend; and an Athenian of the name of Gylon was one of those who negotiated the conclusion of an intimate union. Although he had hereby in no sense done damage to the interests of his native city, yet his proceedings were regarded with disfavor at Athens, so that an indictment was preferred against him, and he was sentenced to a fine. In consequence he repaired anew to the Pontus, where he met with a most honorable reception at the hands of the princes there. A place near Phanagoria, Cēpi by name, was bestowed upon him as a gift, and he married a native woman. From this marriage sprang two daughters, who, being possessed of a considerable dowry, came to Athens and wedded Attic citizens. The one of them married Demo-

Demos-
thenes, the
son of De-
mosthenes,
born
Ol. cxix. 1
(B. C. 383)?
His
parentage.

wall and Grote. The results of all these labors, manifoldly advanced by his own research, are combined in the work of Arnold Schäfer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* (1856-8), the treasure-house of all that we know of the Philippic age, to which, as a matter of course, my narrative too owes far more than it is possible to indicate by citations. Since the appearance of this work, the historical materials have not been increased to any important extent; but I have endeavored to turn to the fullest possible account the gain which is to be obtained from the new Scholia to Æschines, from inscriptions, and from coins.

chares of the deme Leuconoë; the other, Cleobule by name, became the wife of a manufacturer and merchant of position, Demosthenes of the deme Pæania, who maintained an establishment of two large workshops, in which arms, cutlery, and furniture were produced. This Demosthenes and Cleobule were the parents of the orator, who was born at Athens three or four years after the peace of Antalcidas.

These relations of parentage were, at a later date, when Demosthenes the son directed the politics of Athens, made use of by his adversaries, in order to represent him as an intruder, devoid of any claim to interfere in the affairs of the city, inasmuch as he was not even a genuine Hellene, but a foreigner and a semi-barbarian. His grandfather on the mother's side was declared to have forfeited his rights as a citizen by treason, his grandmother to be a Scythian woman, and indeed to belong to the Nomad race of that people. Doubtless this is an invidious conception misrepresenting the facts of the case. Before his death Gylon had paid the debt which he owed to his native city, nor could any one of the opponents of Demosthenes prove the existence of any obligation resting upon Gylon's family, or impugn on satisfactory grounds the rights of inheritance of his descendants. With regard on the other hand to the defect of descent, it is by no means unlikely that there was more of reason in this objection. For in the colonies on the Black Sea manifold family-connexions were formed between Hellenes and Scythians, (vol. i. p. 492). Had not even a chieftain of the Scythians, Scylles, the contemporary of Sitalces, born as the son of an Ionic mother, been educated in the Greek language and writing, and become an enthusiastic adherent of Greek manners and customs, even receiving the civic franchise of Olbia, where he had a Greek housewife?

It is true that he was overthrown by his brother, the son of the daughter of Teres (p. 14), the leader of the na-

tional party ; but his story shows, how the influence of the Greek coast-towns had penetrated even into the very heart of the Scythian nation. Doubtless, therefore, the nationalities had become blended far more fully in the coast-towns themselves, especially since the Thracians, whose relations were most intimate both with the Scythians and with the Hellenes, promoted this amalgamation. In general, intercourse with the peoples of the north was much less repugnant to the Hellenes, than *e. g.* with Phœnicians, Babylonians, and Egyptians ; indeed they were rather in a sense attracted to the former ; and if we call to mind the Athenians who were blood-relations of Thracian families, such as Cimon, Thucydides the historian, the philosopher Antisthenes (perhaps Themistocles also should be included in the list), we cannot avoid the observation, that it was precisely men of great mark who sprang from mixed marriages of this description. Menestheus too, the son of Hippocrates by the Thracian princess and the son-in-law of Timotheus, caused a sensation in Athens by his early and peculiarly vigorous and manly development ; and when he was asked about his parents, he was wont to say he owed far more thanks to his mother than to his father ; for that while the latter had done his utmost to make him a Thracian, she had done her best to make him a Hellene. Now since the growing exhaustion of the Attic civic communities, as we have good grounds for assuming, connects itself with the fact that the majority of marriages were concluded among the sons and daughters of family-circles akin to one another, it seems extremely natural, that connexions formed with members of other nations should have contributed to invigorate the Greek families both physically and mentally, and especially, in the period of the gradual decrease of national energy, to call into life powers, such as were becoming more and more rare in purely Hellenic houses. Thus it may perhaps be also conjectured with

reference to Demosthenes, that the extraordinary power of tension characteristic of his mind is connected with the circumstance, that some of the blood of the northern peoples flowed in his veins.

But however this may have been, we may assume with certainty, that the foreign connexions of his family furnished to him an impulse of great significance. His mother, whose birth-place was on the Pontus, could not but at a very early date lead the spirit of the boy beyond the circle of the walls of his native city, while his father stood before his eyes as the image of an efficient and worthy citizen, of the type which had still survived in the better spheres of the civic population. He was capable of conducting an extensive business with circumspection and with a vigorous hand, was loyally devoted to the commonwealth, and deemed it his highest honor to fulfil with the utmost conscientiousness all his duties as a citizen. There was no lack either of means for education or of good-will and rational direction; and thus Demosthenes, who grew up at home with a younger sister, was doubtless a boy exceptionally favored and fortunate.*

But this good fortune was of brief endurance. When

* As to the maternal descent of Demosthenes: Æsch. iii. 171, a passage doubtless based upon facts. That the Scythians were Mongols is convincingly disputed by Müllenhoff in the *Monatsberichte der Berlin. Akad.*, 1866, p. 549.—Menestheus: Rehdantz, *Iphicr.* 235 f. With respect to the mingling of blood in the Attic families, it is worth pointing out that, according to Bernays (*Dial. des Aristot.* 134), Aristotle too was a half-Greek. (This will probably also explain many a peculiarity of diction in him.)—Demosthenes comes of age in the summer of 366, towards the end of Ol. ciii. 2, or the beginning of Ol. ciii. 3. The period of guardianship closes in the tenth year; it begins Ol. ci. 1, B. C. 376; Demosthenes was then seven years of age; hence he was born about Ol. xcix. 1, B. C. 383. This calculation, which is based upon the chronology of the guardianship and upon *Vil. X. Orat.* 845, is contradicted by the incidental statement in the speech in *Mid.* 564, according to which Demosthenes was in the autumn of 349 B. C. thirty-two years of age; which would make the year of his birth 381 (Dion. *ad Ann.* i. 4) or 382. Schäfer assumes 32 to be a clerical error for 34. The year is not to be fixed with perfect certainty, but it is preferable to follow the former of these two calculations.

Demosthenes was seven years of age, his father fell sick and died. He left indeed a house in good order behind him; there remained a property of at least fourteen talents (£3,400 *circ.*), invested in his own business and in other concerns, the interest of which was far more than sufficient to support his widow and children. Moreover, the father had most carefully provided for the management of this property. The nearest friends of the house had been appointed guardians, viz. Therippides, and the nephews of the testator, Aphobus and Demophon, all of them well-to-do men, to whom he had moreover providently left special legacies on account of their trouble; finally he had also endeavored to make his two above-named nephews so thoroughly members of his family by means of marriage-engagements, that according to his presumption they would care for it as for their own.

But never has the last will of a faithful father of a family been more vilely contemned. For the friends of the house proved themselves its worst foes; all the advantages which the will offered to them they greedily appropriated, without fulfilling the obligations imposed on them by its recognition. They paid no attention to any of the provisions of the testator, neglected and deprived of their value the manufactory and business, squandered and invested moneys, and instead of their augmenting the property of their wards, which an intelligent management might easily have doubled, their administration of it was of so unconscientious a character, that even the capital was for the most part lost. The complaints of the mother, the representations of honest friends, public opinion, which asserted itself in favor of the orphans—all remained without effect; the guardians appealed to the powers conferred upon them; and it was not until after the expiration of these powers that they could be called to account. It was from this side that the youth, as he grew towards man-

The guardianship.

Ol. ci. 3—ciii.
3 (B. C. 376-366).

hood, became acquainted with the world; the first sensations which took hold of his mind were those of indignation at faithlessness and treachery; and while other boys were joyously looking forward to the time, when, having outgrown domestic discipline, they might enjoy life, he was filled by the single idea, that he should like to be a man and a strong one, in order to avenge the shame cast upon his paternal home, and to chastise the crime committed by ruthless selfishness against its children. Although, then, neither means nor opportunities were wanting for intellectual development, yet the unfortunate condition of his family affairs entirely marred the joyousness of his youth. As a rule he remained at home with his mother, avoided the sports of boyhood, and entered into none of those genial connexions between comrades, such as were wont to be formed in the palaestrae and among the chivalrous exercises of youth; he was pale and slender, and was mocked as a weakling by those of his own age. In their eyes he seemed awkward and saturnine; he was incapable of being merry at his ease among them. He had in his mind only a single object, upon which he was intent with the whole energy of his intellect; viz. to obtain the requisite weapons for the struggle incumbent upon him.

To the effect of speech he was already no stranger. As a boy he had been present in the judicial chamber, where Callistratus was subjected to an indictment of life and death on the affair of Oropus (p. 105); he was witness of the bitter wrath of the assembly against the accused, and saw how by the power of his eloquence he changed the opinion of the jury, and at the close of the proceedings was conducted home like a victor amidst praise and congratulations. This experience was for Demosthenes an event of enduring effect; he was resolved to become an orator; and, as soon as he had come of age, applied to Isæus (p. 172), the foremost master of Attic law, and the advocate

Demosthe-
nes and
Isæus.

OL. ciii. 3 (B.
c. 366).

of the most successful experience, particularly in questions of disputed inheritances. After having doubtless already previously been connected with him, Demosthenes now claimed his services exclusively for himself, induced him to come and live in his own house, and in return for a considerable fee (10,000 drachms = £367 *circ.*) to devote himself entirely to training him; so that, although Isæus did not in consequence leave off conducting cases and writing orations, he gave instruction in oratory to no one else. It was a close personal relation into which they entered, an intellectual armed alliance, in order with their united strength to carry on the contest of vengeance, which Demosthenes, like the Heroes of ancient mythology, undertook against the desolaters of his paternal home.

Opening of
the suit
against the
guardians.

Ol. civ. 1 (B.
c. 364).

This contest was waged in a succession of stages. The first was the demand of an account, and the preferment of a general complaint with reference to the conduct of the guardianship. Next, resort was had to the various ways of decision by arbitration; but the guardians avoided all attempts at a compromise, and refused to acknowledge even the decision of the arbiters appointed by the State. There accordingly remained nothing but a formal action. In the third year after he had come of age, Demosthenes handed in his written accusation to the First Archon, whose duty it was to superintend the preliminaries of questions concerning the guardianship; and in this indictment moved for a penalty of ten talents (£2,505) against each of the guardians. The matter was now fully set in motion. Demosthenes, who had right on his side as well as the most accurate knowledge of the law, and who, notwithstanding his youthful age (twenty years), possessed all the strength of character of mature manhood, went on unshaken, and there was nothing left for his adversaries but to contrive new intrigues. For this purpose they took advantage of the institutions existing

in Athens, the design of which was to avoid undue impositions and injustice in the demands of public services from the wealthier citizens (vol. ii. p. 524). When a citizen considered that an excessive demand had been made upon him, and that the service claimed from himself ought with more justice to have been asked from some one else, he had the right of transferring the service to this other person, or of calling upon him for an exchange of property, undertaking to defray out of the property of the other the service in question,—whether it were the equipment of a ship or of a chorus. If in such a transaction no amicable understanding was arrived at, he who had proffered the exchange had the right of sequestrating the property of the other, being at the same time obliged to hold his own in readiness for the same purpose. Hereupon an inventory was made within three days of the property of either; and on the basis of this inventory the judicial tribunal finally decided which of the two was rightfully called upon to undertake the disputed service. This institution, which owed its origin to Solon, was in general calculated upon simple and easily intelligible conditions of property. In later times it became more and more difficult, and, instead of affording a protection against arbitrary oppression, was not unfrequently used as an instrument of malicious intrigue, admirably adapted for suddenly disturbing fellow-citizens, whom it was intended to annoy, in the tranquil possession of their property, and preparing for them the most insufferable vexations.

Such was also the case in the present instance. An Attic squadron was to be despatched from the port, and the contributions requisite for the purpose had been imposed by the Board of Generals upon a certain number of trierarchs. Among these was Thrasylochus, the son of Cephisodorus and the brother of Midias. With him the

Forced trierarchy of Demosthenes.

Ol. civ. 1.
(B. C. 364—3).

guardians entered into an understanding; in consequence of which Thrasylochus, a few days before the judicial term at which the indictment concerning the guardianship was to be finally decided by sentence, appeared in the house of Demosthenes and offered an exchange of properties, in case he would not voluntarily undertake the trierarchy. The intrigue was cunningly enough devised. For Demosthenes was either to perform this liturgy—in which case he would inevitably complete the ruin of his shattered finances; or, he accepted the exchange. In this case his property with all his claims passed into the hands of Thrasylochus, who could hereupon, according to his agreement, quash the demands made upon the guardians as well as the entire lawsuit. Demosthenes, whose mind was wholly occupied with the suit, saw himself suddenly surprised by these wiles; at first he failed to see through the whole intrigue, and agreed to the exchange of property, because he opined that in spite of the transfer of his property he would be able to maintain his demands and to reserve his right to carry through the suit. But no such reservation was permitted to him; whereupon he resolved, in order in no case to allow himself to be deluded out of his suit, to cancel the transaction of exchange which had been commenced, and simply to undertake the expense of the public service forced upon him. Thrasylochus had already let it out for twenty minæ (£81) to one of the speculators, who at Athens made a trade of undertaking such public services for others; Demosthenes paid the sum, and had thereby incurred the loss of a considerable part of his remaining capital.*

* The difficult passage, Dem. xxviii. 17, seems to me not to have been made perfectly clear even by Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. ii. p. 344 [E. Tr.]. According to Boeckh and Platner it would be necessary to assume two *διαδικασίαι*, the one concerning the sum total of the properties of the two litigants, and another concerning the demands of Demosthenes and the reservation made by him. But it should be remembered that already in the former all the assets and liabilities must have been entered into. *Τῶν χρόνων ὑπογύων ὄντων* refers to the despatch of the fleet; and we must

Such struggles and sacrifices were needed, before the matter could be as much as brought before the judges; and even then it cost great labor, before the end could be reached. The most important documents, above all his father's will itself, had been made away with; and it was no easy matter for Demosthenes to furnish evidence and witnesses, in order to establish the original amount of the property. And yet he succeeded in removing all doubt as to the guilt of the guardians; he was able to prove with what results the property of other wards had been managed in the same period of time, and how he, who when entering upon his inheritance had belonged to the same property-class as Timotheus, the son of Conon, and others subject to the highest rate of taxation, would, had his guardians' administration lasted but a few years longer, have been absolutely reduced to beggary. But not only did Demosthenes claim for himself and his sister the compassion of the jury, not only did he seek to excite deep indignation at the crime committed against his dying father and his house, but he also pointed out how much in the public interest depended upon preserving those civic properties upon which the State could reckon, when in a situation obliging it to claim the performance of more extensive services, which his father had invariably undertaken with patriotic ardor.

Aphobus was the first accused. In spite of all the forensic tricks resorted to by himself and his associates, he was condemned. The other guardians met with the same fate, or before the decision consented to a compromise. The damage inflicted was, indeed, by no means thus made good. The adversaries of Demosthenes contrived by a

assume that in consequence of the want of time no legal discussion took place, but that Thrasylochus was all the same able to force Demosthenes into such a position that he undertook the trierarchy. 'Αποκλείειν probably only signifies the closing of a house before the beginning of *διαδικασία* on an exchange of properties.

His speeches
as plaintiff.

Ol. civ. 1—
civ. 3 (B. C.
363—361).

variety of new tricks to escape from their obligations; fresh vexatious law-suits were requisite, in order to force them to give up pieces of land which they kept back with perverse obstinacy; and in the end Demosthenes was obliged to acquiesce in the loss of the greater part of his paternal inheritance. But in truth, from the first his main object had been, not the money, but to bring about the expiation of the wrong, the unmasking of the treachery, and the restoration of the honor of his house. In this point his victory was complete; towards this end he had worked for years with indefatigable zeal, while he almost seems to have taken too little trouble to turn his victory to the fullest account. Although therefore compassion may be felt for the young man, in that he was forced to occupy six of the fairest years of life with these vexatious quarrels, yet it is certain that he could have gone through no better school for steeling his inner strength and acquiring an inflexible force of will. It should be considered what was at that time the condition of things at Athens. It was a quite uncommon occurrence for a man to insist purely upon his rights and to advance unswervingly towards his object. The usage was to pursue none but crooked paths, and to settle everything by means of compromises, secret contrivances, and mutual concessions; disputed cases were ordinarily brought to an issue from any point of view except that of simple justice. This explains the unheard-of audacity of the guardians; and only thus is it possible to recognize the lofty spirit of Demosthenes, in whose eyes the struggle was a matter of conscience, to which he inflexibly adhered, a contest of honor, in which he fearlessly exposed himself to personal attacks even on the part of his nearest relatives. In the midst of these perils the youth rapidly matured into a man. At an unusually early period of life he became acquainted with the world from its worst side; but this failed to embitter, and still more failed to discourage him.

Environed by numerous and crafty enemies, he, a defenceless youth, learnt to trust in himself and in a good cause; and inasmuch as it in the end after all proved victorious, he in spite of all these dark experiences yet acquired confidence in the sound and honest spirit which lived in the better part of the civic community,—a confidence which never afterwards deserted him.

At the same time he had been obliged in this contest immediately to apply such know-^{His natural gifts.} ledge and skill as he had acquired by his studies in the department of the advocate's art; he had thus converted these acquirements into independent possessions of his own, and could now enter the arena of life as a fully-equipped man. At the same time he was supported by his inborn gifts; for he naturally possessed a keen understanding, a lively and easily-moved mind, and an abundance of ideas which developed themselves out of a grand conception of life. But he still lacked much towards being a perfect orator, and, in order to supply these defects, it was still necessary for him to give arduous proofs of his strength of will.

Demosthenes, in accordance with his character, was too prone to consider everything to depend upon the merits of a cause, and to trust to its justice, so long as it was lightly treated. Giv-^{Formation of his character.} ing way to this tendency, he neglected himself in externals which were frequently decisive in the eyes of the Attic public; and in such matters he had been least able to learn anything from Isæus, who himself never came forward in public. Moreover, the young man, who after a life of retirement by his mother's side had immediately plunged into the most laborious studies, notwithstanding the firmness of his spirit, after all lacked proper assurance and that becoming ease of manner which is the fruit of intercourse with society; there clung to him a certain shyness and clumsiness, which contrasted very strongly with

the effrontery of ordinary orators. He was also deficient in physical strength. His organs of speech by no means corresponded to the deep movements of his mind, and the pathos of his eloquence became ridiculous when his voice failed him.

His training and development as an orator.

His pronunciation wanted purity, his mouth was disadvantageously formed, and his bearing was timid and awkward. In his heart he was firm and decided, for he was conscious of a lofty power, which he felt it his duty to turn to the best account on behalf of his fellow-citizens and his mission stood with immovable fixity before him; he regarded liberty of speech as still the noblest possession of the Athenians, and their openness to the power of spoken words seemed to him their best quality. But he had to go through the severest struggles, in experiencing a succession of humiliations, while seeing shallow babblers without trouble reap a full harvest of applause, and in again and again coming to doubt, whether insignificant circumstances would not prevent him from ever reaching the goal for which he was striving with the exertion of all his strength. At the same time he was a solitary man, a stranger to his fellow-citizens, and obliged to rely entirely upon himself.

Fortunately, some few men were found to encourage him when he lost heart, and to revive him by good counsel. Eunomus of Thria is said to have been the first to recognize in him a Periclean force of eloquence; others, such as the actor Satyrus, in a friendly spirit pointed out to him the weak points in his delivery. Thus, in spite of all humiliations and failures, he ever again returned to his task and continued to labor at his self-development. He strengthened his chest and voice, by talking aloud while ascending steep declivities; he set himself, however greatly it jarred upon his natural inclinations, to learn from the artists of the stage, in order to acquire a dignified bearing of body, an appropriate play of features, a correct accen-

tuation and distribution of the breath ; and the numerous anecdotes, to which already at an early date currency was given, in order to deride him as an eccentric pedant, who allowed himself no rest at night, and who forced himself to the utmost seclusion, so as to live entirely for his studies, at all events prove that the iron strength of will with which Demosthenes pursued his end, created astonishment among his fellow-citizens. They regarded him as a man made of quite different stuff from the other folk who in the times of Eubulus filled the market-place of Athens.

As to the character of his speeches, he revealed the master to whom he had at so early an age and under circumstances of such intimacy attached himself. The nervous simplicity of expression, the keen conduct of an argument, the brief queries which interrupt and animate a speech,—these and other peculiarities he had acquired from his teacher ; indeed, in the orations concerning the guardianship we find Demosthenes verbally reproducing certain turns and even passages of greater length from Isæus, which is explained by the circumstance that in the course of his training he had got by heart orations of his master's.

His relations to the present,

But he was not merely a pupil of Isæus. It will be remembered that from Callistratus too, and doubtless not only by a single hearing, he had received an impression for life. So ardent a spirit as his could not remain untouched by the performances of the oratory of the times ; indeed, if he was desirous of controlling the minds of his contemporaries, it was indispensable for him to familiarize himself with all the intellectual currents of the age. Accordingly he is likewise stated not to have left unnoticed the orations of the Sophists, *e. g.* those of Polycrates (p. 150). But most especially, a significance could not but attach for him to the efforts of Isocrates, inasmuch as the latter was not only the most celebrated rhetor of his age,

but also the centre of an influential circle, which had a very decided political tendency of its own. At the same time, however, there prevailed between Isocrates and Demosthenes as deep a contrast as it would be possible to conceive of between two contemporary orators. The one timidly retreated from the public gaze, and only felt at his ease when surrounded by friends and pupils who admiringly looked up to him; the other boldly faced every peril, and courted the struggle in which he might stake his life in the cause of his conviction. Demosthenes was able to acknowledge the masterly skill in Isocrates, and zealously followed him in the neat elaboration, rhythmical grouping and rounding-off of his sentences. But what in the eyes of the rhetorical artist was the main thing, with Demosthenes subordinated itself to higher considerations; the cold smoothness of the Isocratic periods could not accord with his fiery spirit; and however finely his ear was trained, yet he could not consent to bind himself down to external laws of euphony (p. 179), such as had been established in the school of the rhetor; at all events in his forensic speeches he was not painfully anxious to avoid the *hiatus*.* Moreover, already on the occasion of the first contest which Demosthenes had to wage, Isocrates was on the enemy's side; for he was the tutor of Aphobus' brother-in-law Onetor, of whom he expressly boasts as his pupil.

The other circle, which at that time was an intellectual power at Athens, was that of the followers of Plato. Towards them, too, Demosthenes stood in an attitude of direct opposition; for he could not but be averse from any philosophy which estranged man from his civic duties, and removed him from the sphere of practical efficiency into the realms of ideas. He was therefore more attracted towards the Megaric school, because its members prepared

* The *hiatus* in Demosthenes: Schüfer, iii.2, 317. Of very rare occurrence only in the speeches on affairs of State.

the mind by dialectical exercises for the task of public life; and Eubulides (p. 151), with whom he felt connected in political tendencies also, is mentioned among the men who advanced Demosthenes in his development. At the same time neither can the labors of Plato have passed him by without leaving their traces. Plato's Socratic dialogues could not fail to make the most animating impression upon all who devoted themselves to acquiring an artistic command over the language, or to stimulate them to follow with ardor in the same direction. And in the innermost tendency of mind there undeniably likewise existed a deep connection, in spite of the great contrast, between these two Athenians. For both possessed an invincible faith in the moral forces in the life of man; both made it the task of their life to assert these, and not in the individual only, but in the whole community; but the one desired by means of the divine ideas to create a new State-commonwealth, while the other wished to elevate the existing State to the height at which it might correspond to the idea of a true civic State.

Demosthenes, however, not only drew mental nourishment from that which was offered ^{and to the past.} by the present, but also possessed himself of that which was great and typical in preceding ages; nor could a patriotic Athenian have done otherwise. He reverentially contemplated the monuments of art, the dedicatory gifts, the statues of citizens of desert, the documents in stone, the memorials of victory, which, he declared, were set up, not in order to be idly gazed upon, but in order to stimulate to imitation of their authors. He closely studied the ideas of Solon, in whose sayings and laws he found the moral mission of the Attic state most perfectly expressed: he drew strength from recalling the great past of his native city, and already for this reason loved Thucydides more than any other author; to him he felt inwardly akin; the work of Thucydides was to him, so to speak,

the canonical book of the Attic spirit; he is said to have copied it out eight times with his own hand, and to have known the greater part of it by heart.

Thus the intellectual being of Demosthenes is rooted in the best elements which native tradition had to offer; and by appropriating these to itself in a life-like way, his mind, in which there was by nature a want of elasticity and receptivity, became flexible and many-sided; he thus gradually acquired for himself the full facility of motion belonging to the Attic character. Hence the variety of expression, in which he surpasses all his predecessors, the difference of manner, according as he treats of public or private affairs, and the abundance of changes of style in his orations. In them we find the sharpness and severity of the old style, the sententious brevity, such as from the lips of a Pericles mightily moved the minds of men, and such as still finds an echo in Thucydides; but Demosthenes' form of expression never lacks transparency or ease; on the contrary, where it suits the subject, he passes into the light flow of the eloquence of Lysias. But he is everywhere more full of vigor than the latter, he always marches in his panoply, equipped with the ready logic of the Megaric school. He has the dignity and sonorousness of Isocrates, but at the same time an infinitely greater variety of movement; he is fresh, warm and dramatically animated like Plato, but, as befits an orator, more measured and severe. Thus in full truth the eloquence of Demosthenes is sustained and nourished by the rich culture of his native city; it is the acme and perfection of all that had preceded him, while at the same time he had by no means forfeited his peculiar characteristics. For his talents, it must be remembered, had not easily and lightly developed themselves by following the prevailing tendencies of the age; on the contrary, he was opposed to all the tendencies of the present, to rhetoric, to sophistry and philosophy, and similarly to the

His originality.

great world and to the political sentiments which dominated over the citizens in the times of Eubulus. It was in solitary struggles that he labored and strove to form himself, and it was thus that he impressed upon his development the perfect stamp of his own individuality. The weight of the seriousness of his life is impressed upon his eloquence; hence his aversion from all phrase-making and from rhetorical verbiage. His style is short and condensed; he adheres strictly to the subject, seeking to seize it in the most thorough way possible from every side, and to cut off by anticipation all possible objections. With this mastery over the dialectical art are combined a force of moral conviction and a passionate hatred of all that is base, an inflexible courage and a fervent love for his native city, so that thus the art of the orator becomes the expression of the entire man. In him, character and eloquence, word and deed, were one; and after he had developed the rich gifts bestowed upon him by nature, with the fidelity and persistency which are the tokens of true genius, after he had possessed himself of all the impulses to be derived from rhetoric, from philosophy and from dramatic art, he finally bestowed the supreme consecration upon his art, by allowing no vanity or selfishness to beset it, so that, sustained by the nobility of a pure spirit, it became the organ of a mind filled with enthusiasm for the loftiest ends.*

That which Demosthenes had acquired by solitary study as well as by intercourse with remarkable men, was brought to perfection by the tasks of practical life. His art was first applied by him as an advocate. It was in this capacity that he derived most benefit from the schooling through which he had passed under Isæus, above all from the thorough

Demos-
thenes as
an advo-
cate.

* Dionysius, *περὶ τῆς λεπτικῆς Δ. δεινότητος*, on Demosthenes as the orator who united all previous stages and species. Cf. Blass, *Griech. Beredsamkeit*, 1865, p. 180.

knowledge of civic law which he had acquired. It is true that the profession adopted by him enjoyed no very high repute among the Athenians, although in general they by no means took rigorous views of morality; the word "*logographos*" (writer of forensic speeches) was now employed as a term of abuse, because in no kind of business was more dishonesty wont to occur than in this; and thus the activity of Demosthenes himself as an advocate was in every way taken advantage of by his enemies, in order to impugn his good name and to cast suspicions upon his character.* There is, however, no reason for assuming Demosthenes to have trodden this slippery path otherwise than with the most absolute regard for honor. For assuredly no one will blame him for having availed himself of his labors in this field, in order to regulate his shattered fortune, to provide for his mother and sister, and to found a domestic establishment for himself. He rather proved himself an Athenian of the ancient stamp by the very fact that he was a good economist at home; and the same demand he necessarily made upon every citizen for the sake of the commonwealth. He was convinced that the welfare of the State rested upon the well-to-do civic families; it was in them that he found patriotic sentiments surviving; and for this reason he, as a member of the upper class of citizens, was animated by a proud self-consciousness as towards all adventurers and dubious upstarts. At the same time he sufficiently proved by his whole course of conduct, that it was not his own comfort which he had in view, when decently providing for an augmentation of his property, but the honor of his house and the advantage of the State. It amounted to a triumph for him, that already in Ol. cv. 2 (B. C. 359) he could undertake a trierarchy by virtue of his own property, and on

* *Λογογράφος*, *ap.* Pl. *Phædr.* 257 (from Archinus according to Sauppe) Dem. xix. 246.

this occasion prove himself to be, like his father, a man who did more than his mere duty.*

The lawsuits, in which he supported with his counsel and his art fellow-citizens in difficulties, introduced him to greater intimacy with all conditions of society. He had opportunities of becoming acquainted with the forces of party-feeling and love of lucre which were destroying the peace of the community; he observed how the difference between rich and poor was becoming more and more broadly marked; the wealthy citizens erected mansions which surpassed the public edifices in beauty, and bought up lands of great extent, while the poorer classes fell into relations of dependency, and lost all inclination for husbandry and for activity on their own account. These social evils were closely connected with the political state of things; for while, as the apathy of the multitude grew, the members of a party joined hands and took possession of the conduct of public affairs, they turned to every possible account the advantages of their position, became wealthy and arrogant, and abused their power. Accordingly, neither was Demosthenes able to derive lasting satisfaction from his practice as an advocate. His spirit demanded a wider sphere of action; it behooved him to penetrate to the bottom of the evils of public life, and freely to oppose himself to the abuses of the administration.†

The first opportunity presented itself to him, when in the summer of Ol. cvi. 1 (B. C. 356) Androtion brought forward a motion, to honor the Council which was quitting office with a crown. The orator Androtion (p. 186) was one of the partisans of Aristophon, who formed a close group of persons regarding public affairs as their private domain, glorying before the people in their business life as statesmen, proposing motions

* Trierarchy under Cephisodotus, cf. p. 104, Note.

† Rich and poor: Dem. xiii. 30; cf. Freese, *Parteilampf der Reichen und Armen*, 75.

upon motions, contriving to escape from the rendering of any account, and in many ways abusing the influence which they thus acquired to the damage of the State. Androtion's motion on the present occasion was not of much significance; but the object of the opposition offered to it was to let it be seen that the men at the helm of affairs were not at liberty to manage everything according to their liking, and that there still existed citizens who paid vigilant attention to the laws of the State. Now, the motion proposed to the civic assembly was out of order, because it had not been preceded by a decree of the Council, and because the Council had by no means acted up to its obligations, more especially with reference to the fleet (vol. ii. p. 243), to such a degree as to be lawfully entitled to the honor proposed. Accordingly, Euctemon and Diodorus came forward against Androtion, and Demosthenes composed for Diodorus the speech, in which the illegality of the motion was demonstrated. He disregarded the fact, that the accusers had been irritated by personal acts of hostility on the part of Androtion; he had nothing but the State in view, and in the public interest seized upon this opportunity, so as to bring to light the unconscientious intrigues which the mover, trusting in his powerful connexions, permitted to himself.*

and
Leptines.
Ol. cvi. 2
(B. C. 354).

Before this year was at an end (Ol. cvi. 2; B. C. 355-4), Demosthenes came forward in a second case, and this time in his own person.

The object was to resist the financial law, proposed in the preceding year by Leptines, a well-known popular orator,—one of the many laws designed to open new resources for the exhausted public exchequer, without inconveniencing the citizens. Leptines had pursued the course of proposing that all relief from public services for the state-festivals should be abolished; with the solitary

* Androtion: (cf. *Note* to p. 186) Schäfer, i. 316, *seq.*

exception of the honorary rights conferred upon the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton, all favors of this description were to cease, and no privileges of the kind were in future to be granted, either to citizens or to resident aliens.

The law had been urged on with great haste, and had been adopted without the constitutional formalities being observed; it was a popular law, because it promised in a genuinely democratic spirit to remove unjust inequalities, to diminish the civic burdens, and to assure the splendor of the public festivals; accordingly Leptines had succeeded in fortunately escaping the first attacks during the year in which he was as mover responsible for his law. But in the following year Apsephion and Ctesippus, the son of Chabrias, came forward against the law of Leptines, and proposed an amended draft of an act, the contents of which designed to subject one and all of the privileges conferred by the State to a careful control, to abolish those which were without a legal foundation, or which had been procured by unworthy proceedings, and for the future to prevent all abuses. Ctesippus had Demosthenes for his champion, who with victorious eloquence proved the objectionable character of the law of Leptines. It was virtually quite useless to the State; and its very dubious advantages stood in no proportion to the damage which the State must suffer by the loss of honor and confidence which it would incur by offending and disgracing its benefactors. Athens ought never to be false to her ancient principle, of joyfully honoring and liberally rewarding all desert.*

* The motion of Leptines was dealt with unconstitutionally: Dem. xx. 34 (probably it was immediately brought before the civic assembly). The death of Bathippus and the withdrawal of his associates put an end to the first indictment; hence the second indictment, πρὸς Λεπτίνην. The following were the actual terms of the law of Leptines, according to Funkhanel, *N. Jahrb.* 1866, p. 559: ὅπως ἂν οἱ πλουσιώτατοι λειτουργῶσι, μηδένα ἀτελῆ εἶναι μήτε τῶν πολιτῶν μήτε τῶν ἰσοτελῶν μήτε τῶν ξένων πλὴν τῶν ἀφ' Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐξεῖναι. But cf. Sauppe, *Philol.* xxv. 265.

The following year brought him once more into conflict with Androtion and his associates, whom a law originating in their own party had placed in a situation of great embarrassment. Aristophon had proposed the institution of an extraordinary commission, whose task it was to be to investigate all outstanding demands of the public exchequer, and to find out all its solvent debtors. Of this, advantage was taken by the cunning Euctemon, who gave information that the vessel in which immediately after the close of the Social War Androtion had sailed in the company of others as envoy to Maussollus, had on the way captured an Egyptian merchantman; that the latter had been condemned as a prize of war; but that the legal duty had never been paid on account of it to the public treasury. The facts were found to be as he had stated; and since Androtion and his associates had acknowledged their ownership of the prize money, they were forced either to pay down immediately the sum, which had in the meantime swollen to double the original amount, or to submit to arrest as lagging debtors of the State.

In this difficulty they resorted to a desperate expedient. They interested Timocrates on their behalf, a popular orator of evil repute on account of dishonest doings; they contrived in the first assembly of the new year (Ol. cvi. 4) to induce the civic community to summon a legislative commission for the next day, the twelfth of Hecatombæon, while, in order to make the matter appear extremely urgent and important, the rumor was spread, that the question to be discussed was the obtaining of pecuniary means, in particular for the expenses of the approaching Panathenæa. But instead of this, Timocrates suddenly came forward with a proposition, containing an essential change in the existing legislation with regard to the public debtors, to whom it was in future to be permitted to free themselves from personal arrest up to the end of the year by bringing

Demos-
thenes against
Timocrates.
Ol. cvi. 4
(B. C. 353).

forward others as securities. The audacious scheme succeeded; the law was adopted; and the immediate danger threatening Androtion seemed to have been happily averted. Euctemon and Diodorus, the unwearied adversaries of Androtion, instead of abandoning their case, indicted the mover for illegality; and Demosthenes composed the speech of accusation for Diodorus. All the informalities of the law were laid bare, in particular the neglect of the terms of time and of the preliminaries imposed by statute, the false and delusive pretences by which the motion had been prefaced, and its conflict with previous laws of the State; next was demonstrated the danger to the public credit involved in such a law as this, and finally it was shown, how this law, which was so utterly informal, and fraught with peril for the State, had originated by no means in ignorance or want of intelligence, but in evil intentions; for evil it was to be called, when laws were proposed in order to help bad men out of a difficulty, and unjust and criminal, when in the case of certain public debtors, such as the farmers of duties, the old penalties were allowed to remain in their full rigor, while in the case of others,—and these others men who had fraudulently retained public moneys,—the legal punishment, and thereby at the same time the security of the State, were diminished; and when, finally, a retrospective force was attached to such laws, in order that they might be immediately made use of for selfish party-purposes.

On this occasion Demosthenes is no longer the pupil of Isæus, the advocate learned in the law and the confidential counsel of individual fellow-citizens; but he comes forward as a

public personage, as a man who viewed his duties as a citizen of the State in a serious spirit, such as had long since fallen out of use at Athens. In the Attic free commonwealth it was in truth the mission of every citizen, to exercise a control over public life, and to see, so far as in him

Political
character of
his forensic
speeches.

lay, that no unwarrantable act was allowed to go without its punishment. This end was served by the indictment for illegality; and it was this which Demosthenes took into his hands like a sharp sword, in order to wield it without consideration of persons against every enemy of the Right. At the same time he had in view not the letter of the laws, but their spirit, which had been impressed upon them by the wisdom of bygone generations. Conceived of in the sense of these, the laws were to be held in honor, because with them the good name of the city was indissolubly connected; they were to be defended as the most sacred jewel of the State against all arbitrary perversions and misrepresentations. For this reason we find Demosthenes contending with inflexible wrath against those venal creatures, who, like Timocrates, delude the people by making laws on behalf of their own friends; he tears the mask off those men who by reason of their busy officiousness wish to be accounted patriots of merit, and who force an entrance into all the commissions; he refuses to permit impure hands, like those of Androtion, to concern themselves with the affairs of the community.*

Thus, then, Demosthenes, starting from domestic and personal matters, had entered into wider and wider spheres of activity, first as an advocate in private suits, then as a legal counsel in matters of public business, and even in the latter capacity at first only writing speeches for others, but afterwards taking the full responsibility by appearing in his own person. Simultaneously he steadily advanced his activity to higher and higher points of view, since all personal relations at the bottom of questions in dispute fell into the back-ground, so soon as Demosthenes took these questions in hand. It was herein that he so essentially distinguished himself from the orators who had pre-

* Timocrates already on a previous occasion assisted Androtion in a commission for the levying of an outstanding property-tax: Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.* vol. i. p. 212 [Eng. Tr.].

ceded him, who like him combated the abuses and the slackness prevalent among the Athenians, as did the fiery Aristophon, but who always had the particular case only in view. Thus, *e. g.*, after the mishap at Peparethus (p. 107) all the trierarchs who had caused their services to be performed by substitutes, were, as if they alone had caused the calamity, indicted by Aristophon with unmeasured ire as traitors, a charge on life and death being preferred against them. Demosthenes everywhere had the whole in view; he invariably penetrated to the root of the evil; he knew how to elevate every question concerning a point of legislation in the domain of the laws of debt, of privileges, &c., to the height of one involving the vital interests of civil society, and to give to it an ethico-political significance. Thus, then, he had already with his forensic entered the sphere of public speeches; and a year after he had spoken against Leptines, he now also for the first time succeeded in obtaining a hearing as a popular orator. Herewith begins his participation in the direction of the community and of its public affairs.*

Athens stood in greater need than ever of a leader. When summoned once more by the The political situation. death of Epaminondas, which occurred about the time of Demosthenes' lawsuits against his guardians, to play a more important part in Greece, she had shown herself incapable of responding to the call. During the whole period in which Aristophon was the leader of the citizens (p. 109 *seq.*) the power of the State had retrogressed. After an inglorious feud, Athens had concluded the most shameful of pacifications, and had at the same time lost her best generals (p. 121). Eubulus assumed the leadership among the citizens; but this failed to secure to them a firm guidance; there existed among them no man eminent above the rest by his character, no regularly disciplined party, openly and honestly pursuing a definite line

* Aristophon after the discomfiture at Peparethus: [Dem.] li. 8.

of policy. The Athenians lived on thoughtlessly, or swayed in their conduct by changing phases of feeling, although the situation of affairs was an extremely serious one. The Phocian War threatened to extend its limits further and further; Philip was since the conquest of Amphipolis actually at war with Athens (p. 139); Mausollus was spreading out his dominion over the islands, and in his rear there rose menacingly the Persian empire, which since the accession to the throne of the third Artaxerxes, called Ochus (Ol. civ. 2, B. C. 362), sought to recover its ancient position of power in the Mediterranean. Ochus was an enterprising prince, surrounded by energetic generals and Greek mercenary troops; the support which his satraps who had revolted against him had received from Athens (p. 120) had aroused in him the utmost wrath; and, although in consequence of his threats the Athenians had abased themselves so deeply, yet the feeling of ill-will continued even after the termination of the Social War. In the interior of the empire extensive armaments were in progress; and when the tidings of these reached Athens, the civic community became extremely excited; they could not resist the belief that a new Persian War was in prospect; and utter discouragement was suddenly succeeded by a warlike phase of public feeling, which was eagerly fostered by the orators. Many of them seized the welcome opportunity for indulging in the favorite reminiscences of Marathon and Salamis; the menaces of the barbarians, it was declared, could only serve to restore the ancient glory of the city; the attacks of the Great King ought to be anticipated; and the citizens already dreamt of heading the Hellenes in expeditions leading to new victories on the Eurymedon.*

* Artaxerxes Ochus (who once more restored with ruthless energy the authority of the Achæmenidæ, Plutarch, *Artax.* xxvi. 30; Diod. xvii. 5) from Ol. cv. 2; B. C. 359. It was in his interest that already Maussollus had been active against Athens. Cf. Schäfer, i. 413.

Demosthenes must have confessed to himself, that there could be no more thankless task for his first oration on affairs of State, than that of confronting this patriotic enthusiasm with the opposition of sober caution. But such a man as he was not watching for opportunities favorable to him, in order to make a public appearance of especial brilliancy or admitting of easily gained applause; he simply followed his sense of duty, which bade him in the face of a dangerous excitement raise the voice of warning.

Demosthenes
against the
Persian War.

Ol. cvi. 3
(B. C. 354).

Undoubtedly, he told the citizens, Persia was the hereditary foe of the Hellenes; but whosoever the adversary might be, it was unreasonable to enter into hostilities with any power, without having made sufficient preparations for them. Laudation of our forefathers was an admirable subject for orators desirous of displaying their art; but for the civic community it was assuredly more salutary, if one even less gifted with eloquence showed forth the conditions under which alone a contest could be waged leading to glory, such as former generations had achieved. "If," he continued, "we commence a war against Persia without just cause, the consequence will be that we shall stand alone, while the Persians find allies among the Hellenes. The only rational course is this: to irritate no one, but on the other hand to prepare ourselves for war with all possible ardor. When hereafter the hour of danger arrives for us, the remaining Hellenes will follow us, the well armed, as those who have a mission to fight in the van. This, then, is the task of the true orator of State: to show forth the means, whereby Athens can advance her military strength, in order once more to assume a position worthy of her forefathers."

But what was the actual condition of the military strength of Athens, and in particular of her navy, upon which everything depended, inasmuch as by sea alone she was still capable of effecting

Condition
of the
Attic navy.

anything? The ancient institutions, which had once made Athens powerful by sea, still existed; the law of Periander (p. 119) had transformed them in accordance with the times; but these changes were from no point of view sufficient. The navy was no longer a power ready to strike a blow when called upon; Athens had become an unwarlike city; and on every occasion when the civic assembly had decreed the despatch of a naval squadron, a confused hurrying to and fro commenced in city and harbor, during which the most precious time was lost. First the Board of Generals had to provide for the levy of the crews and for the appointment of the trierarchs; eventually also for the imposition of a war-tax. Next, it was the business of the ten dock superintendents to distribute ships and ships' furniture among the trierarchs; whereupon again another commission of ten came into play, whose duty it was together with the Council to superintend the despatch of the fleet. The Council itself held its sittings on the harbor mole; final terms of time were fixed, penalties threatened, prizes offered. But it would not answer to take very serious measures as to the punishments, because the carrying out of these only threatened still further to impede the armament; and the golden wreaths merely led to vexatious lawsuits. Indeed, even with regard to the obligation of individuals to undertake trierarchies, with regard to proposed exchanges of property (p. 223), and other such like matters, further suits were carried on, which occasioned frequent judicial sittings under the presidency of the Generals; and it was found, that of the citizens under obligations of public services more than one-third contrived to escape from their duties. Of those, on the other hand, who fulfilled them, the majority merely provided for taking the matter as easily as possible; and many of them entered into contracts with substitutes, who undertook in their stead the personal service and the equipment of the vessel; and these substitutes again had no other interest

except that of making a profitable transaction out of the contract, and of course did as little as they could for the State. The ships' furniture offered by the State was frequently so old and bad, that it seemed more advantageous to take one's own. The crews, rapidly brought together at the moment, were not to be depended upon, hard to keep in order, and unfit for acting in unison; it was accordingly necessary to give them a preliminary drilling. Moreover, the crews of the individual ships so frequently fell short of the right numbers, that it was impossible properly to fill the rowers' benches. Under these circumstances the trierarchs, if their intentions were honest, could not but be placed in the most painful of situations; they were obliged to make the greatest sacrifices, if their ships were only to some extent to meet the demands made upon them. The rest had sufficient excuse for their defective equipment, while the authorities were forced everywhere to proceed considerately; and it may be easily conceived, what was the general character of the ships of war, which in the end were passed as fit for sea by the inspecting officers.*

Such a condition of things could not fail to fill Demosthenes with shame and indignation. He therefore took advantage of the very first opportunity, to indicate the defective points in the organization for war purposes, and to propose changes intended to bring about a more equitable distribution of the public burdens. He in the first instance demanded, that a larger number of citizens, 2,000 in all, should be included in the lists of those liable, in order that after all those had been subtracted who could on any grounds claim exemption, at least 1,200 might be reckoned upon as being more than mere names on the lists. The twenty *symmories* or taxing associations were to be left standing, but each of these was again to be divided into five sections, in which citizens of

Reforms
proposed
by Demos-
thenes.

* As to the condition of the Attic navy: Kirchhoff, "*Rede vom trierarch. Kranze*," in *Abhandl. der Preuss. Akad. der Wissensch.*, 1865.

different property classes were to be grouped together. These sections, the expenses being equitably distributed among the members of each, were to undertake to provide for three ships of war; so that the result was a normal total of 300 vessels. Secondly, the pecuniary resources of the country were to be organized in a corresponding way, in order that there might be a certainty of regularly securing the additions which necessarily had to be made to the disbursements of the trierarchs, for defraying the pay and food of the crews and other expenses. Accordingly, the sum total of property-tax collected out of the paying capital of the citizens (p. 91), which was reckoned in all at 6,000 talents (1,465,500*l.*), was not in the first instance to flow into the public treasury, but was to be at once divided into one hundred parts, so that each section should receive and expend its quota of the tax. Furthermore, the entire materials of the Attic naval power, the existing establishment of hulks, ships, and ships' furniture, was to be divided according to the new symmories, so that these were themselves to have the right and duty of controlling it, and a title for demanding all the State property, which might happen to have remained in the hands of negligent trierarchs. Finally, with regard to the crews, who were levied out of the ten tribes of the civic community, to each tribe were to be assigned by lot thirty ship-sheds lying near together; for which it was under the superintendence of the public authorities to furnish the requisite number of men. Indeed, the group of thirty ship-sheds, as well as the whole body of the tribesmen, were again divided by three; so that to each third of a tribe were assigned ten vessels as its particular sphere of duty.*

* The 6,000 talents are the capital subject to taxation of all the citizens liable to it (Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. ii. p. 292 [E. Tr.]); but the property of the people itself amounted to far more than five times that sum (cf. *ante*, p. 91), without counting in the state-property which was exempt from taxation (Boeckh, vol. i. p. 252). It is not clear on what principle Euripides' estimate of 20,000 talents (vol. iv. p. 297) was based.

The practicability and expediency of these reforms may be open to some doubt; and there was perhaps reason for objecting to them as a scheme elaborated with excessive artificiality. But the points of view from which they were devised were undoubtedly those of a truly high-minded statesmanship, and the means for their achievement thoroughly corresponded to the spirit of the Attic constitution. Demosthenes desired to stay the abuse which the rich made of their social position, to cause the citizens to participate in larger numbers and in a higher degree in the equipment of the vessels, as well as to provide for the whole matter becoming more perspicuous and more definitely regulated. At the same time he followed the existing institutions as closely as possible, and was far removed from an impatient craving for innovation.

Speech
concerning
the symmories.

Ol. cvi. 3 (s. c. 354).

For the rest, the proposals of Demosthenes were by no means intended immediately to acquire the force of law; they were merely to open the eyes of the citizens to the real points at issue, if the glory of former ages was to be revived, as their orators punished them; and it at all events amounted to a very important success, that Demosthenes not only completely achieved his main object by recalling the Athenians to calm reflection from their dangerous dreams of possibilities, but also upon the whole made an evidently favorable impression upon the assembly. He had come before it for the first time, without followers, without powerful friends, without the recommendation of an attractive personal appearance, with a speech bitterly in earnest, which, notwithstanding the reticence observed in it, still amounted to a severe rebuke of the citizens. That they should notwithstanding have listened to him, and have even received with applause the dry exposition of his projects of reform, is only to be explained by the fact, that the manly maturity of this youth of nine-and-twenty years of age, the unadorned simplicity keeping

only the cause itself in view, and the serious labor of thought, which were perceptible in the speech, did not miss their effect. To these reasons were added the impressive brevity, which he took over into State-oratory from that of the law-courts; he invariably kept his opponent in view, anticipated every possible objection, and contrived to establish the truth of his views by proofs from the convincing force of which it was simply impossible to escape.

Thus on this occasion was first formed a relation between Demosthenes and the civic assembly; he came to have confidence in himself and his fellow-citizens, who knew how to appreciate what he offered them; and he saw his adversaries disarmed notwithstanding all the advantages which they had on their side. And this was a double gain, inasmuch as not only those were in question, who, excited by a sudden outburst of enthusiasm, were rushing headlong into war without having realized to themselves their own intentions; there doubtless also existed another class, whose political views were not determined by so simple-minded a sentimentality, and who supported the reckless clamor for war, not only because it gave them an opportunity for fine speeches, but because it diverted the attention of the Athenians from the real dangers of war. They meant to take advantage of the warlike enthusiasm fostered by Isocrates and his friends, in order to involve Athens in complications of a kind which would force her to seek for allies in arms; in this case she would also be unable to proceed without the help of Macedonia; and it was to be foreseen, that, if the Greek continent should engage in hostilities with Asia, the leadership of the former must, sooner or later, fall to the lot of that State, which alone had at its disposal a standing armed force, and which commanded the Thracian coast-towns and mines. With this policy, moreover, all those agreed, who, without being adherents of Philip, would not hear of their native city playing the part of a Great

War-and-
peace-par-
ties.

Power, and who had therefore supported Eubulus, when he advocated peace at any price (p. 142). It was in this strange relation of attitudes that the parties confronted one another. Those who demanded war, and who called to mind the deeds of Cimon, were at bottom the men of peace, the enemies of the democracy, and the representatives of a policy befitting a petty city, while in the peace-oration of Demosthenes was concealed a bristling declaration of war. A tone of delicate irony pervades the speech; it destroys the fictitious clamor for war, and indicates the real enemy; it admonishes the citizens to be calm, and calls for the most serious armaments; it lays bare all the weak points of the city, because in a clear perception of these lies the only way to make it strong and great again. Thus this earliest of Demosthenes' orations of State contains the fundamental ideas of his subsequent political activity, and was therefore already by ancient critics called his first *Philippic*.*

The Athenians had no cause to repent of having obeyed the sober voice of Demosthenes; they soon convinced themselves what insanity it would have been for them to have lightly thrown themselves into the midst of dangers of war abroad. The clamor for war in Asia soon died away, while the real enemy was approaching into a more and more menacing closeness, and while his newly created navy was already showing itself on the coasts of Attica.

Simultaneously the war spread further and further from Phocis; and the Spartans, full of malignant pleasure in the troubles of Thebes, took advan-

Sparta's
policy of
Restoration.

* Inasmuch as since the beginning of the quarrel concerning Amphipolis partisans of Macedonia were beyond doubt already at work in Athens, they doubtless bore a hand in adding fuel to the clamor for war; for nothing could have better suited Philip than that a Persian War should have actually been brought to pass, in which he would then simply have had to intervene. Accordingly, Dionysius, *Rhet.* viii. 7, calls the oration *περὶ συμμοριῶν*, the *First Philippic*. There can be no doubt as to the meaning of § 11: *τί τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας ἐχθροὺς ἔχοντες ἐτέρους ζητοῦμεν*, &c.

tage of the conjecture, in order if possible to overthrow everything which had been done to their advantage in the times of Epaminondas. They allied themselves with the Phocians, for the purpose of restoring Plataeæ, Orchomenus, and Thespiæ, and at the same time intended to destroy in Peloponnesus whatsoever owed its origin to the fatal day of Leuctra. The Spartans had a martial king in Archidamus (p. 174), their military force was ever lying in wait, and threatened from its ambush to invade, now this, now the other, land on their borders, while their menaced neighbors, Argos, Messene, and Megalopolis, lacked all external aid, and found themselves in the most perilous position. They turned to Athens; and the question now was, whether Athens would come forward in the place of Thebes in the peninsula, or whether she would adhere to the Spartan alliance.

Athens in
league with
Messene.

This question first confronted Athens with reference to Messene; and in this case the civic assembly decided to enter into an alliance with the Messenians, whereby their territory and their independence should be guaranteed to them against any hostile attack. The Spartans in consequence abstained from a serious attack, but turned against Megalopolis, in order to dissolve this city, as they had done in the case of Mantinea (vol. iv. p. 322). Considering the division existing in Arcadia, and the aversion from a united settlement which still continued to prevail in many of the former rural communities (vol. iv. p. 444), they thought that favorable prospects were in this quarter open to them. They set to work craftily, and announced a universal policy of restoration, in order by means of this programme to secure the good will of all who had suffered losses on the occasion of the late changes. The encroachments of Thebes were, they declared, to be regarded as an interruption by force of the state of things existing according to law; at the present time the Bœotian country-towns were to be re-

stored; to the Eleans the prospect was held out of the recovery of Triphylia (vol. iv. p. 493); the Phliasians were promised the evacuation by Argos of the castle of Tricaraneum situate above Phlius; the Athenians finally were made to expect back Oropus, the possession of which was still regarded by them as a most grievous loss (p. 104). For themselves, on the other hand, the Spartans at present claimed nothing, except that they should be allowed liberty of action with regard to Megalopolis, so that the primitive condition of things might be once more restored in Arcadia. Thus the Spartans with crafty policy came forward in favor of the ancient institutions of public law, in order in this way to regain their position at the head of the states of the peninsula. They sent envoys to the several states, and at Athens appealed to the alliance which had been in existence between the Athenians and themselves since the Peloponnesian campaigns of the Thebans; by this alliance, they declared, Athens had expressed their disapproval of the revolutionary measures which the campaigns in question had brought about.

The Megalopolitans were likewise represented at Athens; but their envoys were in a far less advantageous position as towards the civic assembly. They had no party in the city; they could not, like the Spartans, appeal to an alliance, or make promises like theirs. They could only remind the Athenians, that, if the Spartans were to succeed in carrying out their intentions, a greater danger for Athens would also immediately arise; they expressed their confidence in the magnanimity of the city, which would surely protect the weaker side, and hoped that Athens would not reject the alliance offered to her.

Both embassies found advocates among the popular orators. The one side inveighed against Thebes as the arch-foe of the city, the other against Sparta; and all the injuries which the one or the other State had at any time inflicted upon the

Oration for
Megalopolis.

Ol. cvi. 4
(B. C. 352).

Athenians were recalled to the memory of the citizens, as if the sole object had been to inflame their passions. At such a moment Demosthenes could not hold his peace; for he saw how precisely those considerations were neglected, which were alone entitled to determine the decision of the community. "All ancient grievances," he tells the citizens, "are put before you; but what is demanded in the present case by the interests of the city is stated by no man. And yet it is clear and manifest. For every Athenian must desire that neither Sparta nor Thebes should be too powerful. At the present moment Thebes lies low, and Sparta is anxious again to extend her power—nor is Megalopolis alone in question, but Messene at the same time. But if Messene is in danger, we are bound to furnish succor; and this being so, it is surely better for us to intervene now than at a later time. It is not we who are changing sides; but Sparta, by commencing war, forces us to determine our attitude accordingly. The order of things at present existing is the actually recognized one; what will follow, if nothing is ever allowed to remain without being called in question? A logically consequent policy consists, not in always remaining on the same side, but in immutably following the same principles. Now, it is the principle of Athens, ever to give aid to those who are unjustly exposed to pressure, and to secure confidence by opposing all encroachments of lust of dominion, from whatsoever quarter they may proceed. But if we intend to purchase back Oropus, which is dangled as a bait before our eyes, by allowing the peninsula to fall back under the dominion of Sparta, at the very best the gain is out of proportion to the price demanded for it. If, on the other hand, we accord our protection to the confederates of Thebes, we have a right to demand that they shall permanently adhere to us. If, then, the Thebans issue victoriously from their present troubles, they will at all events have been weakened in Peloponnesus, if they suc-

cumb, at least the states in the peninsula founded by them will have been rendered secure, and will continue to serve to restrain Sparta's lust of dominion. Thus the best provision will have been made under all circumstances for the interests of Athens."

In these recommendations we already find a clear expression of the Hellenic policy of Demosthenes. Athens is once more to step into the foreground, and to gather states around her, but, instead of by force or prematurely endeavoring to re-establish the former conditions of things, she is cautiously to take advantage of every opportunity, in order by means of a vigorous protection of the lesser states to secure grateful good-will and trustful allies. How could any one oppose a well-founded protest to the clear and simple policy of Demosthenes? And yet he failed to determine the civic assembly to arrive at resolutions corresponding to a just perception of the situation. The Athenians had too much accustomed themselves to live on carelessly from day to day, and to abstain from taking thought of what apparently lay in the distance. They allowed the Spartans to continue their hostilities undisturbed against Megalopolis; and the disadvantageous results suggested by Demosthenes would have come to pass in full measure, had not the Phocian War suddenly taken a new turn, and thereby also given a quite different development to Peloponnesian affairs. The overthrow of Onomarchus (p. 79), before the year was out, restored freedom of action to the Thebans; and, with an energy which survived in them as a reminiscence of the days of Epaminondas, they entered Peloponnesus, united there with their confederates, and forced the Spartans to conclude a truce.*

The Thebans
in Pelopon-
nesus.

Ol. cvii. 1 (B.
c. 351).

* Athens and Messene: Paus. iv. 28; Dem. xvi. 9.—Oration for the Megalopolitans: Schäfer, i. 465. Last incursion of the Thebans into Peloponnesus: *ib.* 470; ii. 162.

The affairs
of Thrace. But from the overthrow of Onomarchus sprang consequences of a yet more important character. For it must be remembered that this was the first occasion on which Macedonian arms had decided a Hellenic war, and determined the mutual relations of the Hellenic states. Philip was master of Thessaly, and had Thermopylæ. He was, however, by no means minded to wait here in inaction, until an opportunity should offer for a further advance. He left the affairs of Thessaly to his civil and military officers, and himself hastened to the Thracian coast, where he was not less dangerous to the Athenians than at Thermopylæ (p. 82). On the Thracian coast the Athenians had after protracted disputes and negotiations with Cersobleptes at last achieved so much as this: that the important peninsula on the Hellespont, the Chersonnesus, was acknowledged to be their property (p. 113). After their losses in the Social War, it was of all the more serious importance for the Athenians to make sure the remnant of their possessions; and in the Thracian sea their supremacy as yet prevailed more than anywhere else. Here they held as their property the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Seyros. Thasos was allied with them, as were Tenedos and Proconnesos; and at the southern boundary of the Thracian sea, Sciathos, together with the groups of islands in its vicinity. Here, therefore, their dominion still possessed a certain cohesiveness; here they had numerous harbors for their naval squadrons, which kept a watchful eye upon the Thracian peninsula. And yet the state of affairs in these regions remained very insecure; and so soon as Cersobleptes was left free to act as he chose, he persistently pursued the one object of extending his dominion at the expense of the other two chieftains, Amadocus and Berisades.

This condition of things precisely suited Philip for establishing, by means of a crafty intervention in its internal disputes, a firm footing in the Thracian coast-land; which

was indispensable to him for his dominion by land and sea. He had made his first appearance here in Ol. cvii. 1, B. C. 353, when accompanying his friend Pammenes (p. 48) on the occasion of the expedition of the latter into Asia (p. 77). At that time he had taken Abdera and Maronea, and had appeared on the border of the Thracian principalities, where he was vigorously resisted by Amadocus, while Cersobleptes entered into negotiations with him.

This expedition was merely a first *reconnaissance*; it passed by without any serious danger; indeed, Chares succeeded in routing Macedonian troops on the river Hebrus; and although he failed in his attempt to seize upon the royal squadron on its return home, yet he took Sestus, the place commanding the Hellespont, which the Athenians had lost in the Peace of Antalcidas, had recovered in B. C. 365 through Timotheus, but five years afterwards had once more lost to the Thracian princes through the guile of the city of Abydus, which was always hostile to them. Chares established a colony of citizens there, with the intent of securing this important place for Athens, as Lysander had formerly designed to do in his own interests (vol. iv. p. 167).

The affairs of Thrace had now acquired an increased importance for Athens. The citizens occupied themselves more seriously with them than with any other subject of foreign policy; and Demosthenes too, who, as will be remembered, might himself half regard the Pontus as his original home, and who had borne a personal share as trierarch in the expedition to the Hellespont under Cephisodotus (p. 112), found an opportunity, in the same year in which he had spoken on behalf of the application of the Megalopolitans, to discuss in public the condition of things in Thrace.

Now, Cersobleptes stood in relations of great intimacy with Charidemus. For the latter had, in Ol. cv. 1 (B. C. 360-59), made a treacherous

Cerso-
bleptes
and Chari-
demus.

attack upon the Athenians who at his summons had come to the Chersonnesus under Cephisodotus, had defeated them, and forced them to acknowledge Cersobleptes in his dominion. The prince accordingly owed the most important success to Charidemus, and had made him his confidential friend and brother-in-law. Inasmuch, then, as Charidemus had since found opportunities of attending to the interests of the Athenians in several transactions, he was, by virtue of his eminent position, the man of the hour, upon whom the greatest hopes were placed, and through whose mediation it was hoped that all the wishes of Athens with regard to Thracian affairs, even the hope of recovering Amphipolis, might still be fulfilled. It therefore seemed to be in accordance with a sagacious policy to keep this important personage in good-humor, in particular as every distinction conferred upon him at the same time obliged Cersobleptes. After, therefore, wreaths of gold and other honors had already been bestowed upon him, Aristocrates proposed to place under a special protection the person of Charidemus, whose oft-imperilled life ought to be dear above all other things to the Athenians; accordingly, every one who ventured to lift a hand against him was to be an outlaw in the whole length and breadth of the Attic dominions; and whosoever, whether an individual or a community, afforded protection to the assassin, was to be ejected from the Confederacy of Athens.

Demos-
thenes
against Aris-
tocrates.
Ol. cvii. 1
(B. C. 352).

Against this motion Euthycles raised the indictment for illegality. He had been trierarch with Demosthenes in the above-mentioned naval expedition, which had come to so unfortunate an issue through the treachery of Charidemus; and Demosthenes drew up the speech of accusation for him. The orator first exposed the contradiction between the motion of Aristocrates and the venerable ordinances of the primitive Attic law of homicide, and likewise that between the present proposal and the spirit

of the Attic constitution, which refused to allow of privileges in favor of individuals. And, he went on to observe, the particular person upon whom it was intended to bestow so un-republican a boon, this captain of mercenaries and erratic partisan, seemed least of all to deserve that the community of Athens should go bail for his safety, and constitute itself his body-guard. And, in point of fact, every distinction conferred upon Charidemus signified nothing else than a demonstration in favor of Cersobleptes, and was for this reason desired by him. But neither for this was there any necessity; for Cersobleptes was utterly and entirely untrustworthy, a prince, who merely used the Athenians for his own purposes, who showed himself ready to make concessions and to adapt himself to circumstances, when the Attic triremes appeared in his vicinity, but who at other times was hostile. Thus even at the present moment he was with the utmost obstinacy maintaining his hold upon the town of Cardia, on account of its important situation on the peninsula connecting the Chersonesus with the mainland. If Athens advanced the designs of this ambitious prince, she would thereby sacrifice the others, who were now the allies of the city, and avert them from herself; while the gratitude of the favored Cersobleptes would not last any longer than the time during which he stood in need of the Athenians.

We are unacquainted with the decision arrived at by the court. But it is extremely probable that the jurymen could not resolve upon condemning Aristocrates, because it was not wished publicly to offend such men as Cersobleptes and Charidemus. It was too prominent a feature in the character of the citizens of those days to give themselves up to careless hopes with reference to particular individuals, and to expect everything from these without any exertions on their own part. It is, however, certain that the principles of Thracian policy recommended by Demosthenes were

Further
losses in
Thrace.

not adopted, and that the punishment very soon followed. For when Philip after his victory over Thessaly appeared for the second time in Thrace (p. 82), Amadocus, who had taken offence at the preference shown for Cersobleptes, and who had no prospects of Athenian protection, instead of offering any further resistance, submitted to the king. The towns on the Hellespont, on the Propontis, and on the Pontus, likewise placed themselves under his protection; whereupon he established despots who governed in his interest; and the favor accorded to Cersobleptes proved entirely useless. For he too submitted; and, together with the schemes of his ambition, the hopes which the Athenians had attached to his person likewise irrecoverably perished.*

Application
for aid from
Rhodes.

Ol. cvii. 2
(B. C. 351-50).

While thus one domain of influence or property after the other was lost, Demosthenes was indefatigably engaged upon securing compensations for what had been lost, upon making good what had been omitted, and upon establishing anew advantageous and honorable connexions for his native city. Thus in particular with the island-states. Here was felt more keenly than anywhere else the absence of the strong hand, which of old had withstood all encroachments on the part of Asiatic potentates; here first arose a condition of things which abroad too caused the need to be perceived of entering into a connexion with Athens. It became too clearly manifest how impossible it was for the island-world between Asia and Europe to remain neutral. Incapable of political independence, the island-states oscillated to and fro between oligarchical and democratical parties (p. 141); and as on the mainland Philip, so here the Carian dynasts interfered, establishing in defiance of law and treaties despots, who ruled the islands, and subjected them, in the

* As to the voyage of Cephisodotus and the death of Cotys, cf. *Note to p. 104*.—Submission of Amadocus: Theopomp. *ap.* Harpocr. 'Αμᾶδοκος. The son of Cersobleptes a hostage at the court of Philip: *Æschin.* ii. 81.

first instance to the influence of Halicarnassus, and indirectly to the suzerainty of the Great King. Such was the case in Cos and in Rhodes. The democratical party in the islands, notwithstanding, refused to abandon all hope; the death of Maussollus (351 B. C.) encouraged it anew, and brought about the despatch of an embassy of Rhodians to Athens in quest of support.

They met with a very cold reception. The lax mood, which prevailed in the civic community under the guidance of Eubulus and his associates, concealed itself under the ill-will for which good reasons were thought to exist as towards the Rhodians. The Carian mercenaries, who occupied their citadel, constituted, it was said, a well-merited punishment for their defection from Athens (p. 117); since they had complained of hard treatment from Attic hands, let them now learn what the oppression of Tyrants actually signified.

But although this was the universal view, yet Demosthenes courageously opposed it. He blamed it as petty, and unworthy of the Athenians. Instead of rubbing their hands in delight at the distress of members of their own race, they ought to return thanks to the Gods, that distant states were once more sending envoys to Athens, and requesting aid from her. The present was not a question of persons, but one concerning a great cause. Granted that the Rhodians deserved no magnanimous treatment, yet their liberty was worthy of protection; and Athens was the natural guardian of liberty. The example of Samos, which Timotheus had re-appropriated to the Athenians (p. 104), showed that the enemy, when calmly repulsed in illegal enroachments, was not on that account ready to declare war. Accordingly, neither was there in the present case any immediate reason to apprehend a Persian War; and still less ought fear of a woman, of Artemisia, to deter Athens from doing her duty. But the treaties, it was urged, prohibited any intervention. Yet

these same treaties had been most grossly violated by the other side; if, then, Athens for her part still deemed herself bound by them, while the enemies were advancing, this was, not conscientiousness, but a cowardice which must inevitably bring the State to ruin.*

The war-policy of Demosthenes. Every one of these speeches of Demosthenes was a political act. Loftily disdaining all ordinary means of acquiring influence, he fearlessly confronted the momentary feeling of the multitude, as well as the practices of the mighty. He desired to be nothing more than the voice of truth; and no movement of hostility, no ridicule, no humiliation, not even the fact of his exertions remaining without result, was capable of diverting him from service.

It was not, however, a general conviction of the historic mission of Athens, which ever and again urged him forward to the struggle; but the entire policy lying at the root of the speeches discussed above has reference to the existing situation, and to definite dangers which menaced the community from without and from within. In the Archipelago, the Athenians remaining inactive, the ancient bonds were relaxed more and more; the princes of Halicarnassus controlled the Carian Sea, and also held Chios occupied, while Lesbos was given up to Persian influence. But however humiliating this state of things was, yet there was no fear of any danger advancing upon Athens from this quarter. On the other hand, Philip had mounted the throne in the very year in which Demosthenes was cruising with his vessel in the Thracian waters (p. 264); and in Philip he from the very outset of his public activity recognised the enemy of his native city, who would not rest until he had destroyed the remnant of its power and independence. Accordingly, the Athenians

* Death of Maussollus, according to Plin. xxxvi. 30. and 47: Ol. cvii. 2 (Diodorus, xvi. 36, dates it Ol. cvi. 4). His successor Artemisia reigns up to B. C. 349.

could not be allowed to escape a struggle for their dearest possessions; and just as Themistocles foresaw the War with Persia, and Pericles that with Sparta, so Demosthenes saw the Philippic War, which was still being carried on in remote regions, approaching the walls of the city; and like them he deemed it his duty as a citizen to prepare the city for the inevitable conflict. But the peculiar difficulty of his task lay in this: that he had not only to point out the proper ways of conducting the war and the resources by which it could be supported, but also to transform the community, and in truth to create the condition of public feeling which was necessary, if Athens was not to perish in shame and dishonor.

This, then, was the reason why already in his speech against Androtion he combated the effete principles of the citizens and of their magistrates; why he attacked the rotten financial laws of a Leptines; why he rose so wrathfully against those who by a fictitious clamor for war diverted public attention from the real dangers; why he demonstrated the utter insufficiency of the naval institutions, and in his speeches for Megalopolis and for Rhodes insisted upon the necessity of Athens reviving her moral authority by means of a national policy: for he perceived that the former proteges of Thebes, being abandoned by Athens, would fall back upon Macedonia. In the speech against Aristocrates the figure of the Macedonian for the first time comes forward more clearly out of the background; in it express warnings are already uttered against the guile of the king, who had previously been merely indicated in general expressions.

These were the skirmishes preliminary to the great conflict itself. In them Demosthenes took up his public position, clearly marked his stand-point, and with not less caution than firmness and persistency opposed the dominant party. But already in the same year in which he spoke on behalf of the Rhodians, indeed a few months pre-

viously, he took the Macedonian question itself in hand, and made his first Philippic oration proper.

The Macedonian question: currents of opinion and sentiment at Athens.

Frequently enough this question had already been among the orders of the day; but the leading statesmen did their utmost to keep it in the background; for the influence of Eubulus would necessarily be at an end, so soon as the citizens should find themselves obliged to enter upon an energetic course of policy. It had therefore been agreed among his following, that the serious nature of the situation should be concealed, and that all exciting discussions should be avoided. These intentions on the part of the statesmen met with a response from all careless Athenians, who were unwilling to have their comfortable enjoyment of life disturbed; and they found most zealous supporters in those who, in the interests of Philip, encouraged the feeling of security among the citizens. Now, already at this time the king was served at Athens by men who stood in his pay and kept him informed of everything that happened in the city; men devoid of character, ambitious upstarts, traitors, who are clearly pointed at already in the Rhodian speech. Through their agency the party of the Laconizers was likewise gained over, being made to believe that Philip was about to humble the Thebans, and to carry out the Spartan policy of a Restoration (p. 258). To these influences was added that of the anti-constitutional tendency, which was so widely spread, and which loathed every popular agitation, every democratic forward movement. Whosoever agreed with Isocrates was full of aversion from those restless folk who were incessantly sounding the alarm-bell and declaring the State to be in danger. The men of philosophical culture were likewise hostile to every patriotic excitement,—not only those who on principle stood apart from all public business, but those, too, who served the State; and served it with as much distinction as Phocion (vol. iv. p.

391), the "honest man." He was senior by ^{Phocion.} about twenty years to Demosthenes,—a man of the most rigorous conduct of life in the midst of the effeminate community, just and efficient as a speaker and as a soldier, but never occupied with more than the most immediate tasks, lacking all breadth and freedom of view, devoid of enthusiasm for the honor of the city and of confidence in his fellow-citizens, and therefore in spite of his personal valor a supporter of the peace-policy and a main prop of the party of Eubulus, which preferred Phocion to any other man as a member of the Board of Generals, and always most warmly favored his re-election. Demosthenes, therefore, had to contend against a powerful combination of the most diverse tendencies. Easy love of enjoyment, treasonable sentiments, anti-democratic opinions, pusillanimity, narrowness of judgment, short-sightedness, and force of habit,—all united in supporting Eubulus. His policy was deemed that which suited the times, nay, that which was alone possible. Who took thought of the fact, that this system of government was consuming the very marrow of the body politic and that the existence of the fatherland was at stake! This fact Demosthenes was the first, and for years the only, man to recognize; he stood as a faithful sentinel upon the watch-tower, and let the light of truth shine in with gradually increasing brightness upon the sleepy civic community, full of craven self-delusion.*

The sixth year had now already arrived, since the Macedonian War had been com- ^{Alterna-} menced, in order to take vengeance on account ^{tions of fear} of Amphipolis (p. 58). From its outset it had dragged ^{and indiffer-} on like a consuming disease. Athens was continuously retreating; and instead of chastising the king in his territory, as had been intended, it was now thought matter

* Phocion, ὁ χρηστός, Diod. xvii. 15; Plutarch, *Phoc.* 10; Nepos, *Phoc.* 1.

for congratulation, if the soil of Attica itself was left in peace. Had not Macedonian privateers already carried off the Sacred Vessel out of the bay of Marathon? * However greatly therefore the orators of the party of Eubulus might exert themselves in order to repress or explain away any apprehensions among the citizens, yet men's thoughts were occupied with Philip; and after it had long been attempted to consider him of small account, the man of mystery, the incalculable one, who was always doing something new and unexpected, was now exciting a feverish anxiety in every breast. In the market-place and in the public assembly he was discussed; and whoever had anything to tell concerning him, as to where he was, what were his designs, what sayings he had uttered, was in the eyes of the citizens the bringer of the most important news. And if hereupon occasionally a new act of violence was announced, a sudden flame of wrath was incidentally kindled, and men inveighed against the barbarian king, who dared to desire, against the established order of things, to rule over Hellenes. Menacing decrees were issued, and vigorous resolutions were passed; but all measures remained unexecuted, or came too late; and after such ebullitions there again supervened an utter discouragement. The Athenians knew no way of reaching this detested foe; they were utterly without any plan to oppose to his unwearied energy; and thus they relapsed into stolid indifference, and allowed the inevitable to approach them.

The First
Philip.
Ol. cvii. 1
(B. c. 351).

Of a sudden, when in the spring of B. c. 351 the question of the Macedonian War happened once more to be awaiting discussion in the civic assembly, Demosthenes quite unexpectedly came forward, anticipating all those who were gene-

* Abduction of the Paralus shortly before the delivery of the *First Philip*, Dem. iv. 34; Philochorus and Androtion, *ap. Harpocr. s. v. ιερα τριήρης*.

rally accustomed to speak on this subject. His intention was, not to repeat the ordinary declarations, but to put an end once for all to the way in which the matter had been hitherto treated. There was no crisis of pressing difficulty for the moment, nor was the adoption of any speedy remedy in question. The orator was therefore able to call upon his fellow-citizens to take into consideration the whole question of the war, and to form a plan for the future.

"Doubtless," Demosthenes tells his fellow-citizens, "you are in an evil plight, and have every reason for depression. Your affairs are in a sufficiently bad position, but in point of fact only because you have done nothing of that which is necessary; and herein lies a consolation, which you would lack, had you done your duty and yet were as unfortunate as you are now. If you alter your ways, fortune may alter likewise; since fortune follows the brave and the vigilantly active. The power of the Macedonians, which has grown to so lofty a height from small beginnings, is assuredly no divine power; it is subject to all human changes, indeed it stands upon a very feeble footing. The worst foe threatening Athens is not the king of Macedonia, but your own effeteness; which, were this Philip to die to-day, would call you forth another to-morrow. You desire to be possessed of Amphipolis, and are so badly armed that, were fortune to offer that town to you, you would be wholly unprepared to receive it. Forces of war must therefore be created, such as correspond to our means. A small force (for to march with a land-army against the king we are too weak),—but this force must be at all times in the field, lest we lose the season of action in preparations. For at present you experience in the matter of your armaments what the barbarian experiences in the boxing-match; he is always feeling for the spot where he has just been hit; and if his adversary directs a blow at another spot, his hands follow; but to guard himself against the blow, and to see his ad-

versary's intention in his eye, he is too clumsy and unskilful. We must therefore have a force of operation stationed in the Northern waters, in Lemnos or Thasos, where petty warfare will enable it to inflict very considerable damage upon the foe, and in particular to hinder him in his lucrative expeditions of pillage. Again, this armed force must not consist of untrustworthy mercenary troops; of 2,000 soldiers at least 500, and of 200 horsemen 50, must be citizens with a supervision over the rest. Where citizens of Athens are found, there the gods of the city will accompany them. For this force of armed men ten fast vessels will suffice; and the entire equipment of ships, infantry and cavalry, amounts to something over ninety talents (22,000*l. circ.*), an armament which by no means exceeds your resources. But everything depends upon that which is done being done in a real and thorough way. For if I ask you how it comes to pass that your Dionysia and Panathenæa are year by year celebrated at the proper time, you will find the cause to be, that everything is fixed by law, and that every one knows beforehand where his place is. Accordingly, neither ought the most important of matters to be left to the chances of an arbitrary freedom from rule."

The *First Philippic* constitutes an epoch in the history of Athens. Not as if the speech had achieved a great result; but in the most important affair of the State a fixed programme had at last been put forward, and a free and open protest had been raised against the existing system of government. Demosthenes now confronted Eubulus as his declared opponent; and, although he had as yet formed no following of his own, (for from the first he desired to have on his side not a party, but the civic community,) yet his words struck fire, and the minds of the citizens were after all seized with fear, when they heard his warning cry; while you are sitting quiet, you are being surrounded on all sides, as by the huntsman who

draws his nets closer and closer round his prey! The opposite stand-points of policy had now been openly expressed; hereby the men of peace were likewise scared out of their tranquillity; they bestirred themselves once more, and desired for their part to be accomplishing something, so as to escape the blame of remaining absolutely inactive. A suitable opportunity for this purpose presented itself in Eubœa.

Pericles had made Eubœa a portion of Attica (vol. ii. p. 451). Since this relation had been severed (vol. iii. p. 483), the island had never again known peace. It was incapable of forming a compact whole, united in itself and independent. The primitive conflicting distinctions between the several cities in the island were revived (vol. i. pp. 269, 293); and to the force of these were added the influences from abroad, which increased the fermentation within. For an island, which stretches along in the vicinity of the mainland, from Thessaly to Attica, could not remain untouched by the disturbances on the mainland itself. The Athenians could not renounce Eubœa, because by means of its natural products it formed the indispensable supplement of their own country, and, if in hostile hands, offered an intolerable menace to their shores. The Thebans regarded it as a natural appendage to Bœotia; while the princes of the North, if they desired to control Central Greece, were above all obliged to seek to secure influence in Eubœa. The unhappy island was therefore coveted on all sides; it became an arena in which the political schemes of the most various states met, the party-feuds in the island being fostered by the neighboring states, in order that they might acquire influence by supporting individual party-leaders. Thus Iason of Pheræ (vol. iv. p. 468) had established the Tyrant Neogenes in Oreus, and the Spartans had expelled him, when they were masters of Bœotia.*

Importance
of the island
of Eubœa.

* Neogenes: Diod. xv. 31.

After the liberation of the Cadmea, Athens and Thebes went hand in hand; and the island for a time belonged to the Naval Confederation of which both those states were members. These relations were evidently in every direction the most favorable; and the mere thought of Eubœa ought to have convinced the Attic statesmen, how strongly the considerations of a reasonable policy made it advisable to remain on friendly and neighborly terms with Thebes. For no sooner had hereupon, after the battle of Leuctra, the two states become estranged from one another, than a hostile rivalry commenced with reference to Eubœa, the Attic and the Theban parties standing opposed to one another in its towns. The Theban proved victorious; Themison, the Tyrant of Eretria, brought about the defection of the Oropians, which the Athenians felt so keenly (vol. iv. p. 490); and the whole of Eubœa furnished its military contingent to Thebes, until by means of his successful campaign in B. C. 357 Timotheus destroyed the Theban influence (p. 113). But no secure supremacy was hereby acquired. For no reliance was to be placed upon the towns to which absolute independence had been restored; they fell anew into the hands of Tyrants, who acted in opposition to the wishes of the communities, and the conflict of parties again furnished occasion for foreign intervention. Philip began to stretch forth his hand from Thessaly (p. 81) towards the island; he sent letters to the communities there, in which he gave them to understand how absurd it was for them to seek for protection from such a State as Athens, which was incapable of defending itself; he supported Callias, the Tyrant at Chalcis, and fostered the discord prevailing in the states. This occurred about the very time when Demosthenes was delivering his Philippic oration; immediately afterwards Plutarchus, who reigned as despot at Eretria, applied for succor to Athens, because he was unable to

Application
for aid from
Plutarchus.

Ol. cvii. 2 (B.
c. 351-50).

defend himself by his own strength against the adverse party in Eretria, which was headed by Clitarchus.

Plutarchus possessed influential connexions at Athens, in particular with the house of Midias, an adherent of Eubulus. Midias was one of the wealthy men of the city, who vain-gloriously exulted in luxurious arrogance before the people (p. 124), a self-willed and overbearing kind of man, who thought that by reason of his social position everything was permitted to him. Together with him the whole party of Eubulus was in favor of the request of Plutarchus; they wished to prove, that at the right moment they too knew how to display energy; and they promised themselves a facile and fortunate result. And since undertakings directed towards the island-territory, which was at once near and indispensable, were of all the most likely to meet with approval, a great ardor for war was successfully kindled in the civic assembly.

But Demosthenes opposed the project. With daring courage he came forward quite alone against the undertaking, and thereby excited a storm of rage against himself. Invectives were hurled against the self-willed obstinacy of a man, who was incessantly urging the Athenians to action, who had only the other day been desirous of despatching their ships to distant Rhodes, and who was now opposing an enterprise, simply because it had not been originally mooted by himself. But Demosthenes was no noisy agitator, ready to welcome every clamor for war. With his fiery impatience he combined the highest prudence; nor could anything be more offensive to him, than to see the slender resources of his native city wasted upon unworthy objects. And how was it possible for him to approve of an undertaking, in which the support of a Tyrant was in question, who was in conflict with his community? The Athenians ought to take arms only for national ends, and on behalf of the freedom of Hellenes. Moreover, he perceived that the present *casus belli* had

been brought about solely by personal relations and understandings; and he could foresee that, considering the untrustworthiness of the confederates, great sacrifices would in this case lead neither to honor, nor to increase of power.

Phocion in
Eubœa.

OL. cvii. 2
(B. C. 350).

His protest remained without effect. The Athenians set out towards the close of February under Phocion, citizens and mercenaries, foot and horse. Demosthenes himself took part in the expedition. The horsemen went on in advance, and took up a position at Argura to the north of Chalcis, probably in order to ward off Macedonian aid. The remaining troops crossed to the nearest ferrying-station (Porthmus), and, the road along the coast being, as we may presume, blocked up, advanced towards the mountain-range, in order thus to reach Eretria. When they came to Tamynæ, they suddenly found themselves surrounded in a gorge by the enemy, who was better acquainted with the locality than they. It now became manifest, that the whole of Eubœa was under arms against the Athenians; the Tyrants of Chalcis, too, had leagued themselves with Clitarchus. Phocion saw himself placed in the most dangerous of situations; betrayed by his allies, he entrenched himself on a hillock, and was only with difficulty able to ward off the superior numbers of his adversaries.

Most terrible reports reached Athens, and there awakened a general readiness for all necessary efforts. Wealthy citizens presented ships-of-war to the State, all the troops still remaining immediately took their departure, in order to relieve Phocion, who was cut off from the coast as well as hard-pressed in his position; and, for the purpose of remedying the want of money, Apollodorus came forward with the patriotic motion, that the entire surplus of the year's income should be added to the war-fund.

Meanwhile Phocion succeeded in fighting his way

through the enemy in an engagement very honorable to him, and in effecting his return to Athens by the middle of the summer; but the garrison, which he had left behind in the narrowest part of the island in the fort of Zaretra, in order that he might here retain a firm footing in at least one point in Eubœa, through the treachery of Plutarchus fell as captives into the hands of the enemy. It had to be ransomed by the payment of fifty talents (12,520*l.*); the whole of Eubœa was now lost, and all the efforts which had thoroughly exhausted the public purse, had led to no result, but that of a disgraceful defeat and of the deepest discouragement,*

But this unfortunate campaign had yet other serious consequences for Athens, as well as for Demosthenes. Apollodorus, the son of the wealthy banker Paison, had indeed in other respects not contrived to conciliate much esteem at Athens. He had on a former occasion gone to Sicily as trierarch, about the time when Dionysius interfered in Hellenic affairs (vol. iv. p. 459), with the object of bringing about friendly relations between him and the Athenians (Ol. ciii. 1; B. C. 368). Since that time he had made away with his property by a wasteful life, and had acquired a bad reputation in consequence of a number of lawsuits, in which he had sought again to procure money. He was a man of a careless disposition and of an untrustworthy character, whose patriotism was of more harm than use to the State; for from motives of vanity he observed as little moderation in his pecuniary services to the State as in his private expen-

Condemnation of Apollodorus.

* With regard to the Eubœan campaign, cf. *Æschin.* iii. 86 *seq.*, who represents the transactions in a light unfavorable to Demosthenes and his friends. The newly discovered Scholia to *Æschines* show, that not Callias and Taurosthenes, but Clitarchus, introduced mercenaries from Phalæcus. Cf. Ferd. Schultz in *Neue Jahrb. für Philol.*, 1866, p. 314, who accordingly makes the emendation *παρὰ Φαλαίκων* in *Æschin.* § 85.—March-out before the 12th of Anthesterion: *Dem.* xxxix. 16.—Phocion at Tamynæ: *Plutarch, Demosth.* 12; *Æschin.* iii. 86 (*τὸ στρατόπεδον εἰς τινὰς δυσχωρίας κατακεκλειμένον*). Notwithstanding the victory, *α πόλεμος ἄδοξος καὶ δαπανηρός*: *Dem.* v. 5.

diture, and spoilt the mariners by accustoming them to over-indulgence on his ships. His motion in the Council was, however, honorable to his intelligence, as well as to his honest intentions and to his courage. His colleagues had assented to it, and had brought it before the civic assembly, by whom it had been accepted. The whole affair had been completely in accordance with rule. The motion was rendered necessary by the circumstances of the hour. Moreover, Apollodorus had proceeded as cautiously as possible, having proposed that the citizens should first vote on the question, whether the surplus should be paid into the war-fund or into the festival-fund; it was merely left to them to decide, whether they would resolve upon the former alternative in the sense of the proposer of the motion. But when hereupon during the discussions on the subject better news arrived from the seat of war, an indictment of illegality was immediately brought forward against Apollodorus by Stephanus, who by means of a variety of intrigues succeeded in carrying his condemnation on the charge.

Stephanus, as we may assume, had been urged to this step by Eubulus; and, after it had prospered so well, Eubulus himself came forward, and proposed a law, that whosoever should henceforth venture to move the application of the festival-moneys to purposes of war, should incur the penalty of death. This law was drawn up in such a form, as if Apollodorus had proposed an innovation dangerous to the State, while in point of fact he had once more asserted against a rooted abuse the principle which alone was in accordance with the law. This abuse was now established by Eubulus as the regular and lawful practice; and hereby the commonweal was impaired to an extent far surpassing the calamity which had been suffered in the field. The result of this unfortunate war was therefore not, as would have been just, to cause that party which had, in spite of the protest of prudent citizens, pro-

voked it, to forfeit some of the public confidence reposed in it; but with remarkable audacity this party contrived to convert its defeat into a triumph, to consummate its terroristic sway, to abolish the best possession which the Athenians still retained, viz. freedom of speech, and to establish the misgovernment which had hitherto prevailed more firmly than ever.*

But it was not only from this lamentable turn in public affairs that Demosthenes had to suffer; he was also drawn into the conflict in his own person. The heat of the parties had become intensified; Demosthenes was an abomination in the eyes of the faction of Eubulus; and in particular Midias had for political and for personal reasons (p. 232) made it his task to persecute him in every possible way, to inflict dishonor upon him, and to annihilate forever the authority which he enjoyed among the people. When therefore Demosthenes had voluntarily undertaken on behalf of his tribe the equipment of the course for the festival of Dionysus in the spring of the year in which the expedition to Eubœa occurred, Midias set all his influence in motion, in order to deprive him of the glory due to his patriotic liberality, and at last allowed the passion of a vulgar hatred to carry him to such a length, that on the day of the festival he publicly struck Demosthenes in the face. He succeeded in causing Demosthenes to lose the honor of the prize, but now fell into personal danger.

Demos-
thenes and
Midias.

Ol. cvij. 2-4
(B. C. 350-49).

* Apollodorus, after the death of his father, B.C. 370, trierarch on the occasion of the mission to Sicily, B.C. 368 (cf. *Note* to p. 95), and again, with much expenditure of money, on the Thracian coast, B.C. 362 (Dem. I.). Involved in numerous lawsuits (Dem. xxxvi. 63), he had wasted his patrimony (division of the inheritance, B.C. 368-7), when he threw himself into public business and as member of the Council proposed the motion. εἰτε δοκεῖ τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι εἰτε θεωρικὰ [Dem.], lix. 4. Cf. Lortzing, *de orationibus quas Demosth. pro Apollod. scripsisse fertur*, 1863. According to Hornbostel, *Ueber die von Demosth. in Sachen Apollod. verf. Gerichtsreden*, 49, Apollodorus was merely the agent of Demosthenes, which Lortzing rightly denies. It is more probable that Stephanus (Schäfer, iii.2, 180) was a tool of Eubulus.

The civic assembly, which met in the sanctuary on the day after the festival, recognized the complaint of the ill-used *choregus* as thoroughly well-founded, and pronounced a unanimous sentence of condemnation upon the unwarrantable act of his enemy.

The personal contest was continued with the utmost intensity during the Eubœan war. It was attempted in every way to frighten off Demosthenes from further pursuing the course of legal procedure ; it was endeavored to cast upon him the blame of the failure of the campaign ; it was sought to stop his charge against Midias by means of the cross-manceuvre of bringing the heaviest accusations against him ; it was tried to throw suspicion upon him as a runaway in the field ; he was accused of a share in a crime of murder, which had been committed by an acquaintance, Aristarchus. The whole body of the adherents of Eubulus combined, in order to effect his ruin. But their attacks upon the character of Demosthenes were all futile, though they were in so far successful, that the orator, who by the declaration of the citizens had received a complete satisfaction for his honor, in the end relinquished the action for assault against Midias, and consented to a compromise.*

History of
the city of
Olynthus.

Hardly had he escaped from these vexatious quarrels, when an event occurred, which called him once more to the orators' tribune, and claimed his whole attention for public affairs. It was an event which he had long had in view, which he had anxiously desired, and the occurrence of which he had in all probability hastened. For the first manifestations of a more vigorous policy on the part of Athens could not fail to attract to her the eyes of those Hellenes who were even more directly menaced by Philip ; and thus it came

* Dem. κατὰ Μειδίου περὶ τοῦ κονδύλου. Schäfer, ii. 85 seq.

to pass, that the one power capable of offering resistance, which still existed besides Athens, renounced friendly relations with Philip, and offered its alliance to the Athenians,—viz. Olynthus (p. 83).

Olynthus is one of the most remarkable cities of antiquity. Lying on the outermost border of the Hellenic world, between Macedonia and Thrace, it owed its importance precisely to this exposed situation, which brought it more into contact than all the other colonies with the realms of the North; and the extraordinary energy consistently displayed by the citizens of Olynthus, doubtless finds its first explanation in the fact, that here Hellenic intellect happily combined with the vigor of Northern populations. For founded upon Thracian soil, and originally a settlement of the Bottæans (p. 22), thereupon about the time of the Persian Wars occupied by Chalcidians, the city thenceforth had a mixed population, and nowhere was there a more favorable opportunity for the amalgamation of different nationalities than here; nowhere were Greek, half-Greek, and barbarian tribes dwelling so closely together, as in the highland district of the three Chalcidian peninsulas.

It is true, that the great advance made by the city of Olynthus had not had its origin in its own civic community; it had rather been brought about by Macedonian influence, which on this occasion for the first time asserted itself in Greek public affairs (vol. iii. p. 15). At the instigation of Perdiccas, Olynthus became the centre of the Chalcidian colonial district; and it was he who encouraged the expedition of Brasidas, from the consequences of which Athens never recovered (vol. iii. p. 179). Afterwards, however, the Olynthians showed themselves independent in every direction. They asserted their autonomy against Athens (vol. iii. p. 207); they hereupon, when the Corinthian league was formed, rose against the supremacy of the Lacedæmonians; and about the time of the Peace

of Antalcidas they effected very quietly the formation of a State of the first class, which comprehended more than thirty formerly independent towns in a common military constitution with equality of civic rights,—a Greek empire, provided with all needful resources, admirably situated for extending itself in every direction, a land and maritime power, which moreover had an excellent force of cavalry at its disposal. Whole tribes of the warlike Thracian people stood in relations of dependence towards it, and furnished their military contingents. No power could restrain the progress of the haughty republic, least of all Macedonia, which, itself weakened by internal troubles, now saw its most dangerous enemy in the State of which it had itself laid the foundations. The towns of Lower Macedonia with their population, akin by descent to the Greeks (p. 21), joined the Olynthians; Amyntas found himself in a situation of the utmost danger; and it seemed as if Olynthus had for ever taken out of the hands of the Temenidæ their mission of forming a Græco-Macedonian empire (vol. iv. p. 325). Olynthus also took thought for securing her acquisitions, and for strengthening her position as a Great Power by means of foreign connexions; and with this object sought to enter into an alliance with Athens and Thebes (Ol. xcix. 2; B. C. 383).

These schemes induced Sparta to intervene as the authority upon which devolved the execution of the Peace of Antalcidas; and after a war of several years Olynthus was cast down from the height of her power (vol. iv. p. 343). She was humbled, but not broken; and Sparta was incapable of turning to account the victory which she had obtained. Instead of this, Athens now came forward as a menacing power with her Naval Confederation. In the year 373 the Athenians sought to establish a footing on the Thraco-Macedonian coast, and to recover the cities which had defied them in the times when their power had

been at its height (vol. iv. p. 399). This Attic policy from the first met with the most vigorous resistance on the part of the Olynthians; they braced themselves for new exertions, enlarged their city and army, extended their Confederation, so that Amphipolis after admitting Chalcidian citizens furnished its contingent to their forces, and about Ol. ciii. 3 (B. C. 365) were more powerful than ever before. For this reason Perdiccas III. so vigorously supported the undertakings of Timotheus, who in 364 carried on the Chalcidian War with brilliant success, captured more than twenty places, and pressed close upon Olynthus itself (p. 104). But the city held out; with indomitable power of resistance it frustrated all lasting results on the part of the Attic arms, and the successor of Timotheus, Callisthenes, found himself in a far more arduous position. For Perdiccas now suddenly renounced the alliance of the Athenians, after they had rendered him the services which he desired; he took advantage of the fact that Olynthus had been weakened, in order to place under his protection the several towns which could no longer rely upon the protection of the city holding the primacy, and to defend them with his troops against Athens. The undertaking of Callisthenes ended with a pacification so disadvantageous in its terms, that he was sentenced to death at Athens; and all the advantages obtained by Timotheus were already about the year 362 virtually lost (p. 108).

When king Philip ascended the throne, he immediately perceived, how for him everything ^{Olynthus and King Philip.} depended upon preventing the establishment of a connexion between Olynthus and Athens; and he accordingly sought in the first instance to satisfy both cities. He withdrew the garrison from Amphipolis, and made the Athenians believe, that this already practically amounted to a surrender of the city to them; while in the same way he assumed towards the Olynthians the attitude of a friend and ally. They began indeed to feel appre-

hensions, when the king made war upon Amphipolis (p. 58); and already on this occasion they sent envoys to Athens; but Philip contrived to frustrate the object of the embassy, and to delude the Olynthians by the most gracious treatment. In the war, which after the fall of Amphipolis broke out between himself and Athens, he induced them to take his side, and gave up to them Anthemus and Potidæa (p. 82); they felt happier and more secure than ever before, and with blind confidence abandoned themselves to the idea, that it was the serious intention of the king to remain content with the districts of territory gained by him, and to leave their city with its confederated towns in undisturbed continuance as an independent State on the borders of his empire. But when hereupon Philip in the rear of Olynthus extended his dominion toward Thrace, when he had subjected Thessaly, and overcome the Phocians, and had made it clear, even to the dullest eye, how he was wont to treat his friends and allies,—the Olynthians, too, could no longer deceive themselves as to their situation. They perceived with terror their awful isolation, which they had themselves been guilty of bringing about by their hostility against Athens; they became aware, that the continuance of their independence was nothing better than a term of grace conceded by Philip, and measured out according as it suited his interests. Though therefore the party among them, which in every way worked for the purposes of the king, was both powerful and active, yet the ancient spirit of liberty once more gained the upper hand in the civic community. The Olynthians resolved to prepare for a last struggle on behalf of their independence, and for this purpose it was impossible to find any better ally than Athens, who, by the occupation of Thermopylæ (p. 80), had shown, that she had not yet forgotten her ancient mission of standing forth as the champion of Hellenic independence.*

* Concerning the history of the city of Olynthus; Voemel, *de Olynthi situ*,

The Olynthians proceeded cautiously. In the first instance they sent envoys to Athens, in order to put an end to the state of war which they had four years previously re-opened, conjointly with Philip, against Athens (Ol. cvii. 1; B. c. 352). This was not yet equivalent to a rupture of their peaceable relations with him; for it is not to be assumed that the Olynthians had renounced the right to pass such resolutions. The king indeed regarded this step already as a revolt. He, however, abstained from immediate intervention; and left it to his partisans to counteract the agitation. They were influential enough, even now, to carry the banishment of certain spokesmen of the patriot party, notably of Apollonides.*

Olynthian
embassies
to Athens.

(Ol. cvii. 1-3
(B. c. 352-50).

On the occasion of the first embassy a more intimate connexion, for which some inclination was felt at Athens, was as yet cautiously declined; but soon it was felt that practically a rupture with the king had already taken place, although he still refrained from giving utterance to his anger, and only on the occasion of his Thracian campaigns made a threatening appearance on the frontiers of the territory of the Olynthian Confederation. He even sought to persuade the deputies of the city, that there was no cause for fear. But the citizens mistrusted him, and, when he was engaged in Illyria and Epirus, despatched a second embassy to Athens and requested auxiliary troops for the protection of their territory.

The danger now grew; and the general feeling of anxious expectation was intensified by a special occurrence. A step-brother of the king had taken refuge at Olynthus; the king demanded his surrender, which the city refused.

&c. 1829; Abel, *Makedonien*; Böhneke, *Forschungen, et al.* Amphipolis Chalcidian: Aristot. *Polit.* 205, 10. Callisthenes: *Æschin.* ii. 39. Amphipolis occupied by Perdiccas to defend it against Athens, and subsequently evacuated by Philip, according to the conjecture of Grote, vol. x. p. 510, and vol. xi. p. 100.

* Apollonides: Dem. ix. 56.

For since the Olynthians had once resolved upon the contest, they thought it their duty not to give way in this point, as to which their rights were beyond all doubt. For how could a community with a sense of honor voluntarily renounce the sacred right of protecting those who were enjoying its hospitality? Moreover, the person of the royal prince may have been of some importance; indeed, the passionate pursuit of him by Philip leads us to conclude, that the prince had adherents in Macedonia. This made the outbreak of war inevitable. The Macedonians advanced upon the recalcitrant city, and the third embassy hastened to Athens, in order without delay to arrive at an understanding with regard to a joint conduct of the war.*

State of
public feel-
ing at Athens.

The situation of affairs resembled that of the time when Amphipolis sued for succor against Philip (p. 57). Both Olynthus and Amphipolis were confederates who had fallen away from Athens; both the one and the other had inflicted the greatest damage upon her; both were brought back to her by nothing but their own distress. But in the one case it had still been possible for the Athenians to deceive themselves as to the real intentions of Philip; now, these were palpable; nor could any one who was willing to use his eyes fail to perceive that it was impossible, without Athens being herself endangered, to allow Olynthus, the last outwork of the Attic dominion capable of offering resistance, to fall.

The Olyn-
thian Ora-
tions of De-
mosthenes.
Ol. cvii. 4 (B.
p. 349).

Accordingly at Athens there was by no means any desire from petty motives of selfishness to punish the Olynthians for the wrong formerly committed by them, as had been done

* King Amyntas had three sons by Gygea, viz., Archelaus, Arrhidæus, Menelaus; Justin, vii. 4. Arrhidæus was at that time in Olynthus. Menelaus seems not to have gone thither till a later date, when the city, supported by Athens, became the head-quarters of the resistance against Philip. Schäfer, ii. 116, 131. Both were executed; Justin, vii. 3.—The embassies: Philochor. *Fragm.* 132; *Fragm. Hist. Gr.* i. 405. Their intercourse with Demosthenes: Böhneke, *Forschungen*, i. 161.

in the case of Amphipolis; but public opinion was notwithstanding lukewarm; nor was there any one among the orators who treated the affair with the necessary seriousness, except Demosthenes. His previous orations of State had already found an echo in the Chalcidian towns; to him the envoys had applied; and it was now his task, as he had formerly encouraged the citizens to carry on the petty warfare which they had commenced of their own accord, so at the present moment to kindle in them a readiness for the greater contest,—for a contest which they could not avoid without hazarding their honor and independence. There was no necessity for him to speak against Philip and for Olynthus in general; but it behooved him to commend to the profoundest consideration of the citizens the whole mighty importance of the moment, and the duties which it imposed upon them. His

The First.

Olynthiac Orations breathe the same spirit and are based upon the same principles as his previous public speeches; but the high significance of the decision which had now to be formed, gave to them a yet loftier afflatus, yet more of impressiveness and assurance. For now, he reflects with joyous confidence, every pretext has been taken away from the Athenians for neglecting their duty. Amphipolis they have allowed to fall, and Pydna, and Methone; Potidæa and Pagasæ they have allowed to pass into the hands of the foe; Olynthus, and Olynthus alone, is left. And this city, which during eighty years has been hostile to Athens, which holds the primacy over thirty-two towns, now comes of its own accord to seek our protection. This is an event which is offered like a boon of good fortune of the rarest kind by the hands of the deity. For it is impossible that the inevitable contest should be opened at any more suitable season. So long as Olynthus remains standing, the choice is left to the Athenians, whether this contest is to be fought out on the frontiers of Macedonia, or whether Philip is to be allowed

to approach the walls of the city. Upon the Athenians it now depends, whether a turning-point shall occur in their destinies. The population of Thessaly is in full ferment; it is wroth with the king, who retains for himself the Pagasæan harbor-dues, and who is erecting fortifications in Magnesia. Neither is his dominion by any means well assured in the Northern mountain-land. Only let an armed force show itself in the vicinity of Macedonia, and the Pæonians, lovers of liberty, as well as the Illyrians, will rise anew. An embassy must therefore be despatched to Olynthus, to announce the approach of succor, and to encourage its citizens. Next, a two-fold force must be sent out, the one to protect the menaced city, the other to attack the territory of the king, and to prevent him from massing all his resources against Olynthus. But, in her present circumstances, our city cannot satisfy such demands. She is in no want of resources, but she is tied down in the employment of them. She must therefore free herself from the fetters which she has imposed upon herself, by devoting the surplus of her income to the festivals. Either this surplus must be restored to the war-fund, in which case the means for war will have been secured, or we must all contribute according to our property. Either the one, or the other,—there is no third way possible, for money must be obtained, the war is necessary, *if Athens is not willing to abandon herself.*

The Second. A knowledge of the circumstances of the times existed; but the fear of the omnipotent king, which became intensified as the subject of the war was more closely considered, had taken possession of the minds of the citizens, and crippled their good intentions. Accordingly, Demosthenes about the same time made an address to the people, the essential object of which was to moderate the exaggerated terror inspired by Philip. "The king," he says, "is by no means the invincible man, whom you picture to yourselves. True power must rest

on other foundations. He is nothing but an ambitious lover of self, who allows no one to share the fruits of victory with him; for which reason neither the people, to which his wars bring nothing but suffering, nor the kernel of the nobility, feel any attachment towards him. For he suffers no man of independence near his person. The best officers he removes to a distance; his court is a meeting-place of adventurers and drunkards; his allies are only lying in wait for a discomfiture, in order to fall away from him. His whole power, though outwardly splendid, is rotten in itself; and this will become clearly manifest, so soon as he is involved in serious, *i. e.* domestic wars, just as, when a disease seizes upon the human body, the defects and hurts hitherto concealed in it come to light. Philip's good-fortune rests upon no secure foundations, because it is not based upon justice; but it is not on that account the creature of chance; for it has been brought about by means of his incredible activity and of absolute inaction on our side. If, therefore, it was the necessary consequence of our dilatoriness that one possession after the other was lost, on the other hand, if we begin to do our duty, the contrary result will ensue, and the gods will much prefer to be on our side than on his."

The Third Oration seems to belong to a The Third.
somewhat later stage of these transactions.

In it the Olynthians are already spoken of as allies, and it is assumed that all are at one as to the necessity of action. Indeed, the want of courage among the popular orators has already changed into the direct contrary; they talk of the chastisement of the king, and dangle victorious successes before the eyes of the citizens, without explaining to them the means and methods which are requisite, if only for escaping defeat. Even to achieve this result, it is necessary to break utterly with the existing system of government. "For in these days," Demosthenes declares, "things have come to such a pass, that one may

not even tell his fellow-citizens the truth, without uselessly risking his life. This must be changed. Therefore, summon a legislative commission, not however with the object of giving, but with that of abolishing, laws, in particular the law with regard to the war-moneys, which are at present distributed among those citizens who do not march out to the war. But demand the abolition of this law from the same persons who have passed it. For it is unfair, that they should gain your affection by pernicious laws, while others are to take upon themselves the invidious labor of removing the bad laws in opposition to your inclinations. It is anything but a pleasant task to oppose oneself to those who are mighty in the city, and at the same time to your own wishes; but I deem it the duty of an honest citizen, to esteem the welfare of the city more highly than the applause of the audience. Such was likewise the custom of the men who addressed your ancestors—of an Aristides, a Nicias, a Pericles. In our days all this has changed. Now you have orators, who go about among you and inquire: What do you wish? Wherewith can we serve you? What motion would you like us to make? The result is, that with you everything is in a disgraceful condition, while those ancient orators made the city great and glorious. Your foreign power you have forfeited; and at home in the city you are the servants of those who are filling their pockets at your expense. From them you take the bait of the distribution of moneys for the festivals, which they dangle before you, so that you are altogether unable to perceive your own shame; indeed, you actually feel under an obligation of deep gratitude to those persons who provide for your feasting, although what they do is done out of your own resources, and tends to your ruin. Even now it is not too late. Renounce the foolish fancy, that it is possible to reconcile irreconcilables or, in other words, to waste all the existing pecuniary resources in unnecessary expenditure, and yet after that

to possess the means for necessary purposes. You must clearly realize the actual state of things; you must arrive at a decision, which you cannot avoid. If you now take courage, so as to act in a way which becomes your city, to perform military service, and to stake the surplus moneys, which are now distributed and are of no real use to any one, upon the war, then, Athenians, it may perchance still be given to you to attain to a great and glorious possession, to the rise of your native city."

Thus Demosthenes with unsparing earnestness lays bare the rotten places in the life of the community, without at the same time raising his demands to an excessive pitch; on the contrary, it is with a sagacious moderation that he opposes himself to the prevailing abuses. For he has no intention whatever of denying the claims of the citizens upon the funds of the city; he merely asks for certain services in return on the part of each citizen, and desires that a difference should be made between times of war and times of peace. In periods of calm, he opines, let every man receive his share at home; but when the times are such as the present, the citizen who is capable of bearing arms ought, in return for what he receives from the State, also to come forward in his own person for its protection; and as for those who have passed the age of service, let them arrange and superintend what has to be done, and receive their share for this kind of public labor. In other words, it is merely necessary that order and equitable proportion should take the place now usurped by arbitrary choice and chance. According as the services are in succession undertaken, so the money ought to be distributed according to the measure of each. For the money is due to the active, and not to the idle, who lounge about at home and babble to one another concerning the military exploits of the mercenaries.

The three *Olynthiac Orations* attest Demosthenes' con-

The Olynthian War.

Ol. cvii. 4
(B. C. 349-8).

ception of the situation, and the use made of it by him, in order to raise his native city from its humiliation. They form only a small portion of his activity; he labored indefatigably to influence both young and old, and for the first time had the satisfaction of exercising an effect, which determined the policy of the Athenians. Olynthus was admitted into the Attic Confederacy on very considerate conditions; and thirty vessels, which already formed a squadron under Chares, together with eight newly manned, took their departure for the Chalcidian peninsula, where the war was already in full progress (Ol. cvii. 4; B. C. 349-8).

Its outbreak was in several respects very unwelcome to Philip. Hitherto he had always been accustomed to let the impulse to everything which occurred proceed from himself; now, he found himself obliged to relinquish other schemes, in order to confront a sudden resistance. He had expected that the Chalcidian towns would willingly submit to the position of Macedonian vassal-states, and would gradually pass among his dominions. The rising on the part of Olynthus was therefore a very unwelcome sign to him of the spirit of independence, which was still alive in the Greek communities, and which was powerful enough to overcome the ill-will of the Olynthians towards Athens, and to unite those who had long been mutual enemies against himself. Olynthus was still a dangerous foe, a town of 10,000 citizens, lying in a strong position and provided with a good military organization; its proximity to his kingdom enabled it to be in readiness to seize any favorable opportunity; and, if the territory of its Confederation with its numerous harbors became the regular station of an Attic naval force, this would be placed in possession of all the advantages which hitherto the king had had in his favor as against the Athenians; and every

success obtained by them might occasion risings in the newly conquered portions of his dominions.*

But the Athenians even in the critical moment did everything by halves, so that such sacrifices as they made were likewise uselessly wasted. No citizens had sailed out under Chares; a property-tax had been proposed, but not carried out; the surplus moneys were expended upon the festivals just as before, as if absolute peace had reigned; and the government was, in spite of all the assaults of Demosthenes, strong enough to prevent, as unnecessary innovations, the financial reforms demanded by the war. Even now the civic community was not united, but divided into parties. Each party had its spokesman, by whom it was led, its general, whom it favored, and a clamorous following, which thoughtlessly gave its assent. One party was for Chares, the other for Charidemus. Against the serried ranks of these parties a solitary orator was unable to effect anything; and the misfortune of the city lay in this, that when order ought to have reigned, arbitrary decisions prevailed, and where freedom ought to have obtained, there force and dependence held sway.

The Olynthians sent a second embassy; whereupon a

Three
auxiliary
expeditions.
Ol. cvii. 4.
(B. C. 349-8).

* As to the dates and sequence of the *Olynthiac Orations*: the First (according to Dionysius, the Third) mentions the alliance in process of formation between Olynthus and Athens: the Second (the First according to Dionys.) especially insists upon the ethical points of view, which would be unsuitable, were the action to be supposed already set afloat; and in truth in the Third (the Second according to Dionys.) we have the earliest endeavor to determine the Athenians to action. In all three there is no hint of any succor as having been actually furnished. Cf. Rehdantz, *Demosth. ausgew. Reden*, 1865, p. 29.—Admission of Olynthus into the Confederation: Boeckh, *Publ. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. i., p. 117, Note [Eng. Tr.]; Böhneke, *Forschungen*, 161.—The three expeditions of succor: Philochorus ap. Dionys. ad Amm. i. 9, 734; Schäfer, ii. 151, where, according to the supplementation of the *Fragment* suggested by von Herwarden (*Dionys. Epist. Crit.*, 1861, p. 10), the reading now stands: *τρίηρης δὲ τριάκοντα τὰς μετὰ Χάρητος καὶ ὡς συνεπλήρωσαν ὀκτώ* (the 30 were accordingly a squadron already assembled, the 8 a subsequent addition). Between the words *συμμαχίαν ἐποίησαντο* and *καὶ βοήθειαν ἔπεμψαν* there is in the *Ambrosianus* a lacuna of eighteen letters.

second body of auxiliaries was despatched, this time under Charidemus, who from the Hellespont gave aid to the hard-pressed city with 4,000 light-armed troops and 150 horsemen ; joint raids were made upon the royal territory, and prisoners were brought in, among them some Macedonians of high rank.

But these petty advantages soon disappeared, when king Philip, having returned from Thessaly, opened a second campaign, and now showed himself thoroughly in earnest. He rapidly took one federal town after the other. The majority surrendered on his approach ; the gates of others were opened by treason. The Olynthians, routed in two set battles, attempted the course of negotiation, but were harshly rejected ; for, they were now told, the alternatives were, that they must evacuate Olynthus, or king Philip Macedonia. They had accordingly to arm for the final struggle. Their walls were still intact, they still retained freedom of movement towards the side of the sea, and looked out with anxious expectation for the Attic ships. For they had sent to Athens for a third time ; and on this occasion the Athenians had actually resolved upon making a levy among the citizens. For this had been expressly requested by the Olynthians in consequence of their experiences with regard to the mercenaries of Charidemus. But of 4,000 hoplites only half assembled under Chares ; and even these came too late. The Athenians had deceived themselves as to the power of resistance in the Chalcidians ; their numerous towns were severally hard to defend, their civic communities with their many non-Greek elements were untrustworthy, and were moreover rendered effete by luxury and Thracian love of drink. Again, more protracted troubles in Thessaly had been reckoned upon. Finally it was the north-wind, the officious ally of king Philip, which about the middle of the summer kept the approaching vessels at a distance from the coasts. Before they arrived, Olynthus fell by

treason. The two cavalry commanders, Lathenes and Euthyrates, having been gained over by Macedonian gold, contrived so to arrange matters, that on the occasion of a sally on the part of the besieged a considerable division of the cavalry was cut off by the Macedonians, to whom at the same time an entrance was opened into the city.

Fall of
Olynthus.

Ol. cviii. 1 (B.
c. 348).

Philip in the fullest sense carried out his threat. A judgment of unexampled severity was to quench every remnant of the Hellenic spirit of liberty; the flames of the burning city, and of the towns of its Confederation, were to shine across to all the shores of the Archipelago as a terrible sign of warning. A considerable part of the Greek nation was annihilated together with its habitations; numberless citizens, who had hitherto led a prosperous life, became fugitive mendicants. And indeed the lot of those who saved life and liberty was happy in comparison with the fate of those who, like the majority of the Olynthians, fell into the hands of the conqueror and were sold into slavery, while their possessions were burnt to ashes or flung as booty to the mercenaries. The haughty city of Olynthus vanished from the face of the earth, and together with it thirty-two towns inhabited by Greeks and flourishing as commercial communities. The mines continued to be worked for the royal treasury; with this exception the whole of Chalcidice became a desert; and the seal was set upon the shame of the overthrow by the fact that Hellenes, such as *e. g.* Anaxandrides (p. 199) and Satyrus (p. 195), condescended to glorify by their arts the festival of victory held by the king at Dium; nor could anything more clearly attest in his eyes the decay of the nation, than to find the Greeks willing to turn to account the ruin of the Chalcidian towns, inasmuch as they were not ashamed to accept gifts of landed property and of articles of value, Greeks being actually seen returning from the scene of the calamity accompanied by

women and children in fetters, whom they owed to the grace of the conqueror.

Reception
of the Olyn-
thians at
Athens.

Ol. cviii. 1 (B.
c. 348).

It is true, that such a spectacle roused indignation in all more generous minds; and, after the first paralyzing impression of terror had passed away, sympathy and readiness to help were shown in many places, and most of all in that city which was most nearly interested, and which after a long-enduring quarrel had in the last hour allied itself with the Olynthians, who since the advance of the Macedonian power ought to have recognized its one support in Athens. The overthrow of Olynthus was a terrible judgment upon the jealousy between Hellenic cities. But Athens too could not fail to be now seized by a similar feeling of shame to that which had followed upon the fall of Miletus and upon that of Platæe, who had likewise been so bitterly deceived in the hopes they had set upon her. On the present occasion there again remained nothing for the Athenians but to mitigate the distress of individuals to the utmost of their power. The fugitives were, like the Platæans, admitted as citizens under the protection of the city; the courts condemned those citizens who ill-treated captive Olynthian women; and the curse of the community was pronounced upon the two men who had betrayed Olynthus.*

Turn in the
policy of
Eubulus.

The fall of Olynthus signified a fresh defeat for Athens; and it might be supposed, that it would have at the same time inflicted a defeat upon the national party, who had urged on the war, and that their opponents would have held sway more absolutely than before in the city. The citizens had been deeply

* Charidemus (second expedition): Philochorus; Theopomp. *ap.* Athen. 436 (Capture of Derdas, who was probably a brother-in-law of Philip: Böhncke, *u. s.* 674). Chares (third expedition, first levy of citizens): Schäfer, ii. 133, 141. Fall of Olynthus: Diod. xvi. 53. Olympic festival: Dem. xix. 192. Psephism against the traitors, § 267.

stirred by these great events ; and during their course Demosthenes had acquired an entirely new position. He was not made responsible for the useless sacrifices and exertions ; it was felt that their failure had been nothing but a justification of his views : and the penetrating effect of his words is best shown from the fact, that the government party, which he had so uncompromisingly attacked, now saw occasion to approach its policy to that of Demosthenes.

Eubulus had indeed at all times wished to see the honor and property of the State safe ; he had, moreover, invariably expended part of the surplus upon the navy and the harbors-of-war ; he was no adherent of Philip's ; but he believed it necessary for the Athenians to confine themselves to defending their own, instead of irritating the king and advancing independently. But now he took courage for conducting the affairs of the State in a more manly spirit. As if his eyes had been suddenly opened, he now perceived the threatening cloud, to which Demosthenes had been so long pointing, and now for his part too recognized the necessity incumbent upon the State of abandoning its attitude of expectant inaction, securing allies to its side, and at the head of states holding the same views as itself confronting the enemy of the fatherland. By reason of the extreme flabbiness and want of fixity which characterized his political views, he had little difficulty in making this change of movement ; moreover, he found among his adherents men enough, who readily exerted themselves in order to use this occasion for putting down him who had hitherto been the spokesman of the national policy. In particular he was assisted by a man who, while more able than any of his contemporaries to meet Demosthenes on equal terms as an orator, was decidedly his superior in many oratorical gifts which exercised a great effect upon the people, especially in the self-ingratiating charm of personal appearance and in euphony of speech. This was *Æschines*, the son of *Atrometus*.

Æschines
the orator.

He was descended from an ancient civic family, but one which had lost its position during the Peloponnesian War, had therefore taken to migratory courses, and had fallen into all kinds of adventurous industries. His father had for a time moved about as a mercenary in foreign service, and had then set up a primary school at Athens; his mother is said to have filled the place of priestess in the foreign Mysterious cults, which at that time were very much in fashion (vol. iv. p. 82), and to have made commercial profit out of the superstition of the multitude. This restless industrial activity had likewise descended to their sons, all three of whom by means of flexibility of manner and a variety of talents contrived to work their way up to considerable connexions and influential positions. This was the direct contrary of the position in life of Demosthenes, who opposes himself to them with all the pride of the citizen-class established in its paternal inheritance, regarding as dishonorable not so much particular professions followed by the father and the brothers of Æschines, as rather the restless transition from this to that, the incessant change, the want of dignity, the dependence on party-leaders, and above all the concentrated attention to making a way in the world, which determined their entire course of action. Most variegated of all was the life of Æschines himself. Born about Ol. xc. 2; B. c. 390, he first began in his father's school-room to deserve well of his kind by grinding ink and scrubbing benches, then he served in the field, at Mantinea and in Eubœa, whence he was permitted to bring home the despatch announcing the victory of Phocion (p. 278); next, he did duty as scribe to all manner of subordinate public officers, wherein he acquired a routine experience as a "porer over records," and rose from the position of copying-clerk to the work of compiling state-papers. But he felt within him a soul for higher things, and a need for a wider recognition. He was a *bel-esprit*,

and obeyed the impulse which called him to the stage. He let himself out to wandering protagonists or theatrical managers (p. 194), until he threw himself once more into public affairs, and now from his former subordinate positions rapidly rose to higher places. He was several times chosen writer to the State,—and this through the influence of the omnipotent party-chiefs, of whom he became an officious follower, first of Aristophon and then of Eubulus. In these days, when all power lay in the hands of well-organized party-associations (pp. 126, 295), it was possible by means of skilful ways and servile officiousness to secure the favor of those in power, and, even without being a person of mark, to be brilliantly successful in candidatures for the offices of honor in the republic. Thus the brothers of ^{Æschines} ~~and Eubulus.~~ became generals and envoys, and he became himself the confidential friend of Eubulus, and an orator and leader of public affairs. As an orator too he was the direct reverse of Demosthenes; for his eloquence was not based upon serious studies, but upon happy presence of mind and natural versatility, which were supported by imaginative power, vivacity of sentiment, a fine intelligence and extensive practice in delivery. Æschines always remained an actor, who regarded the cause which he advocated as a part in a play, in which it behooved him to display his skill, and to keep his own interests in view.

Thus he was now all the more ready to attach himself to the policy of Eubulus, inasmuch as it offered him the most welcome opportunity for brilliant orations. He too might now deliver Philippics, and speak with great pathos of the mission which had been bequeathed to the city of Athens by her ancestors. As at the time of the Persian Wars, so Athens must now also gather and array the resources of the population for the struggle imminent on behalf of her hearths and her freedom. In Peloponnesus, the tendency of public opinion was favorable; here a

body of adherents ought to be formed, a strong patriot party, before Philip should have succeeded in bringing over the lesser states to his side. He spoke as a prophet speaks, and bore himself precisely as if the evil foe of the fatherland were a discovery of his own. The confederates ought to be summoned to a congress, and thus the city of Athens ought to be made once more, as in the days of old, the centre of free and freedom-loving Greece.

This congress-policy was at bottom nothing but a feebler version of the policy of Demosthenes. The advocates of the former desired to turn to account for themselves the high spirit which he had awakened; they desired to appropriate his patriotic points of view, without their inconvenient consequences; unwilling at once to renounce the easy comfort of the system of Eubulus, they intended to seek to renew the glory of the past by means of speeches and negotiations, instead of by personal service and pecuniary sacrifices. The citizens of course gladly gave themselves up to this delusion; and great expectations followed the envoys who were despatched to the widest variety of regions in Hellas, as in the times of Themistocles (vol. ii. p. 301). Æschines repaired to Megalopolis, where he made indignant speeches against all the traitors who took the side of the barbarian king; indeed, the very communities which at the critical moment

Æschines
in Peloponnesus.

Ol. cviii. 1
(B. C. 348).

had been left in the lurch (p. 261), were called upon to confide in Athens and to ally themselves with her, as the Great Power whose mission it was to direct the affairs of the nation. At Athens itself, in consequence of the terror immediately inspired by the fall of Olynthus, serious armaments were entered upon. The city seemed now to be exposed without defence to the vengeance of the king; the walls were repaired; the Chersonnesus was made secure; the watch over the sea was intensified.*

* Concerning Æschines: Schäfer, i. 191. The year of his birth according

This warlike state of feeling was, however, neither universal nor thoroughly effective. On the contrary, already during the conflict on account of Olynthus the first manifestations of a longing for peace, which longing had been momentarily repressed, but had already grown to a considerable strength, had revealed themselves; and a quite peculiar occasion had allowed this tendency to find open expression. A citizen of Athens, Phrynon by name, had during the season of the Olympic festival (Ol. cviii. i.; B. C. 348), been captured by Macedonian privateers, and had then been liberated for a ransom.

Now, Phrynon considered, that, because his capture was a violation of the Sacred Peace, he could claim a repayment of the ransom; and he supplicated the civic assembly to acknowledge his claim and to take up his case. Matters of personal interest of this kind were habitually treated with special favor at Athens; and thus this affair too was in the midst of the war deemed of sufficient importance to cause the despatch of an envoy concerning it into the Macedonian camp.

The
case of
Phrynon.

To the king this mission was extremely welcome. It suited his wishes to find himself regarded as a prince with whom business was carried on according to Hellenic federal law; no equally admirable opportunity could have been furnished him, for playing a magnanimous part in a matter which was without the slightest importance to him, and for thus testifying his respect for the national ordinances; lastly, he was gratified to observe what petty affairs occupied the Athenians, at a time when they appeared to be confronting him in a more threatening attitude than ever before. And the king was at all times specially skilful in taking advantage of insignificant occurrences of this description, so as to confer obligations upon men of note, and

Phrynon
and
Ctesiphon
in Philip's
camp.

in the midst of his camp to begin to weave the unobserved threads, which for his ulterior purposes he desired to hold in his hands.

As he had intended, Phrynon and Ctesiphon, the envoy, returned in a highly contented frame of mind from his headquarters, and reported to the civic assembly the extreme courtesy with which they had been treated by the king. He was, they stated, anything but the raging fiend and barbarian, as which he was usually depicted on the orators' tribune, but on the contrary, obliging, affable, and devoted to Hellenic manners. The impression received by them communicated itself to the civic assembly; and such was the mood produced, that Philocrates, one of those who had earliest entered into relations with the Macedonian court, was able immediately to move that, in case the king entertained an intention of concluding peace, he should be permitted to send a herald. This contravened a previous proposal which, in accordance with a precedent of earlier times (vol. ii. p. 334), had made penal any negotiation with the enemy of the land. The motion was passed; and, although it remained for the present without results, yet the path had been opened, and Philip had through his partisans established a firm footing at Athens.

If, then, already during the war a tendency towards peace made a way for itself, how much more was this the case after the war was over! The king now held all the coasts and port-towns of Thrace completely in his hands; his armies marched unopposed from the southern border of Thessaly up to the Hellespont and the Bosphorus. Whatsoever, therefore, still remained to the Athenians of possessions beyond the sea, was now in immediate peril; and if the war were now to continue, what means existed for rendering them secure, after the one ally had fallen? With reference to Amphipolis also, it will be remembered, the sole hope of the Athenians was based on the attempt to give validity

Wishes
for peace on
either side.

to their claims by means of a peaceable understanding with Philip. The king himself, it was well known, had no interest in seeing the war continue; the coasts of his empire suffered heavily from it, the mercantile navy could not develop itself, nor general prosperity prevail. By land Philip felt himself not less impeded by Athens; for he required to seek to obtain, by means of a pacification, freedom of action for his operations in Central Greece. Lastly, he was much interested in establishing relations of alliance and friendship with the Athenians, because their course of conduct determined that of the other Hellenes, who still shrank from any overtures on his part. Under these circumstances the conclusion of a peace on fair terms might be regarded as possible; and even the most zealous patriots seriously contemplated such a transaction.

Thus strangely, then, had the relations between the several parties shifted. While Eubulus and Æschines eagerly preached the prosecution of the war, Demosthenes supported the motion of Philocrates, and declared it to be folly to bind oneself down to perpetual hostilities. He was at this time again the one man who pursued a fixed policy. He perceived how, under present circumstances, Athens could only lose by continuing the war, and that in her present exhaustion she urgently needed a period of a cessation of arms, in order to gather fresh strength and to form a league of allies, which could not be brought together during the war.

Those who were Macedonian at heart encouraged the inclination for peace, and were most vigorously supported by the king, when a new opportunity was afforded him for conferring a favor. The question was as to the fate of the Athenians who had been taken prisoners in Olynthus. Aristodemus, the actor, was sent to Macedonia on business; and since he as well as the Athenians who had been at once liberated unanimously testified to an urgent wish on the part of the king, to convert his hostile relations with

Athens into peace and an alliance, Philocrates took the second step in his well-considered course of action, and proposed the despatch of an embassy, which should call upon the king to send plenipotentiaries to Athens, in order to negotiate with the city. It was on this occasion, then, that for the first time men of the most diverse party-stand-points combined; for Eubulus, too, had again receded from his war-policy, which had not been so very seriously intended, and came forward in support of Philocrates. Amidst universal assent and joyous expectations an embassy was named in February 346, consisting of ten men, among them Philocrates as proposer of the motion, Aristodemus, Phrynon, Æschines, to whom, on the suggestion of Philocrates, was added Demosthenes. The eleventh was a representative of the Attic Federal Council, Aglaocreon of Tenedos; for it seemed to be in accordance with the dignity of the city, as well as with the interests of the confederates, that Athens should not treat as a single city, but as that holding the primacy among her confederates.

Embassy
to Pella.
Ol. cviii. 2
(B. C. 346).

Instructions in a definite form could not be given to the envoys on their mission; for they were merely to find out the intentions of the king. But all sincere statesmen at Athens were at one on this point: that there could be no thought of any honest peace, unless the king, in accordance with his promise, were to surrender Amphipolis, and to give pledges for the *status quo* of territorial possessions, particularly in the Chersonnesus.

For king Philip it was a triumph, compensating for many campaigns, when he gave audience at Pella to the Attic embassy, the mere composition of which clearly proved to him that the desire for peace united all parties, and brought to his court his most decided adversaries. He now had them before him in a sphere of action where he was to a far higher degree their superior than even in land or maritime war.

He listened benevolently to the orations of the envoys, one after the other. The fullest and best composed was that of *Æschines*, who spoke before Demosthenes, the youngest and the last of the envoys; Demosthenes is said to have found himself faltering, and in the end, notwithstanding the encouragements of the king, to have lapsed into silence—so *Æschines* relates, doubtless exaggerating. But it may well be believed, considering the awkwardness which clung to him by nature, that Demosthenes felt confused among surroundings which were utterly strange to him. His passionate character made him ill-suited for the artistic orations of diplomacy; and, moreover, he could not but feel specially ill at ease in the presence of a prince whom he had so violently attacked. Finally, if *Æschines*, in order to put himself forward at the expense of others, discussed the subjects which according to a previous agreement he was to have left to the speaker succeeding him, it is not hard to understand that in this audience Demosthenes found no opportunity for giving proofs of his art as an orator.

Æschines
and *Demosthenes* at
Pella.

But in the ears of the king, the phrases of *Æschines* must have likewise had a very ridiculous sound, when that orator went back to the times of Theseus in order to demonstrate the claims of Athens upon Amphipolis, as if the question were one concerning a disputed inheritance, which admitted of being settled by the evidence of family papers. But Philip, instead of allowing his real sentiments to become apparent, most graciously responded to the speeches which he had heard, and was gratified by the surprising impression palpably made upon all by the skilfulness of his answer. With regard to the point at issue, he declared gently, but firmly: that in the interests of his kingdom he could not give up such places as Amphipolis and Potidæa; the *status quo* of the possessions held on either side he was gladly ready to acknowledge as the basis of a peace; and, in conclusion, he held out to the Athe-

nians the prospect of the greatest advantages from the actual conclusion of an alliance.

Those who heard the report of the envoys on their return home, could not long fail to perceive how admirably Philip had turned the entire mission to account for his own interests. Philocrates and Æschines had become decided partisans of the king. They represented everything in the most satisfactory light, and never wearied of extolling their reception at court. The terrible enemy of the nation had become an unselfish friend and benefactor, the barbarian a perfect Hellene. Demosthenes alone maintained a dignified bearing. To him it was a necessity of life to carry on everything in which he engaged with full seriousness; and for this reason he had, from the moment when—according to his most thorough conviction—he was bound to advise against the continuance of a hopeless war, worked with the most single-minded zeal for the consummation of the peace. In his view, everything depended upon that peace being brought about soon, in order that by its settled conclusion the hands of the king might likewise be bound, and he deprived of his opportunities for further intervention. For this reason he had to the utmost of his power hastened the despatch of the embassy; for the same reason he now met with severe remonstrance the futile talk about the personal bearing of Philip. He demanded that the question at issue should alone be kept in view, and did what he could to have the necessary preparations made for the reception of the envoys who had been announced, and to have the business speedily settled.*

It was the festival of the Dionysia, when the envoys arrived. In order to show himself polite towards the Athenians, Philip had selected personages of the highest

* Phrynon: Æschin. ii. 12. Philocrates: § 18. Audience at Pella: § 22 *seq.*

rank—Eurylochus, and with him the king's two most intimate associates, of best-proved experience in the field and at the council-board, Antipater and Parmenio.* Demosthenes provided for their reception; as to outward forms nothing was to be neglected, in order worthily to return the hospitality shown to the Athenians. Thereupon ensued the decisive discussions in the civic assembly, on the 18th and 19th of Elaphebolion (April the 15th and 16th). They were livelier than the Macedonians might have expected after their first impression as to the state of opinion at Athens; the royal message exercised no satisfactory effect. And how could it have been otherwise?

Debates in the civic assembly concerning the Peace:

Ol. cviii. 2 (B. C. 316).

15th April.

True, the message sounded very gracious. The potent king solemnly declared his wish to conclude a peace with Athens, in which both states with their allies on either side should guarantee to one another the *status quo* of their territorial possessions, and at the same time enter into a mutual promise of armed aid against all acts of hostility. Freedom of intercourse was to begin at once; to the Athenians it was to be reserved to render the sea secure, and any State practising piracy was to be treated as an enemy by both parties. But, examined more narrowly, this message was in itself, according to the signification of its terms, the most disadvantageous of bases for an agreement. For in the case of a State, which had, during the last ten years, invariably lost ground, the acknowledgment according to the forms of international law of the *status quo* signified nothing short of an absolute confession of defeat; while, in the case of Philip, who by craft and by force had everywhere over-reached the Athenians, it meant victory, pure and simple; and it was in truth merely a bitter mockery, that conditions such as vic-

* Antipater and Parmenio; Dem. xix. 69.

tor dictates to the vanquished, should be clothed in the form of a league of friendship desiderated by the victor. The advantages of free traffic likewise principally fell to the lot of the Macedonian coast-towns, which suffered most during the blockade on trade; and the seemingly honorable recognition of the maritime supremacy as due to the Athenians was after all at bottom simply an onerous obligation, which they were to undertake on behalf of Macedonia. The sum of the advantages gained was therefore to be limited to this: that Philip bound himself to leave to the Athenians, their actual possessions, of course for precisely so long as it suited him to observe the treaty.

There accordingly arose lively manifestations of opposition, when Philocrates placed this message before the assembly as the basis of the peace, and recommended its adoption. But the force of opposition was crippled from the outset by the fact, that it was impossible to suggest any change of this proposed basis; it stood there unalterably fixed; any counter-motion was out of the question; there accordingly only remained the choice between obtaining the ardently desired repose of peace on these conditions, or rushing at once into a more violent war, and one which would have to be carried on without allies, against an enemy of overpowering strength, whom nothing could prevent from inflicting upon Athens her death-blow by means of the conquest of the Chersonnesus,—against an enemy, who had quite recently shown how he was able to chastise the defiance of his adversaries.

The voices of impassioned patriots, who desired to see all negotiations on such a basis broken off without further ado, were therefore unable to create an impression. There was not, however, the same objection to an attempt being possibly made, by means of an alteration in the terms in which Philocrates had drawn up his proposals, to gain something for the honor and the advantage of Athens. Philocrates had introduced a clause, whereby of the con-

federates of Athens, to whom the peace was to be extended, two were expressly excepted, viz. the inhabitants of Halus in Thessaly, on the Pagasæan gulfs, and the Phocians. The former were at war with Philip, the latter with Thebes. Of course this clause had been drawn up in the interests, and by command of, Macedonia; but it was not included in the royal message. Accordingly there was more freedom of action left on this head; and it was at this point that Demosthenes intervened in the debates, in order to combat the proposals of Philocrates. In this endeavor he could appeal to a decree of the deputies of the Attic Naval Confederation, which empowered the Athenian assembly to conclude peace with Philip for the confederates as well as for themselves, but with this addition,—that an interval of three months should be fixed, during which the other Hellenic communities were likewise to be permitted to accede to the treaty of peace.

This demand was based upon a very intelligent judgment of the existing state of affairs; and the idea readily suggests itself, that Demosthenes had borne a part in the drawing-up of this resolution. In no other way was an honest and lasting peace possible, and one which could not at any moment be called into question by Philip. In this case Athens would re-assume her mission of providing for the safety of Hellas, and her present confederates would be all the more secure of their rights and liberties, in proportion as the greater number of parties joined the treaty of peace. Mytilene had quite recently freed herself from her Tyrant, and renewed the league with Athens. If this example was followed, a league of Hellenes might once more form itself, which would challenge respect, and the treaty with king Philip might receive a national significance. This resolution of the confederates was therefore recommended by Demosthenes to his fellow-citizens as the basis of the peace; they recognized the truth, that thus alone the honor of the city

The resolution of the Federal Council.

would be satisfied, and a real peace secured; and it was only the advent of evening which prevented the adoption of a decree in this sense.*

Second
debate.
Ol. cviii. 2
(B. C. 346),
16th April.

On the next day, on which this important question was to be decided, the same current of opinion prevailed. Demosthenes renewed his propositions; and the assembly was so decidedly against an unconditional acceptance of the basis brought forward by Philocrates, that its author was prevented by clamor and hisses from being heard. But hereupon it appeared, that under these circumstances there was danger of the entire project of peace coming to nothing; for the Macedonians declared themselves obliged to adhere to the motion of Philocrates as the one admissible basis; they very well understood that their king was in a very essential degree more fettered by the additional paragraph suggested; and that, in case of the latter receiving the sanction of the assembly, it was only by means of an open rupture of the peace that he would be able to execute ulterior schemes of war in Hellas. Only if his intentions had been honestly pacific, could he have assented to the proposition of Demosthenes. Under this aspect of affairs the peace-party was obliged in the second assembly to undertake the serious task of inducing the citizens to change their views; and no hearing being accorded to Philocrates, it was now the turn of Æschines. He was still supposed to share the political sentiments of Demosthenes; indeed, on the journey to Pella he had called upon the latter to join him in keeping a strict watch over the members of the embassy who were less to be depended upon in their relations towards Macedonia. And in truth on the first day of the assembly he had spoken in lively terms against Philocrates. "Never," he had said, "so long as a single Athenian remains alive, shall I advise the adoption of such

* Resolution of the Federal Council: Æschin. iii. 69. Mytilene joins the Confederation: Rangabé, *Antiq. He'len.* ii. 401.

a peace as this;" but at the same time he had energetically insisted upon the necessity of concluding peace. He now abandoned his attitude of opposition, and very skilfully passed over to a recommendation of peace at any price. The Athenians, he now said, ought not only to imitate the greatness of their ancestors, but also to avoid their faults. It was reckless popular orators who had driven the Athenians to the siege of Syracuse. A prudent estimation of what under the circumstances could be secured, was alone capable of saving the State at dangerous crises. The proposal for taking into consideration the Hellenes who had not yet acceded, the cunning orator contrived to represent in such a light, as if it revealed an unintelligent weakness and want of independence. Athens was perfectly free, being supported by no other State, neither need she take any other into account; nor was she bound to let her resolutions as to war and peace depend upon the assent of others. This Sophistic reasoning, which contrived to represent the national policy as an unfree one, and a craven pursuit of particular state-interests as the only policy worthy of Athens, was supported by Æschines with the whole force of his eloquence. It behooved him on this day to let the Macedonians see a proof of his influence; and in this attempt he derived advantage from his reputation for patriotism, and more especially from the actual situation of affairs. The peace, which all were agreed in desiring, was not to be secured without an alliance; equally impossible was it to obtain an alliance open to communities which might accede afterwards, and to the Phocians.

Philip was the one power feared, and the power feared by all. In his hands still remained the captive Athenians, whose lives were in danger, unless the peace were consummated. It is therefore not wonderful that the citizens should have gradually inclined to unconditional acceptance, in particular since at all events the express exclusion of the Phocians and Haleans was omitted from the treaty.

This served the Athenians as a species of consolation, although what it really amounted to was, that it was now left to Philip to decide, whom he would reckon among the confederates. The royal envoys expressly denied any willingness on the part of Philip to include the Phocians in the term; notwithstanding which, Attic orators were to be found, who believed that they knew better, and that they were able to promise more; Philip, they said, from consideration for the Thessalians and the Thebans, could not well at the present moment admit the Phocians into the alliance; this state of things would change, and the king would soon do of his own accord what the party of Demosthenes was now attempting to force him into doing.

The Peace
accepted.

The Athenians allowed themselves to be deluded by such pretences as these; and when lastly Eubulus came forward, who told them point-blank that they had at the present moment to choose, whether they would immediately take their seats on the rowers' benches, pay war-taxes, and renounce the festival-moneys, or accept the motion of Philocrates,—then, under the terrific impression created by this alternative, the vote was taken and the motion was adopted.*

Embassy
of ratifica-
tion.

By this peace much had been given up, and little had been gained; but even this slight gain was anything but well assured. For while in general great importance was attached to the rule, that the envoys of foreign powers should come to Athens with absolute powers (vol. iii. p. 306), this was not the case with the envoys of Philip. For the king had from the first so arranged matters that, after the Attic community had bound itself down to certain terms an interval of freedom of action should still remain for himself, until it should seem suitable to him to bind himself

* Æschines formerly in agreement with the views of Demosthenes: Dem. xix. 344, *seq.*; Westermann, *Quest. Dem.* iii. 36.

in his turn. It had therefore been settled, that after the departure of his envoys, who were to receive the oath of the Athenians and of their confederates, an Attic embassy should come to Pella, in order that there by the administering of an oath to the king and his allies, the whole peace-negotiation should arrive at its consummation. For this reason Demosthenes was at once intent upon urging a speedy administering of the oath to the king, lest the advantages of the treaty, the conclusion of which he had been unable to prevent, should in the meantime be curtailed. But this danger was very imminent. For, while Athens immediately abandoned all ideas of war, and surrendered herself to the long-desired enjoyment of peace, the king was in the midst of war against Cersobleptes,—in other words, in the region most dangerous to Athens. Here, while the Athenians were delivering orations, he was taking one town after the other; the peace was based upon the *status quo*; whatsoever, therefore, Philip should have conquered, whether by force or by sleight, before taking the oath, the Athenians would according to the terms of the peace be obliged to recognise as his property.*

For the administration of the oath the same eleven men were chosen who had composed the first embassy. This time it was only with inner repugnance that Demosthenes brought himself to take part in it; he foresaw, that it would bring him nothing but vexation and anguish of heart, without his being capable of rendering any effective service to his native city; for he could not place confidence in a single one of his colleagues; they were all untrustworthy, or pursued directly different interests from those of their native city; and this absence of patriotism was the more alarming, inasmuch as the welfare of the city was absolutely placed in the hands of the envoys. The slight amount of confidence reposed in them by the

* Peace on the basis of the *status quo*—ἐκατέρους ἔχειν ἃ ἔχουσιν: [Dem.] vii. 26.

civic community itself, is already evident from the instructions given them on their departure, to the effect that none of them should negotiate singly with the king. Demosthenes seems to have been the leader of the embassy, the trusted agent proper of the civic community; nor could he have given any more splendid proof of his self-denying devotion than by accepting this office.

Already at Athens the most vexatious disputes commenced. Demosthenes demanded an immediate departure; while his colleagues allowed day after day to go by. A fortnight after the oath had been sworn at Athens, he obtained a decree of the Senate in accordance with his views, whereby at the same time the commander of the Attic naval station on the north coast of Eubœa, was instructed to transport the envoys immediately to the point where Philip might happen momentarily to be. These express orders were not executed; and, instead of joining the king by the shortest way, the envoys travelled through Thessaly and Macedonia by easy stages to Pella, there to await the king. Thus, a

The envoys
at Pella.

Ol. cviii. 2
(B. C. 346).

June.

business which might have been settled in eight days was protracted through as many weeks; and this procrastination was due to a secret understanding with the Macedonians, whose hints were submissively obeyed by the envoys, while they contemned the commands of their own city. Philip was desirous of bringing to an end the Thracian campaign, which he had opened in person at the beginning of spring, without being troubled by the expression of wishes on the part of the Athenians. The Chersonnesus he had promised to spare; but there was no obligation to prevent him from taking several places occupied by Athenian garrisons, from forcing Cersobleptes to submit to his suzerainty, and from gathering in at his ease the whole harvest of the war, while the envoys were waiting in his palace, where the full splendor of royalty quenched the

last remnants of republican sentiment, and the multitude of deputies from the widest variety of states produced the impression, that Pella was the spot where the destinies of the Greek world were decided.

When, therefore, the Athenians brought forward their demands, it was in a very tame and timid fashion. There was no longer any serious question as to the restoration of the places which had been taken since the conclusion of the peace; attention was already exclusively occupied by what was about to happen. For it was soon perceived that Philip had not the slightest intention of disarming; a general peace, which had been hoped for at Athens, by no means formed part of his plans; and the envoys thought themselves obliged to arrange their proceedings accordingly.

This occasioned fresh quarrels among them. Demosthenes, ever conscientious, insisted upon its being their duty simply to accomplish the orders of the civic assembly, while Æschines entertained a totally different opinion. He conducted himself in a very lordly style, and in his culture as a man of the world felt himself far superior to the plain burgher, the uncommunicative and sullen Demosthenes. In the eyes of Æschines, the administering of the oath was a quite secondary matter; his desire was not to do mere messenger's duty, but to engage in statesmanship on his own account. It behooved the embassy, he opined, actively to advance the interest of Athens according as circumstances permitted; this was the reason why the instructions given to them had been so vague; and if Philip, as he indubitably would, marched into Phocis, the interests of Athens involved in the imminent war ought already at the present moment to be asserted. But these very interests were viewed by Æschines from a thoroughly narrow-minded party-stand-point; for he begrudged the Thebans the friendship of Philip, and sought to irritate the latter against Thèbes, by approving in general of his intended intervention in the affairs

of Delphi, and merely wishing to bring about, in connexion therewith, a humiliation of Thebes.

Demosthenes was powerless as against his colleagues, yet he was indefatigably at work; even now he sought to make the conditions of the treaty more comprehensive, and to provide for the accession to it of other states. But in this respect again Philip would not consent to let his freedom of action be fettered. He insisted upon the Phocians being expressly excluded; Cersobleptes, too, was to be mentioned no longer as an Attic confederate, but as one of the allies of the king; and similarly the inhabitants of Cardia. In giving way on this head, the envoys manifestly exceeded their powers; but the king was determined upon having the result of the last few weeks of war recognized as an accomplished fact; and all that Demosthenes was able to obtain was, that on his application the king promised the liberation of the Attic citizens who were still living as prisoners-of-war in Macedonia; even this, however, was not granted immediately, but merely promised, in order that the fulfilment might be a fresh benefit conferred by the king, and as such might exercise its effect at the proper time. The services, which by means of representations, advances of money and gifts, Demosthenes was able to render to his fellow-citizens, were in the end the solitary bright points in the dark proceeding at the royal court, which daily became more intolerable to him. For he had to see the envoys from Sparta, Thebes, Thessaly, Phocis, assembled in the presence of the king, seeking a cure of their ills from him, courting his favor, submitting to his decision, quarrelling with one another before his very eyes. And in the midst of his deep grief he had not even the satisfaction of being able to send tidings of the truth to Athens; for the report was drawn up in the sense of the majority. In this fatal Pella he was as it were betrayed and sold by his adversaries. He wished to return home alone; even in this he failed. Philip was

not willing, that already at the present moment information should reach Athens as to the condition of affairs; and Demosthenes found himself obliged to accompany the king conjointly with the other envoys on his military expedition into Thessaly.

The invitation to this journey was apparently a special honor; for Philip pretended that he desired to claim the mediation of the envoys with reference to the city of Halus, whose case Athens had advocated. But in point of fact it was merely an application of force, to which the envoys, partly voluntarily and partly against their will, submitted, and an artfully calculated advantage to Philip. For to him it was of the utmost consequence to give a peaceable aspect to the march of his army, to invest his personal dignity with splendor by means of a suite composed of a series of Greek embassies, and as long as possible to conceal his real intentions. Lastly, the envoys likewise served him as pledges, that in the meantime no dangerous resolutions would be taken at Athens, which, considering the general agitation excited by the king's new armaments, was in itself not impossible. Incidentally, the march through Thessaly was made use of in order to swear the towns of the land as allies of Philip to the peace concluded between him and Athens. This was done at Pheræ. But this act in more than one respect signified in reality only a new mockery of legal right. It was performed in an utterly informal way at an inn; and the representatives of the communities were private individuals, whom the king had seen fit to summon to this comedy, while several towns were not represented at all. But since a further circuit on the part of the envoys was not at the present time in accordance with his plans, he assumed the responsibility for the defective execution of their instructions, and furnished them with a letter in reference to this point to the Council and civic assembly. This disgrace again

The envoys
accompany
Philip into
Thessaly.

was submissively accepted by the envoys; and thus, after an absence of seventy days, they returned to their fellow-citizens who were awaiting them with impatience.*

Report of
the embassy
in the Coun-
cil.

Ol. cviii. 2
(B. c. 346).

9th July.

Among them Demosthenes alone could cross the frontiers of his native state with a good conscience, rejoiced to have exchanged the atmosphere of the Macedonian court and the odious company of traitors for the Attic soil, where he could again breathe and speak with freedom. At last he found himself once more in the midst of the Council, the majority of which knew how to appreciate him; and here, many other witnesses being likewise present, he gave a full account of the entire course of the embassy. He showed, how from the outset all the orders given by the city had been treated with contempt, and all its interests neglected; he showed, how by means of malignant delays Cersobleptes and the Thracian towns had been sacrificed; he laid bare the continual private understanding with the king, the officious promotion of all his designs, the unwarranted interference to the disadvantage of Thebes; he described the march through Thessaly, on which the envoys, detained under deceptive prettexts, had been obliged to accompany the king as far as Thermopylæ, where he now stood at the head of all his forces, in order, so soon as he saw fit, to penetrate into the centre of Hellas. In fact, Athens could hardly have suffered greater losses by an unfortunate war, than by this embassy of peace. The Council thoroughly shared the indignation of Demosthenes; a decree of the Council was drawn up in his sense, and laid before the civic assembly. From the latter, too, a similar judgment was to be ex-

* Decree of the Senate for hastening the embassy, obtained by Demosthenes on the third of Munychion (April 29th): *Æschin.* ii. 91, *seq.* He is to be regarded as the leader of the embassy; cf. *Schäfer*, ii. 241. The envoys at Pella: *Dem.* xix. 255, *seq.*; *παρόντων τῶν πρέσβειων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος*, *Æschin.* ii. 112.—Philip sworn (after the middle of June): *Dem.* xviii. 32. The allies sworn: *id.* xix. 158.

pected; and in that case the whole situation might still change.

In the assembly, however, the debates took a totally different and unexpected course. Here the Macedonian party had prepared everything in the best possible way for gaining over the credulous multitude. *Æschines* again played the principal part. He had not the least intention of justifying himself; the powers of the envoys were hardly mentioned. All the more fully he discussed the entire general situation with an assured insight, such as was only to be secured by a politician initiated into the secrets of the great. Undoubtedly, he said in a light tone, Philip was standing at Thermopylæ, but upon that nothing depended; the real point at issue was the nature of his intentions. Now, he could assure them that Philip was standing there as a friend; for through the successful mediation of her envoys, Athens had secured the good-will of the powerful king to such a degree that she was on that account envied by all states. Neither had Philip any evil designs as against Phocis; on the contrary, he had the ruin of another city in view,—and here the orator was not ashamed to place before the citizens the prospect of the overthrow of Thebes as a piece of good fortune, which would not be paid for at too dear a price, even were Philip on this occasion to chance to penetrate, arms in hand, into Hellas. Thus he took advantage of the base impulses in the character of the Athenian people in order to gain applause. He concluded in the favorite style, by stating that for the present moment he was unfortunately still obliged to preserve silence as to the greatest advantages of all, which were to be expected from the king, and left it to the fancy of his hearers to interpret this to mean the acquisition of Eubœa and Oropus, the restoration of Platææ, &c.

Debates in
the assembly

Ol. cviii. 2
(B. C. 346).

10th July.

Demosthenes, desirous of warning the Athenians who

were intoxicated by delusive hopes, could not obtain a hearing; his voice was drowned in clamor, he was derided and pushed back. Philocrates and his associates were in command of the assembly; he was even able to carry the motion, that the blessed bond of peace which had now been knit, had best be at once made obligatory upon all subsequent generations, and that the Athenians should immediately declare their readiness, in the case of a prolonged resistance on the part of the Phocians against the general peace, to furnish aid to the king for its establishment.

Philip and
Thermopylæ.

This motion was of course likewise based upon an agreement with king Philip, from whom, so soon as everything had been duly prepared, a letter arrived, in which he invited the Athenians, as his newly-gained allies, to march out with him against Phocis, in order, in the interests of the public security, to put an end to the abominations in progress there. The actual despatch of an auxiliary force can hardly have been expected; to the king it sufficed to feel himself safe on the side of Athens in his Phocian schemes; for this was to him the main point, which he had from the outset had in view during the whole of the transactions concerning the peace. For was not the Attic power in Thrace so near to a collapse, and was not the advantage there in every respect so decidedly on the side of Philip, that he could at any time execute his wishes according to his own choice? But the case was different with his schemes in Greece. Here, Athens was a power which might cause him serious difficulties. For if he wished to secure his immediate object, it was requisite for him to be master of Thermopylæ, which inlet was at present controlled by Phalæcus with his garrisons at Nicaea and Alponus. The king was unable to advance, so long as the Athenians were ready to support Phalæcus and again to throw troops into the pass by way of the Eubœan Sea (p. 80); nor, again, was Phalæcus able

to hold the pass, unless, if it should prove necessary, the Athenians covered his rear and flank. For either side, therefore, everything depended upon the attitude of Athens; and as to this Philip had to be on his guard. For while it was of course by no means part of his intention to take the pass by storm like Xerxes, yet he was well aware that whatever remnants of national feeling still survived among the Greeks were roused by the name of Thermopylæ; it was even now an idea intolerable, nay all but inconceivable, to them, that a foreign king should appear with an armed force on the hither side of that pass. The entrance into the interior, therefore, still remained a difficult task for Philip.*

All other respects circumstances had assumed as favorable an aspect as possible for Philip. The Phocians had, notwithstanding Philip summoned against Phocis. the defeat of Onomarchus (p. 79), remained invincible to the Thebans, and were still masters of a great part of the Bœotian country, holding fortified places such as Orchomenus and Coronea. Raids incessantly occurred from the one territory into the other; and although the Thebans not unfrequently fought with success, yet upon the whole the war was far more ruinous to them than to their adversaries, because they mostly conducted it on their own soil and by means of their own men, whose places were not so easily filled as those of mercenaries. The war protracted itself from year to year; it became a more and more intolerable national pest to all Hellas; nor could the conviction be escaped, that it would not be brought to a decision by the contending parties. Now, if a third power was to intervene, it could only be the Macedonian, to which all eyes turned. In this respect the Macedonian party had long been active; it had, indeed, brought about an

* Report delivered before the Council: Dem. xix. 31; in the civic assembly, §19; Æschin. ii. 121. Motion of Philocrates: Dem. xix. 47. Philip's letter: §61.

application on the part of Thebes to Philip; following the example of Thessaly, from whose fate they were unable to take warning, the Thebans supplicated for succor at the same court, which had once been in a relation of independence towards them (p. 44). The Thessalians too demanded a Phocian war under Macedonian leadership; and inasmuch as it was still an arduous task to govern them, Philip now had the best opportunity of diverting them from home affairs by means of a war which satisfied their ambition as well as their craving for vengeance, and of thereby at the same time gaining his personal objects. He was able in a season of dire national distress to appear among the Greeks as their one possible preserver, whose services in this capacity were on several sides actually desired; and his sole fear was that the power of the Phocians might possibly without his intervention collapse, like a fire at an end of its fuel.

And in truth the resources of the robber-state could not but gradually exhaust themselves. Out of the Delphic treasury gold and silver to the value of more than two millions sterling are said to have been coined, and expended upon the court of the Tyrants and the pay of the soldiery (p. 75). Finally the ebb appeared, without new resources opening themselves. This also involved the internal affairs of Phocis in worse and worse complications. After the death of Phayllus, Phalæcus, the son of Onomarchus, had become captain-general of the land. Under him disturbances broke out, by which his rule too was temporarily interrupted. Since the temple had now been emptied, a hunt was made for moneys fraudulently appropriated, which it was sought to force out of the hands of their possessors by means of penal indictments.

Hereupon, however, it became unavoidable to look around for help from abroad; and for this purpose Athens was by far the most important State. Upon the relations between Athens and Phocis depended the future

of Greece. As on a former occasion the Thebans, so now the Phocians sued for the federal aid of Athens for the warding-off of foreign intervention in Central Greece; for since the meeting of envoys at Pella the Athenians might know with certainty, that they would be the next object of the political designs of Philip.

The relations between Phocis and Athens had originally been anything but unfriendly. ^{Athens and Phocis.} The Athenians had formerly favored the claims of the Phocians upon Delphi; and Pericles had not mistaken the fact, that the existence of an autonomous priestly state in Central Greece, ever ready to attach itself to Sparta, or even to powers whose interests were yet more foreign to those of Athens, could not be in accordance with hers. The Phocians had therefore, even in the most calamitous moment of Attic history, given their vote in opposition to Thebes for the preservation of Athens (vol. iii. p. 570). They could reckon upon the support of the anti-Theban and of the national party. But at the same time their case seemed, on the other hand, in many respects a very unfavorable one. The present government by dynasts could not arouse any sympathy, and with incomprehensible blindness Phalæcus had treated Sparta as well as Athens with utter scorn; he knew very well, that if they furnished aid, this was far from implying that they supported his sway, the real object of Sparta being to take advantage of this opportunity for restoring her patronship over Delphi (vol. i. p. 282), and of the Athenians, to bring into their possession the fastnesses near Thermopylæ, which were situate in the entirely dependent country of the Locrians. He had therefore rejected the offers of the Athenians, when they had equipped fifty vessels under the general Proxenus, in order to occupy the Locrian places which had been solemnly promised to them. This occurred about the very time when the Athenians were opening their negotiations with Philip. In how utterly

different a manner might not Demosthenes have asserted himself in the course of these negotiations, had Proxenus gained his object, and had the city been under an obligation of honor to guard the frontier-posts of the common fatherland! At present the Athenians were deeply vexed on account of the unfair treatment which they had experienced, and the agents of Philip accordingly found their game much easier to play, when by order of the king they incessantly labored to separate Athens from Phocis, and to cripple the sympathy of the two parties, whose political stand-point would necessarily have inclined them to take a warm interest in the fate of the Phocians. The national party was disarmed by the guileful procrastination of the peace-negotiations; while the other and far more numerous party which hated Thebes and begrudged it any advantage, were simply told a lie, being made to believe that the king's friendship towards the Thebans and hostility against the Phocians were merely a pretence.

Thus by his own fault Phalæcus was placed in the most desperate of situations. He saw the Macedonians approaching for the decisive attack, while at the same time his resources were coming to an end, his dominion in his own country was tottering, and all prospect of support was vanishing. For Archidamus, who was still in Phocis at the head of a thousand men of heavy infantry, for the purpose of observing the progress of events, and who perhaps might even at the last moment have resolved to follow the example of Leonidas and defend Thermopylæ, returned home at the critical moment, after the delusive prospect had been opened to the Spartans at Pella, that they would through Philip recover their ancient rights at Delphi. The Phocians were equally unfortunate at Athens, where they were not indeed represented by envoys with regular powers, but where at the same time they had their agents, who reported as to the course of events there, and followed the progress of the peace-negotiations with

the most eager anxiety. For a time they were able to hope that they would, in accordance with the proposal of Demosthenes, be admitted among the confederates to be included in the treaty of peace; but they soon found themselves deceived in this expectation, and finally the motion of Philocrates (p. 324) completely destroyed any hope of a succor which might perhaps even now be granted at the last hour. Phalæcus had now nothing but enemies in his front and in his rear; there accordingly remained to him no means of preservation except an understanding with Philip. In the middle of July he declared his readiness to hand over the fastnesses of Thermopylæ to the king, being in return granted free departure for himself and his 8,000 mercenaries. For, however great a display Philip had made of his pious zeal on behalf of Delphi, yet he had very little interest in carrying out the punishment of the despoilers of the temple, and in causing those who were the really guilty to pay the penalty of their transgression. He had achieved his object. He had the keys of Greece in his hands, and could advance with his Macedonian army through the open passes into the interior of the land. He came, not as a foreign conqueror, but as the elected federal general of Thessaly, and as the confederate of Thebes. The Thebans now immediately reassumed what had long been denied to them, possession of the entire territory of Bœotia. Then, the allies jointly entered Phocis; and the king enjoyed the triumph of having by the mere fact of his approach, without striking a blow, put a sudden end to the ten years' war under which Hellas had suffered so severely.*

Capitulation of
Phalæcus.

Ol. cviii. 3
(B. C. 346).
17th July.

* Thebes summons Philip: Diod. xvi. 59.—Phalæcus' scornfulness towards Athens and Sparta: Æschin. ii. 133. Proxenus: Dem. xix. 74. The Phocians had agents at Athens (*δρομοκήρυκες*): Æschin. ii. 130. Demosthenes less accurately terms them *πρέσβεις*, xix. 59. Capitulation of Phalæcus on the 23d of Scirophorion (17th of July).

Philip at
Delphi.

The treaty with Phalæcus had been concluded by Philip in virtue of his position as commander-in-chief with absolute powers. The subsequent steps he took in conjunction with his allies; for he wished, not to interfere arbitrarily in the system prevailing in Greece under the sanction of public law and treaties, but to appear in the character of a benefactor of the nation, who restored its national institutions, after they had been subjected to a criminal interruption. And this restoration of law and order was at the same time to serve to obtain for him and his dynasty a lasting position in the Greek confederation of states, and to form a legal basis for all his ulterior schemes with reference to Greece. Already his sojourn at Thebes had made him intimately acquainted with the Delphic ordinances; he had studied the policy of Iason (vol. iv. p. 470), as well as that of the Theban statesmen (vol. iv. p. 427), accurately enough to be aware, even without advice from any other quarter, which of the Delphic statutes he could use for his purposes.

Delphi
reforms.

As a general victorious in a Sacred War, he claimed the same right, which had of old after the termination of the first Sacred War been exercised by Clisthenes and Solon, when he restored the ancient ordinances, and at the same time established new institutions for the protection, as well as for the superior glorification, of the national sanctuary (vol. i. p. 284). Thus Philip also, in conjunction with his two allies, in the first instance re-established the temple-authorities, with which proceeding was doubtless combined the purification of the temple and of its domain. Hereupon, an assembly of the Amphietyons was summoned. But this again was to be a purified one. For whosoever had more or less directly taken part in the criminal spoliation of the temple, had, according to the view of the allies, forfeited his seat and voice in the Federal Council. But in the matter of this

exclusion a distinction was drawn. Sentence of ejection was pronounced in the case of the Phocians, who were declared to have forfeited their double vote once for all, so that it could be transferred as a grateful acknowledgment of his victory to Philip, who had freed the sanctuary out of their predatory hands. The Spartans were likewise excluded, because they still remained under the ban (vol. iv. p. 427), and had since polluted themselves by association with the Phocians; but their vote seems not to have been considered as vacant and transferable. A third kind of degradation consisted in this, that certain states were not summoned to the first meeting of the Amphietyons; which course was pursued in the case of Athens. The Athenians had not responded to the invitation of the king, bidding them to join him as allies by virtue of the treaties recently concluded. Now, participation in the re-organization of the Hellenic League of states was to be a right of honor reserved to those who had taken arms on behalf of the Delphic god, in other words, especially to the Thessalian and Cætan tribes, also to the Dorians at the base of Mount Parnassus, to the Locrians and the Dolopes, whose habitations lay between Thessaly, Ætolia and Epirus. Thus the centre of gravity of the League had been once more entirely transferred to the North, where it had lain in the earliest times (vol. i. p. 126); the mountain-tribes, which the remaining Greeks despised, and which had long lost all importance,—the very tribes which in the Wars of Liberation had fallen away from the national cause, and had by the recognition of the Persian supremacy forfeited their good name (vol. ii. p. 304),—now re-entered history; and most especially it was a deep satisfaction to the ambition of the Thessalians, that they, who had so long been treated with contempt and excluded from Greek history, were now again becoming respected in Hellas and saw the plans of Iason attain to a splendid consummation. How strangely the oldest and the newest elements were now

placed side by side in the Delphic Diet! For there now existed in the newly-regulated League three kinds of states, which severally belonged to the most different periods of history: first, the Thessalian tribes, which had adhered to the standpoint of cantonal district constitutions, such as the Perrhæbians and others; next, the tribes which had become states, such as the Athenians and Thebans; and lastly, in the midst of these rural or city republics an Imperial State, which did not in consonance with Hellenic international law take part as a popular community, but was represented in the person of its king, who received the federal votes of the Phocians as a right to be hereditary in his dynasty.

Doom
of the
Phocians.

Hereupon further debates were held on the subject of the Phocians themselves. The loss of their right of voting appeared to be an insufficient punishment for their violation of the peace, although the really guilty, who had by means of foreign troops maintained a rule of terror, had either fallen during the war, or had escaped unhurt at its conclusion, while on the other hand the Phocian towns, which had suffered most severely of all from the doings of the mercenaries, after the departure of the latter offered no resistance at all, but at once surrendered unconditionally. And yet the hostility of the neighboring tribes refused to be appeased; they were unwilling to relinquish their hold over their victims, until they should have thoroughly glutted their hereditary lust of vengeance (vol. ii. p. 306). Indeed, the Cætreans went so far as to propose that all the inhabitants of Phocis, who were of an age liable to service, should be hurled from the rocks as sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.

Against such brutality on the part of members of their own race—a brutality all the more revolting in that savage hatred assumed the mask of religious zeal—it became incumbent upon the foreign chief of the army to protect

the Phocians. He was solely interested in completely disarming the land, and in taking care that no fortified positions should be left in it, which might serve as bases for vigorous risings, inasmuch as any rising on the part of the Phocians might endanger the advantage which he had derived from the war. Accordingly, two-and-twenty towns were deprived of their walls, and their citizens being dispersed in villages, which were moreover prohibited from exceeding a certain number of houses; the inhabitants were left in possession of their lands, but were forced to pay out of the proceeds of these a tax to the temple, which was to be levied until the temple-treasure had been again made good. All the horses were sold, all the arms destroyed; and all the measures of this judgment, which was actually to be regarded as a manifestation of royal clemency, were intensified by the provision that their execution was committed to the most vengeful enemies of the Phocians. The land sank into unspeakable misery. Whoever had it in his power took flight; and it was once more the sad lot of the Athenians to be able to do nothing for a confederate, whose ruin their inaction had allowed to take place, beyond offering hospitality to the fugitive inhabitants. It is true that the present case differed from that of Olynthus, inasmuch as real relations of confederacy had been impossible with the Phocian Tyrants. All the greater, on the other hand, was the damage which this victory of Philip had inflicted upon Greece proper, and all the stronger was the feeling of vexation on the part of the Athenians, that they had allowed themselves to be so vilely deceived by their own envoys.

At Athens the mood of public feeling had soon changed. The last resolutions of the civic assembly had been passed under the terrorizing sway of the Macedonian party, which contrived to take care that no other tendency should assert itself, and no speaker of opposite sentiments should be allowed a

The Athenians undeceived.

hearing (p. 324). But the Athenians had after all begun to experience a feeling of great uneasiness, as the king drew menacingly near; they could not remain contented with the promises with which Æschines had calmed their apprehensions; and they resolved upon a new embassy to Philip, in order that he might be observed close at hand, and exhorted to fulfil his promises. It was natural that for this purpose the same men should be desired, who had brought home the tranquillizing utterances of the king. But Æschines saw fit to withdraw, since the despatch of this embassy had not been proposed by his party, and since no glory was to be gained by him from the business. For if his information proved unauthentic, the result would be either that Philip had told him lies, in which case he must indignantly abandon the king, or that he was himself revealed to be a liar, and exposed to the just ire of the civic assembly. He accordingly caused himself to be reported sick, and remained at home. Demosthenes likewise on this occasion gave a most decided refusal. And the envoys who took their departure for the royal head-quarters never reached the goal. On the way they learnt that Philip had occupied Thermopylæ and disarmed Phocis; and with these tidings of terror they in a few days returned to Athens.

Here, after the brief intoxication of vain hopes, a bitter disappointment now ensued. Instead of being enabled through Philip to triumph over their enemies, the Athenians saw that the direct contrary of all that they had fancied to themselves had taken place. It was they, and not the Thebans, who found themselves deluded; advantage had been taken of their credulity, to secure Thermopylæ, to ruin their allies, to aggrandize their enemies. They had supposed themselves to be by the much-lauded peace once more acknowledged as a Great Power,—and now they were more than ever excluded even from Hellenic affairs. Without any regard being paid to them,

great armies were passing through the midst of Hellas, and giving it a new constitution. Indeed, they felt insecure in their own proper country; for Attica was environed by overbearing foes, without allies, open and defenceless.*

Though the indignation was great among all citizens of patriotic sentiments, yet it seemed for the moment impossible to give expression to this current of feeling, unless the evils of the situation were to be further increased. Moreover, Philip had done his utmost to calm the citizens: he had immediately after his entrance into Phocis written them a letter, and had, so to speak, excused himself with the pressure put upon him by the Thebans and the Thessalians, which it had not been well possible for him to resist. In truth it was a bitter token of contempt, that he should dare to seek to satisfy the Athenians with such mere phrases; but being seasoned with a variety of blandishments, they did not miss their effect. Of this effect his party helped to make the most; and they even cast a share of the blame upon the Athenians, as not having taken an active part as the allies of the king. At the same time occurred the sending home of the Attic prisoners, which had been reserved for this point of time; and in the end there remained nothing for the Athenians but to suppress their ire, and once more to despatch an embassy, which was to attend to the interest of the city in Phocis. This time Æschines did not refuse; indeed, he put himself forward, and subsequently credited himself with the fact, that his influence had succeeded in defeating the sanguinary proposal of the Cœtæans.

Philip appears
at Athens.
Ol. cviii. 3
(B. C. 346).
August.

* Doom of the Phocians: Diod. xvi. 60; Paus. x. 3. New regulation of the League: Schäfer, ii. 267.—To the Thessalians were restored their ancient honorary rights which the Phocians had kept from them; in addition to which, they received special rights connected with the presidency (Dem. v 23; vi. 22.).

Philip celebrates the Pythia.

OL. cviii. 3
(B. C. 346).

Middle of
August.

In other respects the envoys were simply the witnesses of the brilliant triumph celebrated by Philip. With an exulting multitude surging around him, he enjoyed in more than full measure the honors thought to be due to a man who had purified the most venerable sanctuary of the nation, and had restored the interrupted rites of divine worship. The lamentations which filled the valleys of Phocis were forgotten; the ulterior consequences for Greece remained unperceived. The impression of the most recent events overpowered all other thoughts. The wretched pettiness of the condition of affairs at home intensified the admiration of the man, with whom to will and to act, to come and to conquer, were one. In addition, there was the influence of the splendor of royalty, to which this age was so open (p. 217),—of the overwhelming dignity attaching to a supreme lord of war, for whom thousands were ready to risk their lives in unconditional obedience. From these impressions the envoys of Athens too were at once unable and unwilling to escape. They found Delphi in the intoxication of a festival of victory, which was celebrated by means of hecatombs, gorgeous processions, dedications and consecrated gifts; Æschines notably had no scruple about fully entering in the innocence of his heart into these festivities, as if nothing had occurred of a nature to annoy an Athenian, although at Athens itself men were able to recognize in the victory of Philip a grievous defeat of the city.

Philip could not long remain with his numerous hosts of soldiers in the desolated land; but neither was he willing to quit it, until a reorganization of the state of things should have issued from Delphi under the solemn sanction of its authorities. In order to have this settled, it was a favorable circumstance, and one which Philip doubtless took into timely account, that a few weeks after the occupation of Phocis, about the middle of August, the time ar-

rived for the festival of the Pythia, which since the Crisean War recurred every four years (vol. i. p. 284). On this occasion, then, the king for the first time appeared in full activity as a member of the Hellenic Amphictyony; upon him was conferred the honorary office of conducting the festival; and, as was customary at important epochs of the national sanctuaries, so that which now occurred was likewise celebrated by the introduction of a new competitive game in addition to those traditionally in use, viz. a wrestling and boxing-match between boys. But for Philip everything now depended upon obtaining, while he was still present with his forces, a universal recognition for his ordinances with regard to the festival and with regard to the Amphictyonic League, lest cavils might be raised against them as illegal. In particular he was interested in securing the assent of Athens, because relations of peculiar intimacy existed between her and Delphi, and because Athens was an authority in matters of religious law.

The Athenians had little inclination for such a recognition. They saw in his innovations nothing but acts of force, unwarranted interference, and violation of law. They were, moreover, offended by the transference to Philip of the *Promanteia*, i. e. the right of being the first to address questions to the Oracle; in other words, the right of precedence in the presence of the Delphic god, which had been granted to them since the times of Pericles: accordingly, they had on this occasion sent no official festive embassy to the Pythian festival.

It was desirable for Philip that this obstinacy should be immediately broken. With Delphic embassy of Athens the lively assent of the other Amphictyons, among whom ill-will against Athens predominated, a Macedono-Thessalian embassy was therefore deputed, to bid the Athenians account for their reception of the fugitive Phocians, and, secondly, acknowledge the Delphic Amphictyony as at present constituted. It was a question

of decisive importance for Athens, and for Greece, and one to which it was necessary to give a short and precise answer.

The citizens were agitated in a high degree. *Æschines* could not even obtain a hearing. All the more eagerly were the orators of the opposite party listened to, who loudly declared, that a decided protest was the only answer to this offensive demand reconcilable with the dignity of Athens. There was much danger of imprudent steps being taken. For such a protest would have had no other consequence than this, that the army of the *Amphictyons*, united and ready for battle as it was, would have continued the Sacred War against Athens, who stood utterly isolated, and had not even her slight war-forces collected on one spot.

*Demosthe-
nes de Pace.*

Demosthenes, who so often experienced the pain of observing that his fellow-citizens were in the most pacific of moods when the moment had arrived for war, and demanded war when peace alone could bring salvation, was now, however repugnant it might be to him, obliged to advocate the maintenance of the peace concluded with Philip. He was one of the few who clearly judged the situation as it was, the solitary orator who, free from all party considerations, kept steadily in view nothing but the welfare of the city.

‘The peace which you have concluded,’ he said, ‘is neither fair to look upon nor worthy of you; but, whatever may be its character, this is certain: that it would have been better never to conclude it than to put an end to it now; for in it we have sacrificed much of that which, so long as we possessed it, was of essential advantage to us for the successful conduct of a war. The second point in this, ye men of Athens, that we must take care not to force those states which now call themselves the *Amphictyons*, to engage in a joint war against us. For, should we again fall out with Philip on a subject of

no interest to the Thessalians, the Argives, the Thebans, I do not believe that any one of these states will take arms against us; for so much sense even the most stolid among them possess, as to perceive, that in such quarrels all the burdens would fall upon them, while all the advantages would accrue to one who lies in ambush in the background. But at the present moment circumstances are as unfavorable as they could be for us. For if some of the Peloponnesians are hostile to us, because they believe that we are siding with Sparta against them;—if the Thebans are more wroth than ever, because we have received among us the fugitive Bœotians;—if the Thessalians hate us as friends of the Phocians, and Philip is angry at our having refused to acknowledge his Amphictyonic position: then it is to be feared that all of them, each on his own particular grounds, will obey the impulse of their anger, will seize upon the decrees of the Amphictyons as a pretext, and will in their joint war against us be carried on by the current beyond that which is to the advantage of each individually, as also happened in the case of the Phocians.’

“Are we then from sheer fear to do all that we are bidden? And this you, Demosthenes, demand from us?”

‘By no means; we must consent to nothing which is unworthy of us, but at the same time we must seek to preserve to ourselves the glory of a prudent conduct of public affairs. And those, who will not listen to any recommendations of caution, I ask to consider what course our city has on former occasions followed. We have left Oropus in the hands of the Thebans, and Amphipolis in those of Philip; we have allowed Cardia to be severed from the Chersonnesus; we have given up to the Carian princes Chios, Cos, Rhodes; and the Byzantians we have allowed to seize Attic vessels. Why have we submitted to all this? Assuredly only for this reason, that we hoped to secure greater advantages for our commonwealth, if we kept peace, than if we entered into war on account of

those objects. If then you have abstained from quarrelling with a series of single foes on matters which involved your most important and proper interests, it would be unpardonable folly, were you for the sake of something utterly insignificant, were you for the sake of the shadow of Delphi, now to enter upon a war against all.'

It was thus that Demosthenes spoke in favor of the peace. The review of a series of instances of humble submissiveness was intended to shame the hotspurs, who clamorously insisted upon the glory of the city, and who opined that Athens ought not to be untrue to herself. If the war demanded by honor had been so often avoided even when the prospects were favorable, a decree of war at the present moment meant the downfall of the city, the

Philip
returns
home ardently desired triumph of her numerous and
overwhelming foes.

Ol. cviii. 3
(B. C. 346). The envoys received a measured, but pa-
Autumn. cific answer. Athens declared, as we may as-
sume, that she would raise no protest against
the Amphictyonic organization, and would in future send
deputies to the festivals. Hereby the insidiously expect-
tant enemies were deprived of any pretext for war; and
in the autumn Philip returned home to Macedonia.*

* The prisoners duly arrived according to promise (Dem. xix. 39) at the Panathenæa (vii. 38). The time of the Pythia is now established from inscriptions; cf. Kirchhoff, *Monatsberichte d. Preuss. Akad.* 1864, p. 129. Amphictyonic embassy at Athens: Dem. xix. 111.

CHAPTER IV.

THE LAST STRUGGLES FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE.

THUS, then, had by means of repeated embassies and treaties been terminated the state of war, which had obtained between king Philip and Athens since the capture of Amphipolis; but a real peace had not been hereby effected. Neither had Philip as yet gained, nor had Athens as yet lost, all. Upon the sham war which had dragged its weary course for ten years, there accordingly ensued seven years of a sham peace, during which the germs of the decisive struggle developed themselves.

With the conclusion of peace an essential change had taken place in the situation of affairs. It was to have served to fetter the freedom of action which the king had obtained by the fall of Olynthus; but instead of this the king had employed it for placing a restraint upon the Athenians, until he should on the one hand have effected his purposes in Thrace, and on the other have made himself master of Thermopylæ and Phocis. The king of Macedonia now no longer stood as a foreign power in a threatening attitude on the frontiers, but he had taken up a position in the centre of the Greek world. He was the presiding member of the League of the Greek states; he kept the passes occupied, the protection of which was the duty of the League; he was the governor set over the national sanctuary for its protection. A Greek country of high importance on account of its central situation and its vigorous population, viz. Phocis, lay prostrate at his feet with its towns destroyed. The mightiest tribes of Greece, the

Position of
Philip on
the conclu-
sion of
the peace.

Thessalians and the Bœotians, were gathered around him as their lord-in-war, while the Athenians were entirely isolated, humiliated, and by the imposition of a federal relation shackled in their freedom of action. The treasures of the Delphic god, which had been accumulated during the course of centuries, and which, if expended in the national interest, would have made possible an extraordinary display of power, had been in a few years wasted, to the ruin of the nation. Where was there any longer left a force capable of resistance?

Notwithstanding all this, Philip had not yet reached the goal. Delphi had long ceased to be the centre whence Greece might be ruled. Southern Hellas was still perfectly independent; the threads of the life of the Hellenic states were not yet united in the hand of the king; in those communities which lay outside his present sphere of power he had still to begin to knit such threads, in order that the authority which he claimed as head of the Amphictyons might become a reality.

His further
schemes.

It was accordingly in the first instance not part of Philip's plan, to advance by force; but he rather intended quietly to extend his influence, by skilful treatment gradually to tame the Hellenes, and to accustom them to his guidance. For he was desirous, not of ruling as lord and master, as Xerxes had intended to rule, but of assuming the direction of confederate states, as was in accordance with native tradition, and as Sparta, Athens, and Thebes had repeatedly attempted to do, though, greatly to the damage of the nation, they had never succeeded in accomplishing their purpose in such a way as to control the whole of Greece, or enduringly to maintain their authority. Herein lay the power and importance of this exhausted people, and this was the blessing brought by its glorious history: that its land could not be looked upon like any other portion of the earth, which, so soon as sufficient strength for the purpose was at

hand, had simply to be conquered and subjected,—as Philip had done unhesitatingly with many districts, and with the colonial territories likewise. The Greek mother-country required to be treated with far more consideration; and here it was necessary to show as much tenderness as possible towards existing legal relations, so far as was at all reconcilable with the Macedonian schemes of dominion. This was no weakly whim on the part of the king, but a historical necessity. For the position occupied in the world by his royal dynasty was based upon its appropriation to itself of Hellenic culture; and its policy was no other than that of continually extending this culture, and turning it to increasingly good account for the splendor and power of the growing empire. It was therefore impossible for the king to be desirous of devastating the home of Hellenic culture, and of destroying the intellectual life still flourishing there; and impossible for him to intend to rule over Hellenes otherwise than after a Hellenic fashion.

For the present, therefore, the king could do nothing more than attract to himself the states which still stood outside the combinations recently formed, establish more firmly his maritime supremacy, deprive of all power of doing harm those confederate districts in which resistance still showed itself; and prevent any combination among the states which still preserved their independence. If such a combination should form itself, the one point from which it could proceed was Athens. Her constitution, her history, her ways of thinking made Athens the focus of free Greek nationality; here there still existed a feeling for honor and justice, which might with desperate determination confront the ultimate and inevitable demands of Philip. Of this the king was well aware; and these points of view determined his proceedings in the next ensuing year.

Thus he in the first instance took decisive steps in Thes-

Philip in
Thessaly.

Ol. cviii. 4 (a.
c. 344).

saly, for the purpose of breaking all recalcitrance in this quarter. Frequently enough had Demosthenes counselled his fellow-citizens to secure a Thessalian alliance. In Thessaly there were still large, unimpaired resources of population, and there still existed a desire, though of a kind not clearly conscious of its ends, to assert the strength of these resources,—in particular at Pheræ, where since the days of Iason men had accustomed themselves to believe in a new era for Thessaly. They had unhesitatingly followed the foreign lord-in-war, in order by means of him to satisfy their ancient bitter wrath against Phocis. After this had been accomplished, they thought it would be possible again to withdraw from the pressure of the supremacy of their foreign protector. In their delusion they failed to perceive, that they had been nothing but the tools of Philip's policy; and no sooner had the first symptoms of a desire for resistance shown themselves, than the king proceeded with the utmost rigor, sent troops into the country, placed a garrison in the castle of Pheræ, and established there a Board of Ten on the Lysandrian model, which was composed of partisans of his own, and which bowed the defiant spirit of the citizens under a military yoke. At the same time the whole of Thessaly was more firmly than ever united with the Macedonian hereditary dominions.*

His progress in Peloponnesus.

On the other side of the Isthmus, opportunities likewise offered themselves for extending the influence of Macedonia. For the Peloponnesian states, from the first accustomed to abstain from carrying their interests beyond the peninsula, continued according to their wont to live on in absolute freedom from anxiety, and were by no means intent upon settling their internal party conflicts, or putting an end to the an-

* Δεκαδρχίαι: Dem. vi. 22; xix. 260. Pheræ: vii. 32; ix. 12.

cient border-feuds, in view of the menacing growth of the power in the North. The jealousy between Sparta and the states which had been withdrawn from her influence endured, and, in order to heighten the existing confusion, there now in addition arrived the Phocian mercenaries, who, after the capitulation of Phalæcus (p. 326), moved about from place to place. Where unoccupied mercenaries made their appearance, they became the curse of the country; glimmering sparks of hatred were kindled into a flame; opportunity was offered to party-fury of deeds of blood; and every ambitious scheme had a chance of execution. Thus in Peloponnesus too open civil conflicts ensued, which in the end redounded to the sole advantage of the king, who was ever lying in wait, who left no movement unused, and to whom the same mercenaries, who had worked so admirably and prepared a way for him in Central Greece, now also opened the passage into the peninsula. So it befell in Elis.

Elis was one of those petty states which Elis. were at all times full of ambitious schemes, and ever anxious to carry on political action on a grand scale. Because they were in possession of Olympia, the Eleans fancied themselves superior to the other Peloponnesians; and for this reason they also enjoyed special consideration at the hands of foreign Great Powers (vol. iv. p. 486). But since their relations to Sparta had become hostile, the Eleans were unable to restore a tranquil condition of affairs in their own country; they were torn asunder by parties; and inasmuch as their power was one in itself utterly the reverse of independent, they were obliged to lean upon this, now upon that, other state. As allies of the Thebans they had promoted the restoration of Mantinea (vol. iv. p. 437); after the Arcadian War (vol. iv. p. 492) they had sided against Thebes; and Sparta, to whom any aid against Megalopolis was welcome, had, by giving way with respect to Triphylia, contrived again to

bring them over to her side (p. 259). During this period the aristocracy, which from the outset was very powerful in the land, had the commonwealth in its hands, while the popular party was in exile. It was the latter party which took advantage of the presence of the mercenaries, in order to effect by force its return home. A murderous conflict ensued, in which the city-party ultimately with Arcadian aid secured the victory. But its leaders, Euxitheus, Cleotimus, and Aristæchmus, were not content with glutting their lust of vengeance after the most savage fashion, and with causing four thousand mercenaries to be put to death as sacrilegious despoilers of the temple; but, in order to anticipate future revolutions, they now also entered into connexion with Philip, who was extremely rejoiced to establish a firm footing in the land of the

Philip protector of
Elis.

OL. cix. 1 (B. C.
343);

Olympian Zeus, and readily accorded his protection. Thus the Elean aristocracy became a body of partisans of Philip, and brought Elis under the influence of the king. Such was the sanguinary epilogue to the Phocian War (OL. cix. 1; B. C. 343).

of Messenia,
Megalopolis,
Argos,

Philip succeeded with yet greater ease in those states which, having been founded by Thebes, were from the first obliged to depend upon foreign protection, and urgently needed it as against Sparta. For the Spartans, who at Pella had been not less than the Athenians deluded by false pretences, so long as king Archidamus was with his troops in Phocis still capable of creating difficulties for the king, in their short-sighted policy continued to threaten their neighbors anew, and furnished Philip with the desired opportunity for entering upon the Theban course of policy. Thebes had, nine years ago, for the last time performed the duties of her office in the peninsula (p. 261); she now resigned it to her powerful ally, who took upon himself the protection of the communities, sent troops, and forwarded distinct

orders to the Spartans to abstain from all encroachments. These successes, easily gained, but of extreme importance, followed immediately upon the Phocian War, and seemed to spring as it were as a matter of course from the position secured in Central Greece. The portal of the peninsula, which Epaminondas had burst asunder, was now also open to the king; his orders prevented the Spartan troops from moving beyond the valley of the Eurotas; Elis, Messenia, Megalopolis, and Argos likewise felt themselves dependent upon the new protector.

On the northern side of the Isthmus the king directed his attention to Megara, a commercial city at that time enjoying great wealth and prosperity, which had been able rigorously to guard its independence as against its near neighbor Thebes. Here, too, he brought over to his side the aristocratic party. In the same way he again stretched forth his hand towards Eubœa, which was utterly defenceless, since Thermopylæ had become Macedonian property, and since an end had been put to all resistance in Central Greece. Finally, he was already preparing the operations which, with Epirus as his basis, were to make him the master of the Ionian and Corinthian Seas.

With Athens the peace was maintained, and yet the object of all Philip's measures was to surround that city more and more closely with a network of strong points of attack, and to cut off all its lines of foreign communication. In the Thracian Sea, too, the king made use of his vessels, so as under the pretext of exterminating piracy to hold certain islands, such as Halonnesus, occupied; and although he apparently took no notice at all of the Athenians, yet could their growing helplessness have in no way been more painfully brought home to them than when they saw the king extending his power by land and by water, in the north and in the south. Athens was more than ever the head-quarters of

of Megara.

Relations
with Athens.

the adversaries of Philip, the single spot where men existed who followed his steps with a vigilant glance, and who regarded the peace of Philocrates as nothing better than a truce.*

At the time of the conclusion of the peace the warning voice of Demosthenes had been unable to prevail; the Athenians wished to be deceived, and therefore willingly listened to such persons as Æschines and Eubulus. More-

Public
feeling in
Athens after
the peace of
Philocrates:

the party
of material
interests.

over, their city had more reason than any other to desire peace, as guaranteeing to the poor the unimpaired enjoyment of the festivals, while the wealthy and the middle-class, which now had to bear its share of the public burdens (p. 119), were glad to have nothing further to hear at present of war-taxes and of the equipment of ships. Free traffic by sea was not only the interest of the ship owner and the wholesale merchant, but also of every inhabitant of Athens; because in this city, which had to a great extent to depend upon foreign corn, the character of that traffic determined the prices of the necessary means of life. Moreover, Athens was the spot where there were still to be found the best artists, manufacturers, and handicraftsmen; all articles of luxury were to be obtained here; and, accordingly, no city was more harmed by the war, or derived more advantage from the peace, than Athens. After a long blockade the Northern harbors were once more opening, where, in consequence of the rapidly increasing Hellenization of Macedonia, and of the growing abundance of pecuniary resources, the demand for the productions of Greek artistic industry likewise perceptibly rose. The court of Philip once more gave its orders for such wares at Athens. In Greece, too, since the emptying of the Delphic treasury, a quantity of gold and silver had come into circulation, which had lain dormant

* Elis: Diod. xvi. 16, *seq.* Arcadia, &c.: Dem. xix. 261; xviii. 64.

for centuries as an unproductive capital. This could not but in general cause prices to rise, and life to become dearer; and the Athenians were all the more obliged to depend upon their gains by trade and manufactures, in that the native sources of profit were decreasing. The annihilation of their maritime supremacy was necessarily a heavy blow also for the material prosperity of the citizens; and the silver-mines of Laurium began to grow less productive about the very time when the metallic treasures of Thrace opened with an abundance hitherto undivined. For although the author of the essay *on the Revenues* (p. 182) still speaks in a very boastful vein, so as to affirm the inexhaustible character of the silver-mines, yet his artificial proposals for the advance of the Attic smelting system in themselves clearly enough betray the fact that the citizens no longer placed any genuine confidence in this kind of investment, and promised themselves little profit from the sinking of new shafts beyond the district fully turned to account by their ancestors,—a view which subsequent times thoroughly justified. Under these circumstances, freedom of traffic became more and more the main source of material prosperity. “How foolish, then,” we read in the same essay, “is the judgment of those who think that Athens loses glory and authority by the peace! In war, the city will only involve itself in humiliation and contempt; but in quiet times who is not in need of Athens? In such times the ship-owners and merchants, the corn-dealers, the wine, and oil-producers, the wool-growers, besides those who deal with intellectual capital, the artists, the philosophers, the poets, and again, all who desire to delight ear and eye by artistic enjoyments; finally, those who wish to sell or buy rapidly,—all of them have to depend upon Athens. In war, Athens is miserable and weak; but in peace she is great and mighty—the acknowledged centre of the educated world. For this reason, then, her foreign policy, too, ought to be a policy of

peace; she ought not to seek to bring the neighboring states to her side by force and by offensive claims of dominion, but by benefits conferred upon them; she ought to obtain influence and secure allies by means of embassies, without pecuniary sacrifices or the troubles of war." This was precisely the congress-policy recommended by Eubulus and Æschines (p. 301); and when we read further in the same author: "If you, Athenians, after this fashion earnestly set to work throughout Hellas, that the sanctuary at Delphi may regain its former independence, I deem it by no means improbable that you will have all the Hellenes unanimously on your side as allies against those who now after its evacuation by the Phocians seek to make themselves masters of that sanctuary;"—it is assuredly manifest, that the essay belongs to no other period than that of the Peace of Philocrates, and that it expresses the opinion of those Athenians who regarded the power of the allied Macedonians, Thessalians, and Thebans as one which was illegal and insecure in itself, and which required to be put an end to by peaceable means.*

About the same time the aged Isocrates
Isocrates' Philippus. composed his oration to *Philip*. He, too, inveighs against the unblessed demagogues, as ever anew desirous of involving the city in war, in order to recover for it a position, which in reality was irrecoverably lost, and which had never been a real blessing, because it had invariably been based upon injustice, and had never admitted of being established except by blood

* Xenophon (so-called) *περὶ προσόδων*, extols the mines, c. 27. The passage translated in the text is treated by Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.* vol. ii. p. 393 [Eng. Tr.]; but his interpretation is intolerably artificial, and was only made in order to save the supposed authorship of Xenophon, which has meanwhile already been questioned in another quarter (Oncken, *Isocr. u. A.* p. 96). My view, developed in the text, I find confirmed by Hagen in *Eos* ii. 2, 149. This renders unnecessary the hypothesis of Cobet, *Mnem.* vii. 409. Cf. *Philol.* xliiii. 657.

and iron at the expense of material prosperity. For this reason Isocrates had already uttered his imprecations against the war about Amphipolis, and had advanced the peace-negotiations, when they at last began, in every possible way. But in this view the Macedonian power was, not a national calamity, which it might be hoped would soon pass away, but the long-desired commencement of a better future, of a new age of salvation. The Hellenic republics are mutually irreconcilable; what is needed is a great man, a hero standing above the parties and uniting the states. Several times Providence has already shown such a man to our view; Archidamus, Iason, Dionysius, seemed to be the men summoned to the mission. At last he has actually appeared,—a man, whose historical mission is not open to doubt, a prince of the race of the Heraclidæ, as Archidamus was. He is the new Agamemnon, who shall again lead the Hellenes into the field against their hereditary foe. In him confidence should be placed, and no hearing should be given to the orators who abuse him, and who thereby inflict the greatest damage upon their native land. The evil he has done to individual Hellenes is the consequence of the hostility unwisely fomented against him. It is the War which is cruel, not Philip. Thus to him Isocrates attaches the national hopes; and for this reason now also addresses himself immediately to him, entreats him not to expose his person too much, and begs him not to allow his opponents to irritate him against Athens. Let him render the peace which has been concluded a lasting one, and on the basis of it recommence the long-interrupted National War, as to the successful issue of which there can be no doubt, in view of the weakness of the said Persian Empire as proved by Cyrus and Agesilaus. This was the ancient policy of Cimon: that of putting an end to the quarrels at home by means of a war with Persia (vol. ii. p. 411),—an idea which, as a promising subject of eloquence, had already

frequently been treated by other rhetors, in particular by Gorgias and Lysias, in public festive orations, but to which Isocrates first again restored a political significance.

Finally, there existed a third party, which Philip's friends, was zealous for the peace neither on patriotic grounds, nor from consideration for the general material prosperity, but on account of its personal relations to Philip's court. We may assume with certainty, that since the time when the attitude of the Athenian civic community had necessarily become an object of anxious attention to Philip, *i. e.* since the dispute about Amphipolis (p. 56), he had his agents at Athens, who were at work in his interest, in order to restrain the citizens from vigorous resolutions, to confirm them in their careless confidence in the royal promises and pretences, and to place Philip under obligations to themselves by means of menial services on his behalf. They fomented and took advantage of all the moods of public feeling advantageous to the purposes of Philip, the warlike (p. 257) as well as the peaceable; and the nearer the power of the king approached, the more audaciously they revealed their sentiments. Did not Philocrates boast before the whole people of the money which he had received, and openly display the prosperity which he owed to the favor of the king? The others proceeded with greater caution. But Æschines too had received landed property in Macedonia; he too now openly avowed himself on the side of Philip, and anticipated all kinds of benefits at the hands of the same man, whom he had recently attacked as the worst foe of his native city. These men and their fellow-partisans, Pythocles, Hegemon, Demades, now bore themselves as if all the rest had proved to have been the victims of a delusion, and as if they alone were the true statesmen and the politicians of influence at the present time.

Thus we find after the conclusion of the peace three political parties at Athens, which we may call those of

Eubulus, Isocrates, and Philocrates,—three parties, which notwithstanding all the difference in their standpoints were agreed in viewing the recently-concluded peace in the light of a blessing for Athens, and in representing all those who endangered its endurance as her enemies. In his "*Philip*" Isocrates inveighs against those "who rage on the orators' tribune," those "who are envious of the powerful king, who incessantly cast suspicion upon him, create confusion among the cities, find in the common peace a snare for liberty, and talk as if the power of the king were growing, not on behalf of Hellas, but against it, as if after regulating the affairs of Phocis he had no other end in view but the subjection of all Greece,—together with other follies, which they advance with as much certainty as if they had most accurately ascertained the truth of everything. It was thus that an Attic patriot, the venerated head of a wide circle, would represent the policy of Demosthenes, whom the bought partisans not less abused as one of those unquiet minds, which made it so difficult for the magnanimous king to carry out his benevolent intentions towards Athens.*

The three
Peace-
parties.

And yet neither was Demosthenes so deserted, nor his position so unsupported, as might be expected. His activity had not been in vain; his personal authority had risen. While to the aged Isocrates, who was old enough to have witnessed the full distress of the Peloponnesian War, the history of the Attic free commonwealth seemed like an orbit which had attained to its conclusion and could not be begun afresh, a younger generation had grown up, in whose breasts the words of Demosthenes had struck fire. The circumstances of the times were likewise in his favor; for they at all events served to cause no doubt to remain as to the situa-

Their
weak points.

* Isocrates (xii. 76) describes in Agamemnon the person of Philip, and inveighs (v. 73; 129) against Demosthenes.

tion of affairs, and to destroy false conceptions. How could the delusion be now any further indulged, that the king might be stayed by embassies and peaceable compacts, as the followers of Eubulus wished! And with reference to the hopes of an Isocrates, the royal answer to this address had been given in the destruction of the Phocian cities, which ensued immediately upon the transmission of his last oration; the terrible events in the Chalcidian peninsula had repeated themselves in the very heart of Greece. Could any sober mind still continue to give itself up to the delusion, that Philip really desired to be nothing more than a leader of the Hellenes in national deeds of arms? And the other partisans of Philip, who behaved with so lordly an arrogance, as if they had already won their game, could not but by their treacherous sentiments forfeit all respect in any circle where Hellenic civic virtue was still held of any account. For even the less guilty among them had revealed themselves before the people as self-seeking, characterless turncoats, as untrustworthy go-betweens who had repeatedly deceived their fellow-citizens by means of delusive fictions. How could it be intended to concede to them an influence upon public affairs?

Growing
authority
of Demos-
thenes.

As against all the three peace-parties Demosthenes accordingly could not fail to gain in authority; and thus it came to pass, that immediately after the heaviest defeat which had been suffered by his policy, his personal individuality stood forth more powerfully than ever from among the midst of the citizens. Not only among the younger generation, but among the older citizens too he became trusted. For it being known, how on the Macedonian side no higher importance was attached to any voice than to his, the independence of his character, inaccessible to all temptations, and the immovable fixity of his personal convictions could not fail to secure him a constantly increasing respect.

He alone had remained true to himself; he alone was incessantly at work on behalf of the city, had established connexions with the traders in Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, was always readiest with full information; and, although he had for a time believed in the possibility of an honest peace, had now himself attained to a clearer view of the condition of affairs. And if notwithstanding this he had on the occasion of the last embassy anew counselled peace (p. 338), yet this speech for peace was in reality only a summons to war, but to a war prepared with prudence, a war in which the Athenians should not be confronted by the momentarily existing armed league, and which would not turn upon the Amphictyonic innovations, which assuredly must collapse so soon as Philip's power should have been broken, but in which it might be possible to fight under more favorable circumstances on behalf of the essential and indispensable possessions of Athens.

It is the preparation for this decisive struggle which Demosthenes pursues with unabating ^{Resources} force. Everything therefore depends upon ^{of the city.} strengthening the conviction of its necessity, upon establishing connexions, and upon increasing the means of offence and defence. The resources of the city were still by no means small. It was poor by reason of its bad financial system, but the people were comparatively well-to-do; and Demosthenes could with a brave heart exclaim to his fellow-citizens: "Look, ye men of Athens, upon your city! In it there exists a wealth, I may indeed say, like unto that of all other cities taken together." Nor was there as yet any lack of public spirit. Men are mentioned, such as Nausicles and Diotimus, who in the trierarchic services distinguished themselves by their self-sacrificing efforts. Moreover, immediately after the conclusion of the peace, the Athenians had set to work to give completeness to the harbors of war, to build new ship-sheds, and to create an arsenal, which under the direction of the archi-

teet Philon became an object of patriotic pride on the part of the Athenians; to this purpose an annual sum of ten talents (£2,437) was devoted from the year Ol. cviii. 2 (B. C. 347), and the wealthy resident aliens under the protection of the State likewise in part contributed with great ardor. The superintendence-in-chief was confided to Eubulus.*

Constitutional
reforms.

About the same time earnest attention had also been devoted to the improvement of home affairs, as is already attested by the essay "*on the Revenues*." The Athenians were not, however, satisfied with mere proposals but set actually to work, therein partly following the same standpoints, which are indicated in the above-named essay. Thus provision was made for an improvement of the judicial system, and a law was passed, according to which law-suits, the protraction of which was specially damaging to the progress of traffic, in particular suits having reference to commerce and navigation, had to be settled within a month. Meanwhile, not only were the interests of trade kept in view, but it was also sought to remove the more deep-lying abuses. Thus most rigorous measures were taken against all those who were suspected of having engaged in attempts at bribing the citizens in the popular assembly and in the courts of law. A certain Demophilus distinguished himself in this matter by his patriotic ardor; and the same statesman in Ol. cviii. 3 (B. C. 346) proposed a general examination of the list of citizens. This was beyond doubt a measure intended to purge the city of strangers, indifferent to its welfare and untrustworthy, and in general to re-elevate the spirit of the civic community; it was a measure of an

* Multifarious connexions of Demosthenes with the Greeks traveling or resident in Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly: Dem. viii. 14; and Rehdantz *ad loc.*—The resources of Athens: Dem. xiv. 25; Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.* vol. ii. p. 248 [Eng. Tr.]—Zeal of the *meteci*: *ib.* p. 230; G. Curtius in *Philol.* xxiv. 268.—Nausicles and Diotimus: Schäfer, ii. 309.

aristocratic tendency, like the corresponding law of Aristophan of old (vol. iv. p. 71.)

With these measures is also connected an innovation with regard to the popular assembly. Here the evil of clamorous lawlessness had continuously increased. The presidency over the citizens had been transferred from the *Prytanes* (vol. iii. p. 543) to the *Proëdri*, a commission of nine men, chosen by lot out of the civic tribes not represented in the presiding prytany. Now, a new way was adopted. For every popular assembly one of the ten tribes of the civic body was designated, which assumed the responsibility of preserving order and decency; to this tribe seats were given in the vicinity of the orators' tribune, so that it might protect the orator against any unfair treatment; it was in fact a commission of persons appointed out of the midst of the citizens for the preservation of order. Hereby it was designed to reanimate the sense of honor in the community, and to counteract the efforts of those who observed with inner satisfaction the growing decay of the popular assembly, because they regarded this as a confirmation of their view, that a democracy like the Attic was utterly incapable of an independent and effective policy. It is not improbable, that about the same time the Areopagus too was again allowed a greater influence upon public life, and that powers were again conferred upon it, particularly for proceeding with the utmost rigor against public treason. We therefore recognize after the humiliation brought upon the Athenians by the Peace of Philocrates and by the ruin of Phocis an honorable striving to improve the public state of things, and to remedy the abuses of the democracy,—such as had also shown itself after the Sicilian calamity (vol. iii. p. 437), and after the rule of the Thirty. In other words, there still existed an efficient stock of citizens possessed of a healthy spirit and of a lively feeling for the welfare of the city, and refusing to despair of its future. It was only

indispensable to unite and guide those who were animated by patriotic sentiments.*

Demos-
thenes and
the old par-
ties. Demosthenes was from the first no party-man (p. 274). His was an uncommonly independent nature; he was wont to pursue his own paths, and confided in the power of truth, as one from which the civic community would in the end be unable to escape. But at the same time it could not fail to happen, that his views in many respects agreed with the stand-points of the older parties among the citizens. Thus he shared with the Boeotian party (p. 87) a love for the constitution, a vigorous spirit of enterprise, and a determination not to allow any start to Sparta. On the other hand, he approached to Callistratus' policy of the maintenance of a balance of power (p. 99), and shared his aversion from Boeotia,—an aversion, which after the negotiations of the Thebans with Persia (vol. iv. p. 482 *seq.*) and during the Phocian War had become continuously more intense and general at Athens. In the speech for Megalopolis he considers it the most important point of view for Attic policy, to allow neither Sparta nor Thebes to become powerful; and in the speech against Aristocrates he is able to regard the discord prevailing among the Hellenes as the good fortune of Athens.† Gradually the aspect of things changed. In proportion as the times became increasingly serious, Athens became more decidedly, as she had been in the Persian Wars, the head-quarters of all efforts for liberty; all narrow-hearted considerations with regard to the other states fell more and more into the

* Expedition of procedure in commercial suits, recommended by "Xen." *u. c.* iii. 3; introduced before the transactions concerning Halonnesus ("Dem." vii. 12).—*Διαψήφισις* on the motion of Demophilus: *Æschin.* i. 77; Schäfer, ii. 289.—*Πρόεδροι*, cf. ante *Note* to vol. iv. 67; Vischer, *Epigr. Beitr. aus Gr.* 63.—*Φυλὴ προεδρεύουσα*: *Æschin.* i. 33; Ferd. Schultz, *Demosthenes und die Redefreiheit*, 21.—Areopagus: Meier u. Schömann *Att. Prozess*, 344. As the text shows, several extraordinary commissions occur in this period, which are entrusted to the Areopagus.

† Policy of a balance of power: *Dem.* xvi. 4; xxiii. 102.

background; the national idea attained to more and more powerful prominence, and by it was formed a new party. This party gathered round Demosthenes.

Men took up their position by his side, who, stimulated by his speeches and action, or moved by an impulse in themselves, pursued the same aims; men in whom the sentiments of a better age revived once more, orators and statesmen of a truly Republican character, whose glance was vigilant, like that of Demosthenes, wherever the honor of the city was at issue, near at hand and afar off. Among them was Hegesippus of Sunium, formerly an adherent of Leodamas (p. 87), a fiery patriot, who already in the year 357 had ardently advocated the preservation of Cardia, when that important city was sacrificed (p. 140); in the same sense he had urged upon the Athenians an energetic alliance with the Phocians, so long as they still possessed power of resistance, and had most decisively withstood the Peace of Philocrates. Of yet higher mark were Lycurgus and Hyperides. Lycurgus, the son of Lycophon, was slightly senior to Demosthenes, and belonged to the ancient priestly family of the Eteobutadæ. He was an Attic nobleman in the best sense of the word. Of a lofty spirit and loyal to the traditions of his home, he as it were towered into the present out of a better past. But he stood towards his times in no attitude of unsympathetic and hostile contradiction; he was thoroughly moderate, and therefore ready to consent to concessions and open to conciliation, although he made rigorous demands upon others as well as upon himself. At the same time, he was an enemy of all underhand intrigues, truthful, simple in manners and pious, a patriot animated by the keenest sense of honor and, if only for this reason, decidedly anti-Macedonian, although otherwise he was not a member of the popular party, but rather had aristocratic leanings. His was an idealizing nature.

The
Patriot-
party:

Hegesippus,

Lycurgus,

With a certain enthusiastic bent he gave himself up to the impression left upon him by the ancient poets; he had a receptive sense for plastic art; he was an admirer of Plato, but refused to allow this to restrain him from an active participation in public life. On the contrary, he trained himself with the utmost conscientiousness as an orator, and took advantage of the influence which he gained in this capacity never to weary in throwing light upon all the defects in the State, in chastising treason and immorality, in maintaining the honorable traditions of the past, and in insisting, as in the houses of the citizens, so also in the affairs of the commonwealth, upon discipline and order.

Hyperides, too, the son of Glaucippus, was of a family of repute, and an eager champion of national independence; but in other respects he was the antitype of Lycurgus. For his was a sensual nature, devoid of any moral anchorage, prone to indulgence in all pleasures; though at the same time he contrived like Alcibiades to keep his intellectual vigor unimpaired. He was a man of original power, to a far higher degree than Lycurgus a born orator, rapid and skilful in the combination of ideas, pointed in expression, fresh and natural and of ready wit. These men were joined by others, such as Polyeuces of Sphettus; Callisthenes, who after the destruction of the Phocian towns called upon the Athenians to place city and country in a condition of defence; Aristonicus, the Anagyrasian; Nausicles, who as general had guarded Thermopylæ (p. 79) the patriotic Diotimus; and lastly Timarchus, Arizelus' son, an Athenian of uncommon activity, who was on many occasions entrusted with public missions, and in his policy stood entirely on the side of Demosthenes, as is proved by the law proposed by him Ol. cviii. 2, B. C. 347-6, in which he moved that the penalty of death should be incurred by all those who supplied the king with ships' furniture or arms.

Polyeuces,
Callisthenes,
Aristonicus,
Nausicles,
Diotimus,
Timarchus.

Thus Demosthenes, who for a series of years had been left in so solitary a position, now saw himself surrounded by a considerable group of sympathetic associates. The serious significance of the times had exercised its effect. Their demands were so clear and so inevitable, that men of the most various tendencies, aristocrats and democrats, philosophers and men of the world, idealizing and simply practical natures, without any previous understanding united in common points of view. It is true that at the same time—and indeed it cannot be otherwise in party-life—some elements united which originally were not homogeneous, impure characters attached themselves to the pure Demosthenes; yet after all it amounted to a great progress, that in the place of the stolid indifference, such as had formerly prevailed, views standing in bold contrast to one another had now formed themselves at Athens. The three fractions of the Peace-party were now confronted by a Patriot-party, which regarded Demosthenes as its leading champion.*

But the more that the national party in Athens drew together, the more inevitable be-
Party-con-
tests in the
law-courts.
 came the conflict between it and its adversaries. In particular it could not be endured, that the partisans of the king should now as heretofore present themselves as honest citizens before the civic body. Right and wrong must become clearly distinguished, so that the consciences of men might become more keen. This purpose had to be served by the law-courts, which among the Athenians were so closely connected with public life, and from which it was customary to expect the ultimate decision even in political differences. Those proceedings, which had not been settled in the popular assembly, had

* Hegesippus on behalf of Cardia: Dem. vii. 43.—Hyperides, son Γλαυκίππου τοῦ ῥήτορος; but the distinguished character of his origin is shown by the hereditary tomb before the Horsemen's Gate: *Vit. X. Orat.* 819.—Callisthenes: Dem. xix. 86. Cf. as to the Attic statesmen of the national party, Schäfer, ii. 298—312.

to be resumed by means of public law-suits; for judicial sentences were required to establish the fact, that the civic community had been most vilely deceived by its plenipotentiaries, in order that hereby the citizens might be forced once for all to dissolve the connexion between themselves and such guides. The suits concerning the embassy were therefore not due to a petty appetite for vengeance or to personal scheming; neither were they useless squabbles about matters settled and irremediable; on the contrary, they were struggles necessary in order to make clear the stand-point of the parties, and together with the authors of the peace to bring the whole matter of the peace itself in its true aspect before the eyes of the Athenians.

Demosthenes v. Æschines.

Demosthenes took the first step, by calling Æschines to account. The customary form was that of a question being promulgated to all the citizens by the Board of Account within thirty days after the completion of an official task: whether any one had any information to bring forward as to neglect of official duties. Demosthenes presented an act of accusation, and declared himself ready, together with Timarchus, who had placed his name together with that of Demosthenes on the presentment, to prove that Æschines had performed his office of ambassador in a manner contravening duty and conscience.

Condemnation of Timarchus.

Demosthenes had every reason for reckoning on success; but he had associated himself with a man, who had nothing in common with him except the immediate party-object, and whose fellowship became very disadvantageous to the whole case.

Ol. cviii. 3
(B. C. 345).

Timarchus was a man of loose habits of life, who had publicly offended against propriety; and however little importance really attached to these faults of character in connexion with the matter at issue, yet Æschines contrived with extreme cunning to take

advantage of this circumstance. He busily accumulated whatever objectionable incidents were to be discovered in the wild youth of Timarchus, and with a hypocritical zeal on behalf of virtue attacked him so effectively, that he was declared to have forfeited his honor as a citizen. The consequence was, that the entire accusation became invalid, and that Æschines not only personally rose in authority with many citizens, but that at the same time an unfavorable light fell upon Demosthenes and his case, on account of his association with such a reprobate. The party-manceuvre had succeeded to perfection. The Philippic faction was again full of confidence; and the king doubtless remembered to encourage his partisans by all kinds of new promises. They once more dared publicly to declare themselves in his favor; Æschines himself already in his speech against Timarchus points anew to the benevolent intentions of Philip; and seizes the occasion for inveighing against Hegesippus, and against Demosthenes as a man dangerous to the city and of pernicious influence upon its youth. The entire speech was a party-speech; and here Æschines was in his own most proper sphere, acting the moralist, with his pathos acquired on the stage, and under this mask continuing successfully to ward off the assault of the national party.

But a decision could not be brought about by this success; it was nothing more than a truce. Demosthenes sustained the indictment even after the condemnation of Timarchus; and although he abstained from immediately resuming it, he only did this because he was awaiting a more favorable moment for the further prosecution of the suit. In consequence of the composition of the Attic juries the entire success of such disputes-at-law depended upon the mood of the civic community; and Demosthenes could safely calculate upon many a thing speedily happening which would remove the guilt of Æschines beyond all question. For it was already suspicious enough that

Æschines had raised a protest, when Demosthenes after the termination of the second embassy submitted himself to the Board of Account, in order to render an account of his proceedings; Æschines maintained that there was no special account required in the case of this second embassy, which was nothing but a continuation of the former and rested on the same instructions and powers. This view was, as was to be expected, rejected by the authorities, who caused Demosthenes, and probably also the other envoys, to render an account, while the indictment remained suspended over Æschines.

The case of
Antiphon.

Ol. cviii. 4
(B. C. 344).

The next years were not favorable to the repute of Æschines. In particular it wore an evil aspect for him, that he took up the case of a certain Antiphon, whom Demosthenes had caused to be arrested, because he was very strongly suspected of having entered into a treasonable engagement with the Macedonians, and having promised in return for gold from Philip to set fire to the ship-sheds of the Piræus. Æschines declared the procedure of Demosthenes, who had here doubtless intervened in some official capacity, to be an unconstitutional encroachment, a violation of civic liberty and of the lawful sanctity of a man's house; he contrived to gain over the popular assembly to his side and to bring about the liberation of the guilty man, although the name of the latter was expunged from the lists of the citizens. But at this point the Areopagus interfered, which we on this occasion see for the first time coming forward as armed with special powers; by its orders Antiphon was arrested anew, brought before a jury, and, his guilt having been proved, put to death.

Condemnation of Philocrates.

Ol. cix. 1 (B.
C. 343).

A fresh blow, suffered by the Macedonian party, proceeded from Hyperides. It was about this time that he subjected to an indictment Philocrates, the most audacious, arrogant, and reckless of all the Macedonians in the Attic camp.

The affair was not treated according to the ordinary course of law, but in the form of an *Eisangelia*, or Indictment of Information, was brought immediately before the civic assembly, in order to stir up the whole community against a popular orator, who counselled it against the interests of the city, and who stood in the pay of the foreigner. Proof was given of the damage which the deceptive embassy-reports of Philocrates had inflicted upon the city; and as the judgment concerning his personal character was established beforehand, he was in spite of the assistance of Æschines unable to ward off the blow dealt against him. He was forced to acknowledge himself vanquished, before the sentence had been passed; while in exile, he was found guilty of the heaviest crimes, and condemned to death.*

Although even after this event Æschines bore himself as if he had had no concern with the sentenced Philocrates, yet already during this case Demosthenes had taken advantage of every opportunity for proving the contrary, and for making clear to the citizens the absolutely equal degree of culpability in Æschines. And the extent to which his authority had suffered by the fall of Philocrates and by his association with the traitor Antiphon, very soon became manifest on another occasion, when the matter in hand was to select a trustworthy man among the Attic orators, who was to be honored with a public commission of a most peculiar kind.

In the Cyclades, and even in Delos, the island most closely connected with Athens, a party had likewise formed itself under Macc-

The Delian
suit.
Ol. cix. 1 (B.
c. 343).

* Rendering of account: Dem. xix. 211; Æschines said: ἡ πρεσβεία ἐπὶ πεπραγμένοις ἐγίγνετο (ii. 123).—Antiphon: Dem. xviii. 132; Plutarch, *Dem.* 14 (σφόδρα ἀριστοκρατικὸν πολίτευμα). Criminal attempts by traitors upon the arsenal mentioned also on other occasions: Ar. *Acharn.* 887. That Philip should have hired a fellow for this purpose is incredible; it is possible that the latter thought to earn a reward *ex post facto*. Boeckh (in *Abhandl. der Berlin. Akad.*, 1834, 12) connects the deed with the διαψήφισις.—Philocrates: Hyperides *pro Euxenipp.* c. 39.

donian influences, which raised its head against the claims to supremacy maintained by the Athenians; indeed, their right to the administration of the Delian sanctuary was called into question. Undoubtedly these movements were connected with the efforts of the Macedonian party, to obtain during the continuance of peace more and more ground in the regions surrounding Athens, and gradually to undermine the remnant of Attic power, which still existed beyond the boundaries of Attica itself. And it must have been most especially in consonance with the designs of Philip, to be here too admitted into the presidency over a national sanctuary, as he had succeeded in being admitted in the case of Delphi, and as he undoubtedly also intended with regard to Olympia (p. 346). The true meaning of these movements is already manifest from the circumstance, that the proceedings of the Delians were directed by a Macedonian partisan, Euthykrates, the same who had betrayed Olynthus, and that they proposed that the legal dispute should be settled at Delphi; for was not this an excellent opportunity for giving a political significance to the new Federal Council there, and for elevating the "Shadow of Delphi" into a power in Greece? Athens was not in a situation allowing her to reject the proposal of the Delians; and it was now of the highest importance to find the right man to represent the cause of Athens before the Federal Tribunal of arbitration. The civic assembly chose Æschines, who seemed to be the born spokesman in all Amphictyonic affairs. Now, this choice could not but appear in the highest degree dangerous to all patriots. How could the most sacred interests of Athens be entrusted, as against Euthykrates, to a man who was himself likewise an adherent of the policy of Philip and an instrument of it, in particular before a tribunal itself standing under Macedonian influence? The national party, therefore, set all its strength in motion, in order to reverse the resolution of the assem-

bly, and was able to carry its proposal that the decision concerning this question of election should be left to the Areopagus. This authority annulled the first election, and appointed as agent for the Athenian case Hyperides, who had quite recently, by the suit against Philocrates, given proof of his patriotism as well as of his energy. He showed himself fully worthy of the confidence reposed in him; and since Philip considered it unadvisable to settle this matter by force, the Athenians, by means of the 'Delian' speech made by Hyperides at Delphi, obtained a judicial decision which solemnly recognized their claims anew.*

After this new defeat had been inflicted upon Æschines, Demosthenes thought that the right moment had arrived for himself to resume the law-suit—the carrying through of which was a matter of conscience to him. He had unchangeably maintained his position, and left no opportunity unused for openly designating his adversary as a traitor and enemy of his native city. The time was come for the civic community to adopt his judgment as its own.

One would suppose that this might have been accomplished without difficulty. For if Philocrates was a traitor, then Æschines could not be innocent, although he had now re-nounced his former associate. In the present case, however, success was far less assured. For Æschines was a man of cunning and caution, who never exposed himself like the clumsy Philocrates; he was a model of genteel propriety, a personage whose whole bearing made it impossible to suspect anything dishonorable in him. He still possessed a very powerful following, because he was the most talented exponent of the views of the party of Eubulus; and as an orator and politician he was still a favorite of the people. Demosthenes, therefore, instead of turning

Resump-
tion of the in-
dictment de
falsâ lega-
tione.

* Delian suit: Dem. xviii. 134; Boeckh in *Abhandl. der Ber'lin. Akad.* 1834
11 seq.

against him with an indictment of information before the civic assembly, as Hyperides had done in the case of Philocrates, summoned him before the Board of Account, and even here brought forward no definite motion for punishment, but simply undertook to prove Æschines' administration of his office of envoy to have been dishonest, while the settlement of the penalty was after this to be left to the judicial court, which the Board of Account was to summon.

Although Demosthenes had adopted the regular course of judicial procedure, yet the whole case was by its nature not adapted for a rigorous lawyer-like treatment. For what was in question was not the transgression of this or that law, but the unpatriotic spirit in which the office entrusted to Æschines by the confidence of the citizens had been administered, the change in his political position, which was only to be explained by external influences, and his dishonest bearing towards the citizens. Here, facts of public notoriety were at hand, rendering superfluous any demonstration rigorously based upon evidence. The entire civic community could be appealed to in witness of how Æschines had formerly borne himself as a fiery patriot, and how a change had come over him in consequence of his sojourn at Pella; how he had since acted in the interests of Philip, and had deceived the citizens by fictitious pretences. Demosthenes is indeed obliged to concede that his adversary may possibly have been deluded himself, and have in good faith communicated to his fellow-citizens the royal promises. But supposing this to have been the case, assuredly after being undeceived Æschines should have averted himself with indignation from the party of the king. Instead of which he had not allowed himself to be in the least degree disturbed in his amicable relations towards Philip, and had even in the most joyous mood joined in the royal celebrations of the victory over the Phocians, in whose ruin he

had borne a hand. The logical conclusion was therefore this: that he had intentionally deceived his fellow-citizens in the most important affairs of State, and had knowingly done his utmost to bring the peace to pass after a fashion, than which none could have been more advantageous for Philip, and none more humiliating and pernicious for Athens.

But although nothing could have been clearer than the main point upon which for Demosthenes everything depended, yet in the case of such a man as Æschines it is intelligible enough that it should have been extremely difficult to establish the measure of guilt, to distinguish accurately between weakness and bad intentions, and to prove treasonable sentiments from particular facts. In attacking Æschines, Demosthenes contended against all traitors, whose number was daily growing in Greece; his wrathful zeal carried him away with it, and the exuberance of his charges redounded to the advantage of his adversary. For when Æschines was represented by Demosthenes as the man who had betrayed Thermopylæ and had introduced the foreign king into the heart of Greece, when to him were ascribed the ruin of Phocis, the overthrow of Cersobleptes,—the points of such accusations could be easily broken on particular heads; Æschines could prove that the capital of the Thracian chieftain had fallen already before the embassy had started on its journey, and that the Tyrants of Phocis had been the causes of their own ruin. He could deny the secret conversations with king Philip with which he was charged, as resting on insufficient evidence; he could in particular point out, how unjust it was to make him responsible before all other men for everything, and to treat him as if he, and he alone, were accountable for Philip and for the peace. And most especially was the position of Æschines favorable in this respect, that the personal attack upon him was at the same time an attack upon the peace itself, and could not there-

fore but cause apprehension in all peace-loving citizens. For a condemnation of Æschines would have amounted to a new rift between Philip and Athens, to an indirect declaration on the part of the civic community, that it desired to redeem its honor, which the peace had pledged away.

Æschines was quite the man to turn to the fullest account this favorable conjuncture of existing circumstances. Like a skilful wrestler he slips from the grasp of his overwhelmingly powerful adversary, and instead of entering upon a serious justification of himself against the gist of the accusation, he takes advantage of every particular weakness, mocks at the overflowing measure of responsibility cast upon his poor head, and represents the entire case as one of political differences, which a law-court is an altogether unfit place to decide. As against this savage agitator, he is, he declares, the victim of the party-tendency anxious to preserve to the Athenians the peace, which after all has not yet failed to prove a blessing to their city in reference to material prosperity, not less than to their civic constitution. He made use of the good opinion which prevailed concerning him personally among the Athenians, in order to designate such crimes as those imputed to him as utterly irreconcilable with his character. He exerted all the art of eloquence, all the charm of his voice which moved the hearts of men. At the same time he was favored by the circumstance, that it was he who spoke last, and that his opponent had no opportunity of effacing again the impression of the Æschinean eloquence; lastly, personages so highly respected as Eubulus and Phocion came forward in his behalf; so that the mighty contest between the two greatest orators of Athens in the fourth year after its commencement ultimately closed with Æschines being acquitted on the indictment for violation of his duty, and being declared free from all obligation to render an account.

Acquittal of
Æschines.
Ol. cix. 2
(B. C. 343).

But a victory it was not,—rather the reverse. For only thirty votes acquitted the accused; and those who were aware of the situation of affairs knew very well that this majority was not founded on a conviction of the innocence of Æschines; but that it had been brought together by external influences, by currents of feeling, considerations and views, which were quite remote from the real question of law. Although, therefore, the result achieved was not that which had been desired, yet Demosthenes had no cause to repent the labor which he had bestowed upon this contest; for with the better part of the citizens his authority had after all only increased, and they had attained to a clearer distinction between Right and Wrong.*

During these contests within the city, foreign affairs too had again become a subject of discussion; and just as among the citizens Demosthenes incessantly pursued the party of Philip, so he had outside Attica followed the king himself in all his undertakings, tracing out every one of his designs, and opposing them with all the resources at his command.

Foreign
affairs:
Peloponne-
sus.

The first occasion was offered by the affairs of Peloponnesus. Here a task of special difficulty awaited the policy of Athens. Sparta was the most vigorous and independent among the states of the peninsula; but no overtures could be made to her, lest her adversaries should be rendered wroth, and driven over completely to the Macedonian side. And the attention of Demosthenes had above all to be directed towards preventing any

* *Πρεσβείας εὐθύνας*, Dem. xix. 103, before the *Logistæ* (in contradistinction to the *εἰσαγγελία παραπροσβείας*, Æschin. ii. 139): Schäfer, ii. 358—390. Discussion of the same points without express reference to a previous law-suit (hence the doubts with reference to the latter already *ap.* Plutarch, *Dem.* 15, and in our days in O. Haupt, *Leben des Dem.*, who in opposition to the testimony of Idomeneus considers both orations party-pamphlets) thirteen years afterwards in the speeches of Demosthenes and Æschines for and against Ctesiphon. Concerning the contradictions between the earlier and later speeches, see L. Spengel, *Dem. Vertheidig. des Ktesiph.*, 1866.

Greek State from furnishing an opportunity to the king of extending the domain of his supremacy under a legal pretext. It was therefore of the utmost importance to open the eyes of the Peloponnesian communities to the true character of the Macedonian policy, and there as at Athens to excite against Philip that mistrust, which was the fundamental condition of a firm, national attitude.

Demosthenes in Peloponnesus.

Ol. cviii. 4 (B. c. 344).

For this purpose, by the advice of Demosthenes envoys proceeded to the peninsula, after Philip had already commenced his political action there, had promised aid, had sent mercenaries and had issued ordinances as a supreme authority (p. 345). Demosthenes himself was the leader of the embassy. His speeches were spread outside Athens too as fly-sheets; and thus he appeared before the citizens at Messene as well as at Argos as a friend of the people, well known and admired on account of his love of liberty, in order to warn them against the king, whose attention was now directed towards Peloponnesus, and who was introducing himself among them as their friend and benefactor, and as the guardian of their independence. But let them look around them and convince themselves, from the example of other states, what were the real fruits of the favors of a Philip. He bade them think of Olynthus. "Consider," he said, "ye men of Messene, how full of confidence were the Olynthians, and with what indignation they listened to any one who blamed the king, when he made them a present of Anthemus and Potidæa. Was it well possible for them in those days to expect such a doom as that which they afterwards suffered? Would they not have laughed in the face of any one who should have prophesied it to them? And yet they have deceived themselves so bitterly, and, after for a short time enjoying the territory of their neighbors, they have for ever lost their own, have been shamefully driven out, and not only been conquered, but also betrayed and bartered away by

their own fellow-citizens! From this ye may learn, that to free states no advantage ever results from intimate intercourse with Tyrants. And was the lot of the Thessalians perchance a better one? When Philip expelled their Tyrants, when he bestowed upon them Nicæa and Magnesia, do ye suppose that they then expected the introduction of the Ten, by whom they are now governed, and that they could believe that the prince, who restored to them their seat and vote in the Amphictyonic League, would appropriate to himself their revenues and tolls? Assuredly not; and yet every one knows that this has actually come to pass. See, then, what Philip is, with his gifts and his promises! God grant, that ye too may not speedily make acquaintance with Philip and his deceptions! Many inventions have been made by men, in order to protect their cities, such as ramparts and walls and fosses and other artificial works. Intelligent men possess a natural resource of defence, which is useful and salutary to all, but most especially to free communities against Tyrants. This resource is that of mistrust. This I beseech you to preserve to yourselves; this will save you! For what is it above all to which your efforts are directed? Liberty, ye reply. So be it. Do ye not see, how already the title of Philip is in conflict with this? For whosoever is a King or Tyrant, he is an enemy of liberty and of civic constitutions. Be then well on your guard, lest, while endeavoring to escape from a war, ye saddle yourselves with a despotic master."

The mighty force of Demosthenes had its effect. His words excited applause and admiration; the more high-minded among the citizens of Messene and Argos were illuminated by a just understanding of the situation, and set aglow with a Hellenic love of liberty. But the sentiments of the multitude it was impossible to change. The appearance of Demosthenes was only like the performance of a brilliant visitor

The hearing of the Peloponnesians.

on the stage. No sooner had it passed away, than the hearts of his hearers grew cold; and with their former indifference they again pursued the narrow-hearted interests of their selfish domestic policy, which was afraid of nothing but Sparta. Nowhere was the self-seeking tendency which besets the policy of petty states more potent than in the peninsula; nowhere were men's eyes more determinedly shut against the broad aspect of affairs important to the world at large. They fancied themselves thoroughly secure behind the passes of the Isthmus, and deemed it sheer folly that it should be attempted to frighten the mountain-towns of Peloponnesus with the burning of Olynthus. It was too convenient for them to find the protection formerly furnished by Thebes at once supplied by a prince mighty in war, whose orders in truth the states of secondary rank far more willingly obeyed than those of a Hellenic commonwealth, which had itself only recently stepped forth from the number of the secondary states.

Notwithstanding this, the proceedings of Demosthenes had frightened the partisans of Macedonia; their chief leaders, Neon and Thrasylochus at Messene, Myrtis, Teledamus and Mnaseas at Argos, would not listen to any proposals for the termination of the discords at home; they redoubled their exertions; after the admonitions of Demosthenes they only all the more persistently excited their fellow-citizens against Sparta, and at the same time against all supposed friends of Sparta, whom they declared to be also the foes of Peloponnesian liberty; and they cast suspicion upon Athens herself, as having arrived at a secret understanding with Sparta. From Macedonia this movement was encouraged, in order that difficulties might be created for the Athenians, and damage inflicted upon the democratic party; and thus an embassy was sent to Athens on the part of the cities, to demand explanations as to the relations be-

Pelopon-
nesian
embassy
at Athens.

tween Sparta and Athens. Macedonian envoys arrived at Athens together with the Peloponnesian, in order to support the cause of the latter, and at the same time to proffer complaints as to the uninterrupted insults heaped upon the king on the Attic orators' tribune.*

Such was the result of the efforts of Demosthenes. Instead of the Peloponnesians having been severed from Philip, they were more closely united than ever, and confronted the Athenians as *one* party. But this failed to break his courage; it merely offered him an opportunity for indicating with increased firmness and clearness the standpoint of himself and his friends; as he did in the popular assembly, in which the reply to be made to the foreign envoys was debated.

"In order to settle what we have to do,"—
 such was the gist of this speech—"we must know what Philip intends. If he is the friend of the Hellenes, as he pretends to be, those are in the right who follow him; but if he is the reverse, we are in the right who contend against him with all the resources at our command. Now, the answer to this question, which is decisive as to our conduct, lies in the facts within the experience of all of us. Philip has gone forward, step by step, in order to make the Hellenes his subjects; his measures show that he shrinks from no act of force. He is no king desirous of justice; he seeks dominion and naught else. He makes himself master of one after the other of the bulwarks and inlets of Hellas; and now also advances in the peninsula according to a definite plan. Therefore, in spite of all treaties of peace concluded by him, Philip is, and remains, the enemy of all Hellenes, and our enemy in particular. For the real goal which he keeps in view is Athens. Athens, he well knows, he can-

The Second Philippic.

OL. cix. 1
(B. C. 344).

* Of his speech at Messene, Demosthenes furnishes a report, vi. 20. The party-leaders: Dem. xviii. 295. Envoys in Athens from Philip also: Libanius, *Introd. to Dem.* 6.

not catch by the bait of false pretences, as he has caught Thebes and the Peloponnesian cities. It is a sign of honorable recognition, paid by him to the civic community of Athens, that he should not even venture upon the attempt to make you his allies by temptations unworthy of you, and thus to divert you from your Hellenic mission!" After the orator had thus under the eyes of the foreign envoys impressively shown to his fellow-citizens, as well as to the Greeks who were present, what sentiments all true Hellenes ought to entertain towards Philip, he brought forward the draft of the reply which ought to be made. Doubtless satisfactory declarations were made to Messene and the other cities as to the fact that Athens had no intention of subjecting them once more to the yoke of Sparta; while, on the other hand, a firm resolve was expressed to defend Sparta against any attack; for this, it was declared, was the patriotic task which Athens would never shrink from fulfilling: in every quarter to protect existing rights and to oppose foreign attempts at interference.

It was long since such an assembly of the citizens had been held at Athens. The city of Aristides seemed to have come to life again. The Peloponnesians could not refrain from acknowledging the grandeur of the bearing of a civic community under such leaders; and in so far Demosthenes actually gained his immediate object, that the dangerous hostilities in the peninsula were appeased, and that no opportunity was given to Philip for intervention. Now, since about the same time the Macedonian attempt upon Megara (p. 347) likewise failed, and this city joined Athens, who would seem to have furnished effective neighborly succor, Philip deemed that he ought no longer to remain an inactive spectator of the gradual process by which the defiant spirit of independence was acquiring more and more strength. It amounted to an involuntary recognition paid by him to the successes ob-

tained by his great adversary, that he should have resolved to send an embassy to Athens, in order to justify his policy, and to enter a solemn protest against the suspicions cast upon it. It was simultaneously a confession of his belief that the men of his party at Athens were incapable of performing this task; they had incurred too great a loss of authority, to be able to stem the growing feeling of ill-will against him. He therefore considered a direct message on his part called for, and selected as the bringer of it a Greek orator, who had received his education at Athens, and who seemed to be an adequate adversary of Demosthenes and his associates. This was Python, a native of Byzantium. In order to make this mission more impressive, Philip surrounded this envoy with a stately suite. His allies were instructed to take part in the embassy.

Python at
Athens.

Ol. cix. 1
(B. C. 343).

He wished hereby not only to display his power in its full splendor, but also to make the other communities witnesses of his ability to humiliate the champions of liberty on the Attic tribune.

In fact he already bore himself as a monarch, who learns with displeasure the movements of discontent and contradiction in his states, and addresses his dependants in ungracious terms, because they give ear to men who make it their task to attack all the measures of the king. He renews the assurance of his benevolent intentions. But at the same time, he declares, a continuance of mistrust would really have the result of converting the benefactor into an enemy. Instead of incessantly vituperating the peace once concluded, the Athenians ought rather once more to review and examine the treaties. For this purpose he offered his co-operation, and declared himself ready to consent to alterations which seemed desirable in the interests of the city.

The skilful and brilliant speech of Python had its effect; an apparent readiness for concessions was the best way for

depriving the incessant attacks upon the peace of their force; and the Philippic orators at Athens, with whom Python had from the first established an understanding, felt that a point had been gained in their favor, since they could now appeal to the royal message, as simply confirming what they had invariably asserted. But their adversaries refused to be allowed themselves to be silenced. Demosthenes demonstrated after so vigorous a fashion the false game played by Philip, that the confederates present were themselves obliged publicly to attest the truthfulness of his argument, and to acknowledge the mistrust of the Athenians to be well founded. Hegesippus on the other hand entered into the subject of the proffered revision of the treaties, in order to test the extent to which the king's intentions were serious on this head. The Peace of Philocrates had been concluded on the basis of the *status quo*; each was to retain "what he had." This provision, in itself unfavorable after the conquests made by the king, had become yet more so in consequence of the treacherous delay of the actual conclusion of the peace. Hegesippus therefore proposed an alteration of the expression in the treaty, to the effect that each should retain "his own;" and as the envoys made no protest, it was thought possible that the king might accede to this basis, and at all events in certain points allow, not the mere *status quo*, but the right of possession to be decisive. In this the proposers specially had in view the island of Halonnesus (p. 347). Hegesippus proved how a real peace could only be brought about, if the one side acknowledged the rights of the other, and if the provisions of the peace were made secure against arbitrary encroachments. Secondly, if the peace was to endure, all the Hellenes ought to be allowed to accede to it, and the independence of all neutral states ought to be solemnly guaranteed. In this sense Hegesippus moved a revision of the treaties, which the king himself had suggested as feasible; on this basis he asked that negotiations

with Philip might proceed, in order that it might become clear, whether he was the peace-loving prince which he was represented to be by Python.

The motion was passed, and an embassy deputed to Pella under the leadership of the proposer of the motion. Philip received it with undisguised vexation. The very persons of the envoys revealed to him the change which had taken place in public opinion at Athens. He accordingly treated them at Pella as his adversaries, offered them no hospitality, and even punished the poet Xenoclide, who had received them into his house, by banishing him from the realm. Their proposals he refused to condescend to discuss. He regarded it as criminal insolence, that it should be dared to call into question the entire basis of the treaties, that important seaports should be demanded back, that it should be desired against his clearly-expressed will to admit other states to participation in the treaties, and to bring about as against himself a combination of states, the sole purpose of which was to hinder him in his undertakings. For the present, however, he contented himself with sending home the envoys with an abrupt rejection of their demands; and, without paying any further attention to Athens, where Demosthenes was fighting out his quarrel with Æschines, Philip calmly continued to pursue the execution of his schemes, the object of which was to assume positions of increasing strength and fixity in the circuit of the Hellenic states. Now, from this point of view no country possessed greater importance for him than Eubœa. Here he might take Athens on her most vulnerable side; here he found the best-situated points of attack; here he commanded the route of supplies to Athens, and inserted himself with his power between the city and the Cyclades, where, as the case of Delos shows, his party was already extremely active. In Eubœa he had no lack of the de-

Hegesippus
in Macedo-
nia.

Ol. cix. 1
(B. C. 343).

Philip's
troops in
Eubœa.

Ol. cix. 1
(B. C. 343).

sired opportunities (p. 275 *seq.*); for in all the island-towns the civic body was divided, and the friends of Macedonia were in conflict with the patriots. Ambitious party-leaders were on the watch for the support of the king, in order by means of it to subject to themselves the communities; and, while the credulous among the Athenians still held fast to the hope, which Philocrates and his friends had fostered, that the day was not distant when the benevolent Philip would hand over the whole island to them, they now had to see dispositions made rendering two of its chief cities strong points of support for the Macedonian arms. From Eretria the national party was expelled by Philippic mercenaries; and this city as well as Oreus, the territory of which at that time included a quarter of the whole island, and which by its situation commanded the most important maritime routes (vol. ii. p. 451), were by Parmenio delivered up into the hands of Tyrants, who held sway there as royal vassals. Geræstus and Chalcis still maintained their independence; and the latter city now acquired a prominent importance. Here there was most political activity; here the plan was devised of bringing about a combination among the Eubœan towns; and Callias, one of the most highly-considered among the leaders of the citizens, sought to obtain support for this scheme at the Macedonian court. But to the designs of Philip every movement of independent policy among the Greeks and every combination among Hellenic communities were repugnant; and since Callias had no inclination to submit unconditionally to the royal orders, while at Thebes too he failed to find any support for his plans, he turned to Athens, and caused his fellow-citizens to furnish him with powers for proffering a defensive alliance to the latter city. The matter came under discussion, probably soon after the termination of the suit concerning the embassy (p. 368). Æschines was the representative of the Eubœan governments friendly to Macedonia. He warned

the Athenians against accepting such proposals, which would bring on the war with Philip; and in order also to put forward a seemingly patriotic reason for rejecting the offer, the orators of his party declared it not to be in consonance with the dignity of Athens that she should associate herself with Chalcis, a city formerly subject to her, on conditions of equality. But Demosthenes refuted these arguments, and brought about the conclusion of a defensive and offensive alliance with Chalcis. This was the first determined act of the civic community, which was recovering the vigor of its ancient spirit of liberty; and its consequence was, that the control of the Euripus-channel, which the king thought already to have in his hands, was successfully taken out of his grasp.*

alliance
between
Athens and
Chalcis.

At the same time, ever indefatigable, he was at work in the seas on the other side of Greece. Here he had already several years previously (p. 65) established intimate connexions with the royal house of the Molossians,—connexions which, as will be remembered to have been the case in all other places, at first wore a very friendly and peaceable aspect, until it seemed good to him to reveal his real intentions. Arybbas had been highly delighted to see the mighty neighbor-prince a suitor for the hand of his niece, and thought himself hereby made safe in his own dominion. But together with Olympias her brother Alexander had also come to the Macedonian court. The latter had now grown up to manhood, and had become a useful instrument for converting the country of Epirus into a Philippic vassal-state. The king hereupon at the head of an army conducted his brother-in-law into his father's kingdom, and availed him-

Revolutionary
changes in
Epirus.

OL. cix. 2 (B. C. 343).

* Python: Æschin. ii. 125; Schäfer, ii. 352. Hegesippus (ἐκατέρους ἔχειν τὰ ἑαυτῶν instead of ἃ ἔχουσιν), author of the (so-called *Seventh Philippic*) Oration πρὸς Ἀλουνήσου. Xenoclides: Dem. xix. 331.—Callias. Æschin. iii. 89.

self of this opportunity to subjugate the Greek colonies on the coast; he went on as far as the gulf of Ambracia, and established connexions with the Ætolians, the most vigorous of the tribes of Central Greece, whom he brought over to his side by promising them in a special treaty the recovery of Naupactus, which was at this time in the hands of the Achæans. Naupactus was the ancient place of transit to Peloponnesus, and moreover one of the most important posts of the Attic naval power; and of course the king had the port in view only for his own purposes.

The eyes of the Athenians followed all the movements of the king. It was clear, that after the failure of his attempt upon Megara he was anxious to open to himself a new way of access to the peninsula. They accordingly without delay sent envoys into the regions now threatened, in order to direct the attention of the Corinthians and Achæans, of the Acarnanians, Leucadians, and Ambraciotes to the danger, to summon them to be vigilant, and to promise them aid. In order to give impressiveness to their words, they about the same time sent auxiliary troops to the Acarnanians, their ancient allies (vol. iii. p. 150), and without hesitation openly acknowledged as their friend, and gave refuge to, the expelled king of the Epirotes, who had fled to them. Finally, while Philip was in Epirus, they also sought to agitate Thessaly, and the Attic envoy Aristodemus was able successfully to establish connexions leading to important results with the towns in that country.

Thessaly
divided
among te-
trarchs.

Ol. cix. 2 (B.
c. 342).

Philip rapidly returned home across Mount Pindus, and let the Thessalians experience the heaviness of his hand. It was time, he thought, for them at last to be thoroughly cured of their craving for change and freed from the delusion, that the Phocian War had caused them to enter into a new era of national movement. The crafty king made use of the division into districts, which had

been established under the sway of the Aleuadae for the purpose of a distribution of military burdens (vol. ii. p. 273), in order, while apparently following ancient national ordinances, to divide the country into four parts, to place the several parts of territory, torn from one another, under tetrarchs entirely dependent upon himself, and thus to dispose absolutely over all Thessaly and its resources. In no other way could the unquiet spirit of the people have been more despotically bent. There was no longer any Thessaly in existence; and the numerous separate Hellenic town-communities were no longer anything but villages devoid of rights and belonging to Macedonian provinces. The Aleuadae, to whom at the present time all national interests were as foreign as at the period of the Persian Wars, consented to fill the posts of tetrarchs conferred upon them.*

It was probably during his stay in Thessaly that Philip again entered into communications with Athens. He was perhaps conscious of the fact, that on the occasion of the last embassy he had broken them off too harshly. But his real reason lay in his wish to bind the hands of the Athenians by means of new treaties; for to his painful astonishment he became aware of the change in their bearing, and saw them coming forward against him with great determination in Peloponnesus, in Acarnania, nay even in the domain of his own alliance, in Thessaly. The war-resources of Athens were by sea still superior to his own, and well capable of hindering him in the execution of his wider schemes. But it was always a dangerous sign when Philip sought to approach the Athenians; for every

* Epirus: Dem. i. 13; Harpocr. s. v. Ἀρύβας ('Αρύββας in inscriptions; Ἀρύμβας ap. Diod.; Plutarch; Justin. vii. 6).—Ambracia and Naupactus: Hegesippus, § 32; Dem. ix. 27.—The embassy of Aristodemus to Thessaly is a fact which has only recently become known to us, from the *Schol. ad Æschin* iii. 83 (πρεσβεύσαντος instead of ἐπιστρατεύσαντος, ed. F. Schultz, p. 181). See Schultz in *Neue Jahrb. für Phil.* 1866, p. 311. Wreaths bestowed upon the envoys: Æschin. u. s.—Thessaly divided into four parts: Dem. ix. 26.

attempt of the kind was wont to be the predecessor of undertakings, in the execution of which he had to expect a justifiable resistance on the part of Athens.

King Philip's letter to the Athenians.
Ol. cix. 2 (B. C. 342).

This time he made his advances by means of a letter, which he had very skilfully drawn up in such terms, that it seemed readily to enter upon the wishes of the Athenians, indeed to offer even more than was desired. Halonnesus, he wrote, should not be the cause of any discord between them; he would make a present to the Athenians of the island, which he had taken out of the hands of the pirates. In future Macedonia and Athens should in common guard the sea and suppress buccaneering. At the same time he offered a commercial treaty, which was to unite the two countries more closely than before, and repeated his willingness to engage in a revision of the points objected to in the treaties, with only this reservation, that he must declare it never to have been his intention to abandon the basis of the actual *status quo* of possessions at the time of the conclusion of the peace. But, though he had formerly declined the admission of the hitherto neutral states into the treaty, he was now no longer opposed to their acceding *ex post facto*, and thereby acquiring a guarantee for their independence. On the other hand, as to the cities which were said to have been occupied by him after the conclusion of the treaty, as well as to the questions of territorial possession in the Chersonnesus, he proposed that a tribunal of arbitration should decide.

These were the main points in this most important message, in which he had brought together everything capable of creating an impression upon the Athenians, apparent concessions and courteous offers, earnest protests against hostile tendencies and warnings against unbending obstinacy, promises, menaces;—in short, the letter was such a mixture of kindness and severity, that he might

thereby hope to terrify some, and gain over or confirm in their attitude the others.

His envoys did what was in their power to comment upon the letter according to the meaning of its author; his partisans helped them to accommodate the proposals as well as possible to the ears of the Athenians, and urgently recommended their acceptance. It was therefore no easy task for the patriots to counteract the impression made by this message, and to induce the citizens to give an answer worthy of the city. This task fell above all to the lot of Hegesippus, to whose embassy the reply proper had now been made; and he was quite the man to make clear in a straightforward way, intelligible to all and impressive, the true stand-point from which it behooved them to judge the offers of Philip. In the first instance he claimed for all Athenians perfect liberty of speech, and protested against Philip's taking upon himself to signify his approval or disapproval of speeches made before the civic assembly. Then he passed to the subject of Halonnesus. The island, he said, belongs to the Athenians, whose rights of property are not cancelled through a temporary occupation by pirates. What is ours, we cannot accept as a gift; nor can we ever permit the king to dispose of Hellenic soil according to his choice, and in so doing even to play the part of a magnanimous donor, and to bestow benefits upon us,—benefits which it is humiliating for us to accept. And as to the tribunal of arbitration, the power of Athens is at an end, if we consent to carry on law-suits concerning our possessions, concerning our islands, with the man of Pella; and it is equally little in consonance with the honor of Athens for us to divide with him the watch over the sea. His only desire is hereby to acquire the right of putting in with his ships of war at whatsoever points he chooses. The commercial treaty offered is likewise merely a trap. In itself by no means

Speech of
Hegesippus
concerning
Halonnesus.

indispensable, its sole purpose is to make the court of Philip the highest tribunal of appeal in national affairs, while it was formerly customary that all treaties concluded with Athens received their final ratification at the hands of the civic body.

With reference to the revision of the treaties offered, Hegesippus said, Philip had by a previous embassy declared in the hearing of everybody his readiness to enter upon proposals for alterations. His own (Hegesippus') proposal, which the citizens had accepted, was indeed in conflict with the compact of Philocrates, but on the other hand alone in consonance with justice and with the true interests of Athens. That Philip would have nothing to do with it, simply proved that he was altogether not in earnest as to the proffered revision.

The same was the case with regard to the admission of the other Hellenes, who had hitherto had no part in the treaties. This Athens had required as being equitable, and Philip himself at present conceded the equity of the demand. He was accordingly desirous, that the independence of the Greek states should be guaranteed by the enlargement of the treaties; but at the same time were taking place the occupation of Pheræ, the application of force to Epirus, the campaign against Ambracia, the subjugation of the colonies on the Ionian Sea. How was it possible in view of such facts to trust the words of the king, and to credit him with respect for Hellenic communal liberty? The same was likewise his course of proceeding in the affairs of the Chersonnesus, where he was continuing to refuse to give up Attic property to the Athenians, and anxious to bring a fact clear as day, such as the boundary-settlement with regard to Cardia, before a tribunal of arbitration.

Demosthenes supported the speech of Hegesippus; and specially pointed out the fact that a tribunal of arbitration which treated disputed questions with justice and indepen-

dence, was absolutely not to be discovered. In spite of all the counter-efforts of the Macedonian party, the civic assembly declared in favor of Hegesippus, and the proposals of Philip were rejected as unacceptable. This rejection very considerably increased the previous uneasiness of relations; the peace outwardly continued, but in fact it had been terminated; the citizens had repeatedly given expression to their objections to the existing treaties, while they had declined the revision which accorded with the wishes of the king. Hereupon it was inevitable that sooner or later the sham peace should come to an end; and war broke out, not, however, in Hellas itself, but in the Chersonnesus.*

Philip's
proposals
rejected.

Ol. cix. 2
(B. C. 342).

The Thracian peninsula was, notwithstanding its remoteness, connected with Athens in the very closest intimacy of relations; for it was one of the most ancient and permanent traditions of Attic policy to look upon this peninsula, because it commanded the northern maritime routes, in the light of a transmarine part of Attica. On this head the civic community was more provident, vigilant, and resolute than in all the other fields of foreign policy. The Chersonnesus was regarded as an inalienable public domain, where the State had the right of disposing over the soil; and even during the period in which all the other relations of Athens beyond the sea had grown slack, the practice was continued of sending out colonies to the Chersonnesus, after the precedent of Pericles (vol. ii. p. 534), in order to provide for Athenians not possessed of property, and to secure the dominion of Athens there.

The
Thracian
Cherson-
nesus.

Shortly before the Social War, the territorial relations

* The oration *περὶ Ἀλοννήσου*, or more precisely (according to Dionysius), *πρὸς τοὺς Φιλίππου πρέσβεις* ὅτι *πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν καὶ τοὺς πρέσβεις τοὺς παρὰ Φιλίππου*. Demosthenes too declines to accept Halonnesus, *εἰ δίδωσιν ἄλλα μὴ ἀποδίδωσι*. Verbal quibbling, according to Æschin. iii. 83.

in the Chersonnesus had been advantageously organized by the successes of Chares (p. 113?); six years later Sestus had been taken (p. 234); and the entire peninsula was Attic land from the southernmost point up to Cardia. In the upper country it was sought to maintain Attic influence by means of connexions with the native princes,—a policy which Demosthenes had recommended, as in clear accordance with the interests of Athens, in his speech against Aristocrates.

In proportion as hereupon Philip established himself more firmly in the upper country, made Cersobleptes his vassal, entered into an alliance with Cardia, and revealed his intention of extending his dominion in the direction of the Propontis and the Pontus, it became the more important to be vigilant, and to strengthen the positions in this endangered outwork, which was not of less significance to Philip, than it was to Athens. Accordingly, before the year was out in which the letter of Philip had occasioned the discussion at Athens concerning a revision of the treaties, a number of citizen-colonists were despatched to the Chersonnesus, in order to strengthen the colony there. In consideration of the difficult state of affairs, a man of talent as a general and of acknowledged bravery of heart, Diopithes, was chosen as leader of this band of citizens. He was a man resolved not to allow the interests of his native city to be prejudiced in his hands, and one who was bold enough to proceed on his own responsibility, in case the authorities at home should leave him in the lurch.

Diopithes
on the Hel-
lespont.

Ol. cix. 2 (B.
c. 342).

This came to pass soon enough. Diopithes, meeting with resistance, contrived to obtain moneys by privateering operations, for the purpose of hiring troops, and then advanced against Cardia, which entertained hostile sentiments and received support from Philip. Indeed, in the year 341 he even invaded Macedonian territory, pillaged the country, took fortified places, and sold the prisoners.

This daring conduct caused extreme astonishment. It was the first time since the peace that the proceedings of the Athenians had passed the limits of bold speeches, of answers declining proposals, of embassies stimulating others to movement, and of military demonstrations. Philip immediately raised a complaint and demanded satisfaction, while he already stood with his troops in Upper Thrace and drew to him reinforcements from Macedonia and Thessaly.

In the summer the affair came to be discussed in the civic assembly. The parties were directly opposed to one another. The adherents of Philip took full advantage of the opportunity for attacking their adversaries, who, they said, were with criminal frivolity involving the State in the most perilous quarrels, who could not even hold their hands, when Philip was so far distant from the Attic frontiers. They demanded the recall of Diopithes, and the infliction of punishment upon him for his self-willed proceedings, whereby he had by land and by sea broken the peace.

The facts were not to be denied; it only depended upon the light in which they were viewed. And now Demosthenes appeared before the civic assembly, in order to put the question before it from another point of view. The guilt or innocence of Diopithes he declared to be a secondary question; the real point at issue was the condition of affairs, not a mere question of persons. It was very well for the opposite party to say that the present state of things was insupportable; that either open war should be declared to the king, or peace honestly kept. "This decision," says Demosthenes, "is not in our power at all. Philip maintained that he was keeping the peace, when he was marching his troops into Oreus, occupying Cardia, and pulling down the walls of Pheræ. If Philip takes Attic property and destroys Greek cities, that is no *casus belli*; but if we once in a way proceed to action, and

Speech of
Demosthe-
nes concern-
ing the Cher-
sonnesus.

Ol. cix. 3 (B.
c. 341).

anywhere hold our own, complaints are made about a violation of legal obligations. Are those who judge after this fashion Athenians? Such tenderness of conscience is nothing but treason. We must at all times be armed for warding off his blows, since when he comes he always comes unexpectedly. And now, when our troops happen to be on the spot, we are of our own free impulse to gratify the king by leaving the Hellespont uncovered, and this at the time of the Etesian winds, which will soon prevent us from sailing thither, while he is assembling his troops there! And the general, who once in a way displays determination,—this general we are to punish, while in fact no one else is at fault but the citizens themselves, that objections can be raised against the conduct of Diopithes; for it is only the want of home support which has forced him to seek for means of maintenance elsewhere! Ourselves we ought to accuse, not him. We ought to be ashamed of sending round envoys to all the states, in order to call upon them to be vigilant against Philip, while we do nothing ourselves for our preservation. For it is our preservation which is in question; this we ought clearly to perceive. We must make up our minds to the fact that Philip hates us, our city, the ground on which it stands, all its inhabitants, even those who now boast of his friendship, but first and foremost our constitution. And for this he has good reason; for he is very well aware how, even should he have brought everything else into his power, he yet can call nothing his own in safety, so long as here among us popular government prevails, inasmuch as, should any disaster happen to him, such as may in many ways befall a man, all those whom he now holds together by force will come to us and take refuge here; for you Athenians are by your character and your constitution not adapted for making conquests and founding a dominion, but on the other hand you are indeed adapted for placing yourselves in the path of the

grasping ambition of others, for taking from them their spoils, and for helping all men to secure liberty." The still continuing strong aversion of the Athenians from expense and exertion Demosthenes combats by calling upon them to consider what awaits them, unless they do what is requisite. "For," he says, "supposing you to have one of the gods as a security for Philip's leaving you untouched, in case you hold your hands and abandon everything: it is indeed, by Zeus and all the gods, shameful for you and your city to sacrifice in indolent stolidity the whole number of the other Hellenes; and I for my part would rather be a dead man than give such advice. But if another says it and convinces you,—be it so; abstain from defending yourselves; give up everything! But of course the fact is, that no man believes in any such thing. On the contrary, we all know: the more we allow him to take, the further he advances, and the more powerful he becomes, to our cost and to our damage. Therefore we ought assuredly to arrive at a decision as to the point up to which we are willing to fall back, and at which, ye Athenians, we are ready to begin to do our duty." 'Well then, when the moment of necessity arrives.' "But that which free men call necessity has already long ago and abundantly come upon us; since for such men there is nothing more intolerable than the shame aroused by what they are forced to see done every day. But that which slaves call necessity—chastisement and outrage—may the gods never let us undergo!"

Thus Demosthenes expounds to his fellow-citizens the serious nature of the situation; he calls upon them to keep the troops together, to pay property-tax, to unite the Hellenic states for the pursuit of a common policy, and to inflict punishment upon those statesmen who serve the foe of the fatherland.

The mighty speech produced its effect. The Macedonian partisans suffered a fresh defeat, and Diopithes was

not recalled. But the success was notwithstanding an insufficient one. In the one particular case the Athenians had acted in a rational and manly way; but their general proceedings still left much to be desired; the imminent danger was still not present to their minds under a sufficiently close and bodily aspect; they were still unwilling to renounce the wonted sweetness of peace, and still persuaded themselves that Demosthenes after all took an unwarrantably dark view of the state of things. He

The Third
Philippic.

Ol. cix. 3
(B. C. 341).

therefore a few weeks after his last speech appeared once more before the civic assembly, in order to explain to it after a still more impressive fashion, how in reality the peace no longer existed, as Philip and his friends mendaciously pretended: how since the forcible reduction of Phocis war had incessantly been made upon Athens; and how the present issue was, not the Hellespont and Byzantium, but the city of the Athenians themselves, and Hellas. During the last fourteen years, says Demosthenes, Philip has been incessantly intent, wherever Hellenes dwell, upon carrying through with an unrestricted use of violence the schemes of his lust of dominion. "More than thirty Hellenic towns he has destroyed in Thrace, so that over the soil which they covered men may pass without being aware of them; at Delphi he has deprived us of our rights, and lets one of his servants exercise the presidency there. Thermopylæ is occupied by his troops; the existence of Phocis as a country is annihilated; Thessaly is torn asunder and in bondage; in Eubœa he has established despots: Megara he has threatened, and Ambracia and Leucas. Elis and the other Peloponnesian cities he has already in his hands; Naupactus he promises to the Ætolians; Echinus, the Bœotian frontier-town, he has taken without ceremony from the Thebans; and as he is on the one side stretching out his hands towards the Ionian Sea, so on the other he is extending his grasp towards the

Hellespont, holds Cardia occupied, marches upon Byzantium,—and of such an advance on all sides are the Hellenes remaining tranquil spectators, as if a natural force were in question,—a hail-cloud, on the approach of which every man contents himself with praying that it may spare his fields? The same Hellenes, who were formerly so sensitive and jealous, if a Hellenic city asserted its superior power, now allow the most shameful wrongs to be inflicted upon them by a vile Macedonian!

“Wherefore were the Hellenes formerly terrible to the barbarians, while now the reverse is the case? Not their want of resources is in fault, but the lack of that spirit which of old victoriously defended the liberty of Hellas against the overwhelming might of the Persians. In those days every one was accounted devoid of honor who entered into relations with the barbarians, and he who had been gained over by gold was an object of universal contempt. This sense of honor has vanished; men play with treason, and no longer possess the force of hating what is evil. Are not even traitors, known to the whole town, called upon to address the civic assembly, although the examples of Olynthus and other cities show what are the consequences, if the citizens listen to the traitors and allow themselves to be caught in the network of lies? If the Olynthians were now still able to take counsel, they would have many a thing to say, which might have preserved them from ruin, had they understood it and taken it to heart at the right season. In the same way the citizens of Oreus, the Phocians and the other victims of Philip's ambition. All this is now too late. But as long as a vessel—whether great or small—can be kept above the water, so long the mariner, the steersman, and all the rest, must zealously labor, lest no man intentionally or unintentionally cause it to heel over. Therefore, ye men of Athens, so long as we are still unimpaired, in possession of the greatest city, of numerous resources and of the

fulness of our repute, it behooves us to do our part. We must place ourselves in a state of defence, resolved, even though all the remaining Hellenes without exception consented to enter into bondage, to fight for liberty, so far as in ourselves lies. This we must openly attest, proclaiming our resolutions by embassies into Peloponnesus, to Rhodes, to Chios and to Susa; for the Persian king too cannot be indifferent to the Macedonian's succeeding in overthrowing everything. But above all our own resolution must stand fast; for it is folly to take thought of others, while sacrificing what belongs to oneself; and in the first place it is indispensable for us to do our own duty, and then to unite, and address exhortations to, the remaining Hellenes. Thus it befits such a city as yours is. But if you Athenians intend to wait, till peradventure the Chalcidians shall save Hellas or the Megareans, while you in a craven spirit withdraw from the task, you think wrongly. All these are satisfied, so long as they are themselves preserved; but you it behooves to bring this to pass. Nay, for you your ancestors acquired this office of honor, and even amidst great perils succeeded in preserving it as your inheritance! Thus this speech supplements what was wanting in the former, and draws the attention of the Athenians from the particular affair to the general situation, from the Chersonnesus to Hellas, from the Attic policy to the Hellenic, which Demosthenes brings home to the Athenians and commends to them as their own.*

The mightiest of all the popular orations of Demosthenes was also attended by the greatest success; it finally determined the sentiments of the citizens, who had gradually more and more come over to his side. The party of Eubulus could no longer hold its own against him; it retired, and thus the conduct

The effects
of the
speeches.

* Diopithes: Dem. ix. 15. The oration *περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερσοννησὶ* and the *Third Philippic* (which is preserved both in its original edition and in one enlarged by supplements of an ancient date) are the last and at the same time the greatest Orations of State by Demosthenes possessed by us.

of public affairs virtually came into the hands of Demosthenes. A favorable influence was exercised by the condition of affairs in Thrace. The undertakings of the king there inspired the Athenians with more apprehension than the occupation of Phocis and Thermopylæ. They remembered the times of Lysander, and saw ruin approaching for the second time from the Hellespont through a cutting-off of the supplies of corn. Moreover, at this time a better spirit was arising outside as well as inside Athens,—a recognition of the danger menacing all Hellas, and a determined courage for the contest on behalf of liberty. Doubtless the speeches of Demosthenes, which were widely spread about Hellas, co-operated in producing this effect; a movement of patriotic enthusiasm had been quietly preparing itself; and accordingly the embassies, which had been sent out on the motion of Demosthenes, this time remained no empty and fruitless formalities; they in real truth constituted the commencement of a combination among Hellenic states for purposes of offence and defence against Philip's lust of dominion.

On this occasion also Demosthenes personally participated with the utmost zeal in the execution of his proposals. In the summer of 341 he repaired to the theatre of war, where the first decisive events were to be looked for,—to the Hellespont, in order there to do his best towards keeping the Athenians at their posts, and to Byzantium; for the latter was at present the most important point in the regions of the northern seas, the commanding spot for the traffic between the Pontus and the Archipelago, as well as for the passage from Europe to Asia.

Demos-
thenes in
Thrace.

Ol. cix. 4
(B. C. 341).

The Persian Wars had first made Byzantium a European city (vol. ii. p. 369), and at the same time an important member of the Hellenic federal power, which was at that time forming as against the East. Of all Greek colonies, however, Byzantium was

Byzantium.

invariably the least inclined to take its place as a member of a greater body. Freed from all danger since the Persian Empire had become enfeebled, the city gave itself up to its particular commercial interests; nor was any other Greek city equally privileged by nature as a maritime town. For Byzantium was not only the natural centre of the navigation of the Pontus, but also of the industry of the fisheries; and while the other cities took part in this lucrative pursuit amidst a variety of difficulties and dangers, the current of the sea drove the dense shoals of the tunny-fish, precisely at the time when they had attained to their most perfect condition, into the harbor of Byzantium, so that the most abundant of natural blessings was thus without trouble poured into the lap of its citizens. The city being, moreover, distinguished by its strong situation on a peninsula, by its healthy climate and its fertile neighborhood, it is not wonderful that a very defiant spirit of self-confidence developed itself at Byzantium, and that even individual Hellenes, who established a firm footing here, such as Pausanias (vol. ii. p. 370) and Clearchus (vol. iv. p. 184), when in this city, deemed themselves invincible. Already during the Samian War, Byzantium had sought to break loose from her connexion with Athens (vol. ii. p. 520). In the Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades restored the Attic supremacy on the Hellespont (vol. iii. p. 506). Hereupon ensued successively the efforts of the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans (vol. iv. p. 499); but none of these cities was strong enough to give the proper force to its claims. This tended to heighten the arrogance of the Byzantines, until at last the Social War gave them the desired opportunity of being reckoned among independent maritime states. At the present moment Byzantium had ships in numbers, perhaps equalling those belonging to Athens; it possessed a considerable territory; it had a series of subject seaports on the Pontus and on the Propontis, and had established a connexion

with Perinthus, one of the strongest maritime fortresses of the ancient world, a city which kept an army of 30,000 men. For this reason the crafty Philip had made advances of so amiable a nature to the Byzantines; he had contrived to intertwine their interest with his own, and had concluded an alliance with them for combating in common the Thracian princes.

Perinthus.

It had now become the task of Demosthenes to heal the evil rift, which had been made here by the Social War; to bring back to the side of Athens the defiant, arrogant, and unfriendly maritime city; to convince its citizens of the danger by which they too were threatened, and to proffer the aid of the Athenians. Circumstances were in his favor, since such a condition of discord, as according to the anticipations of Demosthenes had been inevitable, had actually already come to prevail between Philip and Byzantium. The Byzantines had refused the aid which Philip had demanded from them. They had become aware of the fact, that his proximity was becoming more dangerous to them than that of the Thracian princes, upon whom he wished to make war in their company. At this season Demosthenes arrived. It was the right moment for overcoming, in view of the common danger, the unbending pride of the Byzantines and their mistrust of Athens; the two most important maritime cities joined hands, and the Athenians sent troops to the Hellespont, to Tenedus, to Proconnesus, in order publicly to prove, to their friends and foes alike, their determination to uphold their power in the Northern Seas.*

Alliance
between
Athens and
Byzantium.

Ol. cix. 4
(B. C. 341).

Envoys were simultaneously sent to Rhodes and to Chios, where Hyperides was probably the spokesman of the Athenians; while Ephialtes went to Susa, in order to point out to the govern-

Embassies
to Rhodes,
Chios, and
Persia.

* Byzantium : Dem. xviii. 244.

ment there the dangers arising for the security of the Persian empire out of the advance of the Macedonians into the Northern routes of the sea, and accordingly to propose the conclusion of a treaty of subsidies with Athens and her allies. At the court of the Great King it was thought impossible to enter upon these proposals; indeed, they were abruptly rejected in remembrance of the hostile bearing of Athens on former occasions (p. 249). The dangerous nature of Philip's advances was, however, not mistaken at Susa; a vigilant eye was kept upon the Hellespont; and it seemed to be a convenient expedient, secretly to support the Attic defence of the Chersonnesus, in order thus to secure an obstruction against the advance of the Macedonians. The leaders of the war-party at Athens are also said to have received gifts of money; and it is in itself not improbable, that at this time the same policy was pursued at Susa, as in the days of the outbreak of the Corinthian War (vol. iv. p. 236), negotiations being carried on, not with the Greek states, but with individual party-leaders, and means being placed at the disposal of the latter, which they were to employ according as they thought fit.*

Demos-
thenes and
Callias.

During the labors of these embassies very important steps had been taken in Greece itself. Demosthenes had throughout kept Eubœa in view; for in proportion as the actual outbreak of the war became removed beyond doubt, this island rose in importance, as well to Philip for the purpose of an attack upon Athens, as to the Athenians for that of the defence of Attica and the prosecution of a successful war. In this respect the greatest importance attached to the combination of Demosthenes with Callias, the son of Mnesarchus (p. 376), who was in the first instance intent

* Hyperides' λόγοι 'Ροδιακός and Χιακός: Sauppe, *Orat. Att.* ii. 300, 340. Ephialtes: *Vit. X. Orat.* 847; Æschin. iii. 238; [Dem.] xii. 6. Royal present of money sent to Diopithes *τεθνεῶτι*: Aristot. *Rhet.* ii. 8.

upon liberating his own island and uniting it under the leadership of his native city of Chalcis, but who in this endeavor was naturally obliged to seek for a support in the neighbor-states, and therefore went hand in hand with the patriot-party at Athens. Callias is the first statesman outside of Attica who attached himself to Demosthenes, and Chalcis the first neighbor-city who offered its alliance, and which was not merely anxious to receive aid, like Rhodes, Megalopolis and others, but also most zealously went forward itself. As at the time of the Persian Wars Athens and Sparta placed themselves in the van, in order to gather the patriot-party, so now the same step was taken by Athens and Chalcis; they were the two cities, which first concluded the League, and then sought for the accession of others. Hereby the good cause assumed a Hellenic character, and awakened a greater amount of confidence. Demosthenes contrived to turn to the best account the advantage of existing circumstances; he never forgot to direct attention to the main point, and prevented the wrecking of the great result upon secondary matters, in particular upon such as had reference to the international relations of the formerly dependent confederates. Demosthenes and Callias travelled together into Peloponnesus and into the Western districts. The Acarnanians, probably irritated by Philip's treaties with the Ætolians, promised their accession; together with them the Leucadians; then the Corinthians and Achæans; lastly, Megara. A regular scale of contributions for the formation of a common land and naval power was agreed upon. The Eubœans bound themselves to pay forty talents, the Peloponnesians and Megareans sixty.

The National League.

Ol. cix. 6
(B. C. 340).

March.

Callias made a report to the civic community at Athens on the results of his embassy; Demosthenes corroborated the successful laying of the foundations of a national association against Philip; and for the next month was fixed

the definitive conclusion of the treaties, and the first meeting of the new Federal Council under the presidency of Athens. It was a good sign, that during the progress of these preparations the struggle against the Macedonian influence had been successfully commenced; for the more limited Armed League between Athens, Megara, and Chalcis had already come into effect. Callias and his brother Taurosthenes had in company with Cephisophon, the commander of the Attic auxiliary force, marched out against Oreus, which naturally seemed to them the point of the greatest importance, especially because it was from this position that the tenure of the northern Sporades, Sciathus and others, was threatened. Already by Ol. cix. 3, B. C. 341, the Tyrant Philistides had been slain, and the city secured.

With redoubled courage the further proposals of Demosthenes were now entered upon. The deputies met at Athens in the commencement of the spring of the year 340, in order to settle the treaties. Different views obtained as to whether a fixed scale of contributions should be adopted, or the war-expenses, which, as Hegesippus insisted, were of their nature not determinable beforehand, be *ex post facto* divided. As to the main point a good understanding was arrived at, and a League was established, in which, under the presidency of Athens, Eubœa, Megara, Achaia, Corinth, Leucas, Acarnania, Ambracia, and Corcyra took part.

Liberation
of Eubœa.

Ol. cix. 1
(B. C. 340).

Spring.

Athens at the instigation of Demosthenes did more than it was her precise duty to contribute. He urged matters forward with irresistible energy, in order that above all things the League might be open to action as soon as possible. Moneys and vessels were made over to the Eubœan communities; and Demosthenes had afterwards to hear himself blamed, for having in his Hellenic zeal impaired the particular interests of his native city. But

he well knew what he was doing. The advances in money and ships made by Athens essentially contributed to give the death-blow to the rotten peace, which he desired to see destroyed. From Eubœa landings were made on the Pagasæan Gulf; Thessalian towns were occupied; Macedonian vessels seized. In the Northern islands also bloody conflicts already occurred. Halonnesus had fallen into the hands of the Peparethians, who had made its Macedonian garrison prisoners. Philip in return caused Peparethus to be devastated, while the Athenians took up the cause of the island and gave instructions to their ships to make reprisals upon Macedonian property. The Athenians had been as it were transformed; they now set to work with absolute unscrupulousness within the city as well as outside. In Athens a certain Anaxinus of Oreus, who pretended to be making purchases on behalf of queen Olympias, was arrested as a spy and executed. Abroad, an attack upon Eubœa was expected; it was indispensable to overthrow the other Tyrants too as speedily as possible, who promoted the schemes of the Macedonians, in particular Clitarchus of Eretria, who had with Phocian mercenaries ousted Plutarchus (p. 276). At Athens the most praiseworthy ardor was displayed. Forty vessels were equipped by voluntary contributions; under the proved leadership of Phocion, Eretria was taken and Clitarchus slain; and herewith all Eubœa was once more free. A multitude of unexpected successes rapidly succeeded one another in this period. Taken singly, they were not of a nature to cause anxiety to Philip, but together they could not fail to attest to him a very remarkable revulsion in public opinion. The most daring policy on the part of Demosthenes was now welcome to the civic body; the opposite party, upon which a fresh blow had been inflicted by judicial proof being given of an understanding between Æschines and Anaxinus, was powerless; while Demosthenes was publicly recognized as the statesman at the

helm of affairs, and was on the motion of Aristonicus for the first time honored by a golden wreath at the Dionysia. Indeed, the national ill-will against Philip was becoming so intense, that at Olympia too the mention of his name was heard with loud expressions of disfavor.*

The circumstances were highly favorable for the success of the Demosthenic policy; for Philip was at a distance, and involved in a war which he could not immediately break off, so as to hasten into Hellas and burst asunder the League now in process of formation, before it attained to its full strength. Philip had from the first pursued a double method of conducting war, the one against the Hellenes and the other against the barbarians. In the case of the former he invariably sought to obtain a recognition peaceable in form; with the latter he only had in view, the acquisition of territory, an advantageous extension of his empire, pillage, and the increase of his military forces. Thus, after having apparently succeeded in tranquillizing the Greek states, Philip had already for more than two years been engaged in a war, the objects of which were the conquest of an entire complex of territories and the gradual conversion of it into a province. Macedonia was no longer to be the boundary-land of European civilization. The vast land of the Thracians on either side of Mount Hæmus, hitherto only opened at its rims, a land full of mighty rivers, full of forests and mines, of pastures and

* Upon the history of the (Third) Eubœan War new light is thrown by the *Scholia* to *Æschin.* §§ 85 and 103, of which I have made use in the text. Liberation of Oreus in the month of Scirophorion, Ol. cix. 3, by Cephisophon, who at that time had taken up a position near Sciathus (Boeckh, *Seeurkunden*, 480; Böhneke, *Forschungen*, 736); of Eretria, Ol. cix. 4 (spring of 340), on which occasion Clitarchus was slain. In this campaign Hyperides took part as trierarch on one of the two triremes presented by him: *Vit. X Orat.* 850 (ἐπιδόσιμος τρ. Ἀνδρεία, Boeckh, 442, 498). Cf. Schäfer, ii. 480 and F. Schultz in *Neue Jahrb. für Philol.* 1866, p. 314. Anaxinus the spy: *Æschin.* iii. 223; *Dem.* xviii. 137.—Aristonicus, son of Nicophanes: § 83; *Vit. X Orat.* 848.—Olympia: *Plutarch, Mor.* 457.

tracts for tillage, was, with its peoples, to be made to do him service, and at the same time to act as a bridge both for the acquisition of the shores of the Pontus and for the conquest of the continent beyond. To this task he was entirely devoted during a series of years, while he left his son to conduct the business of government at Pella. In Thrace too Philip acted in accordance with the stand-points of Hellenic culture, in contending against barbarians who had, at all times within the memory of man, incessantly endangered the Greek coast-towns. Hereby he deemed that he acquired a claim upon a protecting supremacy over the neighboring Greeks; here, too, he declined no opportunity offering itself to him of forming peaceable bonds of connexion, and preferred alliances to any other means of extending the boundaries of his empire. But in other respects his system of carrying on war here was utterly different from that adopted by him in the regions of Greece itself,—in particular after he had overthrown the principalities in the lower parts of the country, and was hereupon fighting against the mountain tribes, which confronted him with an unbroken love of liberty. To the changes in the fortune of war and to the difficulty of a permanent subjugation were now added the troubles arising from the rough climate and the trackless country. The soldiers were obliged to take up their quarters in wretched pits in the earth; and the heaviest of losses had incessantly to be made good by the despatch of more and more fresh troops from Macedonia and Thessaly.

But it was not only as a general that Philip was here occupied; he was also for years engaged upon the exploration of the country, the study of its resources, the establishment of order in it, and the securing of such acquisitions as had been made. Roads were constructed and towns founded, in order to make safe the routes by land and water, as well as to turn the mines to full account. Thus there arose in the land, which had formed the nu-

cleus of the ancient Thracian empire, a series of Macedonian colonies, Philippopolis on the Hebrus, and Calybe and Bine on its tributary rivers,—places in which under the superintendence of armed forces convicts were settled, in order to make the soil arable and the district habitable. Since the spring of the year 342 Philip was engaged upon these tasks, which claimed his personal attention, so that he could only take thought incidentally of any quarrels at a greater distance.

The main object had been achieved; the rude country of the interior had been subjected by enormous exertions and sacrifices; the dynastic power of Macedonia had been almost trebled; the two empires of the North, which had developed themselves menacingly above Hellas, the basins of the western and those of the eastern rivers (p. 15), had at last been blended into a single whole. But there was yet wanting the consummation of the great work, to wit the union with the newly-conquered mainland of the Greek coast-places, which were in this quarter to serve him after the same fashion as Amphipolis, Potidæa, &c., had in the case of his earlier acquisitions. Until he was possessed of these towns, he was not master over the routes of the sea; without them his entire war of conquest remained an utterly incomplete and defective undertaking; they shut him up in the interior. He had sought to gain his end by treaties; but in vain. Very inopportunately he saw arising not only in the peninsula on the Hellespont, but also in the Greek towns on the Bosphorus and on the Propontis, a spirit of vigorous recalcitrance; and, instead of peaceably accomplishing his purposes, he was forced here at the Northern Straits to begin a war, in which successively the Persians, the Athenians and their confederates became engaged. At this point the contest between Europe and Asia unexpectedly came to an outbreak; and at this point the peace with Athens was, after an endurance of seven years, at last openly broken.

The question turned on Perinthus and Byzantium. Both cities refused to become the allies of Philip; his final campaigns in Thrace had therefore to be directed against these cities, for the purpose of incorporating them, even against their will, into the new territory of the Macedono-Thracian empire.

Perinthus was first assaulted. Siege-towers
 120 feet in height were erected, in order to Siege of Perinthus.
 hurl missiles from above upon the walls; and Ol. cx. 1 (B. c. 340).
 at the same time subterraneous passages were
 mined, so that the city might also be entered underground. Hereupon the fleet was brought to the spot, in order to cut off the supplies which might have arrived by sea. For Philip everything depended upon carrying the siege to a speedy issue; constantly changing his troops, he advanced towards the walls, and notwithstanding the valor of the citizens, the strength of their fortifications, the security of the peninsular situation, and the support accorded by Byzantium, a protracted resistance was impossible. At this moment there arrived unexpected succor from the opposite shore, a support offered to the Greek struggles for liberty by Persia.

The Persians were not by nature so stolid, as to remain apathetic spectators, while king Philip was making himself master of the strong positions on the shore opposite to their own; their attention had moreover been directed to the danger by Ephialtes (p. 395); and they had doubtless taken advantage of the warning. Attic influence is to be all the more readily assumed, inasmuch as an Athenian, Apollodorus, conducted across the auxiliary force, which had been collected by Arsites, the satrap of Lesser Phrygia, in conjunction with the neighboring governors. Already this participation in the movement by several satraps allows us to conclude, that the orders for it had proceeded from the Great King himself. But undoubtedly it was principally due to the skilfulness of the Attic

leader that the succor arrived at the right moment, and that the introduction through the lines of the blockading army of troops, money, provender and necessaries of war, was successfully accomplished. From Byzantium too fresh aid arrived ; and thus it came to pass, that the king, who had already broken through the circle of walls round Perinthus, was met by so vigorous a resistance out of the houses and from behind stone-walls which had been thrown up, that he was forced to turn back in the streets of the city, and, after enormous sacrifices and exertions which had occupied several months, was obliged to depart with his main force.

Siege of
Byzantium.

Ol. ex. 1 (B.
c. 340).

Autumn.

He rapidly turned upon Byzantium, whose resources he supposed to be exhausted by the participation of its citizens in the struggle at Perinthus. But he found the city better prepared than he had expected, best of all through the fact that the civic community, which generally was notorious for disorder and want of discipline, had now given itself up to a man who in full measure deserved and possessed its confidence. This was Leon, a pupil of Plato. As commander-in-chief he stood, like Pericles at Athens, at the head of the entire State, which recognized the necessity of the guidance of a single hand. It was in consequence of the efforts of Leon that the sister-city had been supported with the exertion of all the strength of Byzantium ; by his advice the Byzantines had, when Philip approached against them, withdrawn within their walls, and not afforded the king the desired opportunity of an open battle. Leon trusted in the position of the city and in its mighty defensive works. Situate on a peninsula, washed on the south and east side by the Bosphorus and the Propontis, on the north side by the arm of the sea called from ancient times the Golden Horn, the city was only on the third and narrowest side connected with the Thracian mainland. Walls of extraordinary

strength surrounded the entire peninsula, double ranges of walls securing the land-side. But even the strongest walls were incapable of preserving the city; and now the hour arrived for Byzantium, as had been the case with the other cities of the North which had fallen away from Athens, when upon Athens it too had to place its last hope. Leon, the pupil of the Academy, doubtless essentially contributed to bring about the establishment of a connexion with Athens; and in this too Byzantium was specially fortunate, that what had been neglected in the case of Amphipolis and Olynthus, or had been done too late, was here effected at the right moment and in a sufficient way. In the interval a totally different time had begun, and a warlike spirit prevailed which, having been called forth by Demosthenes, pervaded the whole of Greece.*

When Philip advanced upon Byzantium, he was already at war with Athens. He had unscrupulously passed through Attic territory, in order to cover his fleet, when it was sailing up through the Hellespont for the siege of the cities, and had caused ships of the Athenians and of their confederates to be seized. Athens called him to account for these proceedings. She received an answer from the camp before Perinthus, in which the king represented himself as the injured party and the Athenians as those who were provoking the conflict, and cast upon them the guilt of having broken the peace. It was a mere dispute of words; for in point of fact, as nobody could doubt, the peace had been broken on both sides and was untenable; so that the only point of importance was the actual moment of the open rupture. It was in the interest of

* Philip had been ten months in Thrace when Demosthenes made the speech concerning the *Chersonnesus*, the date of which is the year 341, towards the season of the Etesian winds (July): Dem. viii. 2.—Calybe ‘Πονηρόπολις;’ Suidas, s. ν. δούλων πόλις.—Perinthus: Philochorus, *Fragm.* 135; Diod. xvi. 74. Apollodorus: Pansan. i. 29, 10. The orders of the Great King are mentioned by Diodorus.—Leon. Plutarch, *Phoc.* 14; Suidas.

Philip to delay this moment ; he therefore once more attempted to terrify his adversaries, and in his manifesto made certain final demands, the rejection of which he would feel bound to regard as a declaration of war.

The Athenians replied to this *ultimatum* by pulling down the pillars of peace, and more decisively than ever committing themselves to the guidance of Demosthenes. That the fortified positions on the sea-routes of the Pontus, that Byzantium, the chief market of the Northern trade, must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the king, was a point of view clear to every Athenian ; and therefore amidst universal assent the general Chares, who was in command of a squadron off Sciathus, was at once ordered to sail to the Bosporus. The new confederates too, who on account of their trade took an active interest in the preservation of Byzantium, —Rhodes, Cos and Chios—sent ships. Thus the besieged city was successfully freed on the side of the sea, and the enemy's fleet was forced to retire into the Pontus.

All the more energetically Philip exerted his whole strength for the purpose of taking the city. An endless succession of subterraneous passages and of new machines, constructed by the inventive genius of Polyidus, menaced the walls round the city ; a bridge thrown across the Golden Horn warded off the fleets, the approach of which was obstructed by the sinking of great masses of stone ; on one occasion, the Macedonians, favored by a rainy night, had already advanced within the circle of the walls, but the citizens awoke at the right moment, and under the light of an Aurora Borealis, in which they recognized the succor of Hecate, drove the enemy back into his underground passages.

During the progress of these struggles fresh aid arrived from Athens, sent at the instigation of Demosthenes. The circumstances of the case made it necessary ; for although Chares had done his duty and driven the hostile fleet back into the Pontus, although in his excellently chosen posi-

Open war
between
Philip and
Athens.

tion over against the Golden Horn he likewise commanded the sound, yet he was not the right kind of a man for making the league between Athens and Byzantium in full measure and reality. The remembrance of the days of the Social War caused him to be still regarded with great mistrust. Accordingly, in the spring of the year 339, Cephisophon and Phocion set sail with a second squadron. Phocion had been recommended in preference to all others by Demosthenes; and what would never have been conceded to a commander of mercenaries like Chares, viz. admission into the city, was with perfect confidence allowed to a Phocion. In fraternal concord Athenians and Byzantines henceforth defended the threatened city, as a piece of common Hellenic soil; and the result was, that king Philip had with Siege of Byzantium raised. a heavy heart to raise this siege also.

It is true that he did not at once abandon the ground. He marched to and fro along the coast, so long as his fleet remained cut off in the Pontus; he contrived by means of crafty manœuvres and a variety of deceptive proceedings to make it possible for his ships in some incomprehensible way to sail safe home through the Hellespont; he still continued to carry on negotiations with the Greek island-states, and through them even with Byzantium.

Then, however, he suddenly took his departure, Philip in Scythia.

and marched with all his forces away from the sea up into the land of the Scythians, where Ol. ex. 1 (B. C. 339).

he for a time again vanished from the eyes of the Greeks. It was most assuredly no purposeless lust of conquest which drove Philip into the conquest with Ateas, the aged Scythian prince, whose bands in the low country of the Danube fought against the Macedonian phalanx; but there were at issue the securing of the newly-acquired Thracian lands, the rounding-off of the territory of the empire in the North, and the exploration of the districts of the Pontus and of their resources. For this reason too

Philip had designated it as his most important aim, that he wished to erect a statue to Heracles on the banks of the Danube; a pretext indicating his intention to bring the great water-route into his hands for purposes of trade. And again he doubtless in this too had in view the double purpose of his policy, according to which he desired not only to subject the barbarians of the interior, but also in this way to unite the Greek coast-towns with his empire. For as the Elean colonies (p. 380) properly belonged to Epirus, and Perinthus and Byzantium to Thrace, so the Greek towns on the western shores of the Pontus, Apollonia, Istrus, Odessus, which derived their wealth from the districts of the Danube, formed part of the Scythian land. Thus the campaign on the Danube connects itself with the conflicts on the Bosphorus, and bears testimony to the mighty schemes which Philip cherished in his mind.*

War re-
sources of
Athens and
of Philip.

Demosthenes had brought it to pass, that after a long period of shameful inactivity Athens once more vigorously and effectively influenced the course of events. She had again gathered confederates around her; in Peloponnesus, in Acarnania, in Thessaly, on the Hellespont, she had resolutely confronted the king; she had liberated Eubœa; in

* Philip's *ultimatum*: Dem. xviii. 43; Philochorus, *u.s. ap.* Dion. *ad* Amm. i. c. 11, where the following is stated, according to the supplementation by Herwerden: ἔπειτα διεξελθὼν, ὅσα τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὁ Φίλιππος ἐνεκάλει δια τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ταῦτα πάλιν κατὰ λέξιν ἐπιτίθησιν ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἀκούσας τῆς ἐπιστολῆς καὶ Δημοσθένους παρακάλεσαντος αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον καὶ ψήφισμα γράψαντος, ἐχειροτόνησε τὴν μὲν στήλην καθελεῖν τὴν περὶ τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον εἰρήνης καὶ συμ-μαχίας σταθεῖσαν, ναὺς δὲ πληροῦν καὶ τὰλλ' ἐνεργεῖν τὰ τοῦ πολέμου. The letter of Philip appended to the *Philippic Orations*, deemed genuine by Grote, Böhncke and Rehdantz, must probably, as well as the counter-speech having reference to it, be considered spurious, as is the opinion of Schäfer, iii.² 210.—Chares victorious at Θερμηπρία: Dionys. Byz. *Anal. Bosp.* (iii. 14, Hudson).—Πολύειδος ὁ Θετταλός: Athenæus *de Mach.* in *Mathem. veter.* ed. Thevenot, 3.—Aurora Bo-realis: Steph. Byz. *s. v.* Βόσπορος.—Phocion ('auctus adjutusque a Demosthene . . . cum adversus Charem eum subornaret,' Nepos, *Phoc.* c. 2); Plutarch, *Phoc.* 14.—War with Ateas: Justin. ix. 2. His habitation in the low-country of the Danube: Schäfer, ii. 487.

the waters of the Pontus she had frustrated the undertakings which Philip had carried on with the utmost exertion of all his military resources, and had kept open the route for the supply of corn, which he was anxious to bring into his power. The king had been obliged to abandon his positions before Perinthus and Byzantium; and how proud a feeling must have filled the Attic patriots, when the two powerful maritime cities offered decrees of honor and wreaths of gold in testimony of their gratitude for their preservation to the civic community of Athens!*

The old Athens had revived once more. But it would not suffice to remain content with isolated successes. The rupture of the peace was now decided; and it was indispensable to prepare the city for the now inevitable struggle on behalf of its independence. What resources existed for the purpose? True, the enemy of the city now no longer appeared as the irresistible lord-of-war, in whom failure was impossible; but although certain of his undertakings were frustrated, yet his power was as a whole one of which it was impossible to stay the irrepressible progress. He was incessantly appropriating new resources of war, forcing more and more peoples to furnish their contingents, imposing tributes, levying war-taxes, forcibly amassing spoils, possessing himself of mines and lucrative tolls, and disposing absolutely over an abundance of resources, the continuous increase of which it was quite impossible to reckon up at Athens. On the other hand, Athens herself had no kind of augmentation of her resources in prospect; without subsidies, without tributes, she had to rely entirely on herself, and her whole power of performance depended upon the good-will of her citizens and of the small number of her allies. At Athens nothing could be done besides turning the existing means to the best possible account by a suitable economy, removing

* Decrees of honor to Athens: Plutarch, *Mor.* 350.

hurtful abuses, and raising the military strength of the community; it was indispensable to create in the civic body, demoralized as it had been by the peace-policy of Eubulus, such a bearing, that it should be capable of passing through the severe test which awaited it.

Reforms in
the Attic
political
system.

By the ordinary processes of legislation it was impossible to carry out reforms of public life so urgent and so thorough; for this purpose was needed the directing influence of an eminent man. It was therefore most fortunate for the success of these endeavors, that a statesman was at hand, who had secured the confidence of the citizens; that the large majority of them felt the necessity of arming him with special powers at this critical moment; and, lastly, that it was perceived with correct judgment at what point it was necessary to begin the reforms.

Condition
of Attic naval
affairs.

It was by her ships that Athens had been saved from being overwhelmed by the Persian calamity; in becoming a naval state she had found her historical mission; nor had she ever been greater, than when the statesmen of all parties contemporaneously and successively emulated one another in striving to develop the city as a maritime power, and to render it invincible by means of ships and harbors and harbor-walls. Since the abuse of her naval power had brought ruin upon Athens, the self-confidence of the State had been most deeply shaken; the mistrust entertained by the aristocrats against the navy had spread further into other circles; and in proportion as the vigor of the civic community relaxed, the aversion became more general from the self-sacrificing efforts demanded for the maintenance of the fleet, although the customary construction of vessels went on, and the average number of 300 triremes continued to be kept in an effective condition. And yet Athens could not abandon the traditions of her past. Every new forward movement originated in a successful

maritime enterprise; and since the first victorious expedition to Eubœa (p. 113) the patriotism of the Athenians had repeatedly attested itself in a most brilliant way in a voluntary readiness for efforts directed to the equipment of ships of war. It was not, however, permissible to let the welfare of the city depend upon such ebullitions of patriotic sentiments, and it was a favorable sign of the power still possessed by the ancient traditions of Attic history, that now, when it had been resolved to prepare the city for an arduous war, a reform of the naval system was recognized to be the primary condition, and that to this end Demosthenes was commissioned to examine the actual state of the naval forces, and to propose such provisions as might bring about as beneficial as possible an improvement in it.

Demosthenes had at all times regarded navy and harbors as the main capital of the Attic power. He had always insisted upon the fact, that any movement for the better on the part of Athens must take its start from this point; already fourteen years previously he had, in his first speech on public affairs (p. 253), most sharply animadverted upon the abuses which had come to prevail, and had offered a clear testimony of the earnestness with which he interested himself in an amelioration of the existing condition of things. Meanwhile, the abuses had struck their roots more and more deeply; the condition of affairs had become more and more intolerable; and, even apart from all considerations of higher policy, the middle-class of Attic citizens could not but urge an alteration of the institutions now in force. For the entire system of the *symmories* (p. 119) had degenerated in this way, that advantage was taken of it by the rich in order to overreach, and press upon, the less wealthy. The presidents of the taxing-associations arbitrarily distributed the expenses among the members of the unions bound to furnish a ship each, without considering the amount of property

possessed by each individual ; the poorer members had to spend their whole property, while the rich were quit for a very small expenditure, particularly if in the end they made over the entire management to speculators, who provided the trierarchy for a fixed sum. The essential character of the Attic trierarchy had been utterly destroyed ; men had altogether ceased to speak of trierarchs, and only talked of "joint contributors." The whole business had become a doubtful financial transaction, which the capitalists turned to account in their own favor,—a system which seriously damaged the interests of the State, because it injuriously affected the central body of the civic community, excited ill-will in it, provoked disorder of all kinds, incessantly occasioned the bringing forward of complaints and grievances, and on every occasion delayed the equipment of the fleet. But the worst evil was this: that the existing resources of the city were never actually made use of, inasmuch as it was precisely the most considerable capitals which escaped being devoted to public use. For while the real purpose which the *symmories* were intended to serve was, that those properties which, taken singly, were too small to provide for a trierarchy, should by combination be made capable of undertaking such a service, the principle of association was abused to such a degree, that even the wealthiest men in the city as a rule only contributed as members of unions, as if there had no longer been left any citizens at all in Athens capable of undertaking a trierarchy by themselves alone. And yet persons were living at Athens who, as *e. g.* Diphilus, owned a property of 160 talents (£39,000) and more.

Naval law
of Demos-
thenes.

Ol. c. x. 3 (B. c.
340).

These abuses Demosthenes, as commissioner of the civic body for the naval affairs of the city, combated by means of a thorough-going law of reform. Its particular provisions are unfortunately unknown to us ; but so much is certain, that he established the census of property as the standard of the

contributions towards the fleet ; whereby he lightened the burdens weighing upon the poorer citizens, who had hitherto paid their quota together with the rich after the manner of poll-tax, while at the same time he drew higher payments from the rich. He therefore at the same time secured a just distribution of the burdens of war, and a material increase in the taxing-power at the disposal of the State.

This law was a mortal assault upon the privileges of the rich, who stood at the head of the hitherto existing taxing-unions, and who formed a party-association closely united by the common interests of selfishness. They set to work all the means offered to them by their social position, in order by attempts at bribery, by menaces, by indictments, to frustrate his designs, and caused him the most vexatious difficulties in his patriotic endeavors. Demosthenes, immovable on the main point, on particular heads did his utmost towards avoiding everything likely to endanger the concord among the citizens : he sought to give consideration to all well-founded objections, and made several changes in his naval law, until at last he managed to pass it through the Council and to bring it before the civic assembly, where it was debated in several stormy meetings, and finally passed. The principle of association was now for the first time combined in a proper way with the ancient trierarchy. In the unions the lesser capitals were included, in order that by correctly estimated quota of taxation the sum might be collected which was requisite for the equipment of a ship-of-war (50-60 minæ = £200-240 *circ.*). The larger capitalists on the other hand, whose property was so considerable that they could undertake a whole ship each, had henceforth again to come forward as independent trierarchs. According to a statement, which is, however, not to be depended upon, their number included those whose property was entered in the register as ten talents (£2,440 *circ.*).

Those whose property amounted to twice this sum had to furnish two ships each; the highest liturgy on the part of a single individual rose, it is said, to the equipment of three triremes and a service-boat.

Its results.

The results of this new organization made the abuses which had formerly prevailed more manifest than ever (p. 252). It actually occurred, that Attic citizens, who had hitherto only borne the sixteenth part of the equipment of a vessel, were now bound themselves alone to provide for two ships of war. But in general not only was a considerable increase realized in the war-contributions, and in the offensive and defensive strength of the State, but these changes redounded to the advantage of the entire life of the commonwealth, as invariably happens when, instead of partiality and arbitrary discretion, order and justice come to prevail. This could not fail to exercise a salutary influence upon the spirit of the civic body. Henceforth, every man had to render service to the State in his own place and according to his power; an end had been put to the complaints as to the unjust imposition of burdens; the anti-popular selfishness of the rich had been disarmed, and a multitude of vexatious quarrels, which had hitherto been a regular accompaniment of all naval levies, ceased as of course. "After the introduction of the new law," said Demosthenes, "no trierarch any longer appealed to the compassion of the people as being unduly burdened; no man now fled to the altar of Artemis in Munychia (the asylum of citizens in trouble with reference to naval affairs); no man was placed in chains; not a single trireme was lost to the State or left lying in the docks, because those who ought to have made it ready to put to sea lacked the requisite means."*

* Wealth of Diphilus: *Vii. X Oral.* 354; Boeckh, *P. Ec. of Ath.*, vol. i. p. 50 [Engl. Tr.].—Demosthenes *ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ναυτικοῦ*: *Æschin.* iii. 222; cf. *Dem.*, xvii. 102: ὁρῶν τὸ, ναυτικὸν καταλυόμενον καὶ τοὺς πλουσίους ἀτελεῖς ἀπὸ μικρῶν

But the transformation of the trierarchical system was not enough. If war was to be carried on seriously, it was necessary to procure pecuniary means. War-taxes were an insufficient expedient; still less could Demosthenes take refuge in unworthy financial measures, such as had formerly been applied (vol. iv. p. 297), or in bad financial laws, against which he had himself contended. Fortunately, however, in this particular too the situation was such, that there was no lack of means, and that the only point was to make the right use of them; in other words, an end had to be put once for all to the rotten management of the finances, which Demosthenes had repeatedly designated as the cancerous disease besetting the commonwealth. As a financier, Eubulus had ruled the Attic State since the fall of Aristophon (p. 143). First he had himself filled the highest financial office; then he had caused men who were entirely dependent upon him, such as Aphobetus, the brother of Æschines, to be his successors, while for himself he arranged the office of superintendent of the festival-moneys in such a way, that by virtue of it he exercised a control over all the other funds, had the whole property of the State in his hands, and even in the midst of war rendered every diminution of the popular entertainments penal as treason against the rights of the people.

Meanwhile the power of Eubulus had been severely shaken. He had been unable to prevent that Demosthenes was called to the head of naval affairs; nor could he hinder his proceeding from the naval law to a reform

Financial reform.

(Ol. cx. 3
(B. C. 339).

ἀναλωμάτων γιγνομένων, τοὺς δὲ μέτρια ἢ μικρὰ κεκτημένους ἀπολλύοντας, κ. τ. λ. The documents inserted *ap.* Dem. xviii. 106 remain untrustworthy (Boeckh considers them authentic, vol. ii. p. 357). According to these the obligation for the equipment of a trireme begins with an οὐσία ἀπὸ τάλάντων δέκα (i. e. a capital of 50 talents), and the rise in a personal liturgy advances ἕως τριῶν πλοίων καὶ ὑπηρετικῶν. Schäfer, ii. 490, rejects the documents; their contents however seem to rest on a sound tradition.—Effects of the naval law. Dem. xviii. 107.

of the financial system, which constituted the necessary supplement to that law. It was necessary at once to restrict all expenses: the magnificent construction of the arsenal was stopped, and the moneys assigned to that purpose (p. 352) became applicable to the requirements of the war. But the main point was, that Demosthenes now took the steps which he had long designated as the necessary condition of real progress on the part of Athens. He moved the abolition of the law of Eubulus with reference to the festival-moneys (p. 280); and after this solemn restriction had been removed, he introduced a law to the effect that for the present the whole surplus of the annual receipts should, instead of being distributed, be accumulated as a war-fund. An independent war-treasure was once more formed, and a war-treasurer appointed for its administration.

These were the great results achieved by
Effects of
the reforms. Demosthenes in home politics. They were victories of the most arduous description, gained by inflexible strength of character, and by firm persistency in a struggle which was carried on by the power of speech only, and which, instead of humiliating those who allowed themselves to be vanquished, only made them freer, stronger, and better. For although many only unwillingly bent before the intellectual superiority of Demosthenes, yet the great majority of the citizens were morally ennobled by him, and elevated to the stand-point of a warm love of country and a patriotic enthusiasm, which he had so long held alone and without companions, being all the time exposed to vehement attacks. He introduced no innovations foreign to the life of the State, but merely restored the old condition of things; he overthrew the unconstitutional oligarchy of the rich, and removed the abuses of the degenerate democracy, which only served to flatter the indolent love of pleasure in the multitude. He combated the selfishness of the rich as well as of the poor,

and knew how to revive the idea of the State after so vigorous a fashion, that the poor voluntarily renounced the festival-moneys to which they had become accustomed, simply in order to see the State rise again in its ancient dignity. What Demosthenes achieved was an outer and inner new-birth of Athens; and after a long period of utter want of purpose and of moral effeteness, all the thoughts, all the powers, all the resources of the people were once more devoted to *one* purpose—to the noblest purpose which it is possible for a commonwealth to pursue, viz. the preservation of its independence and liberty.

These great reforms of Demosthenes were rapidly carried into execution; their date is fixed by the war on the Bosphorus. At the time when Demosthenes carried his motion for the support of Byzantium he first felt that he had the civic community at command. In the following year the financial law was passed. Assuredly Demosthenes did not bring about these reforms unassisted. He was the champion in the van, and to his force is due the glory of the victory; but he doubtless acted in connexion with those who shared his views, and above all with Lycurgus. Lycurgus possessed eminent administrative talents. He was better acquainted than any other man with the resources of the State, and was in a special degree fitted for providing for the increase of the revenues by useful institutions in the public economy. These qualities could not remain unknown to Demosthenes; and we may therefore assume that in his administrative reforms he made use of the counsel of his friend, who had for years gone hand in hand with him, and who is indeed said to have already accompanied him in his journeys in Peloponnesus (p. 317). No sooner had the party of Eubulus been overthrown, than new men were needed; and although it was not till Ol. cx. 3 (B. C. 338), that Lycurgus assumed the office of chief superintendent of the finances, an influential activity

Demosthe-
nes and Ly-
curgus.

on his part doubtless begins already about the time when the reform-laws of Demosthenes were passed. In the same year in which Lycurgus entered upon his official duties, his brother-in-law Callias, the son of Habron, of the deme of Bate, likewise took office as the manager of the newly-established war-fund. These were the fresh forces which advanced the work of the new-birth of Athens. It was a new generation of statesmen, genuine Athenians, filled with love towards the city and the common Hellenic country, united to one another by a lofty endeavor; and when we compare these men with Eubulus and the upstarts whom his favor thrust into the highest offices of State, we perceive the difference between the old times and the new, the decisive turning-point which Attic history had reached.*

The enemies at home lay vanquished; Eubulus and his associates were powerless; the friends of Macedonia had still less influence, and had no intention of offering open resistance. Demosthenes was therefore no longer the leader of the opposition against a party-government of overwhelming strength, but the director of the State; and it now behooved him to show that he was not only able to reveal the evils of the commonwealth and to remedy them by well-considered legislative proposals, but was also in tempestuous times capable of guiding the helm, which the confidence of his fellow-citizens had placed in his hands. The rupture of the peace, which he had always demanded, had taken place; the war, which he had conjured up, had broken out; it now became the duty of the war-party to show that the struggle, which had been accepted at its instigation, was not a hopeless one.

* Eubulus superintendent of the finances Ol. cvi. 3—cvii. 3; Aphobetus Ol. cvii. 3—cviii. 3 (during the Olynthian War); Schäfer, i. 375 seq.—Cessation of the magnificent construction of Philon, Ol. cx. 2: Philochorus, *Fragm.* 135 ἐνὰ δὲ χρήματα ἐψηφίσαντο πάντ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά Δημοσθένους γράψάντος. Cf. G. Curtius in *Philol.* xxiv. 266.—Callias ταμίης τῶν στρατιωτικῶν: *Vil. X Orat.* 842. —Demosthenes and Lycurgus: *Philol.* xxiv. 264.

Herewith commenced Demosthenes' hardest task. For what hopes could be indulged upon a calm examination of the situation?

The prospects of the War.

How could the little commonwealth of citizens, whose strength had been relaxed by a long habituation to peace, be successfully enabled to defy the military prince of Macedonia and his veteran armies? It was one thing to frustrate the designs of the king in individual undertakings, difficult in themselves, such as the siege of Byzantium;—another, to enter upon a war against him, which, once begun, must end in a complete humiliation of the king or in the hopeless overthrow of Athens. Where were the commanders, who could be opposed to Philip and his generals, accustomed to victory? Where was to be found a pledge of success amidst so many dangers abroad and at home? The Philippic party continued to work in secret, and to lie in wait for a turn in affairs favorable to it; and how was it possible to rely upon the spirit of the citizens, concerning which it had to be assumed, that after having been raised by the successes on the Bosphorus, it would with equal rapidity change into the contrary, while Philip on the other hand had often enough shown, how he could contrive to make good defeats suffered by him, and how, being in consequence of his inexhaustible resources undisturbed by all the changes and chances of war, he steadily pursued his aims? Their navy made it requisite for the Athenians to let their war be one of offence; but how could the Macedonian empire be effectively attacked, which had from year to year been increased and more and more advantageously rounded off?

Doubtless Demosthenes and his friends seriously weighed all these difficulties; and if they notwithstanding courageously entered into the war, it is only possible to comprehend and appreciate their mood from the standpoint of Hellenic patriotism assumed by them. They looked upon Philip as a barbarian, and upon his empire

as a barbarian empire. The further that his conquests extended, the more manifest that his design became of uniting the whole complex of territory from the river Danube to Cape Tænarum, and of blending Scythians, Illyrians, Thracians, Macedonians, and Hellenes into a single empire:—the less did such an empire appear to possess the requisite guarantees of endurance in the eyes of the Greeks, who regarded capability of being clearly surveyed and inner homogeneousness as the sole secure basis of a State. The absence of measure from the schemes of Philip was considered his weak point; it was thought inevitable, that such an arrogance must come to a fall; the strength of the enemy was under-estimated, because it was compared with that of the Persian empire, which had likewise sunk into decay by reason of its inorganic immensity. The conviction was still held fast, that in a struggle with barbarians Hellenes must necessarily be victorious; it was believed, that the event would again be decided by sea; confidence was placed in the superiority of the Attic fleet; and when even such men as Phocion, who in general obstinately opposed the policy of Demosthenes, after the outbreak of the war had no hesitation as to doing their duty as patriots, Demosthenes and his friends might well hold, that during the progress of the war the entire civic community would unite more and more firmly, and derive strength from union.

The position in which the Athenians stood towards the mainland power of the Macedonians resembled that which they had of old held towards the Lacedæmonians; only in the present case it was far less favorable, and the present adversary was far more difficult to reach. The blockade of the coasts was very keenly felt by the Macedonians; but nothing could be decided by it. The landings effected in the territory on the coast were beaten back; no bases of operations were discovered, where it was possible to establish a firm footing, and the great advantage secured

by Philip through the wholesale destruction of the Hellenic coast-towns now became apparent. All attempts to induce the coast-populations to rise against Philip failed; so that, before the king himself arrived at the theatre of the war, his adversaries were already discouraged.

On the other hand, however, Philip himself was at a loss as to the way of conducting the ^{Philip's} difficulties. war. He could not remain a tranquil spectator of the recalcitrance of the Athenians, and of the formation of a Hellenic League; this would have amounted to a confession of weakness, and would have been doubly dangerous after the failure of his undertakings on the Bosphorus. It behooved him to redeem the honor of his arms, and to restore his authority in the Greek world. If, then, he were to advance at once upon Athens, he was obliged to confess to himself, that a siege of the strongly-fortified city was in itself a very doubtful enterprise, and that in this event the Athenians might reckon upon support from many sides and of a vigorous character. But a Hellenic national war Philip was still desirous of avoiding; he wished to adhere to the stand-point, that it was not the people against which he was making war, but a perverse and deluded party, which opposed the true interests of the city as much as it opposed himself. Nor could he in the case of such a war put trust in his allies. He was not certain of the Thessalians, and still less of the Thebans, his former relations with whom, once of so confidential a nature, had been long ago disturbed. At Thebes the parties were as bitterly opposed to one another as at Athens. Timolas, a despicable debauchee, was at the head of the friends of Philip, who were prepared for any humiliation. On the other side a national party had arisen, and had already gained in authority by the fact, that a great part of the civic body had been rendered indignant by Philip's self-willed proceedings in Phocis, by the connexions which he had established with the ancient confederates of Thebes in

Peloponnesus, and by his occupation of the fortified places at Thermopylæ. Under these circumstances it was necessarily of the utmost importance to Philip to avoid the kindling of a national war; it was therefore indispensable to discover an opportunity enabling him to enter Greece with an armed host, without appearing to take the field against the Greeks, in order that thus the responsibility of the actual attack might be cast upon his enemies, and that they might be induced openly to meet him in the field. For this purpose it became necessary once more to make use of the position which Philip had already assumed in Greece; in it must be found the pretext for entering in a manner apparently justified. For if it was possible for him to come as the protector of Delphi, he would at the same time secure this advantage, that his enemies would be once more obliged to come forward as enemies of the Delphic god, while he appeared himself to represent a national cause. In other words, a second 'Sacred War' was requisite.

The War which had first introduced Philip into Greece had been the consequence of events which had developed themselves of their own accord and gradually. The new War, on the other hand, it was necessary to bring about artificially, the preparatory steps being taken by the Greeks themselves for Philip's purposes. For this end there was no lack of appropriate agents. For the rising authority of the national party at Athens and other places had indeed driven the friends of Macedonia into the background in public life, but had at the same time only rendered them more bitter, sore, and unconscientious. They were in secret all the more anxious to serve the king, and for the second time to open to him the inlets into Greece. The necessary agreements between the Macedonian court and its adherents were probably arrived at in Delphi. Here were the head-quarters of the Macedonian intrigues: at Delphi Athens was betrayed.

The Athenians themselves were entirely occupied with the imminent war; they observed more vigilantly than ever the personal movements of the king; but to the Delphic affairs no one paid attention, and no one took heed of the newly-created Amphictyonic assembly, which was despised on principle. Herein a great mistake was committed by the party at the head of affairs; for its adversaries turned this carelessness to the best account, and, on the next recurrence of the season when the officers of the city to be sent to Delphi were appointed, carried the assignment of all the posts to men of their own color,—a success which was made possible by the fact, that the participation in the elections held for the purpose was uncommonly small. Besides Diognetus, the *Hieromnemon* (*i. e.* voting assessor of the Amphictyonic Council) chosen by lot, Æschines, Midias, and Thrasycles were by a majority of votes elected as *Pylagoræ* or representatives of the community, who were able to exercise an important influence as consultative members. It was an easily gained party-victory, which annoyed the patriots not a little. But there was no objection to be offered to the elections; and the patriots consoled themselves, because they did not anticipate the results which were to evolve themselves out of the event. As for Æschines, he had only waited for the day of this election in order to come forward once more into the arena out of the retirement in which he had remained for several years, and to assume the leading part in the game of intrigues, for which he was most perfectly qualified.*

The election of the Pylagoræ.

Ol. cx. i
(B. c. 339).
March.

At the western base of Mount Parnassus dwelt the little population of the Ozolian Locrians; and their chief place, Amphissa, lay close at the foot of the chain of mountains which con-

Æschines
and the
Amphisseans.

* Timolas: Theopomp. *ap.* Athen. 436.—Election of the officers for Delphi: Æschin. iii. 195; Dem. xviii. 149.

nects Mount Parnassus with the Ætolian highlands; below Amphissa spreads a fertile low-lying plain, which opens to the south-east towards the Crisæan Gulf. The Amphisæans had in the most recent times of war been the most determined adversaries of the Phocians; next to Bœotia they had suffered most largely at their hands, and the overthrow of the Phocians accordingly gave great satisfaction to their lust of vengeance. Perhaps they on this occasion gained a few advantages, which rendered them insolent, and stimulated them to desire to play a part on their own account. This mood was taken advantage of at Thebes, where a feeling of wrath against Athens prevailed. For, before the purification of the Delphic temple had yet been completed, the Athenians had hastened to set up anew on sacred ground certain dedicatory shields,—the monuments of the battle of Plataæ, with the inscription recalling the victory achieved over the Persians and Thebans conjointly. The Thebans were anxious to have this insult animadverted upon, not only as an act of personal unfairness, but also as a violation of Hellenic usage; and, making a variety of promises, they put forward the Amphisæans, in order to have the matter brought before the Amphictyons. No sooner, therefore, had the deputies arrived for the spring meeting, than it became known, that in the first sitting a motion of the Amphisæans, directed against Athens, would be among the orders of the day. As Diognetus announced himself sick, Æschines took his powers upon him, and now conducted the cause of Athens entirely by himself.

A tempestuous sitting ensued. The spokesman of the Amphisæans inveighed against Athens and against the criminal impatience with which she had revived the memory of the ancient struggles between brethren in Hellas; he proposed a penalty of fifty talents (£12,180 *circ.*), and went so far in his ardor, that at the close he broke out into the words. “Nay, ye Hellenes, were ye

wise, not even the name of the Athenians would be allowed to be mentioned on these festive days; ye would have to send them forth from the sanctuary as accursed."

It was now the turn of Æschines. He contrived with brilliant eloquence to repeal the accusation, so that it was not even entertained; and, instead of this, to turn the point of the ban which was to have been launched against Athens, by charging the Amphisceans with a far worse violation of the Sacred Law. The lower portion of their plain touched without any natural boundary the domain of ancient Cirrha, upon which a curse had been laid in the First Sacred War, so that it was withdrawn from all cultivation. During the troubles of the immediate past the Locrians had appropriated pieces of this territory; they had built brick-kilns on the soil of the Cirrhæans, erected a new enclosure for the harbor, and levied tolls upon the ships entering it. To these facts Æschines adverted with the thunders of his eloquence. From the rocky terraces, where the Amphictyons held their diet under the open sky, he pointed with his finger to the smoking brick-kilns on the sea-shore, and demanded a joint march-out, which was only on account of the advanced hour of the day postponed to the next morning. When this arrived, the entire population of Delphi capable of bearing arms accordingly sallied forth under the command of the Amphictyons, in order to pull down the buildings, which were only a few hours off, and to fill up the harbor. It was an improvised Sacred War,—a surprise executed in the midst of peace without the observance of any of the legal formalities. After its accomplishment, the tumultuous expedition came to blows with the Amphisceans, who lay in wait for it on its return home; and after considerable losses it sought refuge in a wild flight to Delphi. Here was a new crime, in consequence of which an extraordinary meeting of the Amphictyons was immediately summoned to Thermopylæ, where

The quarrel about Cirrha.

the deputies of the confederate states were to appear, armed with powers, to discuss the new *casus belli*. Æschines for his part, who had contended with so splendid a result for the honor of his native city and for the rights of the god, returned home in triumph, made his report to the civic assembly, and requested the necessary instructions for the coming federal meeting.

At Athens, too, everything seemed at first to proceed as Æschines desired. He contrived to kindle among his fellow-citizens also the artificial enthusiasm which he had excited at Delphi. He unscrupulously appealed in his favor to the memories of Solon and of his Sacred War; he dared to represent Demosthenes as a traitor, who had in his capacity of *Pylagoras* been purchased for 2,000 drachms by the Amphisseans, in order to throw a veil of silence over their misdeeds. Indeed, such was the contagious force of fanatical excitement, that the Athenians quite forgot the serious position in which their own city was placed, and thought of nothing but the brick-kilns near Cirrha and the impious act of the Amphisseans.

It was only by means of the greatest exertions that Demosthenes succeeded, first in the Council and then in the popular assembly, in asserting the voice of reason, and in making clear to the Athenians the danger into which they would precipitate themselves, if they entered into the projects of Æschines, the sole object of which he declared to be to bring the Macedonians into the land. It was resolved to send no deputy to the meeting at Thermopylæ; and although it was impossible entirely to frustrate it, and to put an end to the criminally kindled quarrels, and to cross the intrigues of Æschines, yet his defeat was marked enough, and in particular it was a triumph for Demosthenes, that the attempt to seize this opportunity for provoking hostility between Athens and Thebes ended in the contrary result to that which had been intended. For Thebes too kept away from Thermopylæ, and for the first

time entered into a course of policy which, in accordance with the desire long cherished by Demosthenes, made possible an approximation between the two cities.*

The diet summoned to Thermopylæ accordingly remained a pure party-assembly, to which only those states sent deputies which stood entirely under the influence of Macedonia. As yet Philip was not at hand. During three quarters of a year after the siege of Byzantium he still continued withdrawn from the eyes of the Greeks, fighting in the distant land of the Danube against Scythians and Triballi. There was accordingly still needed an interlude, before the catastrophe, which was intended, could come to pass. Cottyphus the Pharsalian, who occupied the presidency among the Amphictyons, was therefore empowered by the assembly to conduct the Sacred War. The threatened Amphisæans promised satisfaction, but gave none. When the summer had passed in these transactions, and king Philip, having returned from the North, and having been healed from his wounds, was ready for intervention, a report was made to the Delphic autumn meeting concerning the obstinate recalcitrance of the Amphisæans; there was now, it was declared, no choice left to the Amphictyonic states but either themselves to collect money, hire troops, and impose penalties upon all the states guilty of delay, or to appoint Philip federal commander. The latter alternative was resolved upon, as had long been secretly settled, although Æschines subsequently blamed the Athenians for having, misled by Demosthenes, spurned the opportunity offered by the gods for a pious and honorable war.†

Philip
appointed
Amphic-
tyonic general.

Ol. ex. 2
(B. C. 339).

October.

* Æschines at Delphía: Dem. xviii. 149; Æschin. iii. 117.—Demosthenes against Æschines at Athens: Æschin. iii. 125; Dem. xviii. 143 (πόλεμον εἰς τὴν Ἀπτικήν εισάγεις, Αἰσχίνη, πόλεμον ἀμφικτυονικόν).

† Meeting at Thermopylæ and appointment of Cottyphus (Φιλίππου . . . ἐν Σκύθαις ἀπόντος): Æschin. iii. 128; Dem. xviii. 151.—The nomination of

How the
new Amphic-
tyonic War
was brought
about.

Thus negligence, self-delusion, and treason had within a short time accomplished what had been the object of Philip's schemes. The fault of negligence falls to the charge of the Athenians, who at the time of the Delphic elections were not upon their guard, although they had four years previously so emphatically taken care that the interests of Athens at Delphi should not fall into the hands of an *Æschines* (p. 366). The civic community was imperfectly adapted for taking a clear view of the situation of things beyond their immediate ken; and Demosthenes himself, whose task it was to turn his vigilant glance in all directions, is hardly to be acquitted of having been insufficiently informed of what was taking place at Delphi, and of having altogether under-estimated the dangers which threatened from that quarter. The situation of affairs failed to become clear to him, until *Æschines* returned, and until Demosthenes cast at him the wrathful words: "Thou bringest war to Attica, an Amphictyonic war!" The self-deluded were the Amphisceans, who in aimless excitement allowed themselves to be tempted to kindle a new quarrel, the consequences of which were to burst over their own heads. Finally, treason was at work in every quarter, and this in accordance with a well-devised plan, based upon a joint agreement between the partisans of Philip, and doubtless in its main points already fixed, when *Æschines* was carrying the election of himself and of his associates at Athens. As in a well-studied drama we see all those concerned play their parts,

Philip to the *ἡγεμονία τῆς εὐσεβείας* (*Æschin.* 129) is said to have been advocated by *Æschines* himself among others, according to Grote, vol. xi. p. 666. But assuredly Demosthenes would not have passed by this circumstance. Moreover, *Æschines* not without intention represents the second (autumn-) meeting as a quite separate event, in which he took no part whatever. It should also be remembered that new *Pylagoræ* were elected for every *Pylæa*; and how could it have been possible that *Æschines* should have been re-elected?

each scene accurately fit on to its predecessor, and the catastrophe accomplish itself step by step, which corresponded to the intentions of the man who, concealed from the eyes of the public, managed the whole performance. The only subject on which doubt may remain is the extent to which circumstances took their course of their own accord, and the point at which the intrigue began.

The king wished to be summoned into Greece for a new process of execution. The first point therefore on which it was necessary to arrive at an understanding was the obtaining of a culprit, the discovery of a community, upon which war could be made on account of an act of impiety committed against the Temple. For this purpose the Amphisceans were selected, the only community against which exception could be taken on this head. But inasmuch as they had done no wrong, beyond what had for years been calmly allowed to take its course and been tolerated, the whole intention would have been too palpably revealed, had the opportunity been forced precipitately, and had the prescriptive acts of trespass been suddenly made a *casus belli*. It was therefore necessary that the Amphisceans should themselves by an insolent proceeding furnish the occasion for calling them to account; and to this they were excited by Thebes. It would therefore seem, that the whole intrigue had its beginning at Thebes, and that Theban statesmen, such as Timolas and his associates, guilefully abused the short-sightedness of the Amphisceans, took advantage of their hatred against Athens, and by all kinds of futile promises induced them publicly to attest their holy zeal for the honor of the god by means of a protest against Athens. But among the Amphisceans too there must have been men, whose conduct was the result of a secret understanding; for the insolent vehemence and the defiant bearing of the Locrian envoy fitted so admirably into the plot of the drama, that in this also it is hardly possible to perceive a mere accidental connexion.

Moreover there existed in Locris a party of the "Godly," which sided with Cottyphus.

The course of events becomes clearer from the moment when Æschines enters upon the stage, in order to assume the leading part. He is to all appearance completely taken by surprise; nothing more than a vague rumor announces an attack about to be made upon Athens; and not until he has listened to the complaint of the Amphisseans does the notion suddenly occur to his mind of the answer with which he will confound the audacious accusers;—and yet everything has been long ago prepared, in order by the withdrawal of his fellow-countrymen to play the whole game into his hands; and yet he has all the documents in immediate readiness in order to prove the impious proceedings of the Amphisseans. The placing of the shields in the temple was manifestly a matter of absolute indifference, which is altogether dropped, after it has, as an incident previously arranged, exercised its effect. The Amphisseans fell into the trap; and under the presidency of Cottyphus, a person entirely dependent upon Philip, all subsequent steps are hurried on with a ruthless speed and violence, the sole purpose of which is to goad the unhappy Amphisseans into the commission of a new wrong, and to frustrate anything which might perchance make possible an amicable settlement of the quarrel. And the hypocritical nature of Æschines could find no greater satisfaction than in his having an opportunity of appearing as a fiery patriot on behalf of his native city, while he was in truth busily engaged in conjuring up the worst of calamities over its head. For, from the moment when he occasioned the process of execution against Amphissa, he could not remain in doubt as to the fact that he was opening a way into Greece for Philip, and that his native city, between which and Philip a state of war prevailed, must thereby be involved in the most imminent peril. The only question as to which doubts may be en-

tertained, is whether he acted thus from a desire of vengeance upon his opponents, to whom he had succumbed at Athens, or from paid officiousness, of which motive Demosthenes accuses him; and even were it desired to give the mildest interpretation to his course of action, viz. that he considered the approach of a Macedonian army the best means for overthrowing the war-party at Athens, yet it would still have to be designated as base treason, that for such a purpose he made use of the national enemy. But in truth it was not political but personal motives, which made Æschines a traitor. By nature devoid of character and of independence, he invariably attached himself to such men as seemed to be likely to furnish him an opportunity of letting his talent shine and playing a prominent part, an end to which in spite of all his natural gifts he was unable to attain by a straight path and by his own strength. Vanity was the impulse at the bottom of his actions. Since the embassy to Pella he had been dazzled by the greatness of Philip, and unscrupulously supported the designs of the king, in order thus to satisfy his own restless ambition and to gain personal advantages. Being more and more driven into the background by the personal superiority of Demosthenes, he sought for a new opportunity for asserting himself, and therefore unhesitatingly entered into the intrigue which, whether its first threads were spun at Thebes or at Delphi or at Athens, was in any case a treasonable combination among all the partisans of Philip, designed to bring a Macedonian army into the country, and to place in the hands of the king the decision of the destinies of Greece.*

* The εὐσεβεῖς in Amphissa, whose recall is demanded by Cottyphus: Æschin. iii. 129. It may be regarded as highly probable, that the δι' εὐσεβείαν φεύγοντες are the same men as those who had with the Philippic party brought about the entire catastrophe, and had immediately afterwards been expelled as traitors.—The defence offered on behalf of Æschines and the attempted refutation of the suspicion cast upon him by Demosthenes in Spengel, *Demosth. Vertheid. des Ktesiphon*, have failed to convince me.

Advance of
Philip.

Ol. cx. 2
(B. C. 339).
November.

After all the events had been accomplished, which Philip had awaited in prudent retirement, he no longer delayed. Of the strong positions at Thermopylæ, Nicæa, and Echinus (p. 287), he had already made himself master. When the winter began, he took possession of all the inlets into Interior Greece; and whoever observed the warlike stir in the frontier-cantons, the activity of the king and his generals, the extreme circumspection with which the campaign was commenced, and the large masses of troops which were gradually assembling, could hardly fail to be struck by the thought, that something of a different kind was intended from the chastisement of the obscure Locrian town, which was named as the goal of the military expedition. Soon even those at a greater distance were to be made to see clearly in the matter.

From Thermopylæ several routes lead into Interior Greece. Of these the one passes out of the recess of the mountains near Heraclea, the ancient Trachis (vol. iii. p. 143), over to the Dorian tetrapolis; and thence by a second pass between Mounts Parnassus and Corax in the direction of Amphissa, which lay immediately at the outlet of the pass. This is the route which, leading from north to south, traverses the Isthmus between the Malian and the Crisæan Gulf by the shortest line. If Philip took this route, it was unnecessary for him to pass through the Pass of Thermopylæ, or at all to touch Central Greece. But he actually sent only part of his army in advance by this route, conducting the main body from Thermopylæ to the south-east, across the hills extending from Phthiotis in the direction of the Eubœan Sea,—the offshoots of Mount Callidromus and of the Cnemis-range, where the passes lead towards Phocis and Bœotia. The most important of these passes ended at Elatea; and before sure tidings had yet been received with regard to the movements of the army, the king suddenly stood in the valley of the Cephissus,

where after the devastation of Phocis he was met by no resistance. Elatea, the most considerable city on the south side of the frontier mountains, the citadel and key of the principal pass and of the whole of ^{Occupation of Elatea.} Central Greece, was rapidly surrounded by entrenchments; below the city Philip pitched a fortified camp. In this position he controlled the plain of the Cephissus, which attains to its greatest breadth between Elatea and Tithora, a place lying opposite at the base of Mount Parnassus. His rear being covered in case of a retreat, and his communications with Thessaly and Macedonia secured, he at the same time had at his disposal the resources of the fertile valley, the best pastures for his horses, and the amplest room for any movements of troops. For on one side he had a convenient line of communication up the valley of the Cephissus, with the district of Doris (vol. ii. p. 437), and with the passes leading thence by way of Cytinium to Amphissa; while on the other, *i. e.* down-stream, he was so close to the frontier of Bœotia, that he kept Thebes perpetually in check, without violating its territory. By his occupation of Elatea Philip had flung aside the mask; he had taken up a position, than which no better could have been found for making war upon Western as well as upon Eastern Greece. It was now manifest, that he had no intention of confining himself to an expedition of execution against Amphissa.

The Athenians had indeed already received an early warning from Demosthenes, so soon ^{Panic at Athens.} as the treasonable scheme of a new Sacred War became known. They had however, notwithstanding this, not allowed themselves to be disturbed in their carelessness, and even seem to have opined that the Amphissean quarrel would in the first instance keep the tempest of war at a distance from themselves. Out of this delusion they were now all the more unexpectedly torn forth. Of a sudden it seemed to them, as if the enemy's army was

before the gates of Athens ; and all the misery of the war, which they had cheerfully decreed when the enemy was fighting in distant Thrace, now stood immediately before their eyes.

It was evening, Demosthenes relates, when the message reached the Prytanes, that Elatea had been taken. They at once rose from their common meal ; some of them drove the buyers and sellers from the market-place, and lit a great fire, in order to give a signal to the rural population. The others sent to the generals, and caused the trumpeters to sound an alarm. The whole city was in motion. On the next morning, as soon as day broke, the Prytanes summoned the Council to the Town Hall ; the citizens streamed to the Pnyx ; and, before the Council had yet arrived at a resolution, the popular assembly was waiting in anxious expectation. And when hereupon the Prytanes had made public the situation of affairs, and had also produced the messenger, so that he might personally repeat his tidings, the question was asked : Who demands to speak ? Inasmuch as there was no motion of the Council before the assembly, the decision depended entirely upon the latter. And yet no man came forward ; and although the herald several times repeated his summons, although all the Ten Generals and all the popular orators were present, and although the interests of the fatherland imposed upon every patriot the duty of offering counsel and aid, yet all remained dumb, deeply agitated, and morally unhinged by the overwhelming events which had taken place. All eyes turned to Demosthenes ; and the universal helplessness having been attested with sufficient clearness by the long and painful silence, the impression was all the greater which was created when he at last came forward,—and not with vacillatory and uncertain proposals, but with a resolute and clearly-arranged exposition of that which was demanded by the honor and safety of the city. Indeed, he contrived with happy presence of mind to take

advantage of the panic of the moment, in order to bring to pass what was of supreme importance, viz. the combination with Thebes.

Demosthenes had by no means remained free from the universal ill-will prevailing ^{Athens} and Thebes. among his fellow-citizens against Thebes. He had deemed the ancient friends of the Persians to be likewise the natural adherents of the new national enemy; he had not believed them capable of appreciating the national cause; and yet he was from the first a man of too much magnanimity of mind and Hellenic feeling to surrender himself to a blind hatred. He had the preservation of the Hellenic nation too much at heart, for it to have been possible that he should have desired the weakening or annihilation of any one member of it. But the cautiousness with which he was obliged to advance this sentiment too, is already evident from the fact, that in his oration *on the Peace* (p. 338) he had expressly to beg his fellow-citizens not to interrupt him by expressions of dissatisfaction, although he was giving utterance to nothing more than the expectation, that for the Thebans also a time would arrive when they would be unwilling to march by the side of Philip against Athens.

The following years confirmed his words. After the peace there ensued a change of mood at Thebes; the germs of a national party formed themselves, which were not unobserved by the vigilant eye of Demosthenes. A change therefore took place in his views also (p. 338); and the opposition between him and Æschines contributed to encourage this alteration of sentiments. Demosthenes perceived the baseness of his opponent to lie principally in this: that he was so busily at work to foster the hostility between the neighbors, to goad on the citizens against Thebes, to make the rift more and more deep and incurable, and, so far as in him lay, to drive the Thebans more and more over to the side of the enemy. Demosthenes

became correspondingly decided in his view; his judgment grew more considerate; his liberal recognition of the worth of the neighbor-state more ready. In his speech *for the Chersonnesus* he admonishes the Thebans to be on their guard, and not to trust Philip's favors, although at that time the mood of the Athenians was still so hostile, that he could call upon them to seek auxiliaries everywhere, even in Persia, but could not venture to mention the Thebans.

After the fall of Elatea a change ensued. It was now impossible to look out for aid from a distance; the next-door neighbors were now the sole auxiliaries possible; and now of a sudden the preservation of Athens seemed to depend entirely upon a combination with Thebes. He accordingly now demands the immediate opening of negotiations for the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance with Thebes; at the same time the equipment of the entire civic forces, and a march-out to the Bœotian frontier. But in order to execute these measures with the necessary energy, a supreme magisterial authority invested with extraordinary powers was required. Demosthenes therefore proposed for the period of the endurance of the danger of war the establishment of a government-committee of ten men, who together with the generals were to provide for the commonweal according to their best judgment. He was himself called to the head of this board of security. Men sharing his sentiments were placed at his side; he was now the Regent of Athens, and on his shoulders rested the welfare of the city.*

* Occupation of Elatea in the last months of 339 B. C.: Westermann *ad* Dem. xviii. 152. The impression created by this event at Athens had also been described by Hyperides; cf. *Rhet. Gr.* i. 167. The ensuing events are according to Köchly (*Freiheitskrieg der Hellenen gegen Phil.* in *N. Schweizer Museum*, II.), in opposition to Plutarch, *Dem.* 18, to be arranged in the following order: —339–8 B. C.: Elatea taken—winter-quarters occupied—negotiations between Athens and Thebes—winter-fights. Spring: march to Amphissa—intrigues at Athens—fresh negotiations—approach of Antipater's army—return of Philip to Phœcis—irruption into Bœotia—battle of Chæronea.—Demosthenes on Thebes: v. 14; viii. 63.

The first step was to make a journey to Thebes. Here he found the deputies of the Bœotian towns assembled, and also met an embassy from Philip, led by the crafty Python (p. 376), a man pre-eminently adapted for exciting all the elements of hostility against Athens which existed among the Thebans, and, on the other hand, for commending to them as impressively as possible the Macedonian alliance. For to Philip nothing could be less welcome than a combination between the two cities, which still possessed the civic bodies best able to fight; their reconciliation on the basis of a national movement would amount to a moral defeat of his Amphictyonic policy, and at the same time to a material obstacle in the way of his strategical plans. The king therefore proceeded with the utmost caution. He abstained from taking advantage of the proximity of his army, so as to make rigorous and extensive demands; he conducted himself, not as king of Macedonia, but as a member of the Hellenic League of states; and his envoy was accompanied by deputies of the Greek cantons. He not even demanded active federal aid, but merely neutrality during his war with Athens, and permission to march through Bœotian territory. In the case of a favorable issue he held out the prospect of an acquisition of spoils and territory; in the contrary event all the horrors of war were described as imminent, and as specially certain to visit Bœotia.

What had Demosthenes to throw into the opposite scale? He had no means at command either for terrifying or for tempting; he could open the prospect of no advantages; he only came in order to demand sacrifices and to bring with him troubles of war. Besides which, he was an entire stranger to the citizens of Thebes, and as an Athenian had to contend against a general mistrust. Athens stood quite deserted in confronting the king. How easy therefore was it to interpret his intentions as if he

were endeavoring, in order to save his city, which had provoked the war, to drag Thebes also into the danger,—into a danger of war, moreover, to which Thebes was in the first instance and in a prominent degree exposed. For upon Athens itself it was impossible to make war successfully without a fleet.

Demos-
thenes at
Thebes.

Ol. cx. 2
(B. C. 338).

Winter.

And yet Demosthenes was victorious on the decisive day in the Bœotian assembly. And yet he was able to proclaim the common duty of waging the struggle on behalf of the honor and liberty of the fatherland, and at the same time on behalf of the independence of each State, with so mighty a power of eloquence, that he carried away with him the hearts of the Bœotian men, that all timid considerations, all scruples, all feelings of ill-will vanished, and *one* flame of patriotic enthusiasm, kindled by Demosthenes, seized Thebes as well as Athens. This was the greatest and noblest victory of Demosthenes; it was most emphatically his own, his personal deed. It was not merely a moral gain, but also a political event which weighed heavily in the balance. For the measures taken by Philip at the very last hour best showed how deeply he was interested in preventing this union. Upon nothing had he calculated with so much certainty, as upon the insuperable hostility between the two neighbor-states. If these joined hands against him, then there was still a chance of the other states uniting; then a national rising was still possible, which might ruin Philip's position in Greece and call all his successes into question. There manifestly still survived among the Thebans something of the spirit which Epaminondas and his friends had aroused; an openness towards great ideas, a capacity for giving themselves up to moral greatness, for allowing themselves to be influenced by true eloquence, and for feeling and thinking as Hellenes. The hard ore had been melted; and that which it had been invariably in vain

sought to effect in former times, by force of arms (vol. ii. p. 440), and afterwards, by Epaminondas as well as by the Bœotian party at Athens, by means of a political agreement, was now rapidly and successfully consummated; and the two neighbor-lands, either of which was so manifestly destined to supplement the other, and was so indispensable for its security, closely united in the last hour. The overtures of Philip's envoys were rejected, and all the proposals of Demosthenes accepted. Athens guaranteed to the Thebans the unimpaired local supremacy over Bœotia; the expenses of the war were to be proportionately divided; at the same time the restoration of the Phocian towns was resolved upon, and an agreement was arrived at as to the joint conduct of the war by water and by land. It was the noblest and most just league ever concluded between two Hellenic states; for it was based upon the determination to overcome all petty jealousies in the interest of the endangered fatherland. Thebes declared itself ready to re-establish the Phocians. The wall which severed Attica from Bœotia had fallen, and on either side of Mount Cithæron, from Cape Sunium to Parnassus, *one* endeavor, *one* will, held sway,—and this will was that of Demosthenes, who was associated in concord with the most generous minds among the people.*

There now once more stood opposed to one another, as in the Persian Wars, two groups of states, the one siding with the foreign power, the other resolved to wage the struggle for liberty. The object, therefore, was jointly to defend this Hellas in a more restricted sense, and to take advantage for this purpose of the bulwarks provided by nature. Below Elateæ

League between Athens and Thebes.

The two theatres of the War.

* Demosthenes at Thebes: Theopomp. *ap.* Plutarch. *Dem.* 18: ἡ τοῦ ῥήτορος δύναμις ἐκρπίζουσα τὸν θυμὸν αὐτῶν καὶ διακαίονσα τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐπεσκότησε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν, ὥστε φόβον καὶ λογισμὸν καὶ χάριν ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐνθουσιῶντας ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ καλόν.—Treaty with Thebes: Æschin. iii. 142.

the valley of the river Cephissus becomes narrower. From Parnassus a hill (Paróri) springs forward in advance towards the river, and from the opposite range, Mount Cnemis, another, by which lay the town of Parapotamii. This pass was occupied by the allies; here was now the Thermopylæ of free Greece. Simultaneously it was sought to gain other bases of operation against Philip. A combination was established with the Amphisseans; for it was of the highest importance to prevent Philip from succeeding in rapidly ridding himself of these enemies by force or by means of an amicable settlement. Accordingly, 10,000 mercenaries on foot and 1,000 mounted, who had been hired by the Athenians, were designated for the protection of Locris, and marched to Amphissa under the command of Chares and of the Theban Proxenus. In other words, the allies renounced all participation in the shameful abuse to which the national religion had been put in the interest of Philip, and were courageous enough before the eyes of all the Hellenes to attach more importance to the preservation of the fatherland than to the excommunicatory curses of the traitorous Amphictyons. For the same reason steps were at once taken to repair, so far as it was possible, the wrong which had been committed, and restore Phocis, which had been sacrificed to the intrigues of Delphi. On the summons of the allied cities, the fugitive inhabitants returned to their homes, and the scattered Phocians assembled in their desolated habitations. With the skilfulness peculiar to the Hellenes they rapidly re-settled amidst the ruins of their towns under the protection of the Locrian troops, and helped to render safe the mountain-passes of Parnassus. They at once became efficient allies, as they glowed with eagerness to take vengeance upon Philip, and were resolved with the courage of despair to defend the home they had regained. Finally, the allies sent messages around Greece, in order to obtain armed auxiliaries; and the states which Demosthe-

nes had secured, viz. Megara, Corinth, Eubœa, Achaia, Leucas, and Coreyra, proved ready to furnish their contingents and to pay contributions to the war-fund, while the jealous Peloponnesians at all events remained neutral, and could not be induced to support Philip, who claimed their contingents on the pretext of the Sacred War.*

Thus, then, an end had likewise been successfully put to the hostilities between Thebes and Phocis, between Phocis and Amphissa, between Amphissa and Athens. Round Mount Parnassus gathered a considerable military force; and at the same time the Thebans and the Athenians had taken the field in fraternal concord against Philip on the Bœotian frontier, watching every movement on his part. Nor was this all. Bloody skirmishes ensued between single divisions in the low-lying plain of the Cephissus. Two of these conflicts were known under the names of the 'River-battle' and the 'Winter-battle;' in both fortune was on the sides of the allies, in both the Athenians in particular—as Demosthenes states with pride showed themselves not only unexceptionable, but worthy of high admiration by the excellence of their equipment, their good discipline, and their ardor. They were once more acknowledged and celebrated as the champions of the Hellenes. Certain bodies of troops which were specially successful in these conflicts, as *e. g.* that of the Cecropian tribe with its captain Bularchus, vowed dedicatory gifts to the Athene on the citadel; in the city the successes achieved were solemnized by sacrifices and processions: the minds of all men were in an elevated, grateful, and hopeful mood. They had full confidence in the guidance of Demosthenes, and gave a public expression to this trustfulness, when at the spring-festival of the Great Dionysia he was, on the motion of his cousin Demo-

Skirmishes
in Phocis.

Ol. cx. 2 (B.
c. 338).

Winter.

* Phocis: Paus. x. 3, 3; 33, 8. Allies: Æschin. iii. 95; Plutarch. *Dem.* 17. The neutrals (ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ἰδίας πλεονεξίας ἐλπίδι), *Dem.* xviii. 64; Paus. viii. 6, 2.

meles, who had formerly been among his enemies, rewarded with a wreath of gold.*

Demosthe-
nes and Pho-
cion. It is true that even now opposition to him raised its head. It was sought to deprive him of the love of his fellow-citizens. Invectives were uttered against the friendly attitude towards Bœotia, which had so long been regarded as an aberration unpardonable in the case of any decent Athenian; and among prominent personages, Phocion in particular, at a season when a good understanding between him and Demosthenes was of greater importance than ever, confronted him with unconcealed bitterness. Doubtless no opposition was felt more painfully by Demosthenes than this; for Phocion was, next to himself, the character of the highest mark, and his was the manliest individuality at Athens; he was a man who, like Demosthenes, owed everything to himself, who was equally unbiassed in his judgment, and of an immovable independence of spirit. He could never become a party-follower. In him the two tendencies of the society of the times met. In the Academy he had imbibed a stern contempt for all existing ways; but his nature was too practical and too much in need of self-exertion, for it to be possible for him to withdraw from the world like a true follower of Plato. He required a calling; he served the commonwealth, but served it merely from a sense of duty for conscience' sake, without taking any personal interest in it, without devoting any love to it, or feeling any warm impulse towards it. Probably there has rarely existed a successful general who has been less animated by ambition, and who has taken less pleasure in his successes, than Phocion. Every danger of war raised his authority; and yet it was peace alone which he desired. He looked upon any enthusiastic movement on the part of the people

* *Ἡ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ καὶ ἡ χειμερινὴ μάχη: Dem. xviii. 216.—Bularchus: *Monatsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1863, 6.—Bestowal of the wreath: *Vii. X Orat.* 846.

as a dangerous delusion, and regarded the orators who encouraged it, and who exhorted the citizens to make efforts, as the most dangerous counsellors of the community. Personally, he had no desire to be an orator; but the training in dialectics which he had acquired, the energy of his character, the sober coldness and the decisiveness of his views, which last is connected with the one-sidedness of his stand-point, gave to his words a cutting force as well in occasional sayings as in public counter-speeches, and made him the most dangerous of all the opponents of Demosthenes. He resembled a rock, upon which all the waves of the current of the times broke; and the higher they rose, the more rigid was his resistance.

In other quarters, too, attempts were made to prevent the outbreak of the war. Alarming Intrigues of the peace-party. signs were announced; calamitous accidents which had occurred on the occasion of the last Eleusinia, it was contrived to turn to account as warning omens. The opposition-party combined, as in the days of Pericles, with a superstitious tendency fostered by the priests, who saw in the alliance with the Phocians and Amphisceans, still under the ban of the Delphic god, an abomination which averted the favor of the gods from the Athenian state. Oracles were bruited about in order to spread terror and pusillanimity; and in the end it was actually demanded, that before the decisive step was taken the Pythia should be asked what Athens ought to do, although it was well known that Delphi was at present even less than at the time of the Persian Wars entitled to a vote, and that the Pythia was, as Demosthenes expressed it, Philippic at heart.

But all these efforts at resistance were impotent against the current of the times. The citizens were in a confident mood. Demosthenes stood firm and secure at the head of the national affairs; he took vigorous measures against all who intended to cripple or disturb the patriotic move-

ment; and probably we may also see a connexion between his struggle against the priestly party and his proceedings against the priestess Theoris, whose execution on account of her intrigues was brought about by him. At Thebes as well as at Athens he directed the government; and with joyous courage all patriots looked forward to the summer campaign, which was to decide everything.*

It was otherwise in the camp of the enemy. Philip found himself utterly at fault in his calculations. Before his eyes the towns which he had destroyed were being rebuilt; the passes on his right and on his left were occupied by considerable numbers of troops, advantageously disposed and efficiently commanded. The first skirmishes had not ended in his favor. The struggle, to which he saw himself forced, was one in itself entirely unexpected by, and unwelcome to, him; and, moreover, he was anything but assured of ultimate success.

Philip's
march to
Amphissa.

Ol. ex. 2
(B. C. 338).

Spring.

During the winter months he had kept the main body of his troops in the rear of the passes; when the spring arrived, it was necessary for him to abandon this anxious position, and to advance either along the base of Mount Parnassus or in Bœotia. He preferred first to repair to the western theatre of the war, because here he hoped for an easier success. A division of his troops still lay at Cytinium, where the pass leads across from the region of the sources of the Cephissus to Amphissa. But here again Philip refrained from venturing at once to penetrate with his troops into the perilous gorges of the hills; he preferred to make use of one of his stratagems, in which the advantage was always, more than in anything else, on his side as against the Greeks. He arranged

* Expressions of opposition to Demosthenes: Æschin. ii. 106: πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς καὶ βιωτάζει. Cf. W. Schmitz, *Ueber den Bœotismus des Demosthenes* in *Zeitschrift für Gymn.*, 1865, 1.—Phœcion: Plutarch. *Phoc.* 9 and 16.—Prodigies: Æschin. iii. 130; Plutarch. *Phoc.* 20.—Theoris: Philochorus *ap.* Harpocr. Boeckh, *über Philochoros*, 23; Plutarch. *Dem.* 14.

an apparent movement of retreat, drew off his troops out of the passes of Doris; and by means of general orders, which he intentionally allowed to fall into the enemies' hands, spread the news that a revolt had broken out among the Thracian peoples, which required his presence, and for the nonce made impossible the continuation of the Hellenic War. Upon bands of mercenaries, which were negligently commanded and only to be retained at arduous posts by the impression of imminent danger and by the immediate presence of the foe, such stratagems exercised a specially strong effect. The troops dispersed; the passes were left open; and, before any movement of the kind had been expected, the king had suddenly returned by forced marches, and had penetrated through the passes. The army of mercenaries, taken by surprise, was completely defeated at Amphissa, and the town itself was subjected to the same judgment as Phocis had formerly undergone. Naupactus too, which was garrisoned by Achæans, was taken by storm, and handed over to the Ætolians.

Through this success, which had been obtained for the king by the carelessness of the commanders of the mercenaries, perhaps also by treason among them, an essential part of Demosthenes' plan of operations had been frustrated. Philip was now able to throw his whole strength into the eastern theatre of the war; he had open access from the south side of Mount Parnassus; and could cross from Naupactus into Peloponnesus, so as to force the auxiliary troops of Athens to return home.*

It was probably about the same time that the king entered into fresh negotiations. He could calculate upon the inability of the cities to sustain for any length of time so excessive an exertion of their resources; he was aware of the large amount of opposition which still existed

Fresh
negotiations.

Ol. ex. 2
(B. C. 338).

Summer.

* Amphissa: Polyæn. iv. 2, 8; Æschin. iii. 146 seq.—Naupactus: Theopomp. ap. Suidas, s. v. *φρουρήσεις ἐν Νάυπακτῳ*.

against the war-policy; the annihilation of Amphissa could not have failed to create a most terrible impression. Bœotia, which had from the first not followed from any original impulse of its own, was now the object which he had next in view. The capital was still animated by the spirit of Demosthenes; but Thebes was not Bœotia, and the deputies of the country-towns, whose territory already had to suffer as the scene of war, were otherwise inclined. Vacillation accordingly ensued in consequence of the new offers brought from Macedonian head-quarters; and not only at Thebes, but also at Athens, the peace-party again ventured to come forward more boldly; from the fact that the most proved general of the city, as to whose patriotism it was permitted to no man to express a doubt, it derived a significance disproportionate to its real strength. It was a strange contrast, that the unwarlike orator should urge on the citizens to the conflict, while the soldier never ceased from warnings and advice in a contrary sense. The two men even came into angry personal contact; Demosthenes, wroth at the unbending resistance of his adversary, is said menacingly to have called out to him, "The Athenians will make an end of thee, if they become heated with anger;" to which Phocion replied, "And thee, if they recover their senses." These and similar exchanges of sallies handed down from these times give a notion of the extreme bitterness prevailing between the opposite stand-points.

Energy of Demosthenes. To Demosthenes no idea could be more intolerable, than that in the last hour all the results of years of sacrifices and efforts should be lost. This intensified his energy, and impelled the fiery man to act with continuously increasing decision, in order to terrify the traitors, to encourage the hesitating, and to strengthen the uncertain. He has been charged with having carried on a system of terrorism irreconcilable with the spirit of a republican administration. As in the

days when Pericles was at the helm, it was complained that the constitution had been virtually abolished, and that Attic affairs were conducted by Demosthenes according to an understanding with the leaders of Bœotia. It was declared that he tolerated no contradiction, treated the generals with masterful arrogance, persecuted with savage wrath, like Cleophon of old (vol. iii. p. 535), every expression of views tending towards peace; and that it was likewise only by despotically intimidating the Bœotarchs that he had induced them, whom the recent offers of the king had shaken, to abstain from renouncing their connexion with him. The bearings of Demosthenes at Athens is, however, justified by the fact, that opposition was not openly offered to him by a considerable part of the citizens, but only proceeded from individuals or small knots of men, who sought to hinder his labors by secret intrigues. The feelings of the civic community found expression in the bestowal of another wreath of honor upon the orator, which was proposed by Hyperides, and carried with brilliant success against the protest of Diondas, perhaps at the festival of the Great Panathenæa (summer of 338 B. C.). After the rejection of the last proposals of peace the battle was inevitable; and both sides could not but desire a speedy decision. As to the scene of the conflict, it was necessarily of the utmost importance to the Hellenes that they should maintain their strong position in the narrow part of the valley of the Cephissus, and there await the attack; while Philip, who during the recent negotiations had caused the reinforcements to join him, which Antipater led to him out of his kingdom, required a battle-field where he could unfold his cavalry and prove his superiority in tactics.*

He accordingly quitted his winter-quarters; withdrew

* Terrorism (*δυναστεία*), of Demosthenes: *Æschin.* iii. 146 *seq.* *Δυναστεύων οὐκ ἀδίκως οὐδὲ παρ' ἀξίαν, ὥσπερ ἀποφαίνεται Θεόπομπος*: *Plutarch. Dem.* 13.—Second bestowal of a wreath of honor: *Schäfer*, ii. 529.

Advance of
the Macedo-
nian main
force.

from the pass; sent his vanguard into the mountainous country which surrounds the valley of Lake Copais in the north; devastated the Bœotian hamlets, and threatened the entire eastern district. The allies had staked their success in the struggle upon the holding of the pass, and were thus by the movement of the enemy suddenly placed in a position of the most anxious doubt. For it was possible, that the whole army of the enemy might march off in an easterly direction, nor was it known where he ought to be awaited. It was therefore necessary to follow his movements, if in accordance with the desire of the Bœotians their land was to be protected. The allies accordingly separated; and only a feeble garrison was left in guard of the pass.

Disposition
of the two
armies.

No sooner had Philip gained this advantage, than he rapidly drew back his troops into their former position, easily overthrew the body of men left behind in the pass, pushed his troops through it in pursuit, and hereupon unexpectedly stood with his whole army in the Bœotian valley of the Cephissus, the broad plain of which he had from the first recognized to be the battle-field best suited to himself. The Hellenes gathered to the south of the Cephissus, where the town of Chæronea served them as a support in the rear, and the river as a line of defence. Here, unhindered by the enemy, they drew up their contingents at the base of the heights which rise to the rear of Chæronea, on either side of the rivulet of the Hæmon, which flowing from the rocky theatre of the town empties itself into the Cephissus. Nearest to the town stood the Athenians, who formed the left wing; the Thebans occupied the place of honor on the right wing, where they touched the river; in the centre stood the Phocians, the Achæans, the Corinthians, and the remnants of the mercenary army, which had made their way hither from Locris. The Bœotians were commanded by Theagenes, a proved general out of the

school of Epaminondas, the Athenians by the brave Stratocles, with Chares and Lysicles under him.

Against this disposition the king advanced. His army is stated to have numbered 30,000 infantry, and 2,000 cavalry, the latter estimate being beyond doubt too low. Altogether it is probable that the two armies were about equal in numbers; they were also equal in warlike ardor. But the great superiority on the part of the enemy's army consisted in the nature of its leadership; it was directed by *one* will, of which the most practised commanders were the instruments. On the enemy's side a plan of battle, which had been thoroughly thought out, was followed. The Hellenes were solely intent upon bravely holding their own against the enemy's advance; each division fought on its own account; and the mind of a general was wanting, capable of uniting the loose members into a single whole, and of proving a match for a foe.

Battle of
Chæronea.

Ol. cx. 3 (B.
c. 338).

7th of Meta-
gitnion, 1st of
August?

At first the battle had not an unfavorable beginning. The left wing courageously advanced; Philip drew back into the plain, and already Stratocles called out to his men: "Let us drive the enemy back as far as Macedonia!" On the other side the Thebans stood immovable, although they were charged with the utmost vehemence by Alexander, the king's son, aged eighteen years, who was on this day to gain his spurs. The discipline of Epaminondas proved itself above all in the Sacred Band. During several hours of the morning the Boeotians held their ground, till at last the brave warriors sank, one after the other, under the lances of the Macedonian horsemen. Over their bodies Alexander charged into the flank of the centre, which was composed of the contingents of the allies and was only capable of offering a far less enduring resistance, especially as it had no supports upon which to lean, either on the right or on the left. No sooner had the battle arrived at this point, than Philip too again ad-

vanced against the Athenians, who in the ardor of the pursuit had gone much too far forward into the open, and had broken off the cohesion between the several parts of the army. They were obliged to stay their advance, and were then driven back ; with the overwhelming numbers of the cavalry swarming around them on every side, they sought amidst great losses to regain their original position, but here too they found no means of defence. They perceived that the army was broken up, that the whole strength of the enemy was combined against themselves, and that their only chance of preservation lay in flight. One thousand men had fallen ; two thousand were taken prisoners ; while the loss of the Thebans must have been far greater. Philip, who intended not only to fight his way through and to gain a battle, but by one single blow to annihilate all power of resistance on the part of Greek troops, had completely gained his end. No thought was taken of re-assembling the troops, or of offering a second battle. There no longer existed any common command, or any cohesion. The contingents dispersed to their homes ; and the Hellenic League, barely concluded, had been completely dissolved after a single defeat. Attica and Bœotia lay unprotected ; the two neighbor-cities were incapable of aiding one another, and both had to be equally prepared for all the terrors of war, with which they were threatened by the wrath of the victor.*

* The day of the battle (7th of Metagitnion according to Plutarch, *Camill.* 19) corresponds either to the 1st of September or to the 2d of October, according as Ol. cx. 2 is taken as a leap-year or not. Boeckh (*Monocyklen*, 29) assumes the cancelling of the intercalary month not to have fallen till Ol. cxii. 2; and places in Ol. cxii. 3 the introduction of a new (the Metonic) calendar. But this assumption is, as Boeckh himself allows, very doubtful. E. Müller (Pauly, *Realencyclopædie*, i. p. 1054) considers it probable, that a reform of the calendar took place at Athens between Ol. lxxxix. 3 and xcix. 3. Possibly the year of Euclides was in this respect also an epoch-year. Certain it is, that in the *Octaëteris* also extraordinary cancellings were not unfrequently instituted, in order to make the beginnings of the years coincide with the course of the sun; and this is the reason why it is so difficult to

And yet the lot of the one of the two cities was very different from that of the other. The ^{Treatment of Thebes.} heroic valor of the Thebans was a last sacrifice, offered by them to the glory of their past; it was able, indeed, to obtain the acknowledgment of the conqueror, but not to determine his conduct. Philip saw in the rising of Thebes nothing but faithlessness and ingratitude, nothing but a base violation of sworn treaties and an open act of revolt, which here, as in Thessaly, he deemed it necessary to punish with inflexible rigor. For the falling-away from his body of confederates, from the new Amphictyony founded by him, he was resolved to cause to be regarded as an act of treason against the Hellenic fatherland. He dealt with Thebes, as Sparta would have dealt with her, had Sparta been victorious at Leuctra. The State established by the great Thebans was broken up; Thebes remained nothing more than a Bœotian country-town; Orchomenus, Thespiæ, Platææ were restored; a Macedonian garrison entered the Cadmea; the leaders of the civic body were put to death, or banished, as traitors; their lands were confiscated and given away; a new system of government was introduced. The fall of the Sacred Band on the field of Chæronea was likewise the end of the city of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.*

Athens, on the other hand, was regarded as an enemy, who even after her overthrow ought ^{Situation of Athens.} to be treated with respect and gained over by magnanimity. And indeed already the dictates of the simplest

decide, whether the more ancient traces of a more correct system of the year are based upon isolated rectifications or upon the introduction of a new Cycle. As to the case in question, the omission of an intercalary month before Ol. cxii. 3 is probable. If we assume this to have taken place in Ol. cx. 2, the beginning of the year Ol. cx. 3 falls on the 23d of June, and the battle of Chæronea on the 2d of August, as Schäfer, ii. 529, also assumes. As to the battle: Diod. xvi. 84; Justin. ix. 3. Disposition of the Greek army Köchly, u. s. 58; Vischer, *Erinnerungen aus Griech.* 591. The death of Stratocles (Köchly, 166) is not handed down by tradition, but is probable.

* Fate of Thebes: Paus. ix. 1, 8; 37, 8.

prudence forbade driving Athens to extermination. The courage, and therefore implicitly the strength, of the Athenians, were by no means broken. Athens was accustomed not to consider herself lost, although the enemy stood in the land, but to trust to her walls. A siege of the city was, under any circumstances, a very doubtful undertaking, one of a far more serious character than the two last sieges in which the king had failed. Should the Byzantines, the island-cities, and perchance Persia too, furnish the city with supplies, and send succor into the Piræus, there was no longer any prospect of success. To these considerations were added those of a higher general policy. It was not permissible to Philip to act like another Xerxes; the king who had made an Aristotle the tutor of his son could not refuse to recognize the soil of Attica as a consecrated one. Its devastation would have been a blot upon his reign; while, on the other hand, an amicable recognition of his Hellenic position on the part of the Athenians was even now the highest advantage which he could have in view.

Demades
becomes
Philip's
agent.

It was therefore, of great value to him to establish relations which might promote his plans; and for this purpose the most excellent instrument offered itself to him in the person of Demades, who had fallen into his hands as a prisoner on the field of battle. Demades was a man of low birth, a true child of degenerate Athens, untroubled by a conscience, frivolous, eager for lucre, sensual, but full of mother-wit, prompt of speech, inexhaustible in happy thoughts and sudden retorts, and, although devoid of superior culture, yet a man of irresistible eloquence. He had already come forward as an opponent of Demosthenes, but without pursuing any definite policy. His meeting with king Philip first brought him into a track thoroughly according with his desires and inclinations; Philip made out of this personage, who had begun as an oarsman, a great lord and a

statesman of influence. Through Demades, then, Philip now entered into relations with Athens, precisely as he had once done from his camp before Olynthus; he sent him to Athens, in order to make known his benevolent intentions. He had every reason for pursuing this course.*

The Athenians had vigorously overcome the first impression of the tidings of terror, the first loud grief aroused by the defeat and by the heavy losses; and, notwithstanding their painful anxiety on behalf of the prisoners, of the wounded and of the dead bodies of their brethren, which had been left lying on the battle-field, they without delay took all the measures required by the security of the State, without thinking of negotiations with the foe. As in the war of Archidamus, the rural population was admitted into the city; the men between fifty and sixty years of age were summoned under arms; the passes into the land were made safe. A general was sought for, and the more hot-headed part of the civic body carried the election of Charidemus (pp. 139, 267). He was still accounted the most talented military commander, and he was credited with being the right man for critical times. However, the choice of so untrustworthy a personage, with whom Demosthenes and his friends could not possibly act in company, seemed extremely dangerous to the more self-possessed citizens. An interference of the Areopagus was therefore brought about, to which it will be remembered that a decisive influence had been again conceded in the case of important transactions of State (pp. 357, 366). The election was declared invalid; and a new election of General fell upon Phocion, with whom under existing circumstances the party of Demosthenes too hoped to be able to

Conduct
of the Athe-
nians after
the Battle of
Chæronea.

* Demades (Δημάδου Παιανιεύς, Boeckh, *Seenesen*, 234): Suidas. According to Diod. xvi. 87 and Justin. ix. 4, it is to him that is ascribed the change effected in the intentions of the king, when full of insolence after the victory. Schäfer, iii. 4.

arrive at an understanding. For this party still continued to direct public affairs, and was by no means minded to allow the political conduct of the State to pass into the hands of Phocion. Hyperides therefore proposed, that the Council should be invested with extraordinary powers, in order that it might adopt the measures which it judged salutary; the members of the Council were themselves to take arms and to march into the Piræus which was to be regarded as the nucleus of the fortifications of the city. Furthermore, all the inhabitants capable of fighting were to be summoned to take up arms; the exiles were to return home; the civic franchise was to be bestowed upon all the resident aliens who bore a part in the defence of the city; and even the slaves, in particular the slaves in the mines, were on these conditions to receive their freedom. It was thought that by these means not less than 150,000 men could be collected, who might be employed in the service of the State. In order to obtain arms, even the dedicatory gifts in the temples were not spared. The proposals of Hyperides were passed. Demosthenes provided for the repair of the walls and the regulation of the service on guard; the most important financial duty, viz. the purchase of corn, was likewise entrusted to him by the citizens. Lycurgus labored with redoubled exertions for navy, arsenal, and the supply of arms. The well-to-do citizens, men of the most various political tendencies, Demosthenes, Charidemus, Diotimus, and others, emulated one another in attesting their zeal by voluntary gifts of money and arms; and Lycurgus took advantage of the high confidence enjoyed by him among his fellow-citizens, in order to accumulate a capital amounting, it is said, to 650 talents (nearly £160,000), which he placed at the disposal of the State. Finally envoys went forth, in order to represent the danger of the city as one common to all the Hellenes; and Athens had every reason for expecting vigorous aid from those states, with which she had already

conjointly and successfully fought against Philip. In short, there was no confusion or despair in the city, but a regularly planned and energetic activity, a bold determination to defend its independence by the exertion of all the resources in its possession. The mood prevailing among the people resembled that of the days of the battles of Marathon and Salamis; as in those times, so now again the Areopagus contributed to give firmness to the bearing of the citizens. Pusillanimity was punished as treason, and the penalty of death was decreed against those who withdrew themselves by flight from the danger of the fatherland.

It was in this condition that Demades found the city. Its mood could not have been less ^{Demades at Athens.} favorable for the intentions of the king; and for the moment the victor was almost in a position of greater difficulty than the vanquished; for the latter were in the midst of the most resolute activity, while the former had yet to discover the means for disarming his adversaries without a conflict.*

Demades entirely followed in the footsteps of the former orators of Philip, by above all assuring his fellow-citizens that the king was exceedingly wroth with Thebes, but had none but kindly intentions towards Athens. But Demades had this great advantage over his predecessors—that this statement was for the first time absolutely true. This he contrived, after the most vigorous fashion, to make understood; and thus he easily succeeded in ruining the fairest results of the Demosthenic policy, in reviving the old sentiments of jealousy, and in extinguishing once more the spirit of national union which Philip recognized to be his most dangerous enemy. All petty and evil elements

* Charidemus, Phocion: Plutarch, *Phoc.* 16. Hyperides: *Lyc. in Leocratem*, 26 seq.; *Vit. X Oral.* 849. Sauppe *ad Fragm. Hyperid.* πρὸς Ἀριστογείτονα, 33 μυριάδας πλείους ἢ δεκάπεντε, πρῶτον μὲν δούλους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τῶν ἀργυρείων καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην χώραν. Boeckh, *Staatsh. d. Athen.*, vol. i. p. 53 [2d Ed.], *Patriotic contributions: Dem.* xviii. 114.

came to the surface again; with base faithlessness the allies were abandoned, in company with whom the citizens of Athens itself had recently bled for the freedom of Hellas; it was no longer remembered that any consideration was due to the Thebans; and pleasure could once more be taken in any humiliation inflicted upon them. This self-abasement on the part of the Athenians was the first result of the negotiations. Hereupon Demades was enabled to add in the king's name, that he was willing to liberate the prisoners, and ready to conclude a peace which should guarantee to the Athenians their independence. On the other hand, if this offer was not accepted, the prisoners would be sacrificed to the anger of the king; even the dead bodies were still in his hands; for it was an extremely crafty piece of policy on his part to have refused the first request that they might be delivered up, which had been proffered to him immediately after the battle. But the main point was, that the reason had been suddenly removed on account of which the Athenians had been willing to expose themselves to the heaviest sacrifices and troubles of the war. The warlike heroism of the Athenians was based on the presumption, that the king was drawing near with fire and sword, that he demanded unconditional submission. Instead of this, he appeared with the most tranquillizing promises, and without any humiliating demands. Hereby the whole situation of affairs was suddenly changed, and the mood of the great multitude of the citizens transformed. Even of the more reflecting citizens, who not without reason saw in the proposals of Hyperides a radical revolution in the political system, the majority were well satisfied that it was unnecessary to resort to such desperate measures of defence; and Phocion, the commander-in-chief, was able more effectively than ever to point out the insanity of a recalcitrance pushed to extremes. The Macedonian party was once more in full activity. Demosthenes, who alone might

have been capable of bringing about at least a cautious reserve, was still absent; and inasmuch as in the first instance all that was required was to establish relations with the king, in order to settle the most imminent questions, and to obtain officially an assurance of the intentions of Philip, no opposition was offered in the whole civic body to Demades' motion for the despatch of an embassy. But of course it was not permissible to send any personages unacceptable to the king, as the Athenian embassy to Philip. lives of the prisoners and the honor of the dead were in question; and thus the public affairs of the city once more fell into the hands of the adversaries of Demosthenes.

Æschines had again come into the foreground. He and Phocion and Demades seemed to be the personages pre-eminently required for the task. When Philip saw these men enter his camp, he might feel convinced that he would easily achieve his ulterior purposes. He treated them at the banquet as the most amiable of hosts, and during the negotiations with the most charming magnanimity. He was not content with the liberation of the prisoners; he actually equipped them for their return home. The dead bodies he still kept back, but only for the purpose of paying a new attention to the Athenians by causing the remains to be solemnly conducted home. After the departure of the envoys he sent the dead bodies to Athens, accompanied by the foremost men of the realm, in particular by Antipater and by his own son, who were at the same time to bring to the Athenians the draft of the treaties.

These treaties proposed friendship and alliance. Attica was not to be entered by the Macedonian army; her ancient independence was to continue, and in particular no foreign vessel of war was to sail into the Piræus. Oropus, the disputed frontier-district (p. 105), was restored to the Athenians.

Philip's
peace-pro-
posals.

Part of the islands were left to them; and they even continued to be recognized as an independent maritime power, the protection of the sea being undertaken by them in conjunction with Philip. The most disgraceful of all the articles of the peace caused the greatest satisfaction; for Athens could not humble herself more deeply than by accepting from the good grace of the enemy a part of the territory of her ally, and by rejoicing over the fact, that the latter alone had to suffer for the war. But to Philip Oropus served as a pledge, that it would be long before the two neighbors would again think of making common cause against him; and the transfer of a piece of land wholly indifferent to himself obtained for him a readiness on the part of the Athenians to agree to that which was alone of importance to him, viz. to their entrance into the League, the establishment of which was his most immediate task. Herein lay a renunciation on the part of Athens of any independent foreign policy, of any hegemony, and of any maritime dominion of her own. Finally, Oropus had to console the Athenians for the loss of their more distant possessions, which were an obstacle in Philip's path, *i. e.* of the Chersonnesus. Hereby the route of the corn-supplies fell into Philip's hands: and this fact alone placed the city in his power.

Doubtless it was contrived to clothe the sacrifices, to which Athens had to consent, in the gentlest forms possible, so as to render their bitterness less perceptible to the citizens; and thus Demades could with thorough confidence propose the acceptance of the terms of peace. Cavils were not indeed wanting. Even Phocion came forward, because he took exception to the point as to the

League. He most justly demanded that at all events full explanations should be obtained as to its character, before the Athenians tied their own hands in the matter. But he found no hearing, when in this instance he sought to guard the

Conclusion
of the Peace.

Ol. c. x. 3 (B.
c. 333).

interest of the city against Philip ; and the peace was concluded. Demosthenes would assuredly have raised a protest against those points which most deeply wounded the honor of the city ; in accordance with his convictions he would have specially been bound to declare himself opposed to the acceptance of Oropus ; and, although he would have been unable to prevent the conclusion of the peace, yet he would at least have demanded the utmost caution and firmness with reference to the League. But, when he returned home from the Archipelago, where he was still actively at work in the cause of the war (probably he visited even allies at a greater distance, such as faithful Tenedos, the cities on the Hellespont, &c.), everything had been settled at Athens ; and there was now, as after the Peace of Philocrates, nothing left for him but to see that Athens kept the peace to which she had sworn, while at the same time preserving as much as possible of her dignity, of her liberties, and of the patriotism which he had once more called forth in her citizens. Nor was there any lack of opportunities for this even now.

For, however greatly the mood of the people had been changed by Demades, yet it refused to withdraw its confidence from the man in whom it had reposed it. The adverse party left no means untried, in order to discredit him and cast suspicion upon him ; they thought it would be easy for them to triumph over him, now that his policy had been so completely overthrown ; he was to be made responsible for the losses suffered, for the resources wasted, for the blood shed in vain ; he was charged with cowardly conduct in the battle ; and in every way it was sought to render him contemptible. And yet they failed to accomplish their purpose. The citizens would not be persuaded, that their former proceedings had been an aberration. Their heroism had been broken, but as to their judgment they remained true to their past, and honored themselves by holding fast to Demosthenes. Of this they offered the

best testimony, by according to Demosthenes the honor of holding the Funeral Oration at the sepulchral solemnity in honor of the fallen (November 338 B. C.). They felt with perfect truth, that there was an indissoluble connexion between Demosthenes and the dead of Chæronea, and that these would be dishonored, were such orators allowed to speak at their tomb as failed to acknowledge the sacred cause on behalf of which these men had gone into death.*

Philip in
Pelopon-
nesus.

Ol. ex. 3
(B. C. 338).
Autumn.

Philip had meanwhile made a progress through the whole of Greece, in order by his personal presence rapidly to organize the affairs of the states; for he was impatiently longing to attain to his goal, which no serious difficulties any longer remained to delay him in reaching. The Peloponnesus had long ceased to be a citadel of Hellenic independence. Its ancient system of states had been burst asunder by the battle of Leuctra; since which time it had been a scene of incessant ferment and feud; now it was intended here too to accomplish, what the policy of Thebes had been unable to bring about, viz., a fixed order of affairs, and to unite and peaceably settle the entire peninsula as a member of the new association of states. Those states which had taken part in the most recent movement, in particular Corinth and Achaia, submitted to the victor, and, as likewise Megara, concluded

* Embassy to Philip: *Æschin.* iii. 227. Demades: *Suidas*. The participation of Phocion in this embassy *περὶ σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως ὁ ὑπὲρ αἰχμαλώτων* is not handed down, but probable.—Peace-embassy: *Diod.* xvi. 37. Terms of the Peace: *Paus.* i. 25, 3; 34, 1. Chersonnesus: *F. Schultz, de Chers. Thrac.* 113. The Attic *cleruchí* remained in possession of their lands; so likewise in Samos, whither the ancient inhabitants did not return until after the Lamian War. Cf. *W. Vischer, in Rhein. Mus.* xxii. 320.—Scruples of Phocion: *Plutarch, Phoc.* 16: Δημάδου γράψαντος, ὅπως ἡ πόλις μετέχοι τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, οὐκ εἶα πρὸ τοῦ γνῶναι, τίνα Φίλιππος αὐτῷ γενέσθαι παρὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀξιώσῃ.—Demosthenes at sea: *Dem.* xviii. 248; *Æschin.* iii. 159 (τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀργυρολογῶν). Cf. the *σύνταξις ἐψηφισμένη* in the decree at Tenedos (*Bullett. dell' Inst.*, 1866, p. 109).—Funeral Oration (*Dem.* xviii. 298) in the first winter-month, i.e. Mæmaeterion. Cf. *Sauppe, in Göttinger Nachr.*, 1864, 201, 215.

peace on the terms proposed to them. The other states had, it is true, also failed to respond to the wishes of the king; they had not furnished him with contingents; but it was not in his interest, at the present moment, to call the several communities to account: he accepted their neutrality as a fully valid sign of their devotion; and since the spirit of recalcitrance had been now completely extinguished, since the ancient adversaries of Sparta all of their own accord offered him open homage and saluted him as their supreme protector, Philip too had no other intention than that of showing himself their gracious friend and benefactor. Quite peculiar relations existed between him and Argos. That city was the cradle of his royal line (p. 26), and in a sense the mother-city of Macedonia; and was accordingly to have its share in the splendor of the empire. Sparta had driven back the Temenidæ; she had deprived the Argives of the first place, which was due to the city of Agamemnon, and had overthrown the ancient order of things established by the Heraclidæ. As a prince of the race of Heracles, as the new Agamemnon, Philip now designed to restore its ancient honors to the ancient primary city of the Hellenes. Here again, as at Athens, it was possible for him to create an exuberant satisfaction by means of gifts which cost him nothing; and the Argives enthusiastically joined the military expedition, which was at last to avenge upon Sparta all the iniquities suffered by them in the course of centuries. The Arcadians and Messenians likewise joined the king; as did Elis, which had only for a short time been reconciled to Sparta (p. 345). The united contingents of the Peloponnesians, of the Greek auxiliaries of Philip and of his own Macedonian veteran troops, together swelled to an armed host, which poured with irresistible force into the valley of the Eurotas. The day had arrived, when judgment was to be held over the ancient primary State of Greece.

Attitude of
Sparta.

Since her brief enjoyment of the acme of power under Agesilaus, Sparta had been continuously retrograding; so that even the resources of good which still survived brought no blessing to her. This shows itself in the case of the son of Agesilaus, the vigorous Archidamus, who since his first coming forward (vol. iv. p. 380), in spite of certain glorious deeds in the field (vol. iv. pp. 472, 505), had been able to effect nothing by his valor for his native city. He too had allowed himself to be deceived by Philip, and had after the attempt, ending in failure, to assert the influence of Sparta in the Phœcian War, returned home in deep vexation of spirit. Even when the common country was at the height of danger, it had been impossible to induce Sparta to renounce her cold and narrow-hearted selfishness; her own sins had utterly isolated her. While the Athenians declared in open assembly, that they would not sacrifice Sparta in the case of need (p. 375), and would not allow the pressure of the general hatred against Sparta to induce them to abandon their peaceable connexion with her, the Spartans were without any cordial feeling toward Athens, and never thought of supporting her national policy. In vain Perinthus too had applied to Sparta; and when the Hellenic League had taken the field for the final decision, king Archidamus was risking his life, not on the field of Chæronea, but in a remote foreign land. As in the case of his father, so with him, the love of military enterprise, because it pursued no national aims, degenerated into a purposeless search after adventures. He went first to Crete, and then to Tarentum, where he was slain in a battle against the Messapians, about the time when the Hellenes were fighting against Philip. It thus fell to the lot of his son Agis to suffer in full measure the calamity which had befallen his home.

Degenerate and ossified as Spartan life was, yet there still survived in it a remnant of the ancient greatness,

which proved itself most manifestly in times of trouble. The idea of the State had still more vitality in the shrunken nucleus of the Spartans, than in the remaining communities, decomposed as these were by the spirit of party; and however untrustworthy the individual citizens of Sparta might prove abroad, yet the civic body had in it a fixed consciousness of inner cohesion, and a resolute assurance in action, whereby it put all other Hellenes to shame. On the present occasion also no traitor was to be found at Sparta; no blandishments met with a hearing; no negotiations were entered into; the Spartans allowed the country to be devastated up to the sea-shore and, after a few attempts at warding off the enemy, gathered around the city-heights, which had been twice already defended with success (vol. iv. pp. 450, 505). At last it became necessary to entertain thoughts of peace; but when the question was, whether they would renounce their claims to hegemony, and bind themselves to furnish their military contingent to a foreign king, the citizens steadfastly refused to conclude any such treaty, and were resolved rather to undergo any sufferings. They gained their end. An annihilation of the civic community could not lie in the intentions of Philip, since it was not demanded by his interests, to which a heroic martyrdom of the Spartans would only have been disadvantageous. He was therefore, although much against his wish, obliged to content himself with putting an absolute end to any power of doing harm on the part of this State, whose domain had already become so narrow, and whose power had sunk so low. An Hellenic tribunal of arbitration was summoned; and Sparta was deprived of all the territory which she had obtained by conquest, in favor of her neighbors. The Messenians laid claim to the declivities of Mount Taygetus up to the ridge of the lofty mountain-range. Argolis received back Thyreatis and the entire district of the ancient Cynurians,

Territorial
changes in
Pelopon-
nesus.

after the Lacedæmonians had during two centuries held sway up to the confines of the Argive plains; to the Arcadians was assigned the territory on the upper Eurotas and on the streams forming its sources, to the Megalopolitans Belmina, to the Tegeatæ Sciritis; so that the Lacedæmonians were not even left in possession of their own river-valley and of their most important passes. Sparta was treated like a brigand-state, from which its plunder is taken in order to restore it to its legitimate owners. In mute defiance she allowed the members to be cut off, which in the course of centuries seemed to have so firmly grown together into a single body, that Epaminondas had formerly been derided as a madman when he demanded from the Spartans the liberation of the lands surrounding their city.

Federal
treaty con-
cluded at
Corinth.

OL. ex. 3
(B. C. 338).

Close of the
year.

The consummation of all these measures took place in the summoning of a General Hellenic Diet to Corinth. Here the treaty was offered for acceptance, in which the king represented the aims of his dynastic policy in such a light, that they appeared to be the long-cherished desires of the Hellenic nation, and the pledges of national prosperity: on the one hand peace throughout the land and security of intercourse and traffic, on the other new splendor and glory as against foreign countries; so that both the settled citizens in their pursuit of trade and industry, and the younger generation, eager for adventures and spoils, were to find their interests satisfied by the new era. The renewed proclamation of the independence of all Hellenic communities served to calm the apprehensions of the petty states; the secure establishment of order and peace against all demagogic innovations was in accord with the interests of the classes possessed of property. A permanent Federal Council was to guard the existing order of things against any attempts in any quarter to violate it; while the Amphictyonic Assembly

was as a Federal Tribunal to punish any impious violation of Federal law. And a guarantee was given for the effectual execution of these institutions by the watch over it being kept by Philip, as the most powerful member of the new League. For Macedonia and the newly organized Greece were now united as a single whole, as a sworn Confederation; and in this again the king appeared merely as the representative of national ideas, inasmuch as he resumed the task of the war of vengeance against Persia, which the weakness and disunion of the Hellenes had interrupted, and for this purpose alone claimed the contingents, as to which a fixed system of regulations was settled with the deputies of the Greek states.*

So immense were the events and the transformations of the relations determining the condition of all Greece, which crowded into the year 338. In order to appreciate their significance, it remains necessary in conclusion, after our summary narration of the facts, to review the efforts of Demosthenes and the situation of the Hellenes under the Macedonian supremacy.

The greatness of Athens is essentially based upon the fact, that at the right time she had the right men, for making clear to the citizens their mission and pointing out to them the true aims before them. After Solon had in grand lines sketched out for the community the entire moral and civil task of its existence, it was in the critical moments of its later history led onward with a safe hand by Miltiades, by Themistocles, by Aristides and Cimon, and conducted by them to ever higher goals: to the highest of all by Pericles,

Retrospect
of the public
career of De-
mosthenes.

* Philip in Peloponnesus: Arrian. vii. 9, 5; Theopomp. *Fragm.* 68 *seq.* The Eleans: Paus. v. 4 (τῆς ἐφόδου Φιλίππου τῆς ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους μέτεσχον).—Archidamus: Diod. xvi. 62 *seq.*—Restriction of the boundaries of Sparta: Paus. ii. 20 (ἐπὶ τοῖς καθεστηκόσιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅροις). Autonomy: Strab. 365—Synedrium: Diod. xvi. 89 (κοινὴ εἰρήνη); Justin. ix. 5 (lex pacis universæ Græciæ . . . concilium omnium velut unus senatus).

when in the period of peace he carried through the construction of the edifice of Athenian supremacy, and established the dominion, which had been gained by arms, upon intellectual culture and wise reflection. This was the legitimate combination of Attic with Hellenic policy. The Athenians pursued only the former of these; they were too one-sidedly intent upon dominion, and after a desperate struggle lost even this. Hereupon ensued a period in which Athens lived an aimless life from day to day, a desolate time devoid of meaning and of movement. There occurred particular moments of a rise towards loftier ends; but these were only transitory after-effects of earlier efforts, mere feeble reminiscences of the past. Thebes assumed the championship against the Spartan dominion, and Athens was incapable of elevating herself above the policy of a petty jealousy. After this she entirely abandoned herself, and sought in an indolent life of enjoyment a compensation for her lost greatness, until at last, a century after the appearance of Pericles, a force once more revealed itself, which was able to resume the efforts of the great statesmen and to restore the interrupted history of the city.

In Demosthenes the gradual development of his activity as a statesman is to be perceived with incomparably greater clearness than in any of his predecessors. We see the youth in his struggle on behalf of his paternal house gain the strength of will, which fearlessly confronts any and every baseness; we see him as an advocate acquire his knowledge of civil life and his mastery over speech. He perceives the vile abuses in the administration; and they urge him to the struggle against a party of overwhelming power, a struggle of years, which steels his character, inasmuch as amidst the greatest hostilities, and notwithstanding the want of success in his opposition, he never becomes untrue to himself. In the Olynthian question he gains a decisive influence; but not until after the Peace of Philo-

crates is he successful in gathering men of the same views as his own around him, in unmasking the baseness of his adversaries, and in bringing the citizens over to his side. Henceforth his own endeavors too become continuously loftier and purer; he emancipates himself from one-sidedly Attic points of view; his labors aim at a rising on the part of the nation under the leadership of Athens. His eloquence has its effect in the islands and in Peloponnesus; his fellow-citizens bow before his greatness; they entrust to him the conduct of their home and foreign affairs. Whatever vital forces are still at work in Greece range themselves under his guidance.

The entire policy of Demosthenes rests on historical foundations. His anxiety never was to shine by new ideas and schemes, but only to re-establish his native city on ancient bases; his conviction is this, that he who speaks and acts on behalf of the State must thoroughly enter into its moral and mental being, and possess himself of its character. Hence the unbroken continuity of his career from his first oration of State; and it is for this reason again that it in so many respects recalls the public career of the earlier statesmen. Like Themistocles, he too foresaw an inevitable war on behalf of the independence of the fatherland, armed the city for this purpose, and gathered in Greece a patriot party resolved upon the struggle. His financial reform, in so far as it constituted the fundamental condition of a successful resistance, had the same significance as the law on the mines (vol. ii. p. 260). In the organization of the new League he, like Aristides, was intent upon treating the rights of others with the utmost possible consideration; for, according to his conviction also, justice is the true foundation of all political institutions. But greatest of all is the harmony between his activity and that of Pericles. Both these men, beginning as orators of the Opposition, after a long struggle

The historical foundations of his policy.

Demosthenes and Pericles.

became leaders of the community and legislators, and this only by the force of a moral superiority, which gradually overcame all contradiction. Neither of them was personally cast in a popular mould, nor was their influence obtained by them through a pleasing eloquence which flattered or dazzled the people; but, strict towards themselves and others, severe and serious, they confronted the citizens with unpalatable demands, unsparingly reproving their perversities and subduing their vanity. The one and the other were enemies of long speeches, and only spoke after careful preparation; it was the perfect command over their subject, the strength of their will, the inner truth of their meaning, which gave to their words the power of conviction. In both we find the same combination of a force of genius, able to create in the great mass of the citizens enthusiasm for the loftiest tasks, with a sober rationality, invariably intent upon facts, and following practical points of view, such as could not but become evident to any one willing to look upon the matter impartially. Both had, the one as a nobleman, the other as a member of the upper burgher-class, an aristocratic tendency, but were notwithstanding loyal adherents of the democracy, and confided in the healthy judgment of the citizens; both had the common people on their side, while the rich were their adversaries. With regard to foreign affairs, Demosthenes, like Pericles, desired that no war should be recklessly begun, yet that a necessary and just war should not be evaded in a cowardly spirit, but provided for during the time of peace with the utmost circumspection. They were both with an equally lively assurance pervaded by a conviction of the mission of Athens to hold the primacy in Greece; and as Pericles acknowledged a right belonging to the stronger, which in the interest of the nation must hold together even the unwilling among the confederates, lest the laboriously achieved results should melt away again in the hand,—so Demosthenes

also held, that whosoever was striving for a good and just object, ought not to remain inactive in the face of hostile guile, or damage himself by timid scrupulousness. For such a scrupulousness among unscrupulous adversaries he considered to be not justice, but cowardice. Lastly, both attained to the highest goal of a republican statesman, in being enabled to take into their hands, as the men enjoying the full confidence of the community, the direction of public affairs. Statesmen who lack personal greatness are only able to maintain such a position by associating themselves with subordinate creatures who follow them from merely selfish motives of interest; it was thus that the party-rule of Aristophon (p. 112) arose, and the yet worse system of *cliques* under Eubulus. But Demosthenes, like Pericles, brought it to pass, that for a time his will alone determined the action of the State. Hereby the system of democratic equality was seemingly abolished, but not really so, because the powers conferred upon him were conferred voluntarily and constitutionally. We are rather justified in designating it as the greatest advantage possessed by the democracy, that it provided the possibility of at any time summoning the most efficient citizen to the helm of the State; and experience teaches, that Greek republics were never more vigorous and more covered with glory, than when their citizens with perfect conviction gave themselves up to *one* man, in whom they recognized the representative of their highest interests, as the Thebans did in Epaminondas, and the Tarentines in Archytas.*

Such phases of affairs, in which the civic community temporarily renounces the exercise of its authority, cannot of their nature be enduring. And if Pericles conducted the personal system of government with better fortune and

* Distinction between public and private law: Dem. xv. 28; cf. Jacobs, *Staatsreden*, 146. Archytas was, like Pericles and Epaminondas, head of the community by a prolongation of the strategy. Diog. Laërt. viii. 79. The best result of democracy is the ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρός.

with far greater results, the cause lies in the incomparably more favorable circumstances of his times. He had still an admirably armed city, a civic community sound at the core, efficient in war and patriotic; while the civic community of Demosthenes disliked arms and was feeble of heart. "The hero-maiden of Marathon had," as the scoffer Demades said, "become an old gammer who comfortably swallows her mess of barley-soup, and slinks about in slippers." Athens in those days wore the aspect of a colony like Tarentum, of an effeminate industrial and commercial city, where the citizens sought as much as possible to escape from the demands of the commonwealth, and let mercenaries fight on their behalf. Although far worse troubles of war were imminent than in the times of Pericles, the walls were allowed to fall into decay, and the navy to go to ruin, in order that the number of festivals and sacrificial banquets might be continually increased. The supreme authority enjoyed by money, and the selfish party-power of the capitalists, likewise perfectly remind us of the condition of things in mercantile cities beyond the seas. In this respect the task of Demosthenes was far more arduous, and his merit incomparably greater. Moreover he, the plain citizen, was more unpretentious than Pericles, freer from personal ambition, severer and purer in his choice of means. He employed no demagogic party expedients; for it is unjustifiable to interpret in this sense the gifts and voluntary contributions by which he attested his patriotism; and although on occasion he combined with unworthy personages, with such a man as Timarchus, yet he did it before the eyes of the public, and only for definite purposes. And, indeed, he also attempted to amend with a vigorous hand such institutions of the Periclean Athens as we must acknowledge to have been pernicious abuses; and above all he sought to ennoble the evil system of distributions of money, by desiring them to be regarded as a compensation paid for the ser-

vices given to the State, and by requiring a counter-service on the part of the receiver.*

On the other hand, Demosthenes had neither so many-sided a natural endowment, nor, in consequence of the pettier character of the relations of life among which he had grown up, so happy a development as Pericles. He lacked the inborn dignity, the lofty calm, and the blended self-control and self-confidence of the "Olympian;" but above all he lacked the military training and the talent of generalship, which, combined with the qualities of a statesman, made Pericles so great and so impossible to replace. Notwithstanding his toughness and manly power of endurance, the natural temperament of Demosthenes was uncommonly excited and irritable, vehement and passionate; and the more exclusively that he had in his efforts to rely upon the orators' tribune, the more too did its influence assert itself upon his character. He returns vituperation for vituperation; he employs all and any means for rendering his opponents contemptible; he proved unable to preserve himself free from the spirit of rhetoric, and allows his acumen to tempt him even into quibbles. Demosthenes was without Pericles' knowledge of the world and of mankind; he was an idealist, and in dangerous times over-estimated the effect of moral forces. And yet it was precisely in this that he showed himself a Hellene of the noblest kind. For it is precisely this moral conception of civic duty which Ethics and
politics. gives to Greek politics their peculiar warmth, and to Greek statesmen their transcendent dignity. Every demand made by Demosthenes upon the community is of an ethical character; every civic duty upon which he insists is a matter of conscience; and the loftiest task of the

* Demades, *Fragm.* 7. Demetrius *περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, § 282, according to Cobet's emendation: πόλιν οὐ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν προγόνων τὴν Μαραθωνόμαχον, ἀλλὰ γραῦν σανάλια ὑποδεσμένην καὶ πτισάνην βοῶσαν. Cf. Th. Gompertz, *Demosthenes*, 1864, 29 *seq.*

statesman he finds in being an example of civic virtue. Demosthenes passed without reproach through all temptations, and allowed neither friend nor foe to drive him to any unworthy step. When the citizens demanded from him that he should prefer an indictment against an unpopular personage, he declared to them that they would find in him a counsellor, even when they had no wish for it, but an informer never, even if they desired it. Thus again the civic community was as a body to be careful of its reputation; he stimulated the sense of honor in the citizens, and sought to awaken in them the conviction, that fair fame was better than money and lands. His entire view of democracy was to the effect that it could only be based upon pure patriotism and loftiness of sentiment. He demands gratitude towards the great men of the city and reverence for the laws handed down; "whosoever recklessly introduces changes into them is worse than a murderer." As against the foreign enemy also, who does wrong, he credits the consciousness of honesty with a strength which gives victory to the arms of those who possess it; while, on the other hand, it is a religious and moral scruple which prevents him from vigorously urging the alliance with the Phocians. All the most important questions are settled, not by considerations of statesmanship, but by the voice of conscience. The defence of independence is an absolute duty, a moral necessity, which must not be allowed to be determined by the consideration of success.

Demos-
thenes and
Isocrates.

But was not the clearness of the political judgment of Demosthenes disturbed by this way of regarding things? Was not his treatment of the Macedonian question from the outset a one-sided policy of mere sentiment; and was not Isocrates after all in the right, when he disapproved of the perverse resistance offered to Philip, and required of the Athenians that they should recognize in the enemy their friend and the benefactor of Greece?

Superficially regarded, the course of events seems to favor the view that Isocrates was in the right as a politician; and yet undoubtedly far too much honor would be done to him, were his bearing to be commended at the expense of Demosthenes, and were a deeper penetration into the significance of the times, or a prophetic insight into the course of history, to be ascribed to him. Isocrates was not swayed by a confidence in Philip and the Macedonian State, based upon superior knowledge, but by a feeling of mistrust with reference to his city, by a spiritless renunciation of its own history, which he at all times failed justly to appreciate, by indifference towards the highest possessions of the city. Isocrates was altogether unacquainted with the real Philip; he was only anxious for a man who should with a vigorous hand unite the Greeks and stay the evils of democracy; for this reason he transferred his hopes from the one to the other, and, sitting among his books, idealized to himself the Macedonian king, so that he corresponded to the image of a magnanimous friend of the Greeks, which Isocrates had sketched out for himself in imagination. It was at bottom a craven optimism, which took pleasure in agreeable self-delusion, and which refused to perceive whatsoever contradicted its wishes and expectations. In the end, it is stated, Isocrates recognized his mistake; and the eyes of the old man—he was ninety-eight years of age—are said to have been suddenly opened to the real intentions of the king by the battle of Chæroneæ, so that a few days after the battle he voluntarily ended his life by starvation. It is, however, unintelligible, why the final conflict should have made him cease to put trust in Philip. For the blood shed in it the king could not be held responsible; and however deeply Isocrates must have lamented the struggle, which had been urged on by a policy disapproved of by himself, yet every obstacle had been now removed; what he had so long desired could now be carried into execution; and

he could himself by virtue of his high authority vigorously co-operate to that end. But Isocrates saw his native city not discouraged after the defeat, he saw it rather arming for a last struggle of despair, which, as must have seemed certain, could not fail to drive the king also to measures of ruthless hostility. Under the impression created by these armaments, and by the decrees of Hyperides, it is very possible that Isocrates arrived at his resolution, in order to escape the conflict of positions in which he would necessarily have been inevitably involved in the event of a fight for the walls of his native city,—as an Attic patriot and as a friend of Philip.*

Demos-
thenes and
King Philip.

Doubtless Demosthenes under-estimated the power of Philip, and allowed himself to be deceived as to the vital powers of Macedonia by comparing it to other foreign empires (p. 419). But after the great variety of experiences which the empire had undergone up to Philip's reign, and after all the acts of violence which had united the most diverse populations into a variegated whole, it was very natural that no power of endurance should be attributed to such a government, and that it should not be regarded as a power to which an immutable destiny forced all neighbor-states to surrender. The entire cohesion of the empire seemed to depend upon *one* man, who exposed himself personally with foolhardy daring; of his successor a very slighting opinion was entertained. How, then, can we wonder that a good Athenian should have deemed the independence of his native city and Hellenic liberty to rest upon far surer foundations than the young barbarian empire, the result of a rapid succession of conquests? And was it in

* The statements as to the death of Isocrates (Dionysius; Isæus; Paus. i. 18, 8; Lucian. *Μακρόβιοι* 23, and the *Biographies*) will not admit of being invalidated by the doubtful authority of the Third Epistle, as Blass would have it, *Rhein. Mus.* xx. 109 *seq.* But he is right in considering the usual conception of the motives of the suicide unintelligible. Perhaps the explanation suggested in the text may be more self-evident.

truth so foolish to hope for success? Since it was treason alone which caused such cities as Olynthus to fall, it might well be hoped, that if the citizens of Athens remained united, the power of Philip would be wrecked upon her walls. There was reason to hope that during the conflict the generous spirit of the citizens would gain strength, and that the common danger would bring to pass a new League among the Hellenes; that the Great King too would remain true to the course of policy which he had begun in the case of Perinthus, and would send money and ships. The disastrous results of the Social War might be made good again, and by her once more coming forward to fight in the front for the liberty of the fatherland, a new hegemony of Athens might be established. A happy beginning having been made, and the most inflexible opposition on the part of an ancient jealousy having been overcome, it would have been unworthy pusillanimity to despair of one's own people.

The petty states, which had always required some power to lean upon, might join Philip, without making any real sacrifice, since the ancient contrast between Hellenes and barbarians had long lost its keenness, as had the aversion of Greek republics from royal dominion. Accordingly, Polybius comes forward on behalf of his fellow-countrymen, and defends the Peloponnesian statesmen whom Demosthenes regarded as guilty of treason against the nation. They acted, says Polybius, with intelligence and patriotism; through the instrumentality of Philip they brought it to pass that they were avenged upon Sparta, that they obtained perfect safety and an enlargement of their territory, without having in return to admit Macedonian garrisons, or to alter their constitutions. In other words, Polybius ascribes to them the right, and in a certain sense the duty, of preferring their separate interests to aught else, while the object of the efforts of Demosthenes was, that all the civic communities of Greece

should feel themselves to be one united body, and should defend their liberty in common.*

While the cantonal policy of the Peloponnesians finds an excuse in the impotence of the petty states, which had for centuries pursued no other interest beyond that of preserving to themselves their narrow separate existence, the case was quite different with Athens. It was the mission of Athens to prove herself the hearth of Hellenic feeling, and to give to the others an example of patriotism; Athens would break with her past and deny her entire history, if she purchased peace by surrendering her independence to a foreign king.

Or was Philip perchance a prince with whom an agreement was possible, in which the honor of the city was safeguarded? Isocrates believed in such a possibility. But how could the personal individuality of the king, which even the pupil of Isocrates, Theopompus, judged so contemptuously, awaken confidence, so that a Greek statesman of patriotic sentiments might have lent himself to the thought of voluntarily placing the destinies of his native city in Philip's hands? Demosthenes and his friends could not find in the camp of the king aught but a policy of mendacity and falsehood, dynastic ambition and measureless lust of dominion. They could not but regard his Philhellenism as a mask; for with him everything was means to his end. How could they hopefully anticipate a future for Greece from association with his empire? Nowhere was any sense for the encouragement of the interests of the people displayed by him; the countries were to him nothing but sources of money and districts for the levy of troops. Everywhere he favored the lowest tendencies; permitted himself a vile abuse of Hellenic traditions; diligently fostered the most narrow-hearted selfishness in the individual states; promoted discord among

* Polyb. xvii. 14. As to his view, cf. Orelli in *Index lect.*, Zürich 1834 (*Lect. Polybianæ*), p. 12.

neighbors ; and best liked to pursue his aims by bribery. The worst men in the nation were his friends, and whosoever entered his circle was as it were seized by an evil spirit. How, then, could the establishment of any closer connexions with the Macedonian empire be regarded in any other light than as the worst of calamities? Could the subordination to this king at the head of his hosts, with his lust of conquest, lead to any consequence but the promotion of the restless quest of adventure which had been the fatality of Hellas since the days of the younger Cyrus,—to anything but a demoralizing adulation of princes, and an infection by barbarian manners and customs which would seize upon the entire life of the nation.

An amicable agreement with Philip, an acceptable middle course, could not therefore appear possible. The choice lay between two alternatives,—liberty or slavery, the preservation or the downfall of the nation. The State was in the eyes of the Greeks not like unto a house, in which a nation finds a lodging, so that, when the old dwelling-place falls out of repair, it is possible to migrate to another. On the contrary, the State was the image of their intellectual being, the perfect expression of their moral consciousness, the visible form of personal individuality shaped from within and necessarily such as it was, into which the several communities had developed themselves in the course of history ; and the more abundant this development, the more sensitive was the consciousness of the communities as against any change imposed upon them from without. The petty states might console themselves with the prospect of municipal independence ; not so Athens. Moreover, even the outward conditions of existence seemed to be in danger. For in this point Demosthenes and his friends probably judged the king incorrectly, that they suspected him of entertaining designs against Athens similar to those which he had executed against

Olynthus and Phocis; they could not believe otherwise than that he must hate Athens most, and they failed to see what political motives necessarily induced him to treat her considerately. The king had not spared menaces; and thus it is intelligible, how the Attic patriots pictured to themselves the fate of Athens as far more terrible than that which in reality awaited her, and were thereby stimulated to the utmost exertions in their labors.

The judgment of posterity on Demosthenes.

The struggle against Philip was, therefore, no perverse fancy on the part of Demosthenes, no blind obstinacy, but a moral necessity. There existed no other standard of action, besides the law of honor and the sworn civic duty of defending city and country to the last breath. Had Athens been victorious in her resistance, Demosthenes would beyond all doubt have been placed on a level with the greatest heroes of the nation; but the failure of the struggle has, both in ancient and in modern times, deprived him of the recognition which was his due. Polybius judges him according to the standpoint of his age; he is unjust, because he considers the resistance offered by Demosthenes not less unreasonable than the rising of the Achæans against Rome; because he failed to perceive the difference between the Greeks of his own times and the contemporaries of Demosthenes and Lysurgus, and equally so the difference between Philip's military sovereignty and the world-encompassing Power of Rome. Demosthenes himself, even after the fatal day of Chæronea, did not repent of his policy; he looked back upon his labors with a good conscience, and could tell his fellow-citizens, that with a view to their fair fame, to their ancestors, and to the verdict of coming generations, they could not have acted otherwise, even though the issue of the struggle had been manifest to them beforehand; to act according to the demands of duty was, he declared, the business of

human beings, while success or failure lay in the hands of the gods.*

With excellent reason Demosthenes takes exception to being held responsible for the result, and to his administration of the State being judged accordingly.

And yet, who can dare to assert that it was a failure, and devoid of result? He achieved

The results
of the policy
of Athens.

the highest success to which it is possible for a statesman to attain; by his speeches, by his legislation, and by his personal example, he overcame the self-love, the craven indolence, and all the evil inclinations of his fellow-citizens; instead of creating in them a transitory excitement, he animated anew the extinguished powers of the Athenians, revived their nobler consciousness, and restored them to themselves. The length of time for which this regeneration would endure it was not in his power to estimate; and in the life of the Greek free states we are least of all justified in measuring the deserts of statesmen according to the period of time during which their efforts took effect. In any case, he preserved Athens from a downfall which would have given the lie to her history. For while filled with the deepest grief by the bloody defeat, he could yet say with just pride: "The city has remained unvanquished,"—because so long as it followed him, it rejected all Philip's attempts at corruption. It was his example, from which even in the ensuing period the better kind of Athenians derived strength for upholding the dignity of the city to the best of their ability. Such a gain would not have been too dearly bought even by the heaviest sacrifices. But neither was the outward fate of Athens aggravated by Demosthenes, any more than the opposite policy brought advantage to the other states. The Thessalians and the neighboring tribes, who, seduced by delusive promises, first introduced Philip into the af-

* Dem. xviii. 199.

fairs of Greece, and who became his helpers in her subjugation, were those who lost their independence first, and who lost it most completely. The other states declined to be used as supporters by Philip; but they let him take his own course, and pay them for their neutrality by a variety of small advantages. Such was the course pursued by Arcadians, Messenians, Argives, and Eleans. They too derived no blessing from their conduct; they were made safe as against Sparta, but in return they were by the partisans of Philip reduced to a far more oppressive condition of dependence and to absolute impotence. Athens is the single State which caused real difficulties and dangers to the king. But the motives which had already previously determined him to try every method of gaining over the Athenians by gentleness, were even more powerful after the battle of Chaeronea than before it. Athens had in the eyes of the civilized world once more proved herself to be the foremost city of the Hellenes, the heart of Greece. Philip was in his own interest bound to be more than ever intent upon sparing her, and upon guarding himself against any abuse of his victory. For this reason Demosthenes was, eight years after the battle of Chaeronea, able to ask his fellow-citizens, whether even the bitterest opponent of his policy could now persist in wishing that Athens might have stood on the side of the Thessalians or the Peloponnesians, who had without exception fared worse than the Athenians? *

The Hellenic policy of Philip.

Demosthenes was the representative of a past age. He still found sympathy and confidence ready to meet him, but no enduring determination; he was still able to gather round him men who shared his sentiments; but the number of the faithful was small even in Athens, and outside Athens it was pre-

* Dem. xviii. 64.

cisely in the most populous districts of Greek inhabitants that his efforts met with least opposition. "If," he said, "according as I have here stood at my post, so in every Hellenic town there had been only a single person, or rather if Thessaly or if Arcadia had only possessed *one* man whose sentiments were the same as mine,—the Hellenes would have remained free and independent both inside and outside Thermopylæ."

That which gave the victory to Philip was therefore the fact, that the strength of the people had come to be relaxed. No moral forces of resistance had survived; and for this reason the immense advantages which Philip had had on his side could not but determine the result; the standing army could not but gain the victory over the civic militias, the one consolidated empire-state over the loosely-knit confederacies, the monarchy over the republics. Notwithstanding this absolute superiority, we find the victor not dealing with the vanquished according to his own arbitrary choice; on the contrary, he follows their native traditions with the utmost precision, and, instead of with a rough hand slitting the threads of the development of the national history, he carefully takes them up again. The ideas which the Macedonian appropriates to himself are one and all Hellenic.

Thus it was a usage of primitive antiquity among the Hellenes, that those tribes and states which sought to acquire a power of primacy, established a connexion with the national sanctuaries, took these under their protection, and, by offering voluntary homage to them, gained them over to their own interests. It was thus that Polycrates and Pisistratus acted towards Delos, and the Lacedæmonians towards Olympia. But the highest importance of all attached to Delphi. Upon their connexion with Delphi was founded the significance which the Dorians acquired for the history of Greece. Athens, Sparta, Thebes (vol. iv. p. 427) at different times sought to attach

themselves to Delphi; after them, Iason of Pheræ (vol. iv. p. 470). Into the same course of policy Philip entered, taking his seat at the "common hearth" of the Hellenes, and thus, as it were, becoming the master of the house in Hellas and acquiring a title to be the spokesman of the national interests. f

In his measures in Peloponnesus he recurred to the distribution of territory, which was said to have taken place on the occasion of the immigration of the Heraclidæ. The new Hellenic League against Persia was concluded on the Isthmus in remembrance of the League of Corinth in the times of Themistocles; and the entire conception of the Persian War as a national duty was of course an idea of the Cimonian age. In his humiliation of Sparta, Philip carried out that for which Athens and Thebes had striven; while he engaged in a Spartan line of policy, when he followed the precedent of Lysander in shaking at its base the power of resistance in the states by means of his partisans, and in placing the vanquished under Boards of Ten (p. 341); and again, when, in accordance with the example of the Peace of Antalcidas, he broke up Bœotia and proclaimed the autonomy of its country towns. In Thessaly he recurred to the institutions of the Aleuadæ. Thus it is a sheer series of reminiscences from Greek history which reveals itself in the several measures of the king.

But the entire position assumed by him towards the Greeks likewise follows their ancient traditions. For among all the forms under which Greek forces of population were united for common efforts, none had proved more effective than that of the Hegemony. The direction of a smaller or larger group of states in its foreign affairs, by a primary State called to the task by virtue of its superior power, was, since the Heroic age, accounted the institution most thoroughly in accordance with the spirit of the Greek nation, and alone capable of forming as

against all foreign powers, without prejudice to home independence, an authority, which corresponded to the national ambition and to the desire for security of intercourse and traffic. It is true, that no permanent creation was ever successfully accomplished, but the striving after the honorary right of the Hegemony became the most potent impulse towards the development of strength; it constitutes the most essential contents of Greek history; it conducted the Spartans, the Athenians, and the Thebans successively to the height of their fame. By confining, then, his royal government to the lands of his empire proper, while among the Hellenes he desired to be nothing more than the chosen general for the conduct of a national war, Philip in the main point likewise followed tradition, and merely assumed the vacant post of the *hegemon*, whom the nation could not spare.

Thus the foreign military sovereign clothed his entire policy in forms which he borrowed from the vanquished people. But they were in truth nothing more than forms. He applied them with great sagacity, in order to appease the Hellenes, in order to have their resources more promptly at his disposal, and in order himself to be regarded as a thorough Hellene. But the small respect which at bottom he entertained for that which was most sacred in the eyes of the Greeks was shown by his destruction of the Greek cities in Thrace and Phocis. If, therefore, already in the associations of states under Sparta and Athens there was many an element of untruth, inasmuch as the actual relations received specious names, which failed actually to correspond to that upon which they were bestowed, the inner untruth was in his case yet far greater. The common compacts were royal ordinances, the confederates were vassals, the national war, for which the nation was summoned under arms, as if eager to rush to the satisfaction of its warlike cravings, was at the time a thoroughly unpopular idea.

Its inner
untruthful-
ness.

The hatred of the Persians had long vanished; the Great King had entered into the most intimate international relations with the Greeks; he had recently supported the Attic policy (p. 404); and those who in any way still had national interests at heart, and who had a clear insight into the circumstances of the times, could not but regard him rather as an ally and as a safeguard for the liberty of their nation, than as an enemy. Equally little could a reasonable Greek seriously think of a liberation of the confederates in Asia by means of Philip of Macedonia. In other words, the entire "national" idea was simply a mask for the king's lust of conquest; and the same was the case with the Amphictyonic institutions, whereby a new unity was to be created for the Greeks on the sacred basis of the most ancient system of law which had obtained among the states. For in point of fact the remnants which still existed of that primitive union among the Hellenes, upon which the beginnings of their history rest, the solitary surviving relic of a common bond, was only taken advantage of, in order to break up the nation as such, and to put an end to its history.

The Hellenes under the Macedonian dominion.

Universal peace, freedom of intercourse by water and by land, perfect security for all Greek communities in their constitutions and in their territorial possessions, friendship and alliance between all the states leagued against the hereditary enemy of the nation,—such was the form under which the new association agreed upon at Corinth followed the more ancient treaties of State. But it differed from all previous compacts in this: that the primary direction came into the hands of a power which stood outside Greece, and which was to such a degree superior to all the confederates together, that as against it there could be no question of a real independence. For although in the first instance foreign affairs only were at issue, yet it was manifest, that the king who had been appointed General

of the League with absolute authority, would in the interior of the states too allow nothing contrary to his interests. If he desired unconditionally to dispose over the offensive and defensive forces of the nation, it was also necessary for him to be thoroughly assured as to the country itself, to control the routes by land and water, and the harbors, in it. For this reason Philip placed Macedonian garrisons at the most important points, in Thebes, Chalcis, Corinth and Ambracia; these were perfectly sufficient for holding all Greece in bondage. True, the entire association had only been agreed upon for the purposes of a single war; but it was in the power of the king to extend this war as he thought best. It was a League-in-arms concluded for all times; and the Greeks once and for ever renounced the right of taking up arms for purposes of their own choice. Any act of recalcitrance against the commander-in-chief was a criminal offence against the sworn treaty of the League, any attempt to regain independence of movement was regarded as a revolt, as was proved by the doom of Thessaly and Thebes. Service in the pay of Persia was likewise made penal as treason against the nation, in order that the enemy might be deprived of the aid of Greek resources, upon which his power was essentially based. Thus, Philip's office of commander-in-chief of itself abolished the state-autonomy and the personal liberty of the Greeks in the most material points.

But, furthermore, he was the guardian of the national peace. In other words, every description of wrong which endangered it, all internal disturbances and party-feuds which diminished the guarantees for the secure endurance of the treaties,—the distribution of land, the extinction of debts, the emancipation of slaves, and other radical changes, were subject to the control of the Federal Council and to infliction of punishment by the Head of the League. Any community, from which a violation of the

peace proceeded, was to be excluded from that participation in the League which was the sole basis of its own autonomy. As a warning against all attempts at revolt, the cities destroyed by Philip were to remain in ruins for all times. The considerate measures of the king, in particular those towards Athens, whose harbor no Macedonian ship of war was to enter, were restrictions imposed upon himself by the holder of supreme authority, so long as they seemed advantageous for his purposes. Acts of interference by force in the life of the states could not fail to occur; for the nice boundary-line between the absolute monarchy, which prevailed on the further side of Thermopylæ, and the Hegemony in Greece, was not permanently tenable.

The real character of the new relations of course only asserted itself gradually. With respect to the levy of troops, Philip seems likewise to have proceeded with great considerateness. And in truth it could not but be in consonance with the interest of the king, that the advent of his rule was hailed as the beginning of better days, and that a feeling of security, which had long been missed, came to prevail, that prosperity rose, that the cities revived, and confidence returned. The gains of Greece redounded to the advantage of Philip; and his authority necessarily best established itself, in proportion as men gave themselves up to the belief that civic life would continue to move undisturbed in the ancient lines.*

* The contents of the first compact, valid as public law (*κοινή εἰρήνη καὶ συμμαχία*), between Macedonia and Hellas, are only known to us from its renewal by Alexander (Ol. cxi. 1, v. c. 336), and these new treaties only from the oration *περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν* ('Dem.' xvii.), the author of which demonstrates all the violations of them which had occurred on the part of Macedonia. At the commencement of the document stood the words *ἐλευθέρους καὶ αυτονομους εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας*, § 8. The king is *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*; the Synedrium (*οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεταγμένοι*) provides, *ὅπως ἐν ταῖς κοινωσούσαις πόλεσι τῆς εἰρήνης μὴ γίνωνται θάνατος καὶ φυγαὶ παρὰ τοὺς κειμένους ταῖς πόλεσι νόμους μηδὲ χρημάτων δημεύσεις μηδὲ γῆς ἀναδασμοὶ μηδὲ χρῶν ἀποκοπαὶ μηδὲ δούλων ἀπελευθερώσεις ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῷ*, § 15. As to the Federal *matricula*: Diod. xvi. 89; Justin. ix. 5.

In Athens the national party remained at the helm. Hyperides defended himself against Aristogiton, on account of the laws proposed by him (p. 453) granting their revolutionary character, but excusing himself with the circumstances of the times. "Not I," he said, "but the battle of Chæronea gave those laws;" and the civic assembly acquitted him. Nine months after the battle, the Athenians in a public document proclaimed the praises of two Acarnanians, Phormio and Carphinas, who, mindful of the ancient friendship of their people towards Athens, had in the last conflict also readily supported her in company with their adherents; and they bestowed upon these men the franchise of the city. Shortly before they had likewise publicly honored the population of Tenedos, the most faithful of their allies in the islands. After the terrible agitation of the times of war, and the excessive efforts called forth by the administration of Demosthenes, the Athenians drew breath again, and, leisure having at last been restored to them, turned their attention to municipal affairs. In dealing with these, Athens had the special good fortune of possessing in Lycurgus a man who with incomparable skill reduced the finances of the city to order, and expended the increased revenues in the noblest way. He contrived to raise the annual income to 1,200 talents (£292,500); he provided for the building of the walls, and increased the numbers of the ships of war to four hundred. The construction of the ship-sheds was resumed; the arsenal and magazine of arms were completed. He finished the Theatre of Dionysus, and built the Stadium on the Ilissus, the Odeum and the Gymnasium in the Lyceum. Since the days of Pericles the external wants of Athens had not been provided for so connectedly or in such a spirit of grandeur. Since the city was unable to pursue any policy of her own, this was the sole method left for maintaining her honor and fostering the remembrance of the past. In the citadel too

were placed dedicatory gifts, which had been vowed in consequence of the events which had promised success in the days before the defeat, and monuments in honor of the brave, who were publicly extolled for their worthy bearing. Indeed, even the Thebans in spite of their deep humiliation erected a stately monument on the battle-field of Chæronea, the colossal marble figure of a lion, who sitting erect guarded the tombs of the citizens slain in the fight, and proclaimed their heroic courage to the coming generations.*

Thus the sense for the Noble and the Beautiful continued to live among the Hellenes even after the loss of their liberty, and afforded them a consolation for their forfeiture of possessions, without which they would in former times have deemed life unendurable. No compensation was received for what had been lost; the Greek communities were not admitted into a larger whole, in order to commence a new life as members of it, after the strength of the life carried on in each of the Greek communities by itself had been exhausted in them; nor again was it their lot to find themselves jointly constituting a single body. On the contrary, the states of secondary importance and the petty states remained unchanged, each in its self-secluded course of existence, hostile and full of suspicion against one another, and at home abounding in discord and party-feuds. The lofty aims, in the pursuit of which the states and parties had temporarily united, no longer existed; all ideal tendencies fell into the background; the interests became more and more narrowed; in short,

* Hyperides c. *Aristog.*: *Vit. X Orat.* 849. Decree in favour of Phormio and Carphinas (βοηθήσαντες μετὰ δυνάμεως, perhaps at Chæronea): Kirchhoff in *Monatsberichte der K. Preuss. Akad. der Wissensch.*, 1856, 115. Decree in honor of Tenedos. Köhler in *Bullett. dell' Inst.*, 1866, 104.—Concerning the public labors of Hyperides we now possess a whole series of original documents: cf. *Hermes*, i. 313; *Philologus*, xxiv. 83; *Hermes*, ii. 25.—Dedicatory gifts in the Acropolis: *Monatsberichte der Preuss. Akad.*, 1863, 9.—As to the lion of Chæronea: Götting, *Ges. Abhandlungen*, i. 148; Welcker, *Il leone di Ch.* in *Monum. ed Ann.* 1856; *Alle Denkm.*, v. 62.

all the grand aspects of the Greek city-republics were lost, while the weak points and disadvantages were maintained, and became more and more perceptible. The protectorship of a foreign king, who arbitrarily dispensed considerate grace or pitiless severity to the subject states, encouraged among them the spirit of jealousy, which served him as a pledge for the security of his dominion, and brought with it no blessing in any direction. Individual Hellenes found opportunities for most abundantly satisfying their ambition; but they were hereby estranged from the fatherland. The spirit of adventure, which had from of old found a home in the Arcadian cantons, and had developed itself in the other parts of Greece since the close of the Peloponnesian War, extended itself further and further, and took away from the country its most efficient sons. The talents, the culture, the still abundant internal resources of the Hellenes, the Macedonian knew how to appreciate and turn to account; he did homage to the glory of their past; he flattered their vanity; but for the Hellenes themselves, for the nation as a whole, he had no heart. The patriots he hated as irreconcilable enemies; the traitors, who had delivered the land into his hands, he despised. Although he owed everything that he gained to the Greeks, although they were indispensable to him for his ulterior purposes, yet he only made them serve his dynastic ambition, without conceding to the nation an independent share in his glory, or thinking of a new elevation of the Hellenes in the united body of his empire. The entrance of Greece into the Macedonian dominion was therefore not a transition into a new era, which removed what had become obsolete, and called forth new germs of development, but only a retrogression and a downfall. Religious faith had long lost its strength; philosophic thought could only conduct isolated individuals to a loftier conception of the tasks of humanity; and though art could invest the localities of ancient glory

with a consolatory and cheering halo, yet it was unable to offer any moral anchorage to the civic communities. The one kind of impulses still operating in the Greek nation, to overcome the love of self and to awaken a devotion to higher aims, lay in the communal feeling, in the attachment to the city and fatherland, in the fidelity to law and usage, in the piety towards past generations, in the love of liberty. Whatsoever movements of high-minded sentiment had found expression in the immediate past, had their roots in the consciousness of state-life. No sooner, therefore, had this ground been taken away from under the feet of the nation, no sooner had its fatherland been annihilated, and its communal life reduced to barrenness, than as a necessary consequence the virtues too decayed, which still survived from the ancient times. For this reason the Macedonian dominion had an altogether demoralizing effect upon the Greeks. External prosperity and the comfortable ease of the life of petty citizens were the objects which the multitude sought to procure for itself. All higher impulses faded away more and more.

The
Hellenes
continued
to live in
Science.

The men of eminence had long ago made themselves independent of local influences, and had striven after an ideal Hellenism, which was elevated above the distractions of tribes and states. This we perceive most clearly in the example of the great Theban statesman (vol. iv. p. 523); and Isocrates accounted it the highest glory of the Hellenes, that their name signified not so much a nationality, as a certain degree of culture,—not so much a physical, as an intellectual agreement. The intellectual movement had since the times of Socrates more and more severed itself from public life; in proportion as civic interests grew narrower and shallower, the impulse of the Hellenes towards knowledge unfolded itself more abundantly; and the spirit of scientific inquiry now extended with greater energy than ever into wider fields and penetrated into

further depths, nowhere allowing itself rest, and comprehending in its grasp things human and things divine. All the subjects of mediation were mastered; all were made to yield a fertile system of contemplation and the corresponding method; the results of earlier labors were carefully turned to account, and the tendencies which had hitherto remained apart were most happily united. The Socratic inquiry and those various studies to which the Sophists had given the first impulse, as well as the labors of a Eudoxus, a Democritus and others,—all were now combined; ethical speculation, physical inquiry, and historical information were united. Thus was Aristotle. formed a new, universal Science; and Athens, deprived of her temporal importance, was consecrated anew, when Aristotle three years after the battle of Chæronea founded there the school from which proceeded the consummation of Hellenic knowledge.

More clearly than Plato, he perceived the incapacity of the Hellenic civic states for a continued life; he judged with severity all their weak points and the evils under which they suffered, in particular the excrescences of democracy, which in such a State as Athens rendered it impossible for the wise and reflecting to take an effective part in public life. But he stood in no attitude of indifference or hostility towards the history of his nation, nor did he abandon his belief in it, since it had ceased to be that nation which determined the destinies of the lands of the Mediterranean. It remained to his eyes the chosen people, the people of the future, which would now for the first time attain to asserting in full measure the gifts which distinguished it before all the peoples of the earth. For the nations of the North, he says, are brave, but they lack the impulse towards perfect knowledge and the sense of art, therefore they are well adapted for maintaining their independence, but they have no mission for the formation of states, and are incapable of ruling over other nations.

The Asiatics have natural gifts for the acquisition of knowledge and for art, but they lack bravery of spirit; they are therefore not suited for maintaining their independence, and sink into servitude. The race of the Hellenes alone combines valor with the sense for art and science; it is therefore created for liberty; it has developed the best of civil institutions; and its mission is to rule over all nations, when it is itself united as a State.*

In such a world-empire Aristotle could believe, so long as the person of Alexander allowed him to hope, that this prince would be a truly Hellenic king, and would realize the ideal of monarchy, which had for a long time floated before the minds of so many Hellenes. But in truth it was only an intellectual supreme authority, which the Greek nation gained as towards other nations; and this world-empire, which it actually achieved, it owes to Aristotle even more than to his pupil.

Through Aristotle philosophy likewise entered into the most intimate relation towards the history of his nation, in proposing to itself the task of scientifically treating the totality of the contents of that history. Documents were collected, the constitutions examined and compared with one another, their advantages and defects, their transitions and degenerations observed. As the physiologist uses for his studies the body from which the soul has fled, so the philosopher employed for his the states of which the development was at an end, in order to ascertain the vital conditions of a healthy organism, as well as the causes of its decay. Literature and Art were likewise conceived of as a whole in their historical development; the biographies of the statesmen were written; and from the recent experiences inquiry mounted back to the most ancient traditions.

Thus there unfolded itself among the Greeks an

* Aristot. *Polit.* 1327^b (p. 105, 28).

abundant science, the subject of which was their own civilization; and although only comparatively few took part in these labors, yet they indicate the character of the age which ensued upon the downfall of independence; and at this stage too the organic development of the Hellenes becomes vividly manifest to us, when we see how the spirit of the nation, after the exhaustion of its formative power and after the completion of its practical tasks in the domain of politics, hereupon at once applies itself with full energy, learning to understand the past connectedly by means of scientific study, and as it were to bring home the harvest of the fruits, which had ripened for the knowledge of human things in the now completed circle of development. Thus the spirit of the people which had grown strong in, and with, political life, now continued its activity outside it and free from all local bounds, and attested its unbroken vigor.

True, the vitality of the states themselves was not yet extinct, nor the resources of population all spent; in several regions, as in the districts of the Achelous and in Arcadia, they had not even yet arrived at a full development. Even the states which were most exhausted continued to live on after their fashion. Sparta now as before insisted upon her rights of primacy. In Athens the old parties maintained themselves. New attempts were dared, in order to recover freedom of action; endeavors were even made for new formations of states, in order to unite after an expedient fashion the dwindled forces of the nation. But all these uprisings were merely interruptions of the dominion of the foreigner. The uprising of Athens under Demosthenes was the last great deed of free Greece; and with the Peace of Demades her connected history is at an end.

The end of
the con-
nected his-
tory of free
Greece.

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
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